



D 4.2

Representation of Immigration in ten countries

Work Package 4 – Analysing the Europeanisation and Platformization of Media Representations



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
Contents

Introduction	4
The topic of migration in Europe	6
Empirical research of Migration on social media with focus on Europe	9
Operationalisation of media representations.....	11
Methodological overview	14
Data extraction	14
Pre-processing.....	15
Manual coding	16
Predictive modelling	17
Data and between country analysis.....	19
Overview of the data	19
Between country analysis	20
Results.....	21
National reports.....	26
Belgium	26
Bulgaria	62
Czech Republic	94
Germany.....	141
Greece.....	189
Italy	226
Portugal.....	259
Spain.....	294
Sweden.....	328
Turkey	367
Conclusions	396
References	397
Appendix	401
Ethical approval.....	401
Instructions for manual coding.....	401
Lexicons Keywords	405
Newsmedia	410
Sentiment Lexicons	412
Results of training the Algorithms by language and type.....	412
Tables related to analysis:.....	414
OLS regressions supporting results of Between country analysis:	414

Introduction

The goal of this work package is to provide an in-depth analysis of media narratives, aiming at detecting to what degree platformization has been changing the representation of migration in Europe. The specific focus will be on how platformization affects the process of Europeanisation and how Europe is represented through migration. To perform this analysis, a number of steps were taken that are displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Overview of the steps to analyse how migration is represented across 10 European countries.



First, relevant social media content in 10 European countries was downloaded from Facebook and Twitter using different Application Programming Interfaces (API) and search queries consisting of a set of keywords related to migration. The countries studied are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey and the period was restricted to between September 2021 to November 2021. In addition, a theoretical framework of media representations is developed for the topic of migration. The theoretical framework comprises several dimensions, or themes, which are commonly encountered in relation to how Europe is represented through migration. It has close connections with the work on Europeanity and Europeanisation by Carpentier et al. (2023). Subsequently, partners in each of the 10 countries manually coded a subset of the downloaded posts to assess if the content of each post is represented by any of the dimensions of representation, the sentiment, if it is related to migration, and whether it is about Europe. Thereafter, Machine learning models were trained using the manually coded data to automatically code the full data set on the dimensions of representations, sentiment, whether it was related to migration and if it were about Europe or not. In this way, we generated a fully coded data set of all tweets and posts on the topic of migration, as captured by our keywords, from the period of study. The resulting data set is analysed using quantitative techniques and comparisons of how frequent the dimensions are in social media posts will constitute the main unit of analysis. The ethical committee at Catalonia Open University (UOC) has approved the proposed research and methods (See Appendix).

The starting point for framing this task is the Europeanisation and Europeanity (E&E) dimension of the Public Sphere. The European public sphere (EPS) approach to E&E focuses on the practices of European citizens, engaging in (allegedly rational) decision-making, providing them with an opportunity to be politically active at a European level. The EPS is also seen as constituted by public discussions on EU (or European) issues in the national media of EU member states (Walter, 2017). Through this lens, we aim at answering the following research question: **(RQ1) Are there similar debates about migration across Europe - can we find hints of a 'European public sphere' - or is coverage dominated by the non-European perspective?**

To further deepen the analysis of Europeanisation and representation of Migration, we will distinguish between debates with and without a European focus. This provides a baseline comparison (the non-European debates) that allows us to assess to which extent there exists an EPS at a European level by controlling for differences in average national levels of representations. By comparing representations of migration between posts concerned with Europe and posts not concerned with Europe we can answer the following research question: **(RQ2) Are there similar debates about migration across Europe when the perspective is European compared to when it is not?**

To investigate whether platformization changes how Europe is represented through the topics of migration, we compare how representations differ between institutional media and user-generated. We aim at answering the following research question: **(RQ3) Are there similar debates about migration when the content is published by media compared to when it is not?**

It is common to conduct sentiment analysis when analysing social media conversations (see, e.g., Drus et al. (2019) and Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas (2020)). While representations describe the content of the debates, sentiments provide a sense of the persons' attitude towards the content. Sentiment analysis can thereby give a deeper understanding of how Europe is represented through the topics of migration. Since the topics of migration is a sensitive topic in general (see, e.g., Malmqvist (2015), Nguyen et al. (2020), Park & Kim (2021), and Öztürk & Ayvaz (2018)), we could expect diverging sentiments regarding the topic. We aim to conduct sentiment analysis to answer the following research question: **(RQ4) Are sentiments towards migration similar across Europe?**

Importantly, by also analysing sentiments between debates concerning Europe and debates not concerning Europe, it is possible to assess whether European debates generate more sentiments than other debates. To address this, we will answer the subsequent research question: **(RQ5) Are sentiments different depending on whether debates are European or non-European?**

It is likely that the change in media- production and consumption has been accompanied by a change in the expression of sentiments in debates, specifically when comparing traditional media to user-generated content. Some evidence for this has been provided when investigating other topics (see, e.g., Godbole et al. (2007), Huang et. al (2020), and Kim et. al (2016)). We aim to study this change for the topics of migration by answering: **(RQ6) Are sentiments related to migration different depending on whether the content is published by media or not?**

The research questions will be analysed for all countries jointly in a between country analysis. Additionally, a national report was written for each of the 10 European countries by consortium partners from the countries to give an in-depth analysis as well as national perspectives and context to the topic of migration and the observed national results.

In the next section we aim at analyzing – in line with the overall goals of the EUMEPLAT project – the representation of migration in social media discourse. In such a way, a plurality of factors is to be considered: the sentiment about immigration, as a key-issue in public debate; the process of platformization; and the European dimension implied or explicitly put forward. It cannot come as a surprise that, based on the review of the existing literature, no similar attempts have been made, which is possibly a consequence of the lack of wide-scale comparative studies, already remarked upon by a few scholars in this field [Lechler, Matthes & Bomgaarden 2019, 698].

For this reason, we will break down the general argument into two smaller, and logically related issues: the differences in the media representation of migration *among the States*; and the differences in the representation of migration in Europe *between legacy media and social media*.

The topic of migration in Europe

We are already in the seventh decade of European integration (Treaty of Rome, 1957) and perhaps we are experiencing the longest period of migration from war - torn regions of Africa, Asia and the Middle East following the collapse of communism. The nightmare scenario of the early 1990's, when under the weight of migratory flows from the former socialist republics, electric walls were erected along the borders of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic seem to resurface.

Within European societies we see the resurgence of fascist and racist movements, riding the wave of rampant xenophobia, a movement that is largely promoted and maintained by the mass media. As a result, poverty, outright hostility, and hatred further complicate the lives of migrants and asylum seekers in the EU.

Issues related to the arrival and integration of migrants have become increasingly contentious in Italy and Europe over the past decade, as right-wing populist parties have made the issue a key element of their respective political platforms. Since the so-called EU migration crisis of 2015–16, much has been written on emergency resettlements, Germany's acceptance of Syrian refugees, Frontex's budgetary increases, the lack of EU-wide solidarity towards frontline member states or the absence of a broader strategy to tackle the issue in the medium- to long-term perspective.

As we'll see in the next paragraphs, the migration debate in Italy is full of contradictions. But the one taking place at the EU-level as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is highly problematic. An UN-appointed Special Rapporteur recently called out the double standards on Ukraine's war-displaced¹. For example, in the winter of 2021, between 2,000 and 4,000 migrants of Middle Eastern descent were forced to camp out on the Belarus–Poland border for weeks on end, leading to multiple deaths.

Needless to specify, we will not address here such a broad issue as the perception of migration in Europe, which would depend on the endless forces shaping the so-called “symbolic boundaries” [for a literature review and an empirical clustering of European countries, in this sense, see Bail 2008]. We will rather focus on the media representation of migration, for how it varies from area to area.

A first acquisition, to start with, is that the media coverage of migration is not necessarily correlated with the actual number of immigrants that a given country is receiving [see Heath & Richards 2020, for the most canonical interpretation]. At the theoretical level, this might confirm the need of a balanced evaluation of the material and discursive dimensions of Europeanization, despite the common tendency of setting by-default hierarchies between the two [see Carpentier, Hroch, Cannizzaro, Miconi & Doudaki 2023]. A plausible explanation, in this specific case, is that the opposition to immigration grows in proportion to transversal societal issues: in particular, the social distance between natives and immigrants, and the “symbolic or economic” threat attributed to the latter [Heath, Davidov, Ford, Green, Ramos & Schmidt 2020, 478]. In other words, in place of a *geographical* pattern – the between-country divide - we would have a *spatial* pattern, the internal fracture of any society, due to the organization of residential areas and to the frequent segregation of

¹ See UN News, Top Rights Expert Questions ‘Double Standard’ on Ukraine’s War Displaced, 28 July 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123502>.

the newcomers. This would also confirm the importance of the internal axes of differentiation, with contemporary society increasingly polarized and fractured, based on the juxtaposition between the space of flows and the space of places [Ruggie 1993, 172]: the deepening divide separating the ruling classes connected to the backbone of global exchanges – whether in terms of physical, cultural, or financial flows - from a majority of people bound to the physical limits of their daily horizon.

Another hypothesis, in the absence of striking empirical variations among countries, is that the national media representations might differ from each other at the level of the sub-topics, rather than in the matter of the general framing. This is somehow stated in a report of the Council of Europe, pivoted in the analysis of the press coverage of migration in eight countries: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Serbia, and the United Kingdom. With only minor differences being observed – over the July-November 2015 period - the news outlets have undergone the very same transition from the stage of “careful tolerance”, to that of “ecstatic humanitarianism”, and finally to the “fear” moment [Georgiu & Zaborowski 2017, 8-9]. Indications akin to these findings are put forward in a study on 1,832 articles on the refugee crisis published by four Belgian and two Swedish newspapers, between March 2015 and July 2017. In this case, all the outlets advocate for a strong “political response to the refugee situation”: “where they diverge”, in the other way, is in the declination of the frame, with the Belgian dailies zooming in “on the aid supplies”, and the “Swedish newspapers point[ing] at civil society’s” mobilization [De Cock, Sundin & Mistiaen 2019, 45].

As stated, one of the major issues under discussion in Europe is whether the media sentiment related to immigration depends on the people’s actual experience with the relocation of migrants or asylum-seekers. On the one hand, it is a fact that anti-immigration discourse can easily spread also in those areas which are barely affected by the phenomenon. On the other hand, a few empirical assessments reveal how immigration is a more common topic in social media debate – in terms of quantitative occurrences – in the “receiving countries”, which have a positive net migration, than it is in negative net or neutral nations [Heidenreich, Eberl, Lind, & Boomgarden 2020, 1272-1274]. A more granular diagnosis is allowed by the topic modeling analysis of 130,000 articles from 24 news outlets in Hungary, Germany, Sweden, UK, and Spain. Geographical location does make a difference, this time, as the refugee issue is perceived the more dramatically, the closest we get to the Eastern borders of Europe [Heidenreich, Lind, Eberl, & Boomgarden 2019, 178-181]. This is the more pertinent, if we consider that the most frequent reference to Europe, in our migration dataset, is about the crisis at the Polish-Belarus frontier, as can be read from the various country reports (following pages).

No major differences among media systems are alluded to by Brosius, van Elsas and de Vreese, in their study on the perception of immigration on the part of Europeans living in 18 countries, between 2012 and 2017. As a result, the media visibility of the refugees’ topic is correlated with a reduced level of trust in the European Union, whilst the “increased media attention” to general immigration is not bringing any perceivable effect [Brosius, van Elsas & de Vreese 2019, 461]. In terms of Europeanization and de-Europeanization strands, it is commonly accepted that anti-immigration discourse implies the opposition to the European Union at large, as first observed in the media studies field by de Vreese & Boomgarden [2005]. It is worth mentioning, therefore, that a comparative scrutiny of the state of the public opinion in nine countries – Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom – unraveled a different pattern, with a “stronger demand for EU initiatives” manifested by the citizens with a stronger sense of insecurity and with a “threat perception of immigration” [Conti, Di Mauro & Memoli 2019, 505].

A more complete assessment, based on both secondary data analysis and literature review, would confirm the similarities in the media coverage of migration among the European countries, as it is made evident by two common traits: the under-representation of the role played by the newcomers in each society; and the over-estimation of crime rate and security concerns [see Eber & others 2018]. In an analogous way, the amplification of the quantitative dimension of the immigration flows, and the exaggeration of their overall demographic impact, has been observed almost everywhere in the European media [see Basile & Olmastroni 2019]. By confronting the representation of migration in a sample of European newspapers, between January 2015 and December 2016, Kempsey and McDowell reached the same conclusion, with news outlets mostly adopting the frame of the natural “disaster”, and thus underpinning a “view of Europe that is highly racialized and geopolitically insular” [2019, 156-158]. A more concrete difference is highlighted in a study on the part of alternative social media in right-wing propaganda, which appear to be more popular in Sweden, and poorly diffused in Austria, Germany and Finland [Schulze 2020].

A short consideration about this apparently *universal* spread of the *localist* instances. As Dutcean Segesten and Bosetta [2019] brilliantly put it, Euroscepticism may eventually contribute, in its turn, “to the Europeanization of national public spheres”: exactly as the XIX century nationalism and the contemporary populism are actually a *cross-European* phenomenon [see Weller 2021, 76-77, 275 in particular]. As paradoxical as it may seem, we might come to interpret the relevance of *national* culture as an *international* phenomenon, in a way that cannot be neglected even from a world-system perspective. This is somehow the same complication that we have faced in WP1 with respect to Thomas Elsaesser’s work [2005, 491-492], with his idea of European cinema as being rooted in the tradition of national authorship – so as to be perceived, in the end, as a series of “seemingly discrete national film cultures” [Bergfelder 2005, 315]. As a matter of fact, both Benedict Anderson [1983] and Michael Billig [1995] – which provided the most useful definitions of nationalism, from a media studies perspective - are aware of this very same point. In both cases, the belonging to the national community is flagged by a series of ordinary symbols: with this function, providing the citizens with an abstract representation of the administrative unit to which they belong, being performed in peculiar ways in each given context.

Temizisler & Meyer & Shahin (2022) studied the patterns of politicisation of migration and their implications for European integration: “empirical results from the claims-making analysis demonstrated that migration issues were exceptionally politicised during the refugee crisis contributing to disintegration and opt-out outcomes in the UK and Denmark. Also, we observed that migration issues were mostly debated as an international conflict between domestic publics and ‘others’ with strong linkages to the EU.”

In the period of observation, in the Central and Eastern European region, the public and political discourse does not favour migration, framing it as a problem or as a threat, despite inconsiderable numbers of asylum applications in the region (Daniel, 2020; Koss & Seville, 2020; Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 250).

As we have already mentioned, this situation has worsened due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war, starting in February 2022. The increased flows of migrant and refugee populations in Europe during this period created new conflicts and led to the emergence of new mobilisations and countermobilisations by both anti-migrant and pro-migrant camps for example in the Czech Republic (Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 250).

Empirical research of Migration on social media with focus on Europe

In the first paragraph we do a succinct literature review to work related to the portrayal of migrants and forced migrants in online discussion spaces.

Social media platforms enable people to not only talk about migration, but also to transform and facilitate it (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014). Social media platforms can for example play a role in refugees' inclusion in host countries (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Giglou, Buitter, Borowski, Joris, & d'Haenens, 2022).

Research on social media and migration focused of some specific case studies, such as the role of social media for Syrian refugees (Giglou et al., 2022) or the Turkish Diaspora (Giglou, d'Haenens, & Ogan, 2018).

The necessary clarification, here, is that an intense discussion around migration – either in legacy or in social media - is no way guarantee of civic improvements or, so to speak, of any positive externality of the process. An example is offered by the analysis of both news media and social media reproduction of the iconic picture of Alan Kurdi: a tragedy that has occupied for a while the public debate, nonetheless resulting in reactions of apathy and pity, when not in the orientalist deformation of the problem [Sajir & Aouragh 2019, 566-567]. With a similar methodological ambition, Mendellsohn, Budak and Jurgens [2021] put into focus the adoption in the “ordinary people’s social media discourse” of the frames proposed by the legacy media for representing immigration, with specific attention placed to the difference between “thematic” and “emotional” frames.

A topic modelling study realized in Sweden, across the 2017-2019 timespan, identified the convergence of news media and social media discourses towards the very same frame, which is the presentation of immigration from the standpoint of the receiving country [Yantseva 2020]. This would indicate that the diffusion of the two-way media – or the platformization process, for our purposes – has hardly impacted on the most typical bias with respect of immigration: which is the adoption of a purely European standpoint, with the immigrants themselves being deprived of any agency or voice [see, in particular, Entman 2007; and Chouliaraki & Zaborowski 2017]. A major difference is rather in the tone of the contents, with social media posts more easily including hate speech and violent extremism [Yantseva 2020, 10]. As there is no space for discussing the overall connection between social media and populist propaganda, we will limit ourselves to touch on some significant examples related to immigration.

That the social media discourse would favor the spread of racist and anti-immigrant ideas is also observed by Ekman, in his work on a selected set of Swedish Facebook groups [2019]. After a quantitative analysis of 112,789 tweets about immigration, de Saint Laurent, Glaveanu and Chaudet state that anti-immigration users, when compared to pro-migration, more efficiently use the affordances of the platforms, and more easily group into the same clusters, or walled gardens [2020, 77-78]. The alleged affordance of on-line communication for right-wing propaganda is still to be proved, in actuality, but it would be matched by the predilection of populist leaders for digital platforms. In this perspective, interesting insights are provided by a study on the way political actors engage on Facebook, Twitter and in national Tv talk shows, in Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy,

United Kingdom, and USA. As a result, political parties “are more inclined to use populism-related communication on social media than” they are in TV [Ernst & others 2019, 10-11]. Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés [2020] came out with comparable findings, drawn on the analysis of the Twitter discourse on immigration during the campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections, in Spain, Italy, France, and UK.

Theorin and Strömbäck [2020] hypothesize that social media are more influential in shaping people’s ideas, than the legacy media. Based on a three-year panel with Swedish users, they reckon that the choice of a specific source is not a predictor of political orientation, while the use of social media has a bigger effect in sustaining and radicalizing people’s position on migration, in both cases of anti-EU and right-wing, and pro-EU and left-wing cases. On the opposite, Schroeder [2019, 2-3] argues that in Sweden social media had only helped the consolidation of right-wing ideas: in as much as social media pages provided a different coverage of migration, when compared to liberal mainstream media, with special emphasis put, not surprisingly, on the crime rate and on the safety problematics of various kind. This would confirm some previous findings of Theorin’s research, as “no significant effects of using traditional media types could be identified”, with social media - and far-right accounts in particular – rather playing a major role in opinion-making processes [2019, 838-840]. An investigation on the narrative about the refugee crisis in Finland goes in the same direction, in force of a dataset of 27,504 online articles from legacy media, and 1,8 million posts extracted from commercial social media. Three relevant differences stand out: firstly, social media are “more versatile”, as their contents cover a wider range of topics. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, the social media debate is more focused on the internal themes, such as the “local consequences of the arrival of the asylum seekers”, with traditional media rather showing a “more international perspective” and placing “the emphasis on European refugee policies”. Finally, and once again, social media debate also reveals “the prevalence of overtly negative, anti-immigrant framings characterized by uncivil arguments, hostile expressions and circulation of negative news and stereotypes” [Pöythäri & others 2021, 89-90].

Nerghes and Lee, by focusing on the much talked-about case of Aylan Kurdi’s death, take a different stance. By means of a topic modeling comparative exam, they found traces of a more positive narrative in Twitter, contrasted to the coverage offered by both Tv networks and newspapers [2019, 280-284]. In the other way, a study on the role played by different types of media in a British immigration-related affair – the so-called “Windrush scandal” – observed the ever-lasting centrality of the legacy media, which came last and still proved to be decisive in the framing of the events [Langer & Gruber 2020, 333-335]. Finally, a more peculiar argument has been made by De Coninck, which found that strong consumers of Public Service Media contents have – on average - a more open attitude towards immigration, when compared to high consumer of private media outlets [2020]. Same findings about the divide between public and private in media in another study performed by the same research group [Matthijs & others 2019, 47-48].

Some research has used Moscovici's (1989) context of social representations to analyze the migratory phenomenon, as it emerges from the media ecosystem.

For example, Di Fraia & Risi (2018) have analyzed how certain practices of media usage can contribute to the construction of social representations and the imaginary about immigration. In particular, the scholars discuss how practical differences in the use of the media (traditional and social media) and news by young people generate recurring social representations. Starting from a qualitative study on

a sample of young Italians, the study confirms that the perception of the migratory phenomenon is strongly modeled on the stereotypical images that the media circulate. The media and visual narratives shape the imaginary so much that what does not circulate through the media, people do not have images or stories (an aspect that recalls the so-called "spiral of silence" by Noelle-Neumann, 1947).

Also De Rosa, Bocci, Bonito and Salvati framed their study of 1,958 tweets (967 in Italian, and 991 in English) basing on Moscovici's concept of representation. Social representations are here defined as systems of shared meanings, values and beliefs, symbols and emotions connected to collective memories, and attitudinal dimensions related to social practices and actions that enable individuals to construct meaningful knowledge about the social reality [De Rosa, Bocci, Bonito & Salvati 2021].

Not accidentally, the focus on representation also allows scholars to think in terms of Europeanization. Among the other things, in fact, they distinguish between the "American approach" to the representation of migration, oriented towards "restrictive regulation", and a "European Community approach", which calls for a "supportive solution through several forms of welcome".

The anti-migrant discourses are often intertwined with Islamophobia (Vallo et al., 2020), as well as with an anti-EU rhetoric, and social media platforms accelerated these discourses (Macková & Štětka, 2016; Krobová & Zápotocký, 2022). Some studies have also shown how refugees have been blamed in social media discourses linking refugees to natural disasters and phenomena such as the plague (Perifanos and Goutsos, 2021).

We can also consider the rise in populist and racist discourses and how transnational are the audiences of far-right parties and movements (Kabata & Jacobs, 2022; Ahmed & PISOIU 2021).

Professional journalistic media are important on social media, both in their own voices and by being referred to in posts of common citizens, politicians and other non-media actors. In newsmedia online, Europe is shown as fragmented but mostly it's blamed as the perpetrator of the migration crisis through its policies (Avramidou et.al, 2019).

Operationalisation of media representations.

The goal of this section is to operationalize the main concepts related to the representation of migration in Europe, so as to frame the first-hand data we have collected. "Operationalizing", Franco Moretti once wrote, "means building a bridge from concepts to measurement, and then to the world". Like in an hourglass shape, in other words, we start from the concepts; then we put them to the test of the empirical evidence; and finally, we generalize from them, for reaching more ample conclusions about "the world" – well, about Europe, in our case.

Representation is a tricky word, we have to admit. In sociology, it is mostly about Durkheim, and after him about Moscovici's interpretation of the category. As each discipline and each approach would come out with a specific, and equally legitimate definition, we will stick to the one laid out in deliverable D1.6 - *Europeanization: Operational Definition* [the section of D1.6 related to

Representations of Europe, which is one of the 19 approaches we have singled out at the time, is pasted at the end of this document]. In short:

the representations of Europe approach focuses on whether and how Europe is represented *within media content*, which brings in a discursive approach. Together with European media content, this approach forms a (media) bridge between the discursive and materialist components of the map's axis, even though this particular approach is tilted towards the discursive side. This approach thus considers how media texts *construct* Europe (and E&E), emphasizing certain features whilst omitting others, and generating contested or partial representations in the process.

The construction of E&E through media representations can occur in a wide variety of ways (as this semantic map also shows more in general), also relating to, for instance, ethnicity, religion, gender, immigration, history, eating and drinking, science and technology, arts, music, architecture, and literature.

Let us make a proposal. At a first level, the analysis of the social media posts can be interpreted based on the existing research questions: the difference between legacy media and common users; the difference between Europe-related and non-Europe related contents; and the dimensions more frequently called upon. At a second level, we may study the representation of migration along the axis the discursive and the material pole, as they are defined in D1.6.

There is little doubt, based on literature review, that migration is a two-faced concept [see D1.6]. On the one hand, Europe itself is the result of a number of resettling processes: while its identity is currently defined in opposition to migration flows. In terms of value, similarly, a major contradiction stands out between the alleged openness of Europe – secularism, civil rights, and the like – and the exclusion of the other, on which the whole system is actually grounded. At the historical level, again, this ambiguity takes the shape of the European upheaval in modern times – the transition by which it has moved from being the source of emigration, to becoming the place of arrival for immigrants from the Global South.

At a more granular level, this contradiction can be detected in the social media debate around immigration. The concept of representation flips the balance toward the *discursive*, rather than the material facet of Europeanness, we stated – and this is certainly the case, at a first glance.

When we drill down the data, though, it appears that the discourse about immigration very rarely touches on such dimensions as *value, people, dialogue, or culture*. What is relevant, is that the dimensions more frequently talked-about are those of Law, Territory – especially the Polish-Belarus border - and Institutions. This fact can be interpreted in a plurality of ways, for sure, but it seems emblematic that the discursive construction of Europe, when it gets to migration, does imply a reference to *structural and material dimensions*: policy, regulations of the flows, the border, the European Union, or the national government.

A working hypothesis, here, is the following: the discursive representation of Europe, per se, may well be fluid, unstable and ever-changing. When related to migration, though, the representation of Europe rather requires the symbolic backup of structural elements: those that, even at the discursive level, cannot be under dispute (once again: territory; law; institutions).

While the European media content approach to E&E focusses on the material programs that are produced, the representations of Europe approach **focuses on whether and how Europe is represented *within media content***, which brings in a discursive approach. Together with European media content, this approach forms a (media) bridge between the discursive and materialist components of the map's axis, even though this particular approach is tilted towards the discursive side. This approach thus considers how media texts *construct* Europe (and E&E), emphasising certain features whilst omitting others, and generating contested or partial representations in the process. The construction of E&E through media representations can occur in a wide variety of ways (as this semantic map also shows more in general), also relating to, for instance, ethnicity, religion, gender, immigration, history, eating and drinking, science and technology, arts, music, architecture, and literature. If we take religion as one of the many possible examples, then we find that, for example, Nelsen and Guth (2016) argue that religion plays a key role in the production of the idea of Europe. The Catholic Church occupies a privileged social and media position within European society, with the Pope's visits constituting media event across various media platforms (Evolvi, 2018). However, this representation of E&E through the lens of religion relies on two representational strategies i.e. 1) creating constitutive others, and 2) not representing certain features or events. In this respect, Asad (2003) explains how E&E representations often favour Christianity at the expenses of other faiths. In particular, Islam is one of Christianity's oldest constitutive outsiders (Carpentier, 2021), and is often represented as a threat in media cultures across Europe, for example across Scandinavian countries (Lundby et al., 2017) and the United Kingdom (Cannizzaro & Gholami, 2016). In regard with representational omissions, Evolvi (2018) lists the media stories that are often overlooked, namely those representing the perspectives of Muslims, atheists, and Catholics (e.g. protesting against freedom of speech, same-sex unions or abortion), who constitute the non-hegemonic facets of European religiosity.

Table 1 displays the operational definitions of social media representations used in the subsequent analyses.

Table 1. Operational definitions of social media representations used.

Social media representation	Operational definition
Law	If the post has to do with the legal aspect of im/migration, and how clearly it describes the specific legal statuses of im/migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers [as the differences among these statuses are usually not clear at all].
People	Whether the post is about the im/migrants themselves and their own voice: history, experience, journeys, travel diaries, profession, life conducted both in the country of origin and in Europe.
Culture	Whether the post is about migration in terms of any kind of artistic expression and cultural production; Cultural habits and practices (including daily life);

	<p>Cultural institutions, including education, the media, science, and the Church; Lifestyle, when related to migration (i.e., multiethnic cities, im/migrants' activities).</p> <p>Posts under this dimension could refer to Artwork/cultural production/media products by/concerning im/migrants; Im/migrants' daily life habits and customs; Educational practices concerning im/migration; Art/cultural centers, educational institutions, scientific institutions, Churches, and religious foundations, dealing with im/migration/im/migrants.</p>
Values	Whether the post is about migration in terms of/Whether the post is about im/migration in terms of Ideas and beliefs related to im/migrant/refugee in/equality, non/discrimination, in/tolerance, dignity, peace, solidarity, diversity, freedom (of thought, expression, information, movement), related to im/migration.
Territory	When the post refers to borders or frontiers being crossed to migrate from one country to another, where at least one of the countries mentioned is a European one. Mentioning of place of departure and place of arrival.
Institutions	When the post is about institutions involved in the field of im/migration regulation, control, governance, and so forth: national institutions, local institutions, European institutions, global institutions, and NGOs.
Interactions & Dialogue	When the post mentions the encounter between im/migrants and natives (hospitality, professional initiatives, hosting, integration, joint activities of any sort).

Source: Authors' own elaboration

Methodological overview

Data extraction

For each of the 10 country / language pairs, data is extracted in the form of social media posts on Facebook and of tweets from Twitter. In the case of Facebook, data is gathered using Crowdtangle, while Twitter data is acquired through the use of Twitter bulk downloader API v2.

For each language, a set of keywords specific to the topic of Migration is defined. This set is roughly the same for each language, although translated or adapted to each specific language. Some languages may contain keywords that are more specific to the country in question. The sets of keywords can be found in the Appendix.

One of the axes of analysis of the final results is whether the posts and tweets are from News media or not. In the data from Facebook, extracted through Crowdtangle, this can be easily determined through the field "Page Category" that comes natively from the API, where the following page categories are designated to be News media: MEDIA_NEWS_COMPANY, MEDIA, NEWS_SITE, RADIO_STATION, TV_CHANNEL. However, the Twitter API does not provide such field. Therefore, for all countries a list of specific authors was compiled that represent news media, typically the major newspapers (both legacy and new/online media) and broadcasters of each country are included. In the Appendix this list is provided.

For each country / language pair a query is constructed that includes all the keywords separated by “OR”-statements for the specific country and language. In principle it is important to specify both language and country. For instance, for Spanish, only posts from Spain are of interest, not of Spanish speaking people in South America. Similarly, for Belgium, posts in Dutch from the Netherlands should not be included, nor French-language posts from the Walloon region. However, in some cases it was found that restricting both language and country made the result set too small (usually resulting in too few posts about Europe) as the country of origin of the post is more often than not, uninformed in the source data. Therefore, in case of posts for Czechia, the restriction of the posts being from Czechia was lifted as it was presumed that the majority of Czech speakers are actually from Czechia. The same was done for Swedish, Bulgarian and Greek.

In all cases the posts to be retrieved were confined to a specific 3-months period which was from 01/09/2021 to 30/11/2021.

Due to restrictions in the size of the actual query that can be launched through Crowdtangle and the Twitter API (typically 1023 characters), technically the queries had to be broken up in several smaller subqueries, but functionally the sum of result sets delivered the same output set for each language and source type (Facebook and Twitter). As alluded to earlier, between the Facebook output and Twitter output there are some differences in the fields that are generated (as in the case of the flag “newsmedia or not”), but generally the fields of interest are comparable and compatible. All data is generated as flat CSV files.

Pre-processing

The CSV files are processed separately for each country. Initially Facebook data and Twitter data are also processed separately, though similarly, before joining those sets together after the first stages of pre-processing.

After some initial basic cleaning and renaming operations on the source data, the first principal step is to apply Ontology Tagging to each post. In this step the content of the post is analysed against the Migration lexicon for the specific language. Within this step, when comparing the individual words of the post with the lexicon, these are first normalized in the sense of converting all letters to lowercase and removing diacritic characters, such as accents, cedillas and tildes. Also, lemming and stemming is applied. The output of this step is an array of coinciding words between post and lexicon. The length of this array is the number of coinciding words and represents a first indicator of the relevance of the post. It is possible that the length of this array is zero, even if the initial selection of the post is based on the same lexicon. However, it is possible that the post is initially selected by the API based on another field than the actual contents of the post, for instance the subject line or even the author name. In a subsequent step, only posts that have actual topic-related keywords in their content field are considered, or, in other words, those that have a keyword array length greater than zero.

In the same step, not only the topic specific keywords are checked, but also the Europe-specific keywords that are in the lexicon (see Appendix). In similar fashion, another array is constructed with all Europe-related keywords.

After constructing the keyword arrays, all posts are stripped from any URLs they may have. As mentioned, posts without topic-specific keywords are removed, but also duplicate posts are removed. Especially news agencies have the tendency to repost or retweet the same post a number of times, sometimes only changing the URL, which is the principal reason for removing it when checking for

duplicates. As the objective at this stage is creating a set of unique posts to be coded manually, it makes no sense providing the same post more than once.

Subsequently, for each post a sentiment score is calculated. For each language, another lexicon of words that express positive and negative sentiments is used from Chen and Skiena (2014). Here Ontology Tagging is also used to compare the post with the sentiment lexicons and arrays of positive and negative words are constructed. This sentiment score is calculated as follows: $ABS(numPositive - numNegative) * (numPositive - numNegative) / (numPositive + numNegative)$. It gives a positive number when there are more positive than negative words and vice versa and it is weighted for the number of sentiment words found, being more positive or negative if the difference between them is larger.

Next, a OnTopic score is calculated, which represent a measure of how relevant a post is to the topic at hand. This score is largely based on the number of elements in the keywords array, where the words are weighted for relevance, as defined in the keywords lexicon. The majority of words has a weight of 1, but some may be weighted more. The OnTopic score is the sum of the weights in the keywords array, slightly adjusted by the sentiment score, in order to give a slightly higher score to more negative or positive posts. The applied formula is: $2 * (sum\ weighted\ score) * (1 + \log(1 + abs(sentiment_score)))$.

Also, an Interactions score is calculated to measure the virality of the post. For Twitter this score is calculated as $(4*replies + 2*retweets + likes)$, for Facebook it is $(Likes + 4*Comments + 2*Shares + Love + Wow + Haha + Sad + Angry + Care)$, where the latter 6 elements represent other types of reactions a user can give to a post. These formulas are chosen in such a way that the average interaction scores between Twitter and Facebook roughly even out.

The flag Europe / Not-Europe is calculated based on whether the Europe keywords array has a length of 1 or greater, or not.

The flag Newsmedia / Not-newsmedia is based on the Page Category in case of Facebook, or the specific author in case of Twitter as mentioned earlier.

Finally, the output datasets for the manual coding are created, one file for Europe, one for not-Europe. For each file, 1000 posts are selected. The first 500 posts in principle are 250 posts newsmedia and 250 non-newsmedia posts, each set selected for the highest on-topic scores, ordered by interaction score from highest to lowest. The last 500 posts are a random selection of the remaining posts.

The author of the post is anonymised in the output datasets.

Manual coding

The output datasets of the pre-processing stage a priori contain the most relevant posts for the topic. As a next phase, human annotators revise these datasets and label the posts whether indeed it is on topic or not, is about Europe or not, as well as code whether the post is relevant to the following categories of social media representations:

- Law
- People
- Culture
- Values
- Territory

- Institutions
- Interactions & Dialogue

Also, they code a sentiment score for the post as being Positive (2), Neutral (1) or Negative (0). The operational definitions of each coded variable can be found in Table 4 of the appendix.

A minimum of 200 posts are required to be positively labelled as on topic, with a relevant number of off topic posts (ideally at least 20%, or 40 posts) in order to be able to contrast both categories. For each post that is positively labelled as on topic, the 7 aforementioned categories should be labelled whether they are applicable to the post or not (yes/no as 1/0). Additionally, the sentiment is also coded for the posts considered to be on topic.

This should be done for both files, the Europe-related and the not-Europe ones. In case of the not-Europe files, another column was added to be labelled manually, which serves to indicate that the post actually is relevant to Europe, although the pre-processing did not mark it as such. This could be the case if certain Europe specific keywords are not present in the Europe-lexicon.

The purpose of this manual coding of the labels is to serve as an input for a predictive model that is described in the next step.

To ensure reliability and consistency in annotation, 20% of the data was manually coded by two coders and a Krippendorff's alpha of at least 2/3 for each category coded was required before the whole data set could be manually coded.

Predictive modelling

The manually coded posts are used to construct Machine Learning algorithms in order to be able to automatically code previously unseen posts. Different algorithms have to be constructed for each of the following characteristics of the post:

- On topic or off topic
- Applies to Europe or not
- Whether each of the 7 subcategories mentioned apply or not
- The sentiment of the post

All indicators but the sentiment are binary 2-class predictors in the sense that the output should be a yes/no-type answer of whether it applies or not. In case of the sentiment the output in principle should be a multi-class predictor as the possible output has 3 values, Positive, Neutral or Negative. However, in the iterative development of this predictor it was found that there was too much noise in the data to have a statistically relevant 3-class predictor and therefore it was chosen to be a binary predictor as well, with output Neutral or not-Neutral.

The coded data is used as input and cleaned and normalized. Subsequently, the text of the post is normalized in the sense of converting all letters to lowercase and removing diacritic characters, such as accents, cedillas and tildes. Punctuation is removed as well and stop words specific to each language are cleared. Also, lemming and stemming is applied which is language specific as well.

All algorithms use this normalized and lemming and stemmed text field as the principal input feature. NLP techniques are then applied to deconstruct the core text of the post, through what is known as Word Embeddings. Word Embedding are numerical representations of a text, which can be used more

optimally by the Machine Learning algorithm. In this case Frequency-based Embedding are used under which umbrella various text handling methods exist of which TF-IDF Vectorization (Term Frequency, Inverse Document Frequency) was the method of choice as it takes into account not only how many times a word appears in a document but also how important that word is to the whole corpus. It should be noted that when constructing these vectors, potentially all words of the post may be used, not just the set of pre-defined keywords themselves that were used in pre-processing.

Once the feature space has been constructed, the actual training of the algorithm is done. For a two-class or multi-class prediction, a number of different algorithms is available, of which the following commonly used algorithms are used: Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Gradient Tree Boosting and XGBoost. Each has their set of parameters and hyperparameters that are finetuned for optimal performance.

The training of the algorithms is by nature an iterative process in order to get the best performance. This performance in first instance is measured by optimizing for AUC (Area Under the Curve) of the ROC-curve (which stands for Receiver Operating Characteristic). This measure is the most commonly used way to evaluate the performance of ML algorithms. To optimize for the threshold between output classes typically the so-called F1 score is used, which is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. However, in this specific case obtaining a good precision has special interest, meaning that a positive label is actually positive.

The algorithm to predict On Topic is based on the posts of the coded data that actually have been labelled as either 1 (on topic) or 0 (off topic).

The algorithm to predict Europe is based on the posts that are labelled exclusively as on topic. The positive label of Europe is assigned either because the post originates from the Europe file or because it is coded as Europe in the not-Europe file.

The algorithms for the 7 subcategories are based on posts that are exclusively on topic and that have a label, either positive or negative, for their respective category. Not in all cases on topic posts are labelled for all subcategories.

The algorithms for the sentiments initially were based on posts that are exclusively on topic and that have a sentiments label assigned. However, basing an algorithm on the coded sentiment label proved to give unsatisfactory results. Therefore, it was chosen to base the sentiments algorithm on the sentiment score calculated in the pre-processing phase, converting the value to a binary label indicating Neutral or not-Neutral sentiments, where Neutral was defined as having a sentiment score between -3 and 3 and not-Neutral outside of that range.

These algorithms are constructed and trained for all 10 languages. However, specifically in the case of the algorithms for the subcategories, in specific instances the ratio between positive and negative labels may be too skewed in either direction (although typically towards too few positives) to train a reliable algorithm as in this case it is either prone to overfitting or the data is simply too sparse.

In the Appendix the specific results from the trained algorithms for all languages can be found. It should be noted that generally the category Institutions & Dialogue was too sparsely coded for most languages that this category had to be discarded entirely.

After training the algorithms, they are deployed to be used subsequently. Only algorithms achieving an AUC score of at least 0.7, a precision of at least 0.7 and a ratio between positive and negative posts of at least 10% and maximum 90%, were considered reliable for production. A flow is created to serially apply these algorithms to unseen posts and thus obtain their characterization in terms of the trained categories.

Data and between country analysis

In this section, we start by providing a brief overview of the downloaded data and the categories of social media representations used in the analyses. Thereafter, the results from a between country analysis is presented that is related to the initial research questions.

Overview of the data

We start by providing an overview of the data. Table 2 displays information of the retrieved data by each country. The table displays the number of posts pertaining to a number of different categories and countries. Initially all posts and tweets that do not contain any migration-related keyword are removed from the data set. The results from the Machine learning models were predicted on this data set and the number of posts is shown in the ML prediction column. Europe, Not Europe, Media, Not Media, and Analysis show the number of posts pertaining to each category among the ML prediction data set. The Europe, Not Europe, Media, and Not Media groups are based on the Europe-specific keywords (not the prediction) and news media lists. Only the posts predicted to be on topic by the machine learning models are included in the Analysis data set.

Table 2. Number of posts of the retrieved data by country of social media posts containing at least one migration-related keyword

Country	ML prediction	Europe	Not Europe	Media	Not Media	Analysis
BE	4044	570	3474	855	3189	721
BG	7717	1065	6652	515	7202	670
CZ	32740	1482	31258	397	32343	7759
DE	12328	4451	7877	2193	10135	2693
ES	23253	3511	19742	5709	17544	3504
IT	16294	5431	10863	3134	13160	6130
GR	24159	3039	21120	1891	22268	14010
PT	6163	1988	4175	2595	3568	1742
SE	34989	1261	33728	993	33996	10205
TR	33150	6084	27066	2043	31107	2984
Sum	194 837	28 882	165 955	20 325	174 512	50 418

First thing to note is that 194 837 posts containing at least one migration-related keyword were extracted in total, on which the trained machine learning models were applied for prediction. Out of these, 50 418 posts were predicted to be on topic and therefore used in the analysis. Some general patterns emerge from Table 2. As expected, posts about Europe are far less common than posts not about Europe for all countries. Moreover, there are more non-media than media posts for each country. The highest number of total posts were extracted from Sweden, followed by Turkey and Czech Republic. It should be noted that the relatively high number of posts retrieved from Czech

Republic, Greece, and Sweden is, to a large extent, due to that the geographic restriction was not used for these countries when extracting tweets. The same pattern follows among the social media posts used in analysis. Additionally, a large share of the extracted posts was predicted to be unrelated to migration for all countries except Greece, Portugal, and Sweden

The manually coded data and the machine learning models had to pass certain thresholds of validity to be included in the analysis as previously mentioned. Naturally, sometimes these thresholds were not met which resulted in that some categories are excluded in the subsequent analyses. Table 3 displays the categories of social media representations used in the analysis for the national reports and for the between country analysis. Institutions, Territory, Values, People, and Law met the thresholds for all countries.

Migration discussions were almost never represented by Interaction & dialogue, which excludes it from the analyses. Moreover, Culture was discarded from some national reports, and the between country study, due to low reliability of the automatic coding produced by the machine learning models (see Table 5 in the appendix).

Table 3. Overview of Social media representations used in analyses.

	Institutions	Territory	Values	People	Law	Interaction & dialogue	Culture
ES	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
DE	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
BE	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
BG	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
IT	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
PT	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
CZ	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
GR	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
TR	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
SE	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Between	10	10	10	10	10	0	6

Between country analysis

A between country analysis is conducted to give an overview of how migration is represented and the displayed sentiment across Europe in this section. Two within-country differences will consistently, and separately, be compared when analysing the data. First, we aim to assess how migration is represented when discussed in relation to Europe. To achieve this, we create a within-country difference between the representations of migration used in European discussions and the representations of migration used in non-European discussions. In this way, we get a sense of how important the European representation of migration is for each country. Moreover, as we compare European discussion with non-European discussion we control for the differences in the average levels

of representations across countries. In the following, any such estimated within-country difference is referred to as a Europe estimate. Additionally, the European estimate is estimated for sentiments as well. Secondly, we compare how media represents migration with how non-media represents migration. A Media estimate is constructed by estimating the within-country difference of how media represents migration to how non-media represents migration. The media estimate is estimated for sentiments as well. When analysing the data between countries we multiply the binary variables of social media representations with the precision of the related Machine learning model (see Table 5 in the appendix for the precision of each model). In this sense, the estimated effects can be considered lower bounds of the true effects as precision is the probability that the machine learning model accurately predicts the positive class. By multiplying a social media representation variable with precision, we only display results where we are more certain that the representation actually is correctly predicted. Since precision ranges from 0 to 1, this lowers the size of the estimated effects. Thereafter, we conduct OLS regressions with the social media representations or sentiments as dependent variables using country dummies and country dummies interacted with a Europe variable indicating whether a post is talking about Europe or not, as independent variables. By estimating the country dummies interacted with Europe, we construct the previously mentioned Europe estimate (within-country difference). Similarly for media, OLS regressions are conducted with country dummies and country dummies interacted with a Media variable indicating whether a post was posted by media or not. By estimating the country dummies interacted with Media, we construct the previously mentioned Media estimate (within-country difference). The outputs from the regression models can be found in Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10 in the Appendix. The country dummies with the interactions displayed in the graphs that follows. Importantly, it is the estimates with COUNTRYCODE_EUR or COUNTRYCODE_MED in the regression tables that are displayed.

Results

Figure 2 displays how migration is represented across the 10 European countries for the social media representations Institutions, Law, Values, People, and Territory. The % of posts pertaining to each social media representation is shown on the Y-axis and each country on the X-axis. The exact numbers can be found in Table 6 in the Appendix. A visual inspection of Figure 2 gives the impression that there does not exist a “European public sphere” – or a common European way of representing migration across the 10 European countries from a quantitative perspective. Conducting chi-squared tests for each social media representation individually and comparing the frequencies for all countries further strengthens this picture as statistical differences are found in all cases ($p < 0.0001$). In addition to this, Table 2 suggested that European discussions are far less common than discussions not about Europe. While there is quite some variation between individual countries, the average levels of the country percentages, showed as dotted lines, of the social media representations are quite similar. What stands out is Values has the lowest average values while Institutions and Territory are the most common social media representations. Law and People have similar average values and have the third and fourth highest average levels.

Figure 2. Representations of migration across 10 European countries





Figure 3 shows how migration is represented comparing Europe and non-Europe discussions across 10 European countries for the social media representations Institutions, Law, Values, People, and Territory. The Europe estimate is measured on the Y-axis and the countries are displayed on the X-axis and each dot refers to the Europe estimate of that social media representation – country pair. While there always exist similarities and differences between some of the European countries across all social media representations, it is apparent that some general patterns emerge. Specifically, there seems to be some hint of “a European sphere” in representations across the countries by looking at the average estimates across the 10 countries. The averages of each social media representation are displayed by the dotted lines. The results suggest that Territory and Institutions are the most important social media representations when Europe is discussed compared to when Europe is not discussed. In fact, Territory and Institutions are the top-two most important social media representations for almost all countries studied. Third is Law, still with a fairly strong positive estimate. Values and People have the lowest and slightly negative Europe estimates, making them the least important social media representations in European discussions. The results from the OLS regressions can be found in Table 7 in the Appendix.

Figure 3. Representations of migration in Europe relative non-Europe discussions across 10 European countries




As we also wrote in the introduction, it is interesting that the issue relating to the "borders" of Europe (social media representation of territory) emerges. However, there is an important aspect to note regarding the data collection period: in the previous paragraphs we had already talked about the migrants of Middle Eastern forced to camp out on the Belarus–Poland border (which in some posts is defined precisely as the "border of Europe") at the end of 2021.

As we see in the different National Reports (following pages), there are many news and posts mainly concerned the Social Media Representations of Territory and Insitution (both in media and in not media posts) because related to migrants on the Polish border and institutional declarations regarding the migration crisis.


Looking at the difference between how media and non-media represents migration two things immediately stand out from Figure 4. First, Media represent migration a lot more through Territory, while non-media represents migration to a larger extent with Values. The Media estimates are the smallest for Values across all studied countries and the highest for Territory for eight out of ten countries. Migration is also represented more through Institutions by Media than non-media. Law and People, however, are almost equally frequently represented by Media and non-media.

Figure 4. Representations of migration by media relative non-media across 10 European countries




Turning to the sentiments in the posts talking about migration, it is possible to conclude from Figure 5 that there are both more positive and negative sentiments displayed when discussions relate to Europe compared to when they are not. For the individual countries, it varies which of the Positive or Negative sentiment is the most dominant one. Since Negative and Positive sentiments are more common when Europe is discussed, the Neutral sentiments are common in discussions not concerning Europe. Consequently, it seems that European migration discussions are slightly more polarized than non-European migration discussions.

Figure 5. Sentiments of migration in Europe relative non-Europe discussions across 10 European countries



Finally, Figure 6 displays the differences in sentiments displayed when discussion migration between media and non-media user across the 10 European countries. Interestingly, negative sentiments are more common on average when media discusses migration compared to when non-media does so. Further strengthening this picture is the fact that media uses positive sentiments to a smaller extent as well. On average there is almost no difference in the neutral sentiments among media and non-media users. One country clearly different from the others is Italy, in which media use significantly more neutral sentiments, while non-media are both more positive and more negative when discussing migrations suggesting a polarization among non-media users in Italy.

Figure 6. Sentiments of migration by media relative non-media across 10 European countries



National reports

A national report was written for each of the 10 European countries by consortium partners from the countries to give an in-depth analysis as well as national perspectives and context to the topic of gender and the observed results. All national reports follow the same structure and present the same type of results. However, the result for each national report was generated using the data extracted from the country only.

Belgium

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Introduction

Background

Social media platforms enable people to not only talk about migration, but also to transform and facilitate it (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014). Social media platforms can for example play a role in refugees' inclusion in host countries (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Giglou, Buitter, Borowski, Joris, & d'Haenens, 2022). However, in Belgium general research on migration and media mostly focuses on radio, television and the press (e.g. d'Haenens & Saeys, 1996). If we want to focus on social media, there are little to no general studies to be found. There is an international study in which public attitudes towards migration and political stances are examined in relation to news and social media exposure.

This is done for several countries, one of which being Belgium (De Coninck, Duque, Schwartz, & d'Haenens, 2021). The survey asked questions about sentiment towards both immigrants and refugees and gauged the extent to which the respondents used social media (De Coninck et al. p. 6). Even though this study was extensive, general studies about migration and social media still occur only rarely in Belgium.

Thus, when searching for research on social media and migration in the Belgian case, we mostly find case studies. For example, social media posts in response to the Turkish Diaspora have been analysed (Giglou, d'Haenens, & Ogan, 2018). The social media reactions in Flanders to the images of Alan Kurdi in 2015 have been examined and contextualised into the representation of migration and refugees before and after the images (Bozdog & Smets, 2017). The role of social media for Syrian refugees with regards to inclusion in Belgium has been researched (Giglou et al., 2022). The role, but importantly also the limitations from digital and social media for gay refugees in Belgium is examined (Dhoest, 2020). The use of social media for 'inter-and intra-ethnic communication' by Chinese student migrants in Belgium has been researched (Hsien-Ming, 2018). There is research on the impact of social media network Facebook on 'the development of languages used by the community of Iranian migrants in Belgium' (Elmianvari, 2019). Finally, there are also studies on the (discriminatory) language used by Belgian politicians when talking about immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Jacques, 2022; Temmerman & Harder, 2021).

Legislation

In Belgium there are multiple migration-related legislations. We briefly mention a few, starting first with some rights about asylum application. To start, people can only apply for asylum when they are present in Belgium (UNHCR, n.d.-a). Next, when applying for international protection, people have the right to receive information about their application, rights and duties in a language they know. They are also entitled to basic (including legal, medical and psychological) assistance and they are obliged to cooperate with Belgian authorities and follow Belgian law (UNHCR, n.d.-b). If asylum seekers don't receive international protection, they have the right to appeal this decision and if they have new elements to support their application, they can also apply again (UNHCR, n.d.-a). With regards to refugees, Belgium has a commitment and responsibility to protect them since Belgium signed the Geneva Convention (Fedasil, n.d.). Secondly, there are fiscal benefits and public rights restrictions for asylum seekers and refugees. We already mentioned the right for basic assistance, however, this also includes food and accommodation assistance. With regards to primary health care, asylum seekers can get access to it but for some services a fee is required. Next, asylum seekers may obtain a right to work, but only four months after submitting an asylum application. Refugees and people with a subsidiary protection status have the same social security benefits as other Belgian citizens, alongside with this, they also have the right to work (UNHCR, n.d.-b). Thirdly, Belgium has regulations on irregular immigration and residence permits. When people stay in Belgium illegally, they will be ordered to leave. Not listening to this order is punishable and one can be forced to leave (IBZ, n.d.-a; IBZ, n.d.-b). The Immigration Office can also prohibit people to enter the country or the Schengen area (IBZ, n.d.-c).

Next to legislations about international protection, there are also laws in place to combat racism and to protect religious freedom. Belgium has an anti-racism law and an anti-discrimination legislation (belgium.be, n.d.). The last one covers various criteria, amongst which are nationality, ethnicity, cultural background ... (Unia, n.d.-a). With regards to religious freedom, Belgium has a law protecting the Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Unia, n.d.-b). However, the principle of neutrality results in disagreement with regards to wearing religious symbols in certain spaces. At some places (e.g. official schools, except for Religion subjects) the hijab is prohibited and at other public places both people and courts disagree about the implications of freedom of religion for wearing a hijab (Unia, n.d.-c; Unia, n.d.-d).

National Context


In 2019 27.742 people submitted an application for international protection. This number dropped to 16.910 in 2020 during the covid-19 pandemic. However, in 2021 this number increased again to 25.971 applications. The peak of this increase happened in September (3.326 applicants). According to the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons this peak is mainly due to the Red Kite evacuation operation. Many people from Afghanistan came to Belgium and applied for international protection (CGVS, 2022). This increase and the flow of immigration from Afghanistan in September got noticed by the public and sparked the public debate about migration legislation. For example, far-right-wing political party Vlaams Belang and right-nationalist N-VA argued for stricter migration policies and Vlaams Belang saw Poland as exemplary. They viewed Poland's actions with regards to closing off its borders as something Belgium had to support and learn from (Van Poucke, 2021; Vlaams Belang, 2021-a).

Aside from the migration peak in 2021, various other migration-related events happened and sparked public debate. We briefly outline two events related to hijab legislation. Firstly, Vincent Van Quickenborne formulated a draft law stating that it would no longer be prohibited to wear a hijab to court (Verbergt, 2021). This change was enthusiastically received by organisations and institutions like Unia ("an independent public institution that fights discrimination and promotes equal opportunities" (Unia, n.d.-e)) (Unia, 2021). Unia had been actively fighting for this legislation and was especially vocal about wanting this change ever since in 2018 a Muslim woman was denied entry to court because of her hijab (Unia, 2018). Other parties, like the far-right political movement Vlaams Belang, were against this bill (Vlaams Belang, 2021-b). Secondly, in 2021 there was a shortage of both primary and high school teachers (Vlaams Parlement, n.d.). Muslim women talked in media outlets about how they would love to teach and/or had a diploma in teaching but were not able to put this to use because in Belgium wearing a hijab is prohibited in official schools. Only Religion teachers are allowed to wear religious symbols (Unia, n.d.-c). The fact that at least a part of the teachers shortage could be resolved by reconsidering this law resulted in discussion about this legislation. People argued that freedom of religion (which is part of Belgian legislation) should allow Muslim women to wear a hijab at school. Others stated that the principle of neutrality in the Belgian law meant that wearing a hijab as a teacher should not be permitted (Unia, n.d.-b; Van Genechten, 2021).

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

Figure 1. Social Media Representations – Distribution among Social Media Representations




Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 1334.

We can conclude from Figure 1 that Values is the most frequent Social Media Representation with a 26.8% occurrence among all 1334 posts. Next, Territory and Law respectively had a 21.4% and a 18.8% occurrence. Institutions was also talked about in the posts but far from the extent of both Values and Territory and Law. Culture only occurred in 10.6% of the posts, but, it was Social Media Representation People that was talked about the least.

When looking at the national context of Belgium with regards to migration, we can see that the two main topics of conversation and debate had to do with Social Media Representations Territory, Values and Law. There was a lot of discussion about border legislation in relation to the migration peak in September and the situation in Poland. These events can both be seen under Territory and Law. Next, people talked about the hijab. They did this in relation to the teacher shortage since it was prohibited for people with a hijab to teach anything but Religion in official schools. They also talked about the hijab in relation to the legislative change about wearing a hijab at court. People discussed these legislative decisions by using the principle of neutrality and arguments related to values like freedom and enlightenment. The hijab discussions can thus be covered under Social Media Representations Law and Values.

Figure 2. Social Media Representations – Relative importance over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 1334$.

We see a peak in Social Media Representations in weeks 45-47, which is November 2021. During this peak, Social Media Representation Territory was the most frequent. Law and Values were also remarkably frequent. When looking at the total amount of the analysed period, Values was the most frequent, followed by first Territory and then Law.

The peak during November 2021, might surprise taken into account that there was a migration peak in Belgium during September. One might have expected a peak during September instead.

Figure 3. Social Media Representations – Evolution over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 1334$.

We can establish from Figure 3 that there is a peak in Social Media Representations Law, Values, Territory and Institutions during weeks 45-47, which is in November. The frequency of each Social Media Representations is at its lowest during week 48. The trends of all Social Media Representations

have some smaller peaks and drops during the other weeks, but they are relatively stable in comparison to the peak in weeks 45-47.

Here again, the peak in November might surprise given that the migration peak happened in September. Also for Social Media Representation Territory, the fact that its peak lies in November is surprising.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations – Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 721.

Figure 4 shows us that the majority of the posts contain one Social Media Representation. Most other posts cover 2 or 3 Social Media Representations. A smaller amount of the posts contain either no or 4 Social Media Representations and only 0.4% of the posts talk about 5 social Media Representations.

Figure 5. Sentiments – distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 721.

Figure 5 clearly shows us that almost 90% of all posts have a neutral sentiment. There are three times as much negative posts than positive ones, but the analysed sample does not contain many of either.

Comparison between Europe and Not Europe

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 721 in each pair of comparison.

Firstly, Chi-squared tests conclude that there are no statistically significant differences between Europe and Not Europe posts about Law, People and Values ($p \geq 0.5$ in all three cases). When looking at the other three Social Media Representations, Figure 6 shows that they occur more often in Europe posts than Not Europe posts. This is especially significant for Institutions, which occurs in 62.2% of Europe posts and only 7.4% of Not Europe posts.

The fact that most of the posts containing Social Media Representation Institution are also posts about Europe, is remarkable when looking at the national context of Belgium during the autumn of 2021. There were a lot of discussions about the role institutions should or should not play with regards to border control. Far-right-wing political party Vlaams Belang spoke a lot about the situation in Poland, where hard measures to close off the border were taken. Vlaams Belang saw Poland as exemplary and argued that Belgium should be more alike. These are discussions about another European country that among others fall under the Social Media Representation Institution. We can see this represented in Figure 6.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 721.

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe – Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	2.3213	1.6017	****	0
SD	(1.017)	(0.963)		

The information in Table 1 shows us that there are on average more Social Media Representations in Europe posts than in Not Europe posts. A t-test confirms that this difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$). More specifically, we can conclude from Figure 7 that there are mostly Europe posts with 2 or 3 Social Media Representations and mostly Not Europe posts with one or two (posts with one being the most frequent) Social Media Representations.


Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 721.

The chi-squared tests belonging to Figure 8 show us that, when comparing posts about Europe and posts about Not Europe, we cannot find statistically significant differences with regards to the sentiments of these posts ($p = 0.326$ for Negative, $p = 0.201$ for Neutral, and $p = 0.964$ for Positive).

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 721 in each estimation.

From the coefficient estimates in Figure 9 we can conclude that there are more Not Europe posts than Europe posts about People, but that both Values and Institutions occur more in the Europe posts. However, there are no statistically significant differences when comparing Europe and Not Europe posts about Law, Territory and Culture. Also with regards to the occurrence of Non-Neutral sentiments (Positive and Negative sentiments together) there is no statistically significant difference to be found between Europe and Not Europe posts. Finally, Figure 9 shows us that there are more Social Media Representations in Europe posts than in Not Europe posts.

Here again, the fact that Institutions occurs more in Europe posts might not surprise taken into account the discussions about Poland.

Comparison between Media and Not Media


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 721 in each pair of comparison.

To start, there are more than double the amount of Not Media posts than Media posts in our sample (see Table 21 and Table 22). Chi-squared tests show us that there are no statistically significant differences in the proportions of People ($p = 0.36$) and Institutions ($p = 0.072$) when comparing posts about Media and posts not about Media. With regards to Law, Values and Culture, Figure 10 shows that there are more Not Media posts about them than Media posts. In contrast, Social Media Representation Territory occurs more often in Media posts.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 721.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and Not Media – Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.7224	1.916	**	0.0178
SD	(0.961)	(1.073)		

There are more Media posts than Not Media posts with one Social Media Representation, but posts with two or more Social Media Representations are more often not about Media. This results in the findings portrayed in Table 2; Social Media Representations occur on average more in Not Media posts (mean value: 1.92) than in Media posts (mean value: 1.72). A t-test confirms that the difference in these mean values is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. $N = 721$.

The chi-squared tests belonging to Figure 12 show us that, when comparing Media posts and Not Media posts, we cannot find statistically significant differences with regards to the sentiments of these posts ($p = 0.886$ for Negative, $p = 0.167$ for Neutral, and $p = 0.069$ for Positive).

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 721 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 show us that Social Media Representations People and Territory occur more often in Media posts than in Not Media posts. However, there are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of the other four Social Media Representations (Law, Values, Institutions and Culture), in the occurrence of Non-Neutral Sentiments, and in the number of Social Media Representations between posts about Media and posts not about Media.

Illustrative examples

Figure 14. Illustrative example for Figure 9 -Institutions



(Van
2021)

Grieken,

In this Facebook post the far-right politician Tom Van Grieken comments on the border legislations of Poland and the EU. Therefore, this post is an example of the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Europe: Institutions.

Figure 15. Illustrative example for Figure 9 -People



(Canvas, 2021)

This post is about a VRT-documentary portraying the stories of migrant children. This Facebook post is thus an example of the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Europe: People.

Figure 16. Illustrative example for Figure 13 -Territory



(HLN, 2021)

This tweet of the news outlet Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN) mentions migrants breaking through the barrier from Belarus to Poland. Therefore, the tweet is an example of the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Media: Territory.

Figure 17. Illustrative example for Figure 13 -People



(Thomas

More

hogeschool, 2021)

This post of the Thomas More Polytechnic talks about student Salah Jaradeh, who only six years prior to the post applied for asylum, his degree and plans to start his own company. This Facebook post about a personal migration story is an example of the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Media: People.

Conclusion

Figure 1 has shown us that Values, Law and Territory were the three Social Media Representations occurring the most among all posts. This is remarkable when taken together with the information about the national context of Belgium. The two main migration-related topics of conversation were border legislations, and the hijab in relation to freedom and the principle of neutrality. This first one has clear links with both Territory and Law, whereas this last one is covered under Law and Values. Next, in Figure 2 and Figure 3 we notice a peak during November in Social Media Representation, with Territory occurring the most often. It is notable that the migration peak in Belgium, a moment where one might expect a peak in Social Media Representation Territory, happened during September. Moving on, Figure 5 teaches us that the vast majority of the posts was written with a neutral sentiment. Next, We learn from Figure 6 that most of the posts with Social Media Representation Institution are posts about Europe. This is interesting when put together next to the discussions about the role of institutions in border control and how far right political party Vlaams Belang vouched for Belgium to follow the measures of Polish institutions. Finally, we conclude from Figure 10 that there are more Not Media posts than Media posts about Laws, Values and Culture and Figure 13 shows us that there are more Media posts about People and Territory.

List of abbreviations

In the report in-text citations use abbreviated versions of the names of certain organisations, institutions ... This list covers all these abbreviations and full names. In the list of references the full names are enclosed.

Full name in Dutch	Full name in English	Abbreviation
Commissariaat-generaal voor de Vluchtelingen en de Staatlozen	Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons	CGVS
Federaal Agentschap voor de Opvang van Asielzoekers	Federal Agency for the reception of asylum seekers	Fedasil
Het Laatste Nieuws	The Latest News	HLN
Intérieur Binnenlandse Zaken	Federal Public Service Home Affairs	IBZ
Bureau van de Hoge Commissaris van de Verenigde Naties voor de Vluchtelingen	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
Vlaamse Radio en Televisie Nieuwsdienst	Flemish Radio and Television News Service	VRT NWS

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	251	18.8	34.8
People	107	8.0	14.8
Values	358	26.8	49.7
Territory	286	21.4	39.7
Institutions	190	14.2	26.4
Culture	142	10.6	19.7
Total	1334	100.0	185.0

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	8	2	16	7	5	5
36	11	6	30	6	10	12
37	17	8	24	12	14	17
38	4	8	16	6	7	6
39	21	10	20	11	9	10
40	19	5	30	14	15	17
41	8	7	20	4	8	12
42	17	13	37	13	14	13
43	9	7	18	3	7	8
44	15	10	18	5	15	9
45	54	10	37	114	39	9
46	30	8	43	63	21	11
47	36	13	46	27	25	12
48	2	0	3	1	1	1
Total	251	107	358	286	190	142

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	53	7.4
1	241	33.4
2	236	32.7
3	146	20.2
4	42	5.8
5	3	0.4
Total	721	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	66	9.2
Neutral	633	87.8
Positive	22	3.1
Total	721	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	89	15.4	35.7
People	23	4.0	9.2
Values	154	26.6	61.8
Territory	103	17.8	41.4
Institutions	155	26.8	62.2
Culture	54	9.3	21.7
Total	578	100.0	232.1

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	162	21.4	34.3

People	84	11.1	17.8
Values	204	27.0	43.2
Territory	183	24.2	38.8
Institutions	35	4.6	7.4
Culture	88	11.6	18.6
Total	756	100.0	160.2

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	9	3.6
1	44	17.7
2	84	33.7
3	82	32.9
4	30	12.0
Total	249	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	44	9.3
1	197	41.7
2	152	32.2
3	64	13.6
4	12	2.5
5	3	0.6
Total	472	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	28	11.2
Neutral	214	85.9

Positive	7	2.8
Total	249	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	38	8.1
Neutral	419	88.8
Positive	15	3.2
Total	472	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0142 (0.037)	-0.0123 (0.038)	-0.0175 (0.037)
Twitter		-0.0873** (0.042)	-0.1048** (0.042)
Interactions		2.254e-05 (0.0)	2.211e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-2.279e-07** (0.0)	-2.535e-07** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0147 (0.01)	0.0158 (0.01)
October			-0.1145 (0.085)
November			-0.0850 (0.143)
week			0.0186 (0.016)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.03

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
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Europe	-0.0941*** (0.031)	-0.1151**** (0.031)	-0.1118**** (0.03)
Twitter		-0.0927*** (0.03)	-0.0811*** (0.03)
Interactions		-8.873e-06 (0.0)	-7.935e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-2.985e-07** (0.0)	-2.783e-07** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0241**** (0.007)	-0.0246**** (0.007)
October			-0.0571 (0.059)
November			-0.1775* (0.106)
week			0.0155 (0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R- squared	0.02	0.07	0.08

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1830**** (0.036)	0.0653** (0.029)	0.0657** (0.029)
Twitter		-4.0903**** (0.151)	-3.9838**** (0.152)
Interactions		2.782e-07 (0.0)	1.888e-06 (0.0)
Followers		8.601e-09 (0.0)	1.042e-08* (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0059	0.0047

		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			-0.0195
			(0.068)
November			-0.1625
			(0.116)
week			0.0148
			(0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.39	0.40

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0258	0.0459	0.0238
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Twitter		0.1914****	0.1193***
		(0.049)	(0.045)
Interactions		4.425e-05	3.999e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		2.283e-07	1.483e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0586****	-0.0544****
		(0.013)	(0.012)
October			0.0099
			(0.085)
November			0.3687***
			(0.138)
week			-0.0110
			(0.015)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.09	0.17

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3814**** (0.009)	0.3683**** (0.011)	0.3671**** (0.011)
Twitter		-0.0302 (0.031)	-0.0372 (0.033)
Interactions		1.608e-05 (0.0)	1.538e-05 (0.0)
Followers		1.129e-09 (0.0)	9.192e-10 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0228**** (0.006)	-0.0221**** (0.006)
October			0.0418 (0.066)
November			0.0858 (0.111)
week			-0.0067 (0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.30	0.32	0.32

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0299 (0.031)	0.0003 (0.03)	0.0056 (0.03)
Twitter		-0.1236*** (0.038)	-0.0932** (0.038)
Interactions		9.668e-06 (0.0)	1.05e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-5.249e-07**** (0.0)	-4.816e-07**** (0.0)

Sentiment Score		0.0141	0.0114
		(0.012)	(0.011)
October			0.0319
			(0.063)
November			-0.0730
			(0.111)
week			-0.0062
			(0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.09

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0275	0.0041	0.0074
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Twitter		-0.0372*	-0.0255
		(0.022)	(0.022)
Interactions		-2.784e-06	-2.52e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.933e-08	-1.404e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0594****	-0.0591****
		(0.007)	(0.007)
October			-0.0199
			(0.044)
November			-0.0160
			(0.072)
week			-0.0053
			(0.008)
N	721	721	721

Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.19	0.20
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Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.7196*** (0.0781)	0.5547*** (0.0737)	0.5461*** (0.0733)
Twitter		-0.8306*** (0.0701)	-0.8705*** (0.0732)
Interactions		0.0001* (0.0000)	0.0000* (0.0000)
Followers		-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0702*** (0.0190)	-0.0672*** (0.0189)
October			-0.0699 (0.1670)
November			-0.0127 (0.2820)
week			0.0239 (0.0316)
Intercept	1.6017*** (0.0443)	1.8492*** (0.0565)	0.8779 (1.1767)
R-squared	0.1085	0.2546	0.2622
R-squared Adj.	0.1073	0.2494	0.2540
N	721	721	721

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	71	16.8	29.0

People	41	9.7	16.7
Values	86	20.4	35.1
Territory	141	33.4	57.6
Institutions	54	12.8	22.0
Culture	29	6.9	11.8
Total	422	100.0	172.2

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	180	19.7	37.8
People	66	7.2	13.9
Values	272	29.8	57.1
Territory	145	15.9	30.5
Institutions	136	14.9	28.6
Culture	113	12.4	23.7
Total	912	100.0	191.6

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	15	6.1
1	102	41.6
2	73	29.8
3	46	18.8
4	9	3.7
Total	245	100.0

Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	38	8.0

1	139	29.2
2	163	34.2
3	100	21.0
4	33	6.9
5	3	0.6
Total	476	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	28	11.4
Neutral	214	87.3
Positive	3	1.2
Total	245	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	38	8
Neutral	419	88
Positive	19	4
Total	476	100

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0898** (0.038)	-0.0391 (0.042)	-0.0379 (0.042)
Twitter		-0.0797* (0.042)	-0.0970** (0.042)
Interactions		1.852e-05 (0.0)	1.791e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-1.889e-07 (0.0)	-2.132e-07* (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0136 (0.01)	0.0148 (0.01)
October			-0.1091

			(0.085)
November			-0.0782
			(0.144)
week			0.0179
			(0.016)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.03

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0280	0.0559**	0.0592**
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Twitter		-0.0848***	-0.0710**
		(0.031)	(0.032)
Interactions		-1.046e-05	-9.181e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-3.232e-07**	-3.028e-07**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0202***	-0.0207***
		(0.007)	(0.007)
October			-0.0647
			(0.059)
November			-0.1969*
			(0.105)
week			0.0167
			(0.011)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.06

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
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Media	-0.2157**** (0.036)	-0.0517 (0.032)	-0.0480 (0.031)
Twitter		-4.1129**** (0.152)	-4.0050**** (0.151)
Interactions		-1.476e-07 (0.0)	1.471e-06 (0.0)
Followers		7.851e-09 (0.0)	9.562e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0036 (0.008)	0.0026 (0.008)
October			-0.0141 (0.068)
November			-0.1519 (0.117)
week			0.0141 (0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.39	0.39

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.2518**** (0.031)	0.2102**** (0.036)	0.1987**** (0.032)
Twitter		0.1467**** (0.037)	0.0784** (0.035)
Interactions		6.409e-05*** (0.0)	5.372e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		6.315e-08 (0.0)	5.549e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0503****	-0.0464****

		(0.012)	(0.011)
October			-0.0261
			(0.082)
November			0.3191**
			(0.134)
week			-0.0068
			(0.015)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.12	0.21

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0670*	-0.0426	-0.0461
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Twitter		-0.1180***	-0.1294***
		(0.039)	(0.04)
Interactions		2.598e-05**	2.454e-05**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-6.479e-09	-7.38e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0342***	-0.0335***
		(0.01)	(0.01)
October			0.0476
			(0.078)
November			0.1250
			(0.133)
week			-0.0083
			(0.015)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.04	0.04

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1303**** (0.034)	-0.0684* (0.036)	-0.0660* (0.036)
Twitter		-0.1192*** (0.037)	-0.0897** (0.038)
Interactions		4.441e-06 (0.0)	5.8e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-4.534e-07*** (0.0)	-4.158e-07*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0120 (0.012)	0.0095 (0.011)
October			0.0401 (0.064)
November			-0.0600 (0.111)
week			-0.0074 (0.012)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.07	0.09

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0067 (0.026)	-0.0219 (0.02)	-0.0174 (0.019)
Twitter		-0.0330 (0.022)	-0.0230 (0.022)
Interactions		-4.067e-06 (0.0)	-3.238e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-1.164e-08 (0.0)	-1.068e-08 (0.0)

Sentiment Score		-0.0602****	-0.0599****
		(0.007)	(0.007)
October			-0.0171
			(0.043)
November			-0.0119
			(0.071)
week			-0.0055
			(0.008)
N	721	721	721
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.19	0.20

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1935**	0.0241	0.0166
	(0.0785)	(0.0749)	(0.0751)
Twitter		-0.9320***	-0.9743***
		(0.0724)	(0.0748)
Interactions		0.0001**	0.0001**
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Followers		-0.0000*	-0.0000**
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0782***	-0.0750***
		(0.0201)	(0.0198)
October			-0.0780
			(0.1704)
November			0.0070
			(0.2941)
week			0.0240
			(0.0328)
Intercept	1.9160***	2.0527***	1.0708

nan	(0.0491)	(0.0552)	(1.2241)
R-squared	0.0078	0.1928	0.2024
R-squared Adj.	0.0064	0.1872	0.1934
N	721	721	721

Bulgaria

Authors: New Bulgarian University team

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Introduction

Background

Traditionally, Bulgaria has been a country of emigration, with more citizens leaving than migrants arriving. Immigration is now (in the last 10 years) gradually increasing, although it remains relatively low compared to the rest of the EU countries.

In 2020, net migration rate for Bulgaria was 15.52 migrants per thousand population. Net migration rate of Bulgaria increased from 9.45 migrants per thousand population in 1971 to 15.52 migrants per thousand population in 2020 growing at an average annual rate of 1.02%.ⁱ

The migration processes as topic are not presented very often on the traditional Bulgarian media. The debate is very low and just in some cases the topic emerges for a while, mainly related with some negative stories and then all is back to “normal”.

Search on online media shows in Bulgaria in the last few years there were a few trainings and seminars for journalists, focused on the migrants’ issue and related to topics like “Migration and refugees – how to cover the topic and deal with hate speech” (June 2022)ⁱⁱ, “How to cover the topic of migrants and work against hate speech” (April 2022)ⁱⁱⁱ and some more, mainly situated in the period 2021-2022.

When the topic is on the media it comes very rarely with the point of view of the migrants and the human perspective.

On the social media there are many channels and accounts which just “copy/paste” same info, very often with “neutral” sentiment, but leading to fake news websites or distributing mainly fake news content. They just „flood” the social media and no real debate is going on.

The coverage is dominated by the national perspective and mainly by the criminal aspect of people’s traffic and the national authorities dealing with this issue.

There are big discrepancies on the debate perspective Europe and Not Europe on social media posts related with the migrants’ issues. Law is dominant, followed by Territory and Institutions when

Europe is on focus and Culture is dominant, followed by Law and Values when the coverage is about Not Europe.

There are no debates on the topic when such content is not provided on the media.

Research on the topic is done in 2016 by a team of scientists from the University of Economics in Bulgaria².

The Bulgarian Council on Refugees and Migrants also did some research on the topic in 2019³.

All law and documentation on the migrants topic for Bulgaria can be found on the website of the Bulgarian Council on Refugees and Migrants <https://bcm-bg.org/>.

For both Europe and Not Europe the dominant sentiment is neutral and the difference is very small.

Legislation

In Bulgaria there is a law, related with the migrants and it is on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ⁴

The law covers The Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted on 28 July 1951 and includes asylum, international protection and temporary protection. The law is following also main European regulations and with this is good, but was last updated in 2015-2016 and needs updates.

The law is for the migrants (https://www.mvr.bg/docs/librariesprovider57/default-document-library/%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B8%D1%89%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B8-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5.pdf?sfvrsn=48308cbe_0) and is accepted in Dec 2002, last changes Dec 2019. It includes "asylum, international protection and temporary Protection" ((2) (Publ. - GN, issue. 80 from 2015, active as per 16.10.2015 r.).

Immigrants have few fiscal benefits and/or public rights restrictions according to the Bulgarian law – they have right to receive shelter and food; social assistance according to the procedure and in the amount determined for Bulgarian citizens; on health insurance, affordable medical care and free use of medical service under the terms and conditions for Bulgarian citizens; of psychological assistance; to receive registration card; of a translator or interpreter.

Religious freedom is protected in Bulgaria, however Burka or Hijab in schools are not allowed as in Bulgaria school is by law secular. This debate is not often on media and just few cases are discussed in the last 10 years, mainly around 2014-2016.

² Социални мрежи на имигрантските общности в България

<https://blogs.unwe.bg/mmisheva/files/2016/12/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%88%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%83%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F.pdf>

³ Добри практики за интеграция на бежанци от общини в Европа https://bcm-bg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/2019_Good_practices_printable-1.pdf

⁴ in Bulgarian

[https://www.mvr.bg/migration/%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B0/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B1%D0%B0/bgzac?__cf_chl_tk=w9_P21EvNxPfy.bDHKhKjKRaqdSd.H3ODOQ1YK0pk_o-1678538676-0-gaNycGzNC1A\).](https://www.mvr.bg/migration/%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B0/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B1%D0%B0/bgzac?__cf_chl_tk=w9_P21EvNxPfy.bDHKhKjKRaqdSd.H3ODOQ1YK0pk_o-1678538676-0-gaNycGzNC1A))

There are laws and public policies to prevent racial discrimination and violence – under the Law for protection from discrimination (2004

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjLklnS3NX9AhVrVrEDHZNPCcMQFnOECBEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fahu.misp.government.bg%2Fportal%2Fdocument%2F56473&usg=AOvVaw3pyNBD4zUDo16OuFk3kO>). There is crime penalty aggravation in case the crime (e.g., violence) is racially motivated, prevent creation of political parties with antisemitic and racist beliefs.

There regulations on irregular immigration and on visas/residence permits and this is regulated by the law for the migrants (<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiLyPy53dX9AhX7cvEDHVncAqsQFnoECAsQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmvr.bg%2Fdocs%2Flibrariesprovider31%2F%25D0%25B4%25D0%25BE%25D0%25BA%25D1%2583%25D0%25BC%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BD%25D1%2582%25D0%25B8-%25D0%25BE%25D1%2582-%25D0%25BF%25D1%2580%25D0%25B5%25D1%2581%25D1%2586%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BD%25D1%2582%25D1%258A%25D1%2580%2F4af02cf7-zchrp-pdf.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0cCgNZq7eEJaGILrVZXRSY>).

National context

The national context for Bulgaria during the period 1/9 2021 - 30/11 2021 is mainly related with the vote for president and parliament. Bulgaria had regular presidential elections on Nov 14th 2021 for first round and on Nov 21th for the second round and parliament vote on Nov 14th 2021. This moved the debate mainly on internal issues and political fights between different parties. The migrants' issue was not on focus during this period.


Also important fact is that in Bulgaria there are waves of disinformation, especially related with the migration⁵ and the research shows many social media channels that produce exactly such type of content. There are many not popular channels on the Facebook and Twitter mainly, which copy/paste links towards same articles with disinformation or just fake news, all with specifically bombastic titles and ordinary, not interesting, like randomly created content.

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations

⁵ Why the migrants in Bulgaria are not treated equally, Factcheck.bg, 22.12.2022 (<https://factcheck.bg/zashto-bezhancite-ot-ukrajna-i-ot-blizkiya-iztok-se-tretirat-razlichno/>)



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 1378.


Two main perspectives for the social media representation of the topic are very well seen from the research data (Fig 1) – Law and Culture come as most often (each by 30%), followed by Institutions, Territory and Values. People’s voice is almost not presented on social media. Law is main topic as most of media very often cover issues, related with the migrants and law. Culture is also on high percentage of social media representation, mainly with the topics around the elections.

It is very well seen from the table that the topic “people” is less represented and this is mainly because the media look for sensation and are not too open to go and look for personal perspective, people’s stories and the voice of the migrants as almost not presented on the Bulgarian media.

Figure 1 shows the % occurrence of Social Media Representations among all Social Media Representations in the data. In our case, we see in the notes that we have just 1378 Social Media Representations occurring in total (N=1378).

We can conclude from Figure 1 that Law and Culture are the most frequently occurring Social Media Representations in Bulgaria with about 30% of the observations pertaining to each of these Social Media Representations. This rises during the elections. People is the least occurring Social Media Representation. Values – the topic is almost absent from the Bulgarian media. Territory and Institutions are more frequent, but far from the extent of Law and Culture.


Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 1378.

The representation over time is with big dynamic as we see from Fig 2 – the curves go in parallel and main dynamic comes in week 45 when the territory and institutions’ topics have bigger coverage. This is mainly connected with the elections during this time and the usage of the migrants’ topic for political fights between different parties regarding the elections.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 1378.

The Law and the Culture aspects of the social media representation go with very similar coverage, as seen by the data in Fig 3, as well as Territory and Institutions. People and Values stay with very low levels almost all the time during the researched period.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 670.

It shows the percentage of Social Media Representations in posts. So, half of the posts have 2 or less Social Media Representations

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 670.

Almost all posts are with neutral sentiment, which also is a mark that the conversation is not strong and deep enough on the social media platforms during the researched period of time. This could be explained with the disinformation wave and the tendency the media to be flooded with information, which is not taking polarizing side.

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 670 in each pair of comparison.


Figure 6 shows the % occurrence of Social Media Representations among Europe (Yellow bars) and Not Europe (blue bars) posts. Above each pair of bars of the same variable is the p-value from the chi-squared test to assess whether there is a difference between the proportions of Europe and Not Europe in the variable (Social Media Representation) tested.

Big discrepancies appear when Europe and Not Europe on social media posts related with the migrants' issues are compared. Law is dominant, followed by Territory and Institutions when Europe is on focus and Culture is dominant, followed by Law and Values when the coverage is about Not Europe. The number in each pair or comparison is 670 (N-670).

There is a difference in the proportions of the variable (Social Media Representation) between posts concerning Europe and posts concerning Not Europe.

We can conclude from Figure 6 that Law is the most frequently occurring Social Media Representations with about 80% of the observations when talking about Europe and Culture is the most frequently occurring when talking on Not Europe with more than 90% if the observations.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 670.

The number of social media representation with perspective Europe comes more often with 1-2-3 and up to 5 posts, while when Not Europe – the number is 1 to 4, but higher percentage with 2 publications. Not Europe goes faster and the debate is not that deep.

Figure 7 shows the number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe posts respectively.


Important is that there are more Social Media Representations in Europe compared to Not Europe.

Additionally, the figure has its own table (Table 1) displaying the mean and standard deviation of the number of Social Media Representations variable as well as the results from a t-test, with the following hypotheses:

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	2.3333	1.8629	****	0
SD	(0.789)	(0.696)		

Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 670.

For both Europe and Not Europe the dominant sentiment is neutral and the difference is very small. The sentiment towards the topic does not relate directly to the European or not European perspective.

Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of any of the sentiments when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe ($p = 0.005$ for Negative, $p = 0.189$ for Neutral, and $p = 0.026$ for Positive). Consequently, there is a statistically significant difference in both Negative and Positive.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 670 in each estimation.


The coefficient estimates in Figure 9 show that there are several differences between Europe and Not Europe posts also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirm that Law, Territory and institutions are more likely to occur among Europe posts than Not Europe posts. For Bulgarian media seems easier to talk about non-European countries and the migrants' issues then for the ones in Europe.

The effects are around 20 and 30 percentage points respectively. At the same time Values and Culture are more likely to be observed in Not Europe posts, with effect sizes of around 10, 15 and 40 percentage points respectively.

Finally, results from an OLS regression point to that there are more Social Media Representations present in the Not Europe posts than the Europe posts.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 670 in each pair of comparison.

Posts by Media (107) are less common than posts by Not Media (1131) (See Table 22 and Table 23). Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of the Social Media representations Law, People, Values and Public sphere when comparing posts about Media and not about Media ($p = 0.0$ in all cases). Media in Bulgaria do cover more law as they receive formal and institutional information about it and have less efforts to produce content. As the topic about culture is more presented as not media content, as individuals, influencers do write on those aspects of the issue in Bulgaria.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 670.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	2.375	1.9982	****	0
SD	(0.766)	(0.758)		


The number of social media representation by media and not media show that media content is dominating, compared with no media. The SDs are about the same (0.766 Media and 0.758 Not Media).

Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 670.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 670 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

Two publications from the EUR dataset that reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Europe:

Figure 14 is a screen from Free Europe Facebook post with sharing of an article – link with picture and short copy. The article has more than 450 reactions, 116 comments and 64 shares. This is a high quality publication which covers an important topic in an appropriate way.

Figure 14. Illustrative example from Facebook



Свободна Европа ✓

November 8, 2021 · 🌐



Правителствата на Полша и Литва съобщиха, че засилват сигурността по границите си с Беларус. Причината за това са множество публикации и видеа в социалните мрежи, на които се вижда как стотици мигранти вървят към полската граница. Това поражда опасения за масово нахлуване.



SVOBODNAEVROPA.BG

Тълпи от мигранти вървят към границата на Беларус с Полша

Правителствата на Полша и Литва съобщиха, че засилват сигурността п...




Margarita Ilcheva and 448 others

116 comments 64 shares

The first publication is from Free Europe Facebook channel – shared article, from Nov 8th 2021, related with the Polish-Belarusian border and the migrants' wave toward the Polish border.

Figure 15. Illustrative example from Facebook



The second publication is from Nova TV Facebook channel – shared recorded live video, from Nov 2021, related with the police’s and Ministry of Internal Affairs action toward an organized group for migrants’ traffic in Bulgaria.

The video is from the TV news on Nova TV and is with high quality, shared on the Facebook channel of the television and with more than 220 reactions and 37 comments.

Figure 16. Illustrative example from Facebook



Поглед Инфо

October 1, 2021 · 🌐



/Поглед.инфо/ Светът винаги е знаел, че британците са еталон на джентълменско поведение. Единствено тук с циганите и нелегалните бежанци от Румъния се отнасят толкова учтиво. Циганските катунци културно се ображдат от полицията, културно се товарят в автобуси, културно се отвеждат до летището и културно се товарят на самолета до Букурещ. Това не са литовските граничари, които ловуват азиатски мигранти с кучета, обгазват ги и ги бият с палки.



POGLED.INFO

Брекзит и бензинът: Всичко си има цена

/Поглед.инфо/ Светът винаги е знаел, че британците са еталон на джентъ...

👍🤔 354

15 comments 41 shares

This publication is presenting the Not Europe on Facebook, media “Pogled.info”, which is digital only media, very often presenting fake news. The publication is on the Brexit and the fuels’ price in UK. The publication includes racists statements and hate speech.

The publication comes from the Facebook profile of one of the many disinformation channels online, used mainly to spread misinformation, floods or fake news.

Figure 17. Illustrative example from Facebook – Not Media



Виктор Лилов

October 23, 2021 · 🌐



Турският фотограф Мехмет Аслан спечели първа награда на Международните награди за фотография в Сиена с този кадър на сирийско момче бежанец и баща му, направена в Хатай, на турско-сирийската граница.

Бащата губи крака си във войната, а синът му се ражда без крайници, поради вродено разстройство, причинено от лекарствата, които майка му приема, заради обгазяване при атака.



Ruslan Trad

October 23, 2021 · 🌐

Турският фотограф Мехмет Аслан спечели първа награда на Международните награди за фотография в Сиена с този кадър на сирийско момче бежанец и баща му, направена в Хатай, на турско-сирийската граница.

Бащата губи крака си във войната, а синът му се ражда без крайници поради вродено разстройство, причинено от лекарствата, които майка му приема, заради обгазяване при атака.

<https://petapixel.com/.../emotional-shot-of-father.../>



Dimitar Iliev, Николай Хаджигенов and 36 others

2 shares

Victor Lilov is a politician and is reposting Ruslan Trad's publication for the Turkish photographer Ahmed Aslan and his photography of a Syrian boy refugee and his father meeting on the Turkish-Syrian border.

Conclusion

The topic for migration is not very popular on Bulgarian media and social media and is rarely covered. When it is covered it is mainly seen via the perspective of Law, Territories and Institutions and not that much by the perspective of People. The debate is more on the national level, then on the European.

The social media debate rises when there are elections and goes down “when is not needed”, periods without elections.

A lot of fake news sites, presenting mainly fake news and disinformation, share “copy/paste” information on the migrants’ issues, often with neutral sentiment. This is flooding the media coverage and the debate as takes away people’s attention into not significant topics, related to the main one.

Traditional media rarely cover in deep the migrants’ topics. Mainly politicians from the right wing use the migrants’ topic for their political communication.

Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	418	30.3	62.4
People	24	1.7	3.6
Values	149	10.8	22.2
Territory	174	12.6	26.0
Institutions	199	14.4	29.7
Culture	414	30.0	61.8
Total	1378	100.0	205.7

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	24	4	10	5	5	30
36	33	0	15	16	14	31
37	48	2	7	13	31	20
38	24	0	9	7	7	27
39	25	0	17	9	11	32
40	12	1	6	5	4	19

41	26	1	9	2	12	32
42	40	0	11	9	16	38
43	23	2	9	6	7	32
44	25	3	16	11	14	33
45	50	7	20	41	34	46
46	48	3	12	41	33	32
47	37	1	8	9	11	39
48	3	0	0	0	0	3
Total	418	24	149	174	199	414

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	7	1.0
1	137	20.4
2	357	53.3
3	152	22.7
4	14	2.1
5	3	0.4
Total	670	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	5	0.7
Neutral	660	98.5
Positive	5	0.7
Total	670	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	222	34.5	80.4
People	13	2.0	4.7

Values	37	5.7	13.4
Territory	148	23.0	53.6
Institutions	155	24.1	56.2
Culture	69	10.7	25.0
Total	644	100.0	233.3

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	196	26.7	49.7
People	11	1.5	2.8
Values	112	15.3	28.4
Territory	26	3.5	6.6
Institutions	44	6.0	11.2
Culture	345	47.0	87.6
Total	734	100.0	186.3

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	1	0.4
1	34	12.3
2	128	46.4
3	101	36.6
4	9	3.3
5	3	1.1
Total	276	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	6	1.5
1	103	26.1
2	229	58.1

3	51	12.9
4	5	1.3
Total	394	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	4	1.4
Neutral	267	96.7
Positive	5	1.8
Total	276	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	1	0.3
Neutral	393	99.7
Total	394	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3016**** (0.032)	0.2272**** (0.039)	0.2369**** (0.039)
Twitter		-0.1552** (0.071)	-0.1487** (0.07)
Interactions		-7.26e-05 (0.0)	-6.748e-05 (0.0)
Followers		5.414e-07 (0.0)	5.491e-07 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0522* (0.028)	0.0471* (0.028)
October			-0.1592* (0.083)
November			-0.3098** (0.135)

week			0.0237 (0.015)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.09	0.10

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0187 (0.015)	-0.0258 (0.017)	-0.0289 (0.018)
Twitter		-0.0743**** (0.02)	-0.0796**** (0.022)
Interactions		6.769e-06 (0.0)	5.314e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-8.169e-08 (0.0)	-7.655e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0159* (0.008)	-0.0140* (0.008)
October			0.0897** (0.039)
November			0.1867** (0.076)
week			-0.0192** (0.008)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.11	0.15

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.1578**** (0.034)	-0.0983** (0.04)	-0.1002** (0.041)
Twitter		0.2161***	0.2068**

		(0.082)	(0.08)
Interactions		0.0002***	0.0002***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.025e-07	5.989e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0178	0.0180
		(0.024)	(0.024)
October			0.1254
			(0.077)
November			0.2555**
			(0.127)
week			-0.0323**
			(0.013)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.05	0.06

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3877****	0.3325****	0.3129****
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Twitter		-0.0860**	-0.0840**
		(0.038)	(0.038)
Interactions		0.0002	0.0001
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-6.152e-08	-4.413e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0444**	-0.0387*
		(0.02)	(0.02)
October			0.0158
			(0.068)

November			0.2191*
			(0.112)
week			-0.0129
			(0.012)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.25	0.28	0.31

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3709**** (0.018)	0.3134**** (0.027)	0.3103**** (0.028)
Twitter		-0.1370*** (0.044)	-0.1338*** (0.044)
Interactions		-0.0001 (0.0)	-0.0001 (0.0)
Followers		-2.929e-08 (0.0)	-1.385e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0384** (0.019)	0.0398** (0.019)
October			-0.0479 (0.073)
November			-0.0276 (0.122)
week			0.0049 (0.013)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.20	0.22	0.22

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.4309****	-0.3512****	-0.3472****

	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Twitter		0.2071****	0.2007****
		(0.047)	(0.046)
Interactions		8.339e-05*	7.899e-05*
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.043e-07	7.453e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0409**	0.0385**
		(0.018)	(0.018)
October			0.1289**
			(0.062)
November			0.1253
			(0.099)
week			-0.0156
			(0.011)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.32	0.36	0.36

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0374**	0.0171	0.0176
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Twitter		-0.0400**	-0.0411**
		(0.017)	(0.018)
Interactions		-1.83e-06	-2.176e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.507e-07	-1.52e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0044	0.0029
		(0.008)	(0.008)

October			0.0444
			(0.029)
November			0.0676
			(0.046)
week			-0.0068
			(0.005)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.10	0.24	0.27

Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.4704*** (0.0590)	0.3768*** (0.0699)	0.3621*** (0.0697)
Twitter		-0.1815* (0.1029)	-0.1862* (0.1026)
Interactions		0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Followers		0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0694* (0.0364)	0.0710* (0.0364)
October			0.1403 (0.1205)
November			0.4249** (0.2041)
week			-0.0471** (0.0223)
Intercept	1.8629*** (0.0350)	2.0476*** (0.1099)	3.8083*** (0.8462)
R-squared	0.0903	0.1064	0.1138

R-squared	0.0889	0.0996	0.1031
Adj.			
N	670	670	670

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	91	36.8	87.5
People	12	4.9	11.5
Values	6	2.4	5.8
Territory	61	24.7	58.7
Institutions	63	25.5	60.6
Culture	14	5.7	13.5
Total	247	100.0	237.5

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	327	28.9	57.8
People	12	1.1	2.1
Values	143	12.6	25.3
Territory	113	10.0	20.0
Institutions	136	12.0	24.0
Culture	400	35.4	70.7
Total	1131	100.0	199.8

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
1	12	11.5
2	46	44.2
3	42	40.4
4	3	2.9
5	1	1.0

Total	104	100.0
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Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	7	1.2
1	125	22.1
2	311	54.9
3	110	19.4
4	11	1.9
5	2	0.4
Total	566	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	3	2.9
Neutral	98	94.2
Positive	3	2.9
Total	104	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	2	0.4
Neutral	562	99.3
Positive	2	0.4
Total	566	100.0

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3641**** (0.064)	0.0799 (0.125)	0.0721 (0.124)
Twitter		-0.2458** (0.114)	-0.2490** (0.114)
Interactions		-6.316e-05 (0.0)	-5.789e-05 (0.0)

Followers		6.8e-07	6.856e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0547**	0.0507*
		(0.027)	(0.027)
October			-0.1523*
			(0.086)
November			-0.2612*
			(0.14)
week			0.0200
			(0.015)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.06	0.07

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0599****	0.0415	0.0520
	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Twitter		-0.0241	-0.0212
		(0.036)	(0.036)
Interactions		7.435e-06	2.065e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.191e-07	-1.271e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0144*	-0.0129
		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			0.0988**
			(0.039)
November			0.2009**
			(0.078)
week			-0.0208**

			(0.008)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.11	0.16

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2870**** (0.072)	-0.1490 (0.115)	-0.1343 (0.116)
Twitter		0.1763* (0.106)	0.1788* (0.107)
Interactions		0.0002*** (0.0)	0.0002*** (0.0)
Followers		1.078e-07 (0.0)	5.779e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0143 (0.024)	0.0144 (0.023)
October			0.1239 (0.078)
November			0.2378* (0.129)
week			-0.0311** (0.014)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.05

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3001**** (0.032)	-0.0926 (0.077)	-0.0748 (0.071)
Twitter		-0.3625**** (0.067)	-0.3371**** (0.06)

Interactions		0.0002	0.0002
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		5.218e-08	9.585e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0500**	-0.0420*
		(0.025)	(0.025)
October			0.0160
			(0.078)
November			0.2817**
			(0.121)
week			-0.0176
			(0.013)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.13	0.17

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3024****	-0.0823	-0.0793
	(0.036)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Twitter		-0.4089****	-0.3987****
		(0.078)	(0.077)
Interactions		-0.0001	-0.0001
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		9.129e-08	1.071e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0441**	0.0464**
		(0.02)	(0.02)
October			-0.0401
			(0.077)
November			0.0450

			(0.127)
week			-0.0011
			(0.014)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.11	0.11

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.5294**** (0.045)	-0.0751 (0.099)	-0.0796 (0.1)
Twitter		0.4478**** (0.088)	0.4313**** (0.087)
Interactions		9.406e-05 (0.0)	8.596e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-2.62e-08 (0.0)	-4.259e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0394* (0.023)	0.0361 (0.023)
October			0.1173 (0.075)
November			0.0187 (0.119)
week			-0.0065 (0.013)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.14	0.18	0.19

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0309** (0.013)	0.0034 (0.011)	0.0046 (0.011)

Twitter		-0.0466**	-0.0467**
		(0.021)	(0.022)
Interactions		-1.345e-06	-1.661e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.512e-07	-1.51e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0049	0.0035
		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			0.0437
			(0.03)
November			0.0700
			(0.047)
week			-0.0070
			(0.005)
N	670	670	670
Pseudo R-squared	0.10	0.23	0.26

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3768*** (0.0812)	-0.2086 (0.1790)	-0.1823 (0.1772)
Twitter		-0.5741*** (0.1715)	-0.5464*** (0.1684)
Interactions		0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.0001)
Followers		0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0684* (0.0368)	0.0716* (0.0369)
October			0.1415

			(0.1249)
November			0.4794**
			(0.2095)
week			-0.0508**
			(0.0230)
Intercept	1.9982***	2.5446***	4.4051***
nan	(0.0319)	(0.1693)	(0.8563)
R-squared	0.0313	0.0672	0.0778
R-squared Adj.	0.0299	0.0602	0.0666
N	670	670	670

Czech Republic

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Introduction

1.1 Background

In the Central and Eastern European region, which the Czech Republic is a part of, the public and political discourse does not favour migration,⁶ framing it as a problem or as a threat, despite inconsiderable numbers of asylum applications in the region, and in the Czech Republic specifically⁷ (Daniel, 2020; Koss & Seville, 2020; Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 250). The Czech Republic is among the countries with the strongest anti-migration attitudes in the EU (European barometer, 2018; European Commission, 2015), and migration is a hot topic in the media, with migrants being portrayed to a large extent as a burden on the state (Urbániková & Tkaczyk, 2020, p. 591). Xenophobia is fuelling the public debate. As some authors suggest, it may be the consequence of isolationism during the communist era, due to which the country has been ethnically homogenous with limited experience with migration (Urbániková & Tkaczyk, 2020, p. 591). Relatedly, in Rosenfeldová's and Vochocová's

⁶ Unless mentioned differently, we use the term migration to refer to either migration or immigration.

⁷ This was the situation prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war, starting in February 2022.

(2022) study on online debates in iDnes.cz, the most popular Czech news provider, which has both online and print versions, it is argued that:

One of the most robust discussion environments related to online news in the Czech Republic turned out to be substantially anti-immigration and anti-liberal oriented. Most of the commenters were approaching the issue negatively, with a significant presence of populist attacks against allegedly liberal politicians, political institutions and the media. They strongly criticised some specific actors of the discourse, such as the EU and the immigration supporters (including the NGOs) (p. 243).

Other recent studies of anti-migration protests and sentiments in the Czech Republic focused on radical-right mobilisation (Císař & Navrátil, 2019), or reversely on pro-refugee activism (Křeček, 2016). Several scholars connect the rhetorics of political elites with illiberalization trends (Kim, 2020) or frame anti-migration movements as bottom-up securitisation (Bartoszewicz et al., 2022; Bureš & Stojanov, 2022) constituting dystopian discourses about the nation's future.

The polarising trends among the Czech public, as it concerns migration, were accelerated by the so-called refugee and migrant crisis between 2015 and 2017, following the trends observed in other European countries (Rosenfeldová & Vochocová, 2022, p. 228). The increased flows of migrant and refugee populations in Europe during this period created new conflicts and “led to the emergence of new mobilisations and countermobilisations by both anti-migrant and pro-migrant camps” in the Czech Republic (Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 250). Navrátil and Kluknavská explored protest activities around migration during the same period in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which share a socialist past. The authors argued that “[p]rotesters saw the government rather as weak, hesitating, and defeatist vis-à-vis European institutions” (Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 260), expressing anti-state sentiments. The anti-migrant discourses are often intertwined with Islamophobia (Vallo et al., 2020), as well as with an anti-EU rhetoric, which situates the Czech Republic in a ‘schizophrenic’ position:

The political schizophrenia of the Czech and Slovak governments, who participated in the decision-making at the EU level and criticised it as something external and ‘imposed on us’ in front of the domestic public, led to the mobilisations of challengers against both the EU and national governments (Navrátil & Kluknavská, 2023, p. 263).

There is a growing interest and academic research on how social media platforms and digital media accelerate these discourses (Macková & Štětka, 2016; Krobová & Zápotocký, 2022). In their study, Krobová and Zápotocký (2022) used the framework of affective turn that allowed to analyse political and public emotional life. They monitored social media conversations related to migration on the Facebook page of Parlamentnílisty.cz news site during the Czech parliamentary elections in 2017 and presidential elections in 2018, concluding that “anti-immigration comments analysed in this study are thematically tied more with cultural and societal aspects of the immigration crisis than an ethnic or racial perspective, even though they are often explicitly racist and race-themed” (p. 66).

1.2 Legislation

The Czech Republic is bound by the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention, known as the Geneva Convention, and its 1967 New York Protocol (UN General Assembly, 1951, 1967). This multilateral treaty sets out the definition of the refugee status and the rights of individuals who are granted asylum, as well as the responsibilities of the country that issues asylum. In the Czech law, the right to asylum is defined in Act no. 325/1999 Coll., and the applicable provisions are embedded in the Article 43 of the 'Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms' (Presidium of the Czech National Council, 1993). As part of the former Eastern Bloc of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia was a signatory of some international treaties, and authors such as Szczepanikova (2011) and Stojarová (2019) traced the historical perspective of how asylums were treated in former Czechoslovakia – and how migration management developed in the post-1989 situation.

As a member state of the European Union, since May 1, 2004, the Czech Republic is also bound by the EU Dublin Regulation that defines the rules and criteria for asylum applications and asylum seekers (concerning, among others, which country should assess the asylum application and whether the applicant meets the criteria for being granted refugee status). The Czech legislation has been adjusted to the Dublin Regulation and the Czech Republic has bound itself to cooperate in asylum and refugee issues⁸. Černý (2020) analysed how the asylum procedure was implemented in the Czech Republic during the migration crisis in the years 2015 to 2019 and identified several problems in compliance with the Czech and EU laws:

The most serious problem in meeting the requirements of EU law has been full and ex nunc review of decisions on asylum applications, which do not fit into the concept of the Czech administrative justice and causes a number of practical problems, as the legislation is not adapted to these requirements at all (p. 52).

In the Resolution No. 55 of 13 January 2003, the Government of the Czech Republic approved a fundamental strategic plan for migration entitled 'The Czech Government's migration policy principles' (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2023). Its goals, according to the document, are to support legal migration and minimise illegal migration. The actions supporting legal migration include, for example, the project entitled 'Selection of qualified foreign workers', the introductory five-year phase of which was launched in July 2003, or the most recent Green Cards project, which was launched in January 2009. Also, in 2004, the Czech government approved (by the Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 108) the 'Action plan of combat against illegal migration'. The document is based on principle 3 of the Czech Government's Migration Policy Principles and relates to the tasks defined in the 'National action plan of combat against terrorism' (Government of

⁸ In 2021, the Czech Republic registered 1411 asylum applications. The number of persons enjoying asylum status in the country, as of 31.12.2021 was 1064 (Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, 2022a). For information regarding the applications for international protection in the years 1992–2021, see Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2022b).

the Czech Republic, 2003). The connection of ‘illegal’ migration with terrorism at the level of policy and regulation are indicative of the anti-migration attitude by the Czech state.

As part of its EU obligations, the Czech Republic also created a permanent government programme called MEDEVAC established in 1993, which provides humanitarian medical help, care and assistance for vulnerable people affected by migration or with refugee status. The care provided is free of charge and exclusively for civilians. The process supported by MEDEVAC involves several stages: a stay in an integration asylum centre of the Ministry of the Interior, then a settlement in municipalities in the Czech Republic. For 12 months, asylum seekers are provided housing under a lease or sublease agreement. Accommodation is connected to employment for a minimum period of one year (persons are provided with assistance when filling out an application for arranging employment, which leads to registration at the labour office branch, arranging training courses, etc.). Then assistance is provided – by the government as well as by NGOs – in the areas of education (when integrating children at primary schools or arranging study at a secondary school or institution of higher education), social services (for instance, when filling an application for social benefits), healthcare services, and Czech language courses (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2023).⁹

As it concerns the legislation protecting religious and other belief-related freedoms, the Constitution of the Czech Republic does not explicitly address religious freedom. Still, the ‘Charter of fundamental rights and freedoms’ (Presidium of the Czech National Council, 1993) provides for freedom of religious conviction and the fundamental rights of all, regardless of faith or religion. The charter states that every individual has the right to change religion or faith and to freely practise religion, alone or in a community, in private or public (see also, Office of International Religious Freedom, 2021). The Criminal Code (Criminal Code, Act No. 40/2009 Coll.) prohibits hate speech based on religion, as well as the denial of Nazi-era genocides and crimes. Violators may be sentenced to up to three years in prison.

The Czech Republic also adopted an anti-discrimination legislation on 17 June 2009, which guarantees the right to equal treatment and bans discrimination in areas including sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, race, ethnicity, nationality, and religious beliefs. The passing of the Anti-Discrimination Act by the Czech Chamber of Deputies was a necessary step to avoid legal action against the Czech Republic, by the European Commission, for failing to implement the obligations contained in the EU Race Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/43/EC) and the Employment Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/78/EC).

National context

The research period (September–November 2021) was dominated by the national parliamentary elections held in the Czech Republic on 8–9 October 2021. Populist rhetorics and increased

⁹ There is no information available on the numbers or demographics of the MEDEVAC beneficiaries.

polarisation centred around the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, migration, corruption, and the economy monopolised the public discourse, also on social media. Prime minister Andrej Babiš's populist party ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens) focussed on the 'migration crisis' and used the opportunity of the COVID-19 pandemic to showcase his working ethics and relationship with ordinary people (Císař & Kubát, 2021). The extreme right-wing populist party, SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy), led by Tomio Okamura, accelerated its anti-EU and anti-migration rhetoric, raising 'Czechxit' as one of the main items of the political party's campaign.

The now former prime minister Babiš dusted off his anti-migration agenda earlier that year "as part of efforts to reverse a decline in popularity before the general elections in October" (Laca, 2021). Migration had become an essential topic for Babiš in the mid-2010s (Wonderys, 2021, p. 733) when he started to position himself as a "fighter against migration" and stated that any acceptance of refugees is a "way to hell" while calling for "quick and radical solutions" to migration (ibid.). Babiš is a populist and opportunistic politician, who swings according to the public sentiment, rather than a far-right politician (as Viktor Orbán in Hungary), but, as Wonderys (2021) observes, Babiš contributed to the normalisation of far-right positions in the Czech Republic. He helped to constitute the new political mainstream: "Babiš' populism legitimises the populist claims of the far right (and far left) and puts them closer to the government and to the (new) mainstream than ever before" (p. 733).

Other authors agree that Babiš is rather a technocrat than a nationalist, however, contributing to the illiberal turn in Czech politics (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018; Kim, 2020): "ANO does not evoke threats to the nation in the same ways as Fidesz¹⁰ or PiS¹¹ but does use fear of migrants and refugees, and partners with the Czech president whose xenophobia and anti-Western views are a centrepiece of Czech politics" (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018, p. 289).

In June 2021, Babiš published a tweet directed against the Czech Pirate party, which claimed that Pirates want to move migrants into Czech people's homes. This tweet, which is illustrative of the rhetorics and tactics that Babiš used for his election campaign, attracted considerable attention during the pre-election period in autumn 2021. Babiš, now the chairman of the ANO party, was ordered by the High Court in Prague (in March 2023) to remove this tweet from his Twitter account. Similarly, during the pre-election period SPD's Tomio Okamura manipulated the three-year-old interview with Vít Rakušan, the leader of the competitive STAN party and currently the Czech minister of Interior. Okamura spread misinformation that Rakušan wanted to invite refugees to the Czech Republic, which was later debunked by the fact-checking website Manipulátoři.cz (Cemper, 2021).

¹⁰ Fidesz stands for Hungarian Civic Alliance, which is a Hungarian right-wing populist party with the strongest parliamentary presence in the country, led by Viktor Orbán.

¹¹ PiS stands for Law and Justice; it is a Polish right-wing populist party led by Jarosław Kaczyński.

Other events that were of relevance during the research period and which fed into the pre-election anti-migration rhetorics were the release of a report (Lighthouse Reports, 2021) arguing that Croatia, Greece and Romania had carried illegal pushbacks of migrants/refugees at the European Union's external borders (Child, 2021); the escalation of the migrant crisis at the Polish border with Belarus, with the EU introducing sanctions against Belarus (Rankin & Roth, 2021), and the V4¹² summit on immigration (Visegrád Post, 2021).

As it concerns the election results in autumn 2021, the ANO party was defeated, by a narrow margin, by the centre-right SPOLU coalition, which formed a coalition government with the Pirate Party. Two of ANO's coalition partners – the Social Democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – failed to reach the 5 % threshold required to enter the parliament. Far-right SPD did not see its position improve since the election of 2017, receiving less than 10% of the votes (McEnchroe, 2021).

When it comes to the Czech media landscape, the public broadcaster's Czech Radio and Czech Television continue to be the most trusted media in the country (Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism, 2022). Among the highly trusted news media are also the online news media Aktuálně.cz, Seznam Zprávy, iRozhlas.cz and printed dailies like Deník N and Hospodářské noviny (Endowment Fund for Independent Journalism, 2022).

Online news media in general, continued to grow in the Czech Republic in 2021, and one of the possible explanations is the increased internet traffic during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Reuters Digital News Report 2022 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2022) showed that news consumption through online channels is the most popular in countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Data shows that online platforms gradually stabilise their dominant role in news media consumption trends. Still, only 3% of online users are willing to pay for content on digital news media platforms (Czech Statistical Office, 2021).

The Czech Statistical Office report published in November 2021 showed that there were 4,94 million social media users older than 16 years in the Czech Republic at that time. The number equals 56,3 % of the Czech population in the respective demographic group. YouTube and Facebook continued to top the list of the most used social networks and are also among the longest-serving, reaching the oldest user base on average. Instagram occupied the third place (AMI Digital, 2021). TikTok and Snapchat were among the social media platforms mostly used by younger users and among the most dynamically growing, even though the latter-mentioned platform "was catching its second breath: (Media Guru, 2021). The most active people on Facebook were users of ages between 30 and 44. According to the 'Digital 2022 Czechia report' (Kemp, 2022), there were 4,85 million Facebook users and 786.3 thousand Twitter users in the Czech Republic in early 2022.

¹² The Visegrad Group forms a regional alliance of four Central European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Quantitative analysis


This section presents the main findings of the quantitative analysis of the migration-related Facebook and Twitter posts that were collected and analysed for the Czech Republic, covering a three-month period (September 2021 – November 2021). In total, 7759 migration-related posts (7241 tweets and 518 Facebook posts) were extracted and analysed. A detailed description of the methods of data collection, analysis and reporting of the findings can be found in Ingebretsen Carlson et al. (2022, 2023).

For the purposes of the research, four main post categories were identified and analysed: Europe-related posts, posts that do not address Europe, posts that were published by professional news organisations and posts published by regular users (not news media organisations). The analysis focused on seven main dimensions (referred to as social media representations, in the data, figures and tables of this report) pertinent to issues of migration: culture, values, people, interactions and dialogue, territory, institutions and law (see Ingebretsen Carlson et al. (2022) for the operational definitions of these dimensions). The dimension of interactions and dialogue did not yield a considerable number of posts, relevant to be analysed through statistical methods of analysis and is not included in this report.

The reporting of the findings was conducted by the research team based in Charles University. The research team based in UOC (Open University of Catalonia) processed the data and provided the figures, tables and results from the statistical tests and regression analyses.

2.1 Descriptive overview

Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 7830.

In migration-related social media (Facebook and Twitter) content, collected and analysed during the research period of September–November 2021, in the Czech Republic, culture is the most frequently occurring dimension appearing in more than one-third (35%) of the identified cases. The dimensions of values, territory and institutions appear with some frequency (22%, 19%, and 16% respectively), whereas those of law and people appear infrequently (4%).


Interestingly, while posts pertaining to migration-related cultural issues and aspects, concerning e.g., daily life practices and habits, or artistic production addressing migration, or institutions that might have some relation to migration, such as education, media and science, appear frequently, posts from/about the migrants themselves and their own voice and personal experiences (dimension of people) are considerably less. This may be connected to the fact that non-Czech speaking migrants do not frequent Czech language outlets and social media, and might feel more comfortable sharing personal experiences in their own native languages or in more protected spaces (see, e.g., Dekker et al., 2018), in, e.g., private Facebook groups, which are not included in this study.

The focus on values, given Czech Republic's general anti-migration sentiment may be echoing ideas of migrant populations threatening the Czech or the European values, but also the claims made by supporters of refugee and migrant populations' rights emphasising the need to adhere to the ideas and beliefs of solidarity, equality, peace, non-discrimination and inclusion towards migrants and refugees. However, further analysis of the findings would be needed to investigate these claims.

When migration is discussed as an institutional or territorial issue, which happens with some regularity but still less frequently, it is likely that the focus is on the institutions involved in the field of migration regulation, control, and governance, and the issues of cross-border movement, border control and

protection, from 'illegal' migration. These posts might also be addressing issues of integration of the migrant populations in the host communities and countries.


Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 7830.

Examining the presence of migration-related content in social media over time, it appears that there is a spike in migration-related content in weeks 45-47 (mid-end November 2021), and a milder increase in weeks 38-39 (end September – early October) (see Figures 2 and 3). Identity is the most frequently occurring dimension during these weeks, as well as during all the other weeks of the analysed period, followed by the dimensions of values, territory and institutions.

Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 7830$.

Figure 3 shows more clearly that there is a spike in the dimensions of culture, territory, institutions and values in weeks 45-47 (mid-end November), followed by an increase in the dimensions of culture and values in weeks 38-39 (end September – early October). The trends of the dimensions of law and people are fairly stable over time when considering the other weeks, staying in overall low levels.

As mentioned earlier, in weeks 38-39, a report revealed that Croatia, Greece and Romania had carried illegal pushbacks of migrants/refugees at the European Union’s external borders (Lighthouse Reports, 2021) “as part of a ‘violent campaign’ to deny access to asylum” (Child, 2021). In the pre-election period, the report on illegal pushbacks was presented as an example of good practice by several Czech far-right populist politicians. SPD’s Tomio Okamura, who was among them, attacking other politicians for wanting to bring refugees to the Czech Republic (Cemper, 2021). In weeks 45-47, the migrant crisis at the Polish border with Belarus escalated – the EU introduced new sanctions against Belarus (Rankin & Roth, 2021), and politicians such as Okamura argued for more significant support of Poland’s rights to defend their borders. In late November, the V4 summit on immigration took place in Budapest, with related news receiving increased attention at the time (Visegrád Post, 2021).

Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 7759.

A considerable number of posts (40%) do not address any of the six dimensions (culture, values, people, institutions, territory, law) examined here for migration (see Figure 4). One third (33%) of the posts address one of these dimensions. Posts with two different dimensions appear with some frequency (18%), while posts with three or more dimensions add to approximately 10%.

A considerable number of the analysed Facebook and Twitter posts do not address any of the examined aspects pertaining to migration, while less than one third of the posts address more than one of the examined aspects of migration, likely connecting them with broader social issues of culture and values, or institutional and territorial aspects of migration. The findings show that uni-thematic or unidimensional posts on migration-related issues are frequent, which is not surprising considering among others, Twitter's preference for short-length communication (in total, 7241 tweets and 518 Facebook migration-related posts were identified and analysed).

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 7759.

The vast majority of the posts (94%) communicate a neutral sentiment. Posts with a positive sentiment appear infrequently (4%), and posts with a negative sentiment appear rarely (2%).

2.2 Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 7759 in each pair of comparison.


Migration-related Facebook and Twitter posts concerning Europe (2220) are considerably less compared to posts not focussing on Europe (5539). The public discussion on social media in the Czech Republic, concerning migration, does not appear to focus much on Europe, during the examined research period (see Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix B, for the total numbers of posts). Chi-squared tests show that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of dimension types, when comparing posts focussing on Europe and posts not related to Europe. For the dimensions of law, values, territory, institutions and culture, where statistically significant differences are observed, the p-values range from 0 to 0.001. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference, when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe in the dimension of people ($p = 0.483$).

Given that overall, the number of Europe-related posts that address migration is considerably lower than that of the posts that do not concern Europe, the overall frequency of appearance of all registered dimensions is higher in the latter category (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix B). When examined proportionally within each category, the dimensions of institutions, territory, law and people appear more often in posts that address Europe, than in posts that do not focus on Europe, while the dimensions of culture and values appear more frequently in migration-related posts that do not address Europe.

These findings might reflect the trend to treat migration as an issue that on the one hand needs to be handled at the institutional and regulatory levels by European or EU institutions, protecting the European and nation state borders against migration flows, and on the other hand addressing culture and values within domestic/national frameworks that oppose or are sceptical towards migration. Still, further analysis of the data would be needed to investigate these claims.

The overall higher numbers of posts that address issues of migration at the national and not at the European level is not surprising, given that all main societal issues tend to be addressed primarily in national contexts (Baisnée, 2007). The pre- and post-election period of study in which the political parties' campaigns and agendas dominated the public discussion, may have impacted on the tendency to address migration within a nation-centred prism, given also the majority of the political parties' general anti-migration stance; however, an additional study would be required to confirm such an evaluation.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 7759.

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means


	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.418	0.8453	****	0
SD	(1.329)	(0.892)		

Examining the numbers of dimension types present in Europe-related and non-Europe-related posts, we can see that, given that the overall number of non-Europe-related posts is considerably higher, the numbers of non-Europe-related posts with 0-6 dimensions are also higher in each of the 0-6 categories, compared to the numbers of posts appearing in each of these same categories, in Europe-related posts (see Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix B).

Still, a closer examination within each of the two main groups (Europe and non-Europe related), shows that there are on average more dimension types present among Europe-related posts than among posts that do not concern Europe (see Table 1). The mean values for the posts of these two groups are 1.42 and 0.85 respectively and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$). More in detail, as can be seen in Figure 7, there are on average more non-Europe-related posts with 0-1 dimension types, and more Europe-related posts with two or more dimension types. The findings might be pointing to a trend to address more migration-related dimensions when

the posts have a European scope, and be narrower in their migration-related dimensions when addressing migration through a national/Czech prism.


Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 7759.

Chi-squared tests show that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of the negative, positive and neutral sentiments when comparing posts about Europe and posts not concerning Europe ($p = 0.0$ for all three).

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 7759 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 9 show that there are several differences between Europe-related and non-Europe-related posts also when controlling for additional variables (media platform type, interactions and followers, sentiment and publication date). Results from logit regressions confirm that the dimensions of territory, institutions and non-neutral sentiments (positive and negative sentiments together) are more likely to appear among Europe-related posts than among non-Europe-related posts (with effect sizes of approximately 14, 20, and 2 percentage points respectively). At the same time, the dimensions of people, values and culture are more likely to be observed in non-Europe-related posts (with effect sizes of approximately 2, 14 and 3 percentage points respectively). However, there are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of the law dimension between Europe-related and non-Europe-related posts. Finally, results from an OLS regression show that there are more dimensions present in the Europe-related posts than in the non-Europe-related posts.

The findings seem to support the argument made earlier that on the one hand migration is treated as an issue that needs to be handled by European/EU institutions, regulating or controlling migration for the EU member states, and on the other hand, migration is addressed using culture- or value-focussed frameworks, by bringing in the specificities of the national/Czech socio-political and cultural context – likely to present migration as burden or threat to the Czech society, or to address issues of integration of the migrant populations in the Czech society. Still, additional analysis of the data would be needed to explore further such claims.

2.3 Comparisons between Media and Not Media

Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 7759 in each pair of comparison.


Migration-related posts published on Facebook and Twitter by Czech professional media organisations (194) are significantly less than posts not published by professional media organisations¹³ (7565) (See Table 21 and Table 22 in Appendix C). At first sight it seems that content published by ordinary users (not news media organisations) dominates the social media discussion on migration, in the Czech Republic, during the research period. Still, as professional news content is shared by social media users through reposting and commenting, to a high degree (see, e.g., Tenenboim, 2022), it is likely that these numbers (significantly) under-represent the extent to which news content about migration circulates through Czech social media.

Proportionally, the dimensions of law, people, territory and institutions appear more frequently in media posts, while these of values and culture appear more frequently in non-media posts. These findings could reflect the trend of professional media to address more dimensions of the issues they present, compared to how ordinary social media users (not news media organisations) address such issues, connecting them also to institutional, legal or regulatory aspects and frameworks, while ordinary users might be focussing more on cultural or value-laden aspects of migration, either in their original posts and comments or in reposting and sharing news media content. Still, further qualitative analysis would be required to substantiate the claims for possible higher levels of complexity, in addressing migration issues by professional media, and orientation of the public towards cultural or value-laden aspects of migration, in the Czech society.

¹³ For simplicity purposes, they will be referred to, from now on, as ‘media posts’ and ‘non-media posts’.

Chi-squared tests show that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of all dimensions (p-values ranging from 0.0 to 0.02) when comparing posts published by professional news media and posts not published by professional media. Given that overall, the number of media posts is significantly lower than that of non-media posts, the overall frequency of appearance of all identified cases of dimensions is considerably higher in the latter category (see Tables 21 and 22 in Appendix C). At the same time, media posts address proportionally more migration-related dimensions than non-media posts, which might be pointing to potentially higher complexity and diversity by professional news media when addressing migration issues than by ordinary social media users.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 7759.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.3918	0.9993	****	0
SD	(1.166)	(1.063)		

From the information in Table 2, we can infer that there are on average more migration-related dimensions present among media posts than among posts not published by media. The mean values for the posts of these two categories are 1.39 and 1.00 respectively and a t-test shows that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0$). More non-media posts appear with one or zero dimension types in comparison to the identified media posts, and more media posts appear with two or more dimension types, compared to the identified non-media posts. These findings align with international literature that suggests that professional media tend to cover more dimensions of the social issues they address - in this case about migration - than social media content published by ordinary users (not news media organisations) (Gutsche & Hess, 2020; Katz & Mays, 2019). In the latter case, content tends to be more monothematic, addressing a limited range of issues which are of interest to the social media users who publish it, and for whom balance and diversity are not particularly relevant.


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 7759.

Chi-squared tests show that there are no statistically significant differences in the proportions of the negative and positive sentiments when comparing media posts and non-media posts ($p = 0.124$ for negative and $p = 0.346$ for positive sentiment posts). However, there is a statistically significant difference in the proportions of the neutral sentiments when comparing media posts and non-media posts ($p = 0.0$).

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 7759 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 show that there are several differences between media and non-media migration-related posts, also when controlling for additional variables (media platform type, interactions and followers, sentiment and publication date). Results from logit regressions show that the dimensions of values and culture are more likely to be observed in non-media posts, than in media posts, with effect sizes of around 17 percentage points in both cases. However, there are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of the dimensions of law, people, territory and non-neutral sentiments (positive and negative sentiments together), between media and non-media posts. Finally, results from an OLS regression show that there are more dimensions present in non-media posts than in media posts, which is not surprising given the significant differences in the overall post numbers (194 media posts and 7565 non-media posts). Given the small number of analysed media posts, it is difficult to argue for the reasons behind the statistically significant differences observed in the regression analysis findings.

Illustrative examples

This section presents briefly some illustrative examples of migration-related posts that reflect the results from the quantitative analysis, as they were presented in the previous sections, across the four main types of posts extracted and analysed– Europe-related posts, posts that do not address Europe, posts that are published by professional news organisations and posts published by regular users (not news media organisations).

The first post (Figure 14), published by ČT24, a 24-hour news channel run by the Czech public broadcaster, is illustrative of the cases where migration and refugeedom are seen as major problems for Europe, and where migration appears as an issue that concerns primarily Europe's territory and is handled by European controlling and deterring institutions. Europe is presented in this post as in need of protection from migrants and refugees. References to migrants and refugees are made interchangeably, and both migrants and refugees are labelled as "illegal". The Czech Republic is presented as part of Europe, sharing the responsibility to guard Europe's borders, and protect Europe's territory through its institutions, in this case the police.

Figure 14. Illustrative example from Facebook: Europe-related post



“Czech police officers help guard European borders

Czech police officers also guard European borders against illegal migrants. Forty of them operate in North Macedonia. In their district, hundreds of refugees try to cross the border illegally every day” (14 September 2021)

The following tweet (Figure 15), published by ‘Deník Referendum’, a Czech independent online newspaper with a leftist orientation, is an example of the posts that focus on the domestic, rather than the European aspects of migration, addressing the social and economic implications of migration for the Czech Republic, and the hypocrisy of the Czech political system when it comes to migration. In this post, migration in the Czech Republic appears as an inevitable reality that also supports the national economy. The post attacks the xenophobic rhetoric which was especially prominent during the pre-election period, and the hypocrisy of the Czech politicians, especially of the then governing party ANO, and Babiš’s government, that on the one hand would launch a populist anti-migration campaign and on the other hand would either actively or silently support EU’s migration policies and accept increasing numbers of migrants in the country. The post also critiques the political establishment in the Czech Republic for failing to integrate the migrant populations in the Czech society.

Figure 15. Illustrative example from Twitter: Non-Europe-related post



“Despite the xenophobic talk, Czech politicians do not fundamentally prevent migration — nor can they, otherwise entire sectors of the economy would collapse. And so the number of migrants there increased by a quarter under Babiš’s government — it is only the fault of the politicians that their integration is grinding away”.

The next post (Figure 16) is illustrative of the discourse circulating also by professional media that presents migration as a problem threatening the European territory, emphasising the role of institutions in addressing the ‘problem’. This tweet, posted by the high-trust online news website ‘Seznam Zprávy’, addresses the “situation on the Polish-Belarusian border” as a “border crisis” and a “migration crisis”. While this post shares the news report by this professional news organisation, which ‘neutrally’ reports on the events, still Belarus is clearly presented as an undemocratic country, since its leader is described as a “dictator”. Belarus is also framed in the article as a non-European country, blackmailing and threatening Europe’s territory allowing or urging migrants coming from the Middle East to leave Belarus and enter illegally in the EU. The level of threat for Europe is so high, that there is an urge by Poland, Lithuania and Latvia for the intervention of NATO. In the article it is further explained that Belarus is accused “of using migrants as a tool in a hybrid war against the European Union in retaliation for sanctions the EU imposed over human rights abuses in suppressing protests against the authoritarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko”.

Figure 16. Illustrative example from Facebook: Post published by news media

← Tweet

SZ Seznam Zprávy 
@SeznamZpravy

Situace na polsko-běloruské hranici se vyostřuje. Polsko spolu s Litvou a Lotyšskem kvůli migrační krizi na hranicích s Běloruskem zvažují aktivaci článku čtyři smlouvy o Severoatlantické alianci. Tento krok byl v dějinách NATO použit jen několikrát.



seznamzpravy.cz

Diktátora z Minsku bude řešit celé NATO, Polsko chce aktivovat Alianci - Sez...
Polsko, Litva a Lotyšsko chtějí situaci na hranici s Běloruskem řešit v rámci celého NATO aktivací článku 4. V historii k tomu došlo jen několikrát.

5:10 pm · 14 Nov 2021

1 Quote 25 Likes

“The situation on the Polish-Belarusian border is intensifying. Poland, along with Lithuania and Latvia, are considering activating Article 4 of the NATO Treaty due to the migration crisis on the border with Belarus. This move has only been used a few times in NATO history.

The entire NATO will deal with the dictator from Minsk, Poland wants to activate the Alliance”

The last post (Figure 17) is an illustrative example of posts not published by professional news organisations, addressing migration largely through a culturalist and value-laden frame. This post concerns the official positions of the Czech extreme right party SPD, which has a Eurosceptic, anti-migration and xenophobic stance. SPD argues for leaving the EU as the European integration project has created a “European superstate” that destroys “the independence and sovereignty of the Czech state”. For SPD, the “ongoing illegal immigration is the beginning stage of the conflict that will ultimately endanger the freedom, democracy and the very existence of the Czech Republic and our nation”. It is also argued that EU’s “multicultural ideology” is “an instrument of Islamization”, and that the “ongoing Islamization of European countries” is incompatible with and threatens “democracy, freedom and human rights” in the Czech Republic and in Europe, and needs to be stopped at all cost.

Figure 17. Illustrative example from Facebook: Post not published by news media



“Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) is a patriotic and democratic movement that will lead an uncompromising political struggle for the independence and sovereignty of the Czech state. The current form of European integration is a faulty project of creating a European superstate. The project is connected with the factual weakening and destruction of the national states and European nations. We demand the right of citizens to decide in a referendum on leaving the EU. The current European integration project also directly threatens freedom and democracy in Europe. Part of this process is the controlled Islamization of Europe. [...].”

Conclusion

The research aimed to investigate how issues and dimensions pertinent to migration are communicated in social media platforms, in the Czech Republic. The research was developed across two main axes, namely whether there are differences in how migration is represented between content that bears a European dimension and content that does not, and between content published by professional news media and ordinary users (not news media organisations).

The research focussed on two social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, and covered a three-month period (September – November 2021). Furthermore, seven main dimensions pertinent to issues of migration were analysed: culture, values, people, interactions and dialogue, territory, institutions and law. However, as the dimension of interactions and dialogue did not yield a

considerable number of posts, relevant to be analysed through statistical methods of analysis, it is not included in this report.

In total, 7759 migration-related posts (7241 tweets and 518 Facebook posts) were extracted and analysed. A detailed description of the methods of data collection, analysis and reporting of the findings can be found in Ingebretsen Carlson et al. (2022, 2023). Migration-related posts published on Facebook and Twitter by Czech professional media organisations (194) were significantly less than posts not published by professional media organisations (7565). Also, migration-related Facebook and Twitter posts concerning Europe (2220) were considerably less compared to posts not focussing on Europe (5539). Furthermore, differences were observed as to how migration is represented depending on whether it bears a European dimension or not, or whether the content is published by professional news media or not. Europe-related posts published by professional media tend to focus on the territorial and institutional aspects of migration, while the dimensions of values and culture are more likely to be observed in non-Europe-related posts, published by ordinary users (not news media organisations). Moreover, the first group of posts (Europe-related posts published by professional media) tends to include more migration-related dimensions than the second group (non-Europe-related posts, published by ordinary users).

Some plausible explanations were given for these findings in the previous sections of the report (e.g., potentially higher complexity and diversity by professional news media than by ordinary social media users, when addressing migration issues; potential trend to address more migration-related dimensions when the posts have a European scope, and be narrower in their migration-related dimensions when addressing migration through a national/Czech prism, etc.). However, it shall be noted that not all findings were statistically significant when controlling for additional variables and in any case further analysis would be required to explore these claims.

Also, the research findings concerning the representation of migration on social media, in the Czech Republic, as they have been presented in the previous sections, shall be considered in the light of the study's specificities and limitations.

Firstly, the specificities of the research period need to be taken into consideration, in evaluating the findings, avoiding generalisations. As mentioned, the research period was dominated by the parliamentary elections, that led to the change of government in the Czech Republic. The high polarisation and the dominance of populist and right-wing voices shall not be considered as the norm for all periods and platforms.

Furthermore, the two social media platforms selected, on the basis of their popularity at the European level, shall not be considered representative of the conditions and practices in all social media platforms in the Czech Republic, and elsewhere in Europe. As it concerns the Czech Republic, Twitter is not among the most popular social media platforms, since YouTube, Facebook and Instagram

occupied the first three places in popularity and numbers of users, in the country, in 2021 (see AMI Digital, 2021).

Moreover, the research focused on openly accessible social media accounts. The vocality of mainstream nation-centred, Eurosceptic and xenophobic approaches to migration, in open online spaces, as captured in this research, might have overshadowed counterhegemonic ideas, alternative or unpopular approaches – in this case about migration, which tend to be communicated more easily in protected spaces (see, e.g., Dekker et al., 2018), and which this research did not study. Hence, while hegemonic ideas and discourses about migration might have been captured, the counterhegemonic positions on migration, in the Czech Republic, might be underrepresented in this study.

Finally, while the methods used to extract and analyse the posts per platform type/research axis were sophisticated (see Ingebretsen Carlson et al., 2022, 2023), they still produced very specific results. For example, the very low number of extracted posts published by professional news media (194), compared to the number of posts published by ordinary users (7565) might be misleading as it concerns the actual circulation of news about migration through the Czech social media platforms, given that professional news content is shared by social media users through reposting and commenting, to a high extent (see, e.g., Tenenboim, 2022), something that this study did not capture. Also, further research might be needed as to why a considerably higher number of Tweets was identified (9030), in comparison to the number of identified Facebook posts (177), given that overall Facebook is more popular than Twitter in the Czech Republic.

Acknowledgments

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Our special thanks to the Open University of Catalonia (UOC) research team for processing the data, and for providing the figures, tables and the statistical tests and regression analyses results, on which this report is based.

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5 Appendices

5.1 Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	324	4.1	4.2
People	340	4.3	4.4
Values	1725	22.0	22.2
Territory	1478	18.9	19.0
Institutions	1248	15.9	16.1
Culture	2715	34.7	35.0
Total	7830	100.0	100.9

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	8	16	78	46	40	104
36	23	16	118	66	65	187
37	16	29	121	59	54	182
38	28	20	211	95	96	252
39	33	25	195	101	98	239
40	20	18	138	52	52	171
41	18	8	96	68	64	159
42	20	17	89	77	73	160
43	13	13	74	53	41	120
44	10	10	98	38	24	122
45	44	57	183	356	277	402
46	55	58	199	295	223	350
47	30	49	114	152	124	238
48	6	4	11	20	17	29
Total	324	340	1725	1478	1248	2715

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	3063	39.5
1	2579	33.2
2	1363	17.6
3	532	6.9
4	183	2.4
5	37	0.5
6	2	0.0
Total	7759	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	184	2.4
Neutral	7299	94.1
Positive	276	3.6
Total	7759	100.0

5.2 Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	137	4.4	6.2
People	125	4.0	5.6
Values	370	11.8	16.7
Territory	806	25.6	36.3
Institutions	947	30.1	42.7
Culture	763	24.2	34.4
Total	3148	100.0	141.8

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	187	4.0	3.4
People	215	4.6	3.9
Values	1355	28.9	24.5
Territory	672	14.4	12.1
Institutions	301	6.4	5.4
Culture	1952	41.7	35.2
Total	4682	100.0	84.5

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	753	33.9
1	487	21.9
2	482	21.7
3	326	14.7
4	143	6.4
5	27	1.2
6	2	0.1
Total	2220	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	2310	41.7
1	2092	37.8
2	881	15.9
3	206	3.7
4	40	0.7
5	10	0.2

Total	5539	100.0
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Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	86	3.9
Neutral	2024	91.2
Positive	110	5.0
Total	2220	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	98	1.8
Neutral	5275	95.2
Positive	166	3.0
Total	5539	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0252**** (0.005)	-0.0044 (0.006)	-0.0038 (0.006)
Twitter		-0.0796**** (0.007)	-0.0788**** (0.007)
Interactions		-4.497e-06* (0.0)	-4.697e-06* (0.0)
Followers		1.926e-08 (0.0)	1.881e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0073**** (0.002)	0.0071**** (0.002)
October			-0.0174* (0.01)
November			-0.0368** (0.017)

week			0.0037*
			(0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.08	0.08

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0163*** (0.005)	-0.0161** (0.006)	-0.0178*** (0.006)
Twitter		-0.0830**** (0.008)	-0.0846**** (0.008)
Interactions		4.306e-06* (0.0)	4.437e-06* (0.0)
Followers		-3.627e-09 (0.0)	-2.177e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0005 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)
October			-0.0224** (0.01)
November			-0.0180 (0.018)
week			0.0026 (0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.07

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0827**** (0.011)	-0.1641**** (0.013)	-0.1443**** (0.013)
Twitter		-0.2778****	-0.2640****

		(0.02)	(0.019)
Interactions		5.913e-05****	5.614e-05****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-4.218e-07****	-4.413e-07****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0253****	0.0238****
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			-0.0146
			(0.02)
November			-0.0761**
			(0.036)
week			-0.0052
			(0.004)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.05	0.07

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2017**** (0.008)	0.1495**** (0.009)	0.1407**** (0.009)
Twitter		-0.2023**** (0.015)	-0.2099**** (0.015)
Interactions		-1.229e-05 (0.0)	-1.118e-05 (0.0)
Followers		1.539e-07*** (0.0)	1.562e-07*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0157**** (0.003)	-0.0149**** (0.003)
October			-0.0373* (0.02)
November			-0.0353

			(0.034)
week			0.0101***
			(0.004)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.10	0.11

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2732**** (0.006)	0.1953**** (0.007)	0.1957**** (0.007)
Twitter		-0.2289**** (0.012)	-0.2281**** (0.012)
Interactions		9.788e-06 (0.0)	9.755e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.251e-07*** (0.0)	1.251e-07*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0144**** (0.003)	-0.0146**** (0.003)
October			-0.0211 (0.016)
November			-0.0515* (0.028)
week			0.0059* (0.003)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.22	0.30	0.30

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0087 (0.012)	-0.0496**** (0.013)	-0.0308** (0.013)

Twitter		-0.1971****	-0.1814****
		(0.024)	(0.023)
Interactions		1.699e-05	1.44e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.547e-07*	-1.615e-07*
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0117***	-0.0136***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			-0.0465*
			(0.024)
November			-0.1701****
			(0.042)
week			0.0073
			(0.005)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0366****	0.0259****	0.0241****
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Twitter		-0.0363****	-0.0383****
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Interactions		-2.74e-06	-2.529e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-7.151e-09	-5.831e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0211****	0.0212****
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			-0.0016
			(0.011)

November			0.0147
			(0.02)
week			-0.0009
			(0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.06	0.06

Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.5727*** (0.0306)	0.2413*** (0.0286)	0.2697*** (0.0287)
Twitter		-1.6556*** (0.0656)	-1.6319*** (0.0653)
Interactions		0.0001** (0.0000)	0.0001** (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0083 (0.0096)	-0.0114 (0.0095)
October			-0.1636*** (0.0487)
November			-0.3878*** (0.0862)
week			0.0236** (0.0096)
Intercept	0.8453*** (0.0120)	2.4803*** (0.0668)	1.6833*** (0.3642)
R-squared	0.0588	0.2009	0.2071
R-squared Adj.	0.0587	0.2004	0.2063
N	7759	7759	7759

5.3 Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	20	7.4	10.3
People	18	6.7	9.3
Values	21	7.8	10.8
Territory	74	27.4	38.1
Institutions	90	33.3	46.4
Culture	47	17.4	24.2
Total	270	100.0	139.2

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	304	4.0	4.0
People	322	4.3	4.3
Values	1704	22.5	22.5
Territory	1404	18.6	18.6
Institutions	1158	15.3	15.3
Culture	2668	35.3	35.3
Total	7560	100.0	99.9

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	57	29.4
1	48	24.7
2	51	26.3

3	33	17.0
4	4	2.1
5	1	0.5
Total	194	100.0

Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	3006	39.7
1	2531	33.5
2	1312	17.3
3	499	6.6
4	179	2.4
5	36	0.5
6	2	0.0
Total	7565	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	13	6.7
Neutral	177	91.2
Positive	4	2.1
Total	194	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	171	2.3
Neutral	7122	94.1
Positive	272	3.6
Total	7565	100.0

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0403**** (0.01)	0.0080 (0.011)	0.0085 (0.011)
Twitter		-0.0757**** (0.007)	-0.0753**** (0.007)
Interactions		-4.015e-06 (0.0)	-4.19e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.29e-08 (0.0)	1.217e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0074**** (0.002)	0.0072**** (0.002)
October			-0.0174* (0.01)
November			-0.0373** (0.017)
week			0.0037* (0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.08	0.08

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0349*** (0.011)	0.0037 (0.012)	0.0025 (0.012)
Twitter		-0.0724**** (0.007)	-0.0731**** (0.007)
Interactions		4.554e-06** (0.0)	4.599e-06** (0.0)
Followers		-1.176e-08 (0.0)	-1.055e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0006	0.0007

		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0222**
			(0.011)
November			-0.0196
			(0.018)
week			0.0026
			(0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.06

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1507**** (0.04)	-0.1832**** (0.041)	-0.1663**** (0.04)
Twitter		-0.1929**** (0.018)	-0.1894**** (0.018)
Interactions		4.998e-05**** (0.0)	4.715e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		-3.91e-07**** (0.0)	-4.083e-07**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0250**** (0.004)	0.0232**** (0.004)
October			-0.0121 (0.02)
November			-0.0878** (0.036)
week			-0.0054 (0.004)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.03	0.05

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1526**** (0.023)	0.0075 (0.027)	-0.0016 (0.027)
Twitter		-0.2930**** (0.014)	-0.2979**** (0.014)
Interactions		-1.389e-05* (0.0)	-1.234e-05 (0.0)
Followers		2.352e-07**** (0.0)	2.327e-07**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0180**** (0.004)	-0.0167**** (0.004)
October			-0.0383* (0.02)
November			-0.0109 (0.034)
week			0.0095** (0.004)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.07	0.08

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.2077**** (0.019)	0.0418 (0.027)	0.0377 (0.028)
Twitter		-0.3460**** (0.013)	-0.3482**** (0.013)
Interactions		1.002e-05 (0.0)	1.087e-05 (0.0)
Followers		2.299e-07**** (0.0)	2.261e-07**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0179****	-0.0173****

		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0247
			(0.017)
November			-0.0156
			(0.028)
week			0.0054*
			(0.003)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.18	0.18

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1211*** (0.038)	-0.1886**** (0.043)	-0.1752**** (0.043)
Twitter		-0.1916**** (0.023)	-0.1855**** (0.023)
Interactions		8.949e-06 (0.0)	6.746e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-8.451e-08 (0.0)	-8.734e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0124*** (0.004)	-0.0145*** (0.004)
October			-0.0465** (0.024)
November			-0.1721**** (0.042)
week			0.0073 (0.005)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0242* (0.014)	0.0146 (0.015)	0.0129 (0.015)
Twitter		-0.0503**** (0.009)	-0.0515**** (0.009)
Interactions		-2.282e-06 (0.0)	-2.052e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-4.085e-09 (0.0)	-2.384e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0214**** (0.004)	0.0215**** (0.004)
October			-0.0016 (0.011)
November			0.0183 (0.02)
week			-0.0009 (0.002)
N	7759	7759	7759
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.05

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3924*** (0.0844)	-0.2508*** (0.0953)	-0.2370** (0.0948)
Twitter		-1.8360*** (0.0622)	-1.8299*** (0.0619)
Interactions		0.0001* (0.0000)	0.0001* (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000	0.0000

		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0131	-0.0156*
		(0.0095)	(0.0095)
October			-0.1678***
			(0.0492)
November			-0.3478***
			(0.0867)
week			0.0232**
			(0.0097)
Intercept	0.9993***	2.7213***	1.9474***
nan	(0.0122)	(0.0617)	(0.3656)
R-squared	0.0033	0.1930	0.1972
R-squared Adj.	0.0032	0.1925	0.1963
N	7759	7759	7759

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Introduction

Migration and Gender are the topics of passionate, heated debates everywhere in Europe. The controversies play out in particular on social media, the arena where professional communicators – journalists, politicians, lobbyists, CSOs, creators etc. – and common citizens can speak and compete for attention.

In Work Package 4, we looked at posts which have been published on German Facebook and Twitter in the period from September to including November 2021. Based on a jointly developed dictionary of words indicative of the topic Migration and of Europe, the Catalan team queried the APIs of the two platforms, generating two datasets: Germany–Migration–Europe and Germany–Migration–Not Europe. Out of each, the first 200 posts manually found to be on topic were then manually coded for mentioning or not one of six sub-topics considered important in the case of Migration – Law, People, Values, Territory, Institutions and Culture – and also whether the sentiment of a post is predominantly positive, neutral or negative. After Europe-related posts were found in the Not-Europe datasets, we were instructed in that dataset to additionally code for the presence of a European dimension: “The post is about Europe when it makes a reference to either the institutions

of the EU, or any kind of interaction between at least two European countries” which refers to the 47 members of the Council of Europe at the end of 2021, i.e. before Russia was expelled in March 2022. We found that out of 316 on-topic Not-Europe posts, 116 are, in fact, about Europe (37%). Double-coding proved the necessary inter-personal robustness of the definitions of the variables (the Intercoder Reliability Test resulted in Krippendorff's Alphas between 0.797 and 0.983).

The 400 hand-coded Migration posts in the two Europe and Not-Europe datasets were then used by the Work Package leaders to train a neural network which then coded an additional 2,293 posts, bringing the total to 2,693 Migration posts. This mixed, manually and AI-coded corpus of posts forms the basis for the tables, figures and statistical analyses of the present report.

Our analysis of the Social Media Representations of Migration focusses on two dimensions: the effects of a post being about Europe or not and the effects of the publisher of a post being a professional media actor versus a political actor, civil society organisation, common citizen or other.

Background

Professional journalistic media, as we have shown in WP2, are important on social media, both in their own voices and by being referred to in posts of common citizens, politicians and other non-media actors. What we see in the media, we will also to a certain degree see on social media. Fengler & Kreutler (2020) report on a study of mass media coverage of migrants and refugees in 17 countries conducted by members of the European Journalism Observatory (EJO). Choosing a centre-left and a centre-right media outlet in each, they found differences between these, between countries and between times of observation. Migrants and refugees dominated media agendas in both European transit and destination countries since 2015. One of the few studies that also took coverage in African countries into account suggests that migrants and refugees as topics are far less salient in the origin countries. Fengler & Kreutler found a peak in coverage across countries in the 2015/16 period, which had dropped already by 2017/18. During the first six weeks of analysis, the average number of articles published per media outlet in the 17 countries was no more than 200, whereas in Hungary it was 1,500 articles and in Germany 1,000. They show that migrants and refugees are mostly covered as a large, anonymous group. Rarely are they identified as individuals, and rarely do they speak for themselves. The audiences learn very little about the context and origin countries of migrants. Articles often do not even make a clear distinction between refugees with protected status and migrants. With the exceptions of Germany, Italy and Greece, migration is reported as taking place abroad – not within national borders.

How transnational are the audiences of far right parties and movements on Twitter? That was the research question of Froio & Ganesh (2019). They used social network analysis to detect transnational links between far right organisations across countries based on retweets from audiences of far right Twitter users and a logistic regression to quantify the level to which specific issues and organisations enjoy high levels of attention across borders. They find that “only a few issues (anti-immigration and nativist interpretations of the economy) garner transnational far right audiences on Twitter. In addition, we find that more than movements, political parties play a prominent role in the construction of a transnational far right discourse.”

With their growing electoral success, right-wing populist parties were eager to distance themselves from ‘right-wing extremism’. Ahmed & Pisiu (2021) analysed tweets from the Twitter accounts of the German AfD, Identitarian Movement and the Autonomous Nationalists by employing frame analysis. They conclude that the frames of far-right actors classified as extremist, New Right and populist in fact converge.

With the rise in populist and racist discourses, countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic refused to participate in the EU refugee relocation scheme. Kabata & Jacobs (2022) analyse how the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) constructed migrants as a security threat. “Through an in-depth discourse analysis of a wide range of texts, we argue that the PiS discourse enabled the securitisation of migration and the subsequent decision to refuse the EU relocation scheme.”

While there are indications for the construction of a pan-European far-right echo chamber, are there signs in the literature for the emergence of a general European public sphere as well? The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 was a major step in the European integration. Barth & Bijsmans (2018) applied a qualitative frame analysis to media representations in Britain and Germany, two countries whose perspectives on Europe, given the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, could not be more different. Yet, they find that from 1991 onwards, in fact, media representations in the two countries converged: “Media in both countries increasingly discussed the same issues of equal relevance at the same time. The increasingly critical debate was accompanied by cross-national convergence and did not mean a complete rejection of European integration, but rather more critical scrutiny of this process. ... This convergence of debates can be seen as representing a nascent transnational public sphere for the discussion of EU affairs.”

The 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ coincided with the Brexit referendum in 2016 and an EU referendum in Denmark in 2015. The Danish Maastricht Treaty referendum in June 1992 had failed. Denmark then negotiated four opt-outs from portions of the treaty, including from the Euro and Union Citizenship. The second referendum in May 1993 approved the treaty amended with the opt-outs. The referendum in 2015 was held to convert two of the opt-outs into opt-ins and rejected by the voters. Temizisler & Meyer & Shahin (2022) studied these in order to address the patterns of politicisation of migration and their implications for European integration. “Empirical results from the claims-making analysis demonstrated that migration issues were exceptionally politicised during the refugee crisis contributing to disintegration and opt-out outcomes in the UK and Denmark. Also, we observed that migration issues were mostly debated as an international conflict between domestic publics and ‘others’ with strong linkages to the EU.”

Legislation

The Right to asylum of politically persecuted persons is enshrined in Article 16a of the German Constitution or Basic Law.¹⁴ This was translated into ordinary law as a section of the German Foreigners Act (AuslG) which was first passed in 1965. The AuslG set rules for foreigners residing in Germany for professional, study, diplomatic, family etc. purposes and it implemented the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees, the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees. It was accompanied by an implementing regulation (DVAuslG). Both expired on 31 December 2004.

The Immigration Act (effective from 1 January 2005¹⁵) is a package of laws that restructured the wide range of laws on foreigners in Germany which had emerged in the meantime. It replaced the

14 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_16a.html

15 Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (ZuwandungsG), 2004, last amended in 2008, <https://www.buzer.de/s1.htm?g=ZuwandungsG&f=1>

AuslG by the Residence Act (AufenthG¹⁶) which transposes no less than eleven European legal acts. The AufenthG stipulates that foreigners require a residence title for entry and residence in the federal territory and that a foreigner who has applied for asylum may be granted a residence title before the asylum procedure has been finally concluded only in exceptional cases (§ 10 AufenthG). It constitutes unauthorised entry when a foreigner does not possess a required passport or passport replacement or a residence title (§ 14) or does not apply for asylum. The AufenthG sets rules on family reunion (§ 27 ff.), integration courses (§ 43 ff.), employment (§ 39 ff.), deportation (§ 53 ff.) and on penalties and fines (§ 95 ff) for unauthorised entry, violation of the obligation to cooperate, illegal employment and the smuggling of foreigners, particularly if done in a professional and gang-related manner.

The Immigration Act also amended some paragraphs in other laws, such as the Asylum Procedure Act¹⁷ that was passed in 1982 in fear of being “overrun”. From the mid-1970s onwards, the number of asylum seekers in West Germany rose steadily. For the asylum seekers, this meant long waiting times that the 1982 Act attempted to shorten.¹⁸ This Asylum Procedure Act in 1992 was replaced by the Asylum Act (AsylG¹⁹). The AsylG in its current version stipulates that a foreigner is a refugee within the meaning of the Geneva Convention if he or she, because of a well-founded “fear of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, political conviction or membership of a particular social group” is outside the country of origin, of which he or she is a national and for whose protection he or she is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself; or in which he or she had his or her previous habitual residence as a stateless person and to which he or she cannot return or to which he or she does not wish to return because of this fear (§ 3 AsylG). § 3b details the grounds for persecution further, e.g. by stating that “persecution on account of membership of a particular social group may also be present if it is linked solely to sex or gender identity”. When neither refugee protection nor an entitlement to asylum can be granted, but a person is threatened with serious harm such as torture or death sentence in the country of origin, then subsidiary protection might apply (§ 4 AsylG).

The Asylum Act then puts the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees²⁰ under the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community in charge of deciding on applications for asylum and lays out the rules for the asylum procedure, such as the securing, establishing and verifying of the identity of the applicant (§ 16 AsylG), including overriding the data collection ban in the GDPR (the highly sensitive datapoints such as political and sexual orientation are often the cause for persecution; § 7). It defines a duty to cooperate (§ 15) and says that a personal hearing should be conducted as soon as possible after application (§ 25). A foreigner who has entered the country without permission from a safe

16 Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (AufenthG), 2004, last amended in 2022, <https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/4752/index.htm>

17 Asylverfahrensgesetz, 1982, https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl182s0946.pdf%27%5D#bgbl_%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl182s0946.pdf%27%5D_1680535916197

18 Migrationsgeschichten, Das Asylverfahrensgesetz von 1982, 16.07.2022, <https://migrations-geschichten.de/das-asylverfahrensgesetz-von-1982/>

19 Asylgesetz, (AsylG) 1992, last revised in 2022, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylvfg_1992/BJNR111260992.html

20 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), <https://www.bamf.de/>

third country (§ 26a) may be returned there without prior referral to a reception centre (§ 19). Safe third countries are the member states of the EU and those listed in Annex 1 of the AsylG. It also defines the relations of federal and state authorities. The Länder are obliged to create and maintain the necessary reception facilities for the accommodation of asylum seekers (§ 44) in accordance with the reception quota that the Länder have agreed (§ 45).

Most foreigners have to apply for asylum at a branch office of the Federal Office and are obliged to live in the reception centre responsible for them until the decision, however, for a maximum of 18 months, or in case of minors and their parents or other legal guardians as well as their adult, unmarried siblings for a maximum of six months (§ 47 AsylG). After the conditions end, applicants are generally to be accommodated in shared accommodation (§53). The AsylG provides that applicants who are obliged to reside in a reception facility, may not engage in gainful employment, and the exceptions to this rule (§ 61). There are rules on deportation when the application was rejected (§ 34 ff.), and finally there are criminal penalties for the inducement to submit an abusive asylum application (§ 84).

Another law modified by the Immigration Act of 2004 is the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG²¹), which since 1993 has regulated the benefits that asylum seekers, tolerated persons and foreigners who are compulsorily obliged to leave the country can claim in Germany. In its current version, the basic benefits cover the needs for food, accommodation, heating, clothing, health care and household necessities as well as personal needs of daily living. Needs for education and participation in social and cultural life in the community shall be taken into account separately for children, adolescents and young adults. These benefits are generally given in kind or in the form of vouchers, and only in case of accommodation outside reception facilities in the form of cash (§ 3 AsylbLG). This includes medical benefits in case of sickness, pregnancy and childbirth (§ 4). Beneficiaries who are able to work and who are not employed and no longer of compulsory school age are obliged to take up a job opportunity made available by the reception facility, in particular for the maintenance and operation of the facility (§ 5) and to participate in integration courses (§ 5). Refugees with a residence permit who do not yet have an income or earn insufficiently to cover their living costs, are entitled to social benefits or a citizen's allowance. These include housing benefits and heating cost subsidy.²²

The Integration Act²³ of 2016 is a reaction to the refugee crisis of 2015. It attempts to improve access to vocational training assistance for recognised refugees with good integration achievements and good prospects of remaining. This includes a toleration permit valid for the entire duration of a training programme and for two additional years if employment is subsequently found that is adequate for the training programme ("3+2 rule") that might ultimately lead to a permanent settlement permit.

21 Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG), 1993, as amended in 2022, <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/asylblg/BJNR107410993.html>

22 E.g. BAMF, Accommodation for refugees from Ukraine, n.d., <https://www.germany4ukraine.de/hilfeportal-en/accommodation-for-refugees-from-ukraine/state-assistance-for-housing-housing-benefit-certificate-of-eligibility-for-council-housing-wbs-and-heating-cost-subsidy-an-overview-of-government-assistance>

23 Integrationsgesetz (InteG) 2016, last amended in 2019, <http://www.buzer.de/gesetz/12155/index.htm>

The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany states in Article 3(3) that no one may be disadvantaged or favoured because of his or her sex, descent, “race”,²⁴ language, homeland and origin, faith, religious or political views. The UN adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD²⁵) in 1965, which Germany ratified in 1969. It binds signatories “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” (ibid.: Art. 2).

Many of the communications we now call hate crimes are punishable under the German Criminal Code (StGB²⁶). These include distributing propaganda material of unconstitutional and terrorist organisations or use of symbols of such organisations such as the swastika, incitement of the people, i.e. inciting hatred or violence against a national, racial, religious or ethnic group or section of the population or an individual, insult, defamation and slander.

After in November 2011 it became known, that the right-wing terrorist group “National Socialist Underground” (NSU) had murdered nine migrants and one police woman and committed other serious crimes over a period of almost fourteen years without being detected by the security authorities at the federal and state levels, an Investigation Committee of the German Bundestag concluded that corrections were urgently needed, among others in the area of criminal prosecution. In the Law on the Implementation of Recommendations of the NSU Investigation Committee of the German Bundestag,²⁷ “racist, xenophobic or other inhuman” motives and goals were explicitly included in the catalogue of grounds for punishment in the Criminal Code (§46 Abs 2 Satz StGB).

What is illegal offline, is also illegal online. Yet, enforcement on the Internet often proves difficult. In 2017, the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG²⁸) was passed which obliges the operators of profit-oriented social networks to delete “obviously punishable content” within 24 hours of receiving a complaint. If this requirement is not met, companies face fines of up to 50 million euros.

Since 2006, the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG²⁹), which transposed four EU directives on anti-discrimination, has also provided protection. Its purpose is to prevent or eliminate discrimination on the grounds of “race” or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual identity in working life and in some areas of civil law (§ 1 AGG).

24 The use of “race” as a legal term has met with criticism for some time, as the term can promote a belief in the existence of different human “races” – a notion that has long since been scientifically disproven. Therefore the current coalition government has agreed to replace the term “race” in the Art. 3 of the Basic Law (Integrationsbeauftragte 2023: 16).

25 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial>

26 Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) 1871, last amended in 2022, <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html>

27 Gesetz zur Umsetzung von Empfehlungen des NSU-Untersuchungsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages vom 12. Juni 2015, https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/BGBl_Umsetzung_NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss.pdf;jsessionid=93FD76B87269876E54A141E92F83D812.1_cid334?blob=publicationFile&v=4

28 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (NetzDG) 2017, last amended in 2022, <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html>

29 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG) 2006, last amended in 2022, <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/agg/BJNR189710006.html>

The National Action Plan against Racism³⁰ in June 2017 started with a stocktaking of the manifestations of group-based misanthropy and ideologies of inequality (antisemitism, antiziganism, hatred against Muslims, Black People, homosexuals and trans-persons) in Germany, highlighting that refugees, women and LGBTQ persons are particularly vulnerable in terms of intersectional exclusion and discrimination. It then outlined the priorities for action by the Federal Government, including political education, improving diversity in working life, education and training and measures against hate on the Internet.

The latest ECRI Report on Germany³¹ in March 2020 regrettably found that a number of deficiencies persist and made recommendations. Two were highlighted as particularly urgent. This concerns, on the one hand, the establishment of a “coherent system of organisations” to support victims of discrimination by setting up independent anti-discrimination offices in all 16 Länder. Secondly, it calls for a study to be commissioned on racial profiling by the police in the Federation and the Länder. ECRI states that there is “strong evidence of the existence of pronounced racial profiling” in the work of the police authorities.

In the wake of the assassination of Kassel District President Walter Lübcke in June 2019 and the attack on a synagogue in Halle in October 2019, the Federal Government adopted a package of measures to combat right-wing extremism and hate crime which led to the Act on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime 30 March 2021.³² It improves law enforcement on the Internet, tightens some criminal offences and amends the Protection of Minors Act.

“The party ban according to Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law is the sharpest and, moreover, double-edged weapon of the democratic constitutional state against its organised enemies.” This is the first sentence of the ruling of the German Constitutional Court in January 2017 on the latest attempt to ban the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). It concludes that the NPD seeks to eliminate the free democratic basic order and replace it with an authoritarian ‘nation state’ oriented towards the ethnic ‘Volksgemeinschaft’. “This political concept disregards the human dignity of all those who do not belong to the ethnic national community and is incompatible with the constitutional principle of democracy.” The NPD furthermore works in a planned and qualified manner towards achieving its goals. “However, there is a lack of concrete indications of weight which make it appear at least possible that this action will lead to success.”³³ The court therefore ruled that a party ban is possible but unfounded in this case, because the NPD is irrelevant in public discourse.

30 Nationaler Aktionsplan gegen Rassismus, June 2017, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/heimat-integration/nap.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6

31 (Sixth Round of Examination), 18.03.2020, https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Archiv/Downloads/6_ECRI_Bericht_ueber_Deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5

32 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität vom 30. März 2021, https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=%2F%2F%2A%5B%40attr_id=%27bgbl121s0441.pdf%27%5D#_bgbl_%2F%2F%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl121s0441.pdf%27%5D_1680698861336

33 Leitsätze zum Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 17. Januar 2017 (2 BvB 1/13), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2017/01/bs20170117_2bvb000113.html

The Basic Law protects freedom of religion in Germany. Article 4 states: "The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed." That is why also face veils such as the nikab and the burqa are not generally prohibited. However, in 2017, the German federal government banned the wearing of a face veil in certain areas of public life.³⁴ Since then, it has been forbidden to veil or cover the face when driving a vehicle in road traffic. Women civil servants, soldiers and judges are also not allowed to cover their faces while on duty. Women wearing a veil have also been required to show their face in certain situations, e.g. when applying for identity papers, during identity checks or at the polling station. Violations are considered an administrative offence. In addition to the federal regulations, seven of the Länder prohibited public servants to wear face veils while teaching in schools, universities or kindergartens.

While asylum is a fundamental right, there is also the option to buy oneself into a country. "Citizenship-by-Investment" offers, with a few exceptions, have been abolished in Europe.³⁵ EP and Commission have urged member states to end such schemes.³⁶ Yet, like other countries, Germany still has a "Residency-by-Investment" programme. A person first has to apply for a visa for self-employment and set up a business in Germany. There is no minimum amount of investment required, but legal service providers advise to invest at least €360,000.³⁷ After three years, the person will receive a permanent residence permit and after eight years can apply for naturalisation.

As for "digital nomads" or "perpetual travellers" – or, for clarity's sake, tax avoiders, – when searching for these in Germany, one is directed to the legal status quo: natural persons who have a domicile or habitual residence in Germany are subject to unlimited tax liability on their global income (§ 1 Abs. 1 EStG³⁸). This information is provided by tax consultants and law firms offering services to help their clients establish a domicile in a low tax country like Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Romania, the UK or Dubai and avoid anything that would establish "habitual residence" in any other country, particularly in Germany.³⁹

34 Gesetz zu bereichsspezifischen Regelungen der Gesichtshüllung und zur Änderung weiterer dienstrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 8. Juni 2017, https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=//%5b@attr_id%3D%27bgbl117s1570.pdf%27%5d#_bgbl_%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl117s1570.pdf%27%5D_1680605813487

35 According to the Guardian, Cyprus earned at least €4.8bn by giving citizenship to 1,685 "foreign investors" since 2008 (Guardian, EU citizenship for sale as Russian oligarch buys Cypriot passport, 02.03.2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/eu-citizenship-for-sale-as-russian-oligarch-oleg-deripaska-buys-cypriot-passport>)

36 PR, MEPs demand a ban on 'golden passports' and specific rules for 'golden visas', 09.03.2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220304IPR24787/meps-demand-a-ban-on-golden-passports-and-specific-rules-for-golden-visas>; EC, Kommission drängt Mitgliedstaaten zum Handeln gegen „goldene Pässe“ und „goldene Visa“ sowie zu unmittelbaren Schritten im Zusammenhang mit der russischen Invasion der Ukraine, 31.03.2022, https://luxembourg.representation.ec.europa.eu/actualites-et-evenements/actualites/la-commission-invite-instantment-les-etats-membres-prendre-des-mesures-en-ce-qui-concerne-les-2022-03-31_de

37 Wohnsitz Ausland, n.d., <https://www.wohnsitzausland.com/golden-visa>

38 Income Tax Act, Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG, 1934, as last amended in 2022), <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/estg/>

39 E.g.: Wohnsitz Ausland, n.d., <https://www.wohnsitzausland.com/digitale-nomaden>; Easy Digit Tax, n.d., <https://easydigitax.de/gewoehnlicher-aufenthalt/>

National context

With only little exaggeration, one could argue that German history is nothing but a history of migration – from the Germanic tribes in the Roman age and the mass migration of peoples in the middle ages through the Napoleonic Wars, which for the first time triggered the idea of a German nation, to the recruitment agreements of the 1960s between West Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia and between East Germany and Poland, Hungary, Mozambique, Vietnam, Angola and other Socialist brother states. In the East, they were called “contract workers” in the West “Gastarbeiter” (“Guest workers”), an oxymoron in which the concept of inviting someone as a guest clashes with that of hiring someone to work for you. In both cases, it was assumed that residence would be granted only temporarily. These recruitments ended in the mid-1970s, when European states were faced with economic recession and rising unemployment. Also it had become clear that many of the Gastarbeiter were not going home again. Their children and grandchildren are now “citizens with a migration background”.

For the far-right, the central narrative on migration, – the equivalent to the “gender ideology” in that debate, – is the “Great Replacement”. The topos goes back at least to the 1916 book *The Passing of the Great Race* by US lawyer, zoologist, anthropologist, eugenicist and advocate of scientific racism, Madison Grant. More recently, this conspiracy theory of a plan to replace the native population with migrants from Muslim countries was developed further by French philosopher and father of the Nouvelle Droite movement Alain de Benoist and particularly by Renaud Camus in *Le Grand Remplacement* (2011).⁴⁰ In Germany, it was Thilo Sarrazin who in his book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (*Germany Abolishes Itself*, 2010) popularised the narrative. From 2002 to April 2009, Sarrazin was Finance Senator in Berlin for the SPD and subsequently a member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank until the end of September 2010. After the critique on his racist book escalated, he resigned from Bundesbank under threat of being fired. It took the SPD until July 2020 to expel him from the party. His book had sold 1.5 million copies until early 2020.⁴¹

There is one sentence that marked out the German debate on migration and still resonates today: Angela Merkel’s “We’ll manage this” in 2015. This and the following year saw about two million refugees and migrants, many from Syria, coming into the EU, one million of them to Germany. In the context of the Single European Act (SEA) and the Schengen Agreement, all inner-European borders were to be abolished, establishing the freedom of movement for EU citizens. Concerning the EU’s exterior borders, the Dublin Convention⁴² instituted common procedures in the handling of applications for political asylum. The Dublin rules state that asylum seekers are required to claim refuge in the first EU state they arrive in. In practice, this led to Greece and Italy being overwhelmed, while Hungary built a razor-wire fence to keep migrants out. In August 2015, the UN’s refugee

40 A deadly ideology: how the ‘great replacement theory’ went mainstream, The Guardian, 08.06.2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream>

41 Wie Sarrazin Millionär wurde, Handelsblatt, 21.05.2012, <https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/lukratives-buch-wie-sarrazin-millionaer-wurde/6647994.html>

42 The Dublin Convention was signed in Dublin in June 1990 ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01))) and replaced first by Council Regulation No 343/2003 (Dublin II regulation; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003R0343>) and then by Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0604>.

agency warned that the situation was deteriorating and called on Europe to establish a human-rights based, coherent and comprehensive migration policy. It was in this situation that Merkel decided to suspend the Dublin rules for Syrians and stop returning asylum seekers to their first port of entry in the EU in a move that has been hailed as 'European solidarity'.⁴³ In this context, at a press conference on 31 August, she said "We have achieved so much – we can manage this!"⁴⁴

This sentence and its rejection has been a rallying point for the far-right ever since. In December 2018, the President of the Confederation of German Employers (BDA) summed up that Chancellor Merkel had been right. Surprisingly quickly, many refugees (namely about 400,000) in Germany had received a job or training place. After one year of instruction, most young migrants could speak German well enough to follow vocational school classes, and the vast majority of employed refugees were working in jobs subject to social security contributions.⁴⁵ Yet, what followed was a years-long political quarrel in the EU about the course of its asylum policy and the fuelling of right-wing anti-migration forces, particularly the AfD. The early 1990s saw a number of riots, with violent anti-migrant mobs attacking residences for contract workers and for refugees (e.g. Hoyerswerda 1991, Rostock-Lichtenhagen 1992). These attacks increased in 2015 and are currently on the rise again.⁴⁶ At the end of Merkel's 16-year term as Chancellor in 2021, journalists took stock and found that Germany had indeed managed to take the migrants in and essentially integrate them. Yet, what the country did not manage was to avoid a division of society, with the AfD now established in parliament.⁴⁷

And indeed, the same conflicts flared up again in our research period which was determined by the German federal elections and by the events in Belarus. Belarusian dictator Lukashenko had regained power in a rigged election in 2020, arrested tens of thousands of dissidents and in May 2021 forced a Ryanair passenger plane to land in Minsk in order to arrest a dissident journalist on board. When the EU began to impose economic sanctions against the regime, Lukashenko threatened to 'flood the EU with drugs and migrants'.⁴⁸ Belarusian authorities and state-controlled tourist enterprises, together with some airlines operating in the Middle East, then started promoting tours to Belarus, increased the number of connections from the Middle East and provided Belarusian visas. Refugees from Kurdish Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other crisis regions saw their chance. Those who arrived in Minsk were then taken by bus or truck to the Polish border. By mid-November, about 9,000 of them

43 Germany suspends 'Dublin rules' for Syrians, DW, 25.08.2015, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-suspends-dublin-rules-for-syrians/a-18671698>

44 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wir_schaffen_das

45 Arbeitgeberpräsident Ingo Kramer: "Die Integration der Flüchtlinge läuft besser als erwartet", Der Spiegel, 14.12.2018, <https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/fluechtlinge-die-integration-laeuft-besser-als-erwartet-a-1243659.html>

46 Bilanz für 2022 Mehr Angriffe auf Flüchtlingsunterkünfte, Tagesschau, 02.03.2023, <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/anschlaege-fluechtlingsunterkuenfte-anstieg-101.html>

47 Merkel-Zitat im Rückblick : "Wir schaffen das" - Bilanz einer Botschaft, ZDF Heute, 28.09.2021, <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/merkel-wir-schaffen-das-100.html>

48 Belarus dictator threatens to 'flood EU with drugs and migrants', The Week, 28.05.2021, <https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/952979/belarus-dictator-threatens-flood-eu-with-drugs-migrants-avoid-sanctions>

had made it to Germany. About 10,000 to 15,000 were estimated to still be in Belarus, wanting to come to Europe.⁴⁹

The Polish PiS government interpreted the influx from Belarus as an act of “hybrid warfare” and responded with a merciless no admission policy. It rejected help from the EU border protection agency Frontex. Instead, it sealed itself off on its own by investing 330 million euros in a fence that is five-and-a-half-metres high and over 186 kilometres long. Publicly, the government is trying to portray the people at the border not as seeking protection, but as a threat to the security of the Polish population. One year later, in September 2022, Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak explained that the refugees from Belarus had been the first attack from Moscow which Poland successfully repelled: “I am convinced that this attack was planned in the Kremlin and was only the initial phase for the attack on Ukraine. The rulers in the Kremlin certainly wanted to destabilise Poland. If they had succeeded, Poland would not be able to stand by Ukraine today.”⁵⁰ At the time of writing, the situation at the border persists, but reporting has all but ceased.⁵¹

The other important event during our research period was the federal election on 26 September 2021, in which the topic of migration has hardly been addressed, as researchers in a joint project of several universities have found⁵² – even though the issue has a relatively high priority from the voters' point of view. The reason likely is, that the situation is completely deadlocked at every political level, preventing any coordinated European response. In a post in our dataset,⁵³ Volt checked Ursula von der Leyen's State of the Union address 2021 and found that Afghanistan & migration had only made short-term waves. Ideas for a fair EU asylum and migration system were still missing. Of the EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, Volt says, it “cannot be the solution.” The New Pact on Migration and Asylum⁵⁴ had been launched in September 2020 by the European Commission with the ambition to create a Union-wide framework to manage migration flows at the EU's borders before the current administration's term ends in spring 2024. The reform stalled owing

49 Belarus-Konflikt spitzt sich zu – Fragen und Antworten, RND, 13.11.2021, <https://www.rnd.de/politik/fluechtlinge-in-belarus-woher-kommen-die-migranten-und-warum-wollen-sie-nach-deutschland-QNIZSV2Z7VA3ZIUQ2ZTKYTZBF4.html>

50 Geflüchtete an der polnisch-belarussischen Grenze, Deutschlandfunk, 12.12.2022, <https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/hintergrund-gefluechtete-an-der-polnisch-belarussischen-grenze-100.html>

51 Migranten frieren immer noch im Wald, ZDF Heute, 17.12.2022, <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/polen-belarus-grenze-zaun-migration-fluechtlinge-100.html>

52 Wahlkampf: Migration laut Wissenschaftlern kaum Thema – Flucht im Fokus, RND, 13.09.2021, <https://www.rnd.de/politik/wahlkampf-afghanistan-fluechtlinge-fuer-waehler-ein-wichtiges-thema-fuer-parteien-jedoch-kaum-WXBZ5UEZZ3NXWUTTFIRKZUIK4.html>

53 <https://www.facebook.com/134209407129787/posts/952397321977654>

54 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en

to persistent disagreements among the Member States,⁵⁵ but seemed to be nearing some agreements at the end of 2022.⁵⁶


An AfD post quoting a PSM station⁵⁷ gives some comparative data to the situation in our research period. The number of asylum seekers in the EU has increased sharply. In Germany alone, by the end of September, 100,278 migrants are said to have submitted an initial application to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany remains by far the most important destination country in the EU for those seeking protection. It is followed by France with 54,105 asylum applications in the first three quarters of 2021, Spain (41,799), Italy (37,492) and Austria (22,928). Overall, 2021 is the ninth year in a row in which the value of first-time asylum applications in Germany exceeds the 100,000 mark.

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

We can see in Figure 1 that Institutions is the most frequently occurring Social Media Representation with 25% of the observations pertaining to it. Moreover, Values is the least occurring Social Media Representation. People and Territory are more frequent, but far from the extent of Institutions.

Figure 1. Social Media Representations Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 7748.

55 'Major progress' as EU gives fresh push to stalled migration pact, Euronews, 10.06.2022, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/10/eu-hails-historic-agreement-as-it-gives-fresh-push-to-stalled-migration-pact>

56 Momentum is here to approve EU migration pact, EPP president says, Euractiv, 22.11.2022, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/momentum-is-here-to-approve-eu-migration-pact-epp-president-says/>

57 <https://www.facebook.com/1601372636839499/posts/2873460189630731>

In Figures 2 and 3 we see a spike in Social Media Representations in week 45 of 2021 (08.-14. November) and a smaller one in week 42 (18-24 October). This is most pronounced for the variables Territory and Institutions, but smaller peaks are also visible for People, Law and Values.

During week 45, the situation at the border between Belarus and Poland escalated, which we see documented in the posts of our sample: “Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko escalates the crisis on the border with the EU. Hundreds of people are pushing towards Poland. Will there be more deaths now? The refugees shout ‘Germany’.”⁵⁸ “Migration via Belarus: Situation at Polish border comes to a head – [then still CSU Federal Minister of the Interior Horst] Seehofer calls for EU intervention.”⁵⁹ “The situation at the Polish-Belarusian border is becoming more and more dramatic. The migrants have to stay out in the cold and are exposed to violence by the police of both countries. ... Stop pushbacks!”⁶⁰ The typically anonymous stream of refugees got a face and a name, that of 14-year-old Redost Ahmad from Iraq. The photo of him standing at the Polish border, begging the border guards in English to let his family into the EU, went around the globe.⁶¹

The institutions in the West began to respond. “Minsk is cynically instrumentalising the migrants at the EU border, von der Leyen and the US president said in Washington. The UN Security Council meets on Thursday for an emergency session.”⁶² While at that time up to 4000 migrants were estimated to be at the border, Merkel spoke on the phone with Russian President Putin and told him “that the instrumentalisation of migrants is inhumane and unacceptable.”⁶³ Meanwhile, Putin was adding fuel to the fire. “Putin is escalating the Belarus crisis, despite the EU's pleas. At the same time, the US is registering ‘unusual activities by the Russian army’ on the border with Ukraine. The mood at Nato headquarters is darkening.”⁶⁴

In this dramatic situation, humanitarian groups such as Pro Asylum,⁶⁵ Bread for the World and the German Deaconry,⁶⁶ Pax Christi⁶⁷ and Amnesty International⁶⁸ demanded that border closure

58 Der Spiegel, 08.11.2021, <https://twitter.com/derspiegel/status/1457766886683250695>

59 Stern, 09.11.2021, <https://twitter.com/sternde/status/1457953671703052295>

60 Nationalismus ist keine Alternative, 09.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/1507031122937735/posts/2778607232446778>

61 Bild, 10.22.2021, <https://twitter.com/BILD/status/1458374756407840769>

62 FAZ, 11.11.2021, <https://twitter.com/faznet/status/1458608872319598597>

63 RND, 10.11.2021, https://twitter.com/RND_de/status/1458394001502089218

64 RND, 12.11.2021, https://twitter.com/RND_de/status/1459045041092104193

65 Integrationshilfe Passau e.V., 10.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/1962854730614215/posts/3143798229186520>

66 Diakonie Deutschland, 11.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/41509493347/posts/10158618071288348>

67 pax christi Germany, 11.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/103935866334074/posts/4689739354420346>

68 TRT Deutsch, 13.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/268397135558/posts/10161244375070559>


measures and illegal violent pushbacks must be stopped and access by the refugee to the asylum system must be ensured.

For the far right, these events were welcome fuel for their fear-mongering about an ‘invasion’ which the institutions do not prevent or even actively encourage, an opportunity to decry the hypocrisy of those who praise sea rescuers in the Mediterranean but do not praise Lukashenko for being a ‘land rescuer’: “Either there is global freedom of movement at the price of disintegrating systems of order or the right of asylum in its present form has had its day. It is hardly possible to openly demand the latter. Fear reigns.”⁶⁹

In week 45 two other events stand out. It started with reports about an incident on the weekend: A mentally ill Syrian migrant seriously injured three people in a knife attack on an ICE train.⁷⁰ This was followed by the story of a Moroccan on a flight to Istanbul who faked a medical emergency in order to force the plane to land on Mallorca.⁷¹

These events can explain at least some of the peaks in week 45 in posts mentioning border-crossings into the EU (the criterion for coding Territory as 1) peak, as well as those referring to the Institutions dealing with the crisis.

Figure 2. Social Media Representations – Relative importance over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 7748.

Figure 3. Social Media Representations – Evolution over time

69 Frank-Christian Hansel, citing an unsourced text “found on the Internet”, 10.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/1440291012931352/posts/2695523430741431>

70 Deutschland Kurier, 08.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=197861205740470>; s.a.Niklas Lotz (neverforgetniki) on Hallo Meinung, 13.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2952949901611114>


71 Sven Granert, 14.11.2021, <https://www.facebook.com/290385074475223/posts/1913325818847799>



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 7748$.

From Figure 4 we can see that at least one Social Media Representation occurs in all posts. Posts containing three Representations of Migration are the most common, making up nearly 25% of the posts.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations – Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. $N = 2693$.

Figure 5 shows the sentiments of the posts. It should be noted that the sentiment describes the sentiment of the post, not the sentiment towards the topic Migration. More than 80% of the posts have a neutral sentiment. About 15% of them contain negative or positive sentiments. Among those, there are more negative sentiments than positive, which is the opposite from the findings in our Gender dataset.

Figure 5. Sentiments – Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 2693.

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Posts about Europe (1,697) are much more frequent than posts not about Europe (996) (see Tables 9 and 10 that show total number of posts at the bottom). This is the reverse of the findings in the DE Report Gender.

The Not EUR set contains posts about Denmark requiring migrants to work,⁷² about Afghan refugees at the US airbase Ramstein who were supposed to apply for asylum in the US but did so in Germany⁷³ or about Europol on the trail of Syrian smuggling network in Germany,⁷⁴ but the majority of the posts are about Germany, at the national, regional or local level. For this dataset, we were asked to manually code posts which are, in fact, about Europe. These turned out to be 115 of 316 on-topic posts (36%).

In the EUR set, Europe and EU member states are mentioned in many of the posts, but a significant number are about Germany at the national, regional or local level. E.g., claiming that most of the suspected looters after the flood disaster in July 2021 had been foreigners,⁷⁵ the CSU election programme,⁷⁶ several post that draw up a balance sheet of the Merkel Era,⁷⁷ or post about three local sports clubs awarded for their outstanding commitment to crime prevention.⁷⁸

72 <https://www.facebook.com/1500066363627018/posts/2669992459967730>

73 <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1435246270621396996>

74 <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1460131716211822594>

75 <https://www.facebook.com/1500066363627018/posts/2665423837091259>

76 <https://www.facebook.com/324182380975861/posts/4398971873496871>

77 <https://www.facebook.com/1509344156054331/posts/3035376880117710>

78 <https://www.facebook.com/426898347332370/posts/4447646355257529>

As shown in Figure 6, chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences for all the variables when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe ($p = 0.0$). Law, Territory and Institutions occur more often in Europe posts. As we have seen, our research period was determined by the events at the Belarusian border, with thousands of refugees crossing into the EU, the EU institutions being worried and those in Poland taking action, including border guards and military, which in turn raises questions about the legality of certain measures as well as calls for stricter laws.

People, Values and Culture occur more often in Non-Europe posts. In People we expect the rare cases where migrants speak in their own voice about their experience, journeys or profession. In fact, we find 26 of the 131 posts in the not-Europe dataset which were manually coded as not Europe to be in this category, i.e. an astonishing 20 percent. Here we find stories of successful integration, e.g. of Fadi Issa, a refugee from Syria now working at the employment office in Bremen: "I have experienced myself what the clients go through."⁷⁹ Or Bahar Haghanipour, who was nominated as Vice-President of the Berlin House of Representatives by the Greens,⁸⁰ Dr. Elif Duygu Cindik, psychiatrist and expert on the mental health of migrants⁸¹ and a portrait of the junior female footballers from Afghanistan who received asylum from the Taliban in Portugal.⁸²

Values are often brought up by local and national politicians and party sections, CSOs and common citizens and they include the right to asylum,⁸³ participation,⁸⁴ feminism and gender neutrality,⁸⁵ integration of migrants⁸⁶ and democracy.⁸⁷

Culture is triggered by mention of the church,⁸⁸ marriage regulations,⁸⁹ the power of language,⁹⁰ media critique,⁹¹ "Archive of Flight", an exhibition in the House of World Culture in Berlin presenting 42 interviews with people from 28 different countries of origin,⁹² and again it is quite expectable that

79 <https://twitter.com/BremenJobcenter/status/1460519710181797889>

80 <https://twitter.com/Tagesspiegel/status/1453635160843427843>

81 <https://twitter.com/DrElifCindik/status/1465420051859841027>

82 <https://twitter.com/sternde/status/1440618226002456576>

83 <https://twitter.com/tnevermind/status/1463069933357654017>

84 <https://www.facebook.com/484950398505596/posts/1598560770477881>

85 <https://www.facebook.com/34894868995/posts/10159477167808996>

86 <https://www.facebook.com/334509466941496/posts/1570708229988274>

87 <https://www.facebook.com/107969381083059/posts/361691179044210>

88 <https://twitter.com/Pallinchen/status/1449743932104003593>

89 <https://twitter.com/Sabotta4/status/1446261702329241600>


90 <https://twitter.com/tazgezwitscher/status/1448971921274642465>

91 <https://www.facebook.com/264691680187/posts/10165720416335188>

92 <https://twitter.com/morgenpost/status/1443469253261336578>

Culture indicators appear more often in local or national posts rather than in those of a European scope.


Figure 6. Social Media Representations – % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 2693 in each pair of comparison.

The majority of Europe posts contain between 1 and 3 Representations. Not Europe post contain 4 or 5 Representations or none at all. This can be seen in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations – % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 2693.


In Table 1, we can see that there are on average more Social Media Representations among Europe posts than Not Europe posts. The mean values for the Europe and Not Europe posts are 2.92 and 2.79 respectively and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0.0205$).

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe – Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	2.9258	2.7942	**	0.0205
SD	(1.349)	(1.54)		

Chi-squared tests show that there are no statistically significant differences in the proportions of the Negative Sentiment when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe ($p = 0.189$), but there are significant differences for the Neutral and the Positive Sentiment (both $p = 0.0$).


Figure 8. Sentiment – % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. $N = 2693$.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 9 show that there are several differences between Europe and Not Europe posts also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirm that Law, Territory and Institutions are more likely to occur among Europe posts than Not Europe posts. The effects are around 12, 44 and 13 percentage points respectively (Tables 13, 16 and 17). At the same time, People, Values and Culture are more likely to be observed in Not Europe posts, with effect sizes of around -18, -16 and -28 percentage points respectively (Tables 14, 15 and 18). There are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of Non-Neutral sentiments (Positive and Negative sentiments together) between Europe and Not Europe posts. Finally, results from an OLS regression show that there are more Social Media Representations present in the Europe posts than the Not Europe posts (Table 20).

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 2693 in each estimation.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media

Posts by Media (573 or 21.28%) are less common than posts by Non-Media (2,120) (See Table 23 and Table 24). In the subset of 400 manually coded on-topic posts, 207 or 52% are coded 1 in is_newsmedia.

In addition to the extracted variable “is_newsmedia”, the likewise extracted values of the variable “category” are also indicative of media. All the posts marked 1 in the is_newsmedia column, in the category column have Media, News Site or TV Channel. Posts marked 0 in the is_newsmedia column, do contain occasional media posts, such as by a political correspondent of Tagesspiegel in category no-media⁹³ and by right-wing alternative medium Hallo Meinung in category Person,⁹⁴ but overall, posts in this set are by non-media actors.

Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of all our Social Media Representations when comparing posts about Media and not about Media ($p = 0.0$ in all cases). All occur more often in Not Media posts, except for Territory which occurs in more than 70 percent of Media posts.

When we compare these overall results with our manually coded set of 207 media and 193 not-media posts, we find them roughly confirmed for Territory (in 56% of media, 34% of not-media). As we have seen, the crossing of the border between Belarus and Poland border was the dominant issue in Germany during our research period. This was reported by media, together with the

93 <https://twitter.com/cziedler/status/1447887732949323781>


94 <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2952949901611114>

reactions of the national and European Institutions, where the difference in the hand-coded posts is much less clear (in 87% of media, 88% of not-media vs. less than 50% and 80% in Fig. 10).

Manual coding also confirms the overall results for Law (in 41% of media, 72% of not-media vs. about 25% and about 45% in Fig. 10) and for Values (in 20% of media, 36% of not-media vs. about 5% and 40% in Fig. 10). This seems to reflect the failure of the EU, or rather its member states, to establish common policies and practices at the EU's external borders and in relation to refugees and other beneficiaries of protection. Since the situation at the Belarusian border was determined by lawlessness and panic-driven, militaristic, ad hoc measure taken by the Polish government, media had little to report in this respect. Whereas, political and civil society actors mobilise fundamental rights and freedoms, primarily the right of asylum, to call for urgent humanitarian and other help.

The differences in manual coding are much less clear for People (in 14% of media, 15% of not-media vs. about 30% and nearly 60% in Fig. 10) and for Culture (in 20% of media, 24% of not-media vs. about 10% and nearly 50% in Fig. 10). Here we find human interest stories reported by the press, e.g. of 14-year-old refugee Redost Ahmad from Iraq.⁹⁵ And we find several posts by the award-winning Migazin,⁹⁶ a magazine which is dedicated to the People perspective: "There is a lot of talk about migrants and migration in Germany. Especially by Germans. But in the chorus of the many, those of the migrants are usually missing. And it is precisely this gap that MiGAZIN fills with high-quality texts and comprehensible reporting."⁹⁷ On the other hand, we do see many posts, as we would expect, by CSOs reporting on the background and motivations of migrants, e.g. from the Kurdish region in northern Iraq⁹⁸ or from Algeria.⁹⁹

Figure 10. Social Media Representations – % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



95 <https://twitter.com/BILD/status/1458374756407840769>

96 <https://www.facebook.com/264691680187/posts/10165720416335188>

97 <https://www.migazin.de/category/migblog/>


98 <https://www.facebook.com/251767884962851/posts/2286005548205731>

99 <https://twitter.com/BerlinHirak/status/1447145244961775617>

Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 2693 in each pair of comparison.

There are more Media posts with 0 to 2 Social Media Representations and more Not Media posts with 3 Representations or more. This can be seen in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations – % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 2693.


From the information in Table 2, we can see that there are on average more Social Media Representations in Not Media posts than in Media posts. The mean values for the Not Media is 3.13 and for Media it is 1.94, and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0$).

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media – Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.9424	3.1297	****	0
SD	(1.123)	(1.391)		

Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of Neutral and Positive Sentiments (both $p = 0.0$) when comparing posts about Media and not about Media, while there are no statistically significant differences between Media and Not Media with respect to Negative Sentiments ($p = 0.567$).


Figure 12. Sentiment – % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 2693.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 show that there are several differences between Media and Not Media posts also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirm that Territory occurs more often among the Media posts as compared to the Not Media posts. The effect is around 22 percentage points (Table 30). They also confirm that all other variables (Law, People, Values, Institutions and Culture) are more frequent in Not Media posts, with an effect of -6, -17, -25, -5 and -26 percentage points respectively (Tables 27 till 29, 31 and 32). Finally, results from an OLS regression show that there are more Social Media Representations present in the Not Media posts than in the Media posts.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 2693 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

Figure 14 shows a post from the German EUR Migration dataset, which is exemplary of the posts containing the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Europe: Territory (Figure 9).

As we have seen, the spike in Social Media Representations in week 45 of 2021 was mostly caused by the escalating situation at the Belarusian-Polish border. Choosing the single post which represents all the different perspectives on the dramatic and complex events remains arbitrary. Migration is the 'brand core' of the AfD. The party was swept to 10 to 20 percent at the polls by the 'migrant wave' of 2015. Therefore, the post in Figure 14 arguably expresses the most immediate effect of the Belarusian crisis and of the failed common European migration policy as a whole: it drives yet more people into the arms of the far-right.

The post¹⁰⁰ is by the Spokesperson of the AfD in the Hesse State Parliament. It links to a comment in the Swiss *Neue Züricher Zeitung* which partly blames German "welcome culture" for the chaos at the Polish border. The title of the post reads: "Polish border: Thousands of migrants chant 'German! German!'" Paraphrasing the NZZ article, the post then argues that Lukashenko "may be fuelling migration" – but the German Government is worse for having sent the completely wrong signals and raised the migrants' erroneous expectations of Germany. In reference to the famous Merkel quote, it concludes that Germany has not managed to integrate the 1.4 million new arrivals in Germany since 2015. As proof, the post points to the crime figures and the increase in the potential for Islamist threats. The author does not present the full narrative up to the 'Great Replacement', but many of his readers will fill in the gap. The post ends with a call to all who feel attracted to a "Bourgeois Conservative Politics" to become member of the AfD and the link to the membership form on the AfD website.

100 <https://www.facebook.com/331622844197016/posts/860761144616514>

Figure 14. Illustrative example from Facebook

 **Robert Lambrou**
10. November 2021 · 🌐

POLNISCHE GRENZE: TAUSENDE MIGRANTEN SKANDIEREN „GERMAN! GERMAN!“

Aus dem Kommentar: Wenn Deutschland etwas ohne jeden Zweifel «geschafft» hat, dann dies: Es hat in Sachen Einwanderung die völlig falschen Signale in die Welt geschickt – Signale, die bis heute wirken und mitverantwortlich sind für die dramatische Lage an der polnischen Grenze. Der weissrussische Machthaber Alexander Lukaschenko mag die Migration befeuern – aber die überzogenen und irrigen Erwartungen der Migranten an Deutschland hat die Bundesregierung geweckt.

Bis jetzt lehrt die Erfahrung, dass jemand, der es einmal bis nach Deutschland schafft, auch bleibt. Ein funktionierender nationaler Sozialstaat und unkontrollierte Einwanderung schliessen sich jedoch aus. Hinsichtlich der Integration von 1,4 Millionen Neuankömmlingen in Deutschland seit 2015 wurde vieles gerade nicht geschafft. Das zeigen unter anderem die Kriminalitätszahlen und der Anstieg des islamistischen Gefahrenpotenzials.

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BÜRGERLICH-KONSERVATIVE POLITIK

Jetzt Mitglied in der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) werden, um die Zukunft unseres Landes besser zu gestalten. Der Mitgliedsbeitrag beträgt nur zehn Euro im Monat.

Hier geht es zum Aufnahmeformular auf der Internetseite der AfD:
<https://www.afd.de/mitwirken/mitglied-werden/>

Einfach den Mitgliedsantrag online ausfüllen oder ausdrucken und per Post an die AfD senden.

+++++

Link zum Artikel:
<https://www.nzz.ch/.../illegale-migration-nach-polen...>



NZZ.CH
Illegale Migration nach Polen: Deutschland ist mitverantwortlich
Die nächste Bundesregierung muss ihre Migrationspolitik an der Realität ausrichten, son...

👍👎 195 42 Kommentare 33 Mal geteilt

👍 Gefällt mir 💬 Kommentieren ➦ Teilen

Figure 15 shows a post from the German Not_EUR Migration dataset which is exemplary of the posts containing the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Europe: Culture (Figure 9). Our exemplary post¹⁰¹ is on the lighter side of migration. It was posted by a talkshow on the private TV station Pro7 announcing the guest of the upcoming show. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the German-Turkish Recruitment Agreement they invited Rapper Eko Fresh, who is the child of a Turkish immigrant family who form largest immigrant group in Germany with almost 3 million today. The rapper often addresses migration and racism in his songs and recently, the lyrics to his song “Der Gastarbeiter” have even become school reading. The quote on the photograph reads: “I do feel that you have to prove yourself twice if you have a migration history.”

Figure 15. Illustrative example from Facebook

101 <https://www.facebook.com/105205171835668/posts/150057790683739>



Figure 16 shows a post posted by media from the German Not_EUR Migration dataset which is exemplary of the posts containing the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Media: Territory (Figure 13). Numerically, another post on Belarus would be most typical of this set, but that would make us overlook other borders that are being crossed into Europe. Therefore, we chose one that is indicative of the posts on the route across the Mediterranean Sea. The post in Figure 16¹⁰² is by Deutsche Stimme (German Voice), which claims to contribute to a more balanced formation of opinion by providing news and commentaries from a patriotic point of view, non-conformist with the disinformation and opinion-making by the established mass media. The post links to another medium, Kanarenmarkt, a German-language online magazine for the Canary Islands. And it paraphrases the content of the linked article: While the world is watching Afghanistan as if spellbound, the influx of illegal immigrants to the Canary Islands continues almost unnoticed. In the first eight months of the year (2021), 9,154 economic refugees, mostly from Africa, reached the

102 <https://www.facebook.com/1582752065305561/posts/3000064900240930>

islands, more than twice as many as in the same period last year. This migration has been further promoted since a court allowed them to continue their journey to the Spanish mainland.”

Figure 16. Illustrative example from Facebook



Figure 17 shows a post posted by not media from the German EUR Migration dataset which is exemplary of the posts containing the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Media: Culture (Figure 13). In our manually coded data, this set contains 22 posts. These are a mixed lot, including many AfD posts. Again it would be difficult to say what is typical about them. The church would have been an option,¹⁰³ sports¹⁰⁴ another, or panel discussions, such as the one on LGBTIQ+ refugees organised by the Queer European Asylum Network (QUEAN)¹⁰⁵. Given several artistic and media related posts, we decided to chose a post about an artistic intervention in public space by the sea rescuers from the Iuventa.¹⁰⁶ The ship had been seized in summer 2017. The crew, who saved more than 14,000 lives at sea, in January 2021 after a nearly five year-long investigation by the prosecutors in Sicily, were accused of collusion in human smuggling,¹⁰⁷ facing 20 years in prison. At the time of the post by the Iuventa crew, 24 other members were facing another

103 <https://www.facebook.com/41509493347/posts/10158618071288348>;
<https://www.facebook.com/103935866334074/posts/4689739354420346>

104 <https://www.facebook.com/426898347332370/posts/4447646355257529>

105 <https://www.facebook.com/264139910322880/posts/6295128917223919>

106 <https://www.facebook.com/132889717426594/posts/879001962815362>

107 Amnesty International, Italy – A Slippery Slope for Human Rights: The Iuventa Case, August 2021, <https://www.amnesty.de/sites/default/files/2021-08/Amnesty-Statement-Italien-Asyl-Seenotrettung-Iuventa-Kriminalisierung-Anklage-August-2021.pdf>; see also Iuventa Crew, The Case, n.d., <https://iuventa-crew.org/en/case>

trial on Lesbos, Greece, including Sean Binder and Sarah Mardini.¹⁰⁸ To protest the indictment, they organised a mock trial at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. In fact, the Greek trial was adjourned on the same day,¹⁰⁹ only to restart again in January 2023.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Iuventa had been completely abandoned, plundered and largely demolished while in Italian custody.¹¹¹ Therefore, this post exemplifies again the failure of the EU member states to establish common human rights based policies and practices at the EU's external borders, instead criminalising migrants and humanitarian rescuers and showing a deadly un-culture unworthy of European values.


108 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Life-Saving on Trial, 11.11.2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/greece-life-saving-trial>

109 Heavily criticised trial of activists adjourned in Greece, Al Jazeera, 18.11.2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/18/dozens-of-activists-face-trial-for-refugee-work-in-greece>

110 UN Human Rights Defenders, Human rights defenders on trial in Greece, 09.01.2023, <https://srdefenders.org/information/human-rights-defenders-on-trial-in-greece/>

111 Iuventa ship destroyed in Italian custody: crew files criminal complaint, Pressenza, 19.02.2023, <https://www.pressenza.com/2023/02/iuventa-ship-destroyed-in-italian-custody-crew-files-criminal-complaint/>

Figure 17. Illustrative example from Facebook





*EN: Together with [borderline europe - Menschenrechte ohne Grenzen e.V.](#), we were today at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin where a mock trial took place in solidarity with Sarah, Seán, Nassos and 21 more [#FreeHumanitarians](#) who are facing a real trial today in Lesbos, Greece, for rescuing people on the move in need. The trial over there however is even more surreal and absurd than the fake one here.


From Berlin to Lesbos, to everywhere: criminalisation of migration and solidarity is the real mockery, where humanity is really on trial! While people on the move are being violently repressed and are dying every minute that passes by at our borders and inside, solidarity is NOT a crime and will never be. We demand that Greece drops the charges now!

*DE: Zusammen mit Borderline Europe waren wir heute Brandenburger Tor in Berlin, wo ein Scheinprozess in Solidarität mit Sara Seán, Nassos und 21 weiteren [#FreeHumanitarians](#) stattfindet, denen heute zeitgleich ein echter Prozess in Lesbos, Griechenland, gemacht wird, weil sie Menschen in Not geholfen un Leben gerettet haben. Der eigentliche Prozess dort ist allerdings noch surrealer und absurder als der Scheinprozess hier. Egal ob Berlin, Lesbos oder sonstwo: Wenn Migration oder Solidarität in politischen Showprozessen vor Gericht stehen, geht es eigentlich um Menschlichkeit. Während Menschen auf der Flucht brutalst gestoppt werden und täglich vor Europas Mauern - aber auch in Europa - sterben, Solidarität ist kein Verbrechen und wird auch nie eins sein. Wir fordern Griechenland auf die Anklage fallen zu lassen. We stand with Free Humanitarians!

[#DropTheCharges](#) [#TheProblemIsTheBorder](#) [#HumanityOnTrial](#)







Conclusion

The present paper analyses the Migration debate on German Facebook and Twitter in the period from September to including November 2021. This debate was dominated by the escalation of the refugee crisis at the Belarusian-Polish border and by the national elections in Germany on 26

September 2021, in which all parties avoided the subject, while the AfD used every single bit of migration-related news to fuel fear and anger and expand its membership.

We have discussed the connection of Migration/Islam and Gender already in the Gender Report. The intersection also becomes evident in our Migration data. In the set of 400 manually coded posts on topic for Migration, a search for keywords indicative of Gender shows that about half the posts in that set refer to migrants in a supportive, solidary way (an announcement by ifa galleries of the exhibition “Mis(s)placed Women?” in the Culture Centre Belgrade,¹¹² an announcement by an institute for feminism and gender democracy of a panel discussion on how the EU Dublin III-return system risks jeopardizing the transfer safeguards for LGBTIQ+ refugees and asylum seekers within the EU,¹¹³ and party programmes that discuss gender and migration among other issues, e.g. by the Greens¹¹⁴ and the Liberals¹¹⁵) while the other half the posts is from AfD, often criticising the new government’s plans as more migration and more “gender insanity”¹¹⁶ or “gender theatre”.¹¹⁷

But we also find a number of expressions of the Great Replacement narrative, which at its core talks about a strategy of ‘weaponising’ sexual production. The speaker on the topics of internal security, migration and asylum of the AfD in the Bundestag, in a lengthy post¹¹⁸ rants about how Germany “has been cleared by the naturalisation of an illegally imported army of foreigners numbering in the millions”, who have “strikingly different demographic reproduction rates” from those of native Germans. The supposed goal is “the cold disenfranchisement of the German voter through right-breaking restructuring of voter demographics.” Another AfD MP calls the EU Pact for Migration and Asylum “nothing other than the resettlement of culturally alien persons in the still predominantly homogeneous Europe of peoples and nations.”¹¹⁹ The new German government “opens the floodgates and pursues the abolition of Germany.”¹²⁰ Another post quotes the UN Genocide Convention that defines genocide as acts “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”, implies an ongoing ‘Genocide of Germans’ in that sense and hopes that those aiding and abetting it will “one day end up in court”.¹²¹ And not the least: “Do you want total immigration?”¹²²

112 <https://www.facebook.com/150436811705115/posts/4338034316278656>

113 <https://www.facebook.com/264139910322880/posts/6295128917223919>

114 <https://www.facebook.com/179895928691877/posts/5195855717095848>

115 <https://www.facebook.com/143504445664134/posts/5296987213649139>

116 <https://www.facebook.com/100044385937879/posts/403387851150743>

117 <https://www.facebook.com/336677843601760/posts/921921285077410>

118 <https://www.facebook.com/265344823886953/posts/1299423043812454>

119 <https://www.facebook.com/1586388241380355/posts/4961649897187489>

120 <https://www.facebook.com/1162229030454420/posts/4951508084859810>

121 <https://www.facebook.com/661864174144910/posts/1669004490097535>

122 <https://www.facebook.com/221093898469074/posts/970968116814978>

The spikes in Social Media Representations in week 45 of 2021 (Figures 2 and 3) which are most pronounced for the variables Territory and Institutions, but also visible for People, Law and Values, can largely be explained by the escalation of the situation at the border between Belarus and Poland and the replies of the institutions in the West.

When looking at the effects of a Gender post being about Europe or not, we find statistically significant differences for all the variables. Law, Territory and Institutions occur more often in Europe posts. As we have seen, our research period was determined by the events at the Belarusian border, with thousands of refugees crossing into the EU, the EU institutions being worried and those in Poland taking action, including border guards and military, which in turn raises questions about the legality of certain measures as well as calls for stricter laws.

People, Values and Culture occur more often in Non-Europe posts. In People we would expect the rare cases where migrants speak in their own voice about their experience, journeys or profession. While in Gender, women and queer people are part of the debate, we would expect this barely to be the case for migrants. Typically, the migrant is the other who is being talked about not with. And indeed, very few posts coded positive for “Interactions & Dialogue”, a variable that was later dropped. Yet, when we look at the 131 posts in the not-Europe dataset which were manually coded as not-Europe, we find 26 in the category People, i.e. an astonishing 20 percent. Here we find stories of successful integration of migrants who are now professionals or politicians.

Values are often brought up by local and national politicians and party sections, CSOs and common citizens. Democratic voices in the Migration debate regularly refer to fundamental values like the right to asylum, participation, feminism and gender neutrality, integration of migrants and democracy. An example is a post by Pax Christi Germany, the international Catholic peace movement, who called on the German government to release the refugees at the Polish-Belarusian border from their plight and take them to Germany. The Chairwoman of the organisation pointed out the Interior Minister Seehofer (CSU) instead of a humanitarian solution has advocated the construction of a Polish border fence. “It is bitter that this is happening just as we Germans are commemorating the fall of the Berlin Wall.” Germany can put an end to the plight of the refugees who are trapped in a no-man's land between Poland and Belarus, of whom at least five have died and children are freezing and starving. “This is also a way for Germany to make it clear that we will not be forced to betray our Christian values and human rights,” Pax Christi stressed. “The humanitarian, rule of law and moral crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border demonstrates once again the failure of EU cooperation on migration.”¹²³

In the Gender Report, we have noted that this is in striking contrast to far-right post, e.g. from the AfD, where we find no explicitly expressed values, not even general ones like ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’. The right are very clear and aggressive about what they do not like, and who to blame for it: the municipality,¹²⁴ the social security system which creates a pull effect,¹²⁵ the Red-Red-Green Senate in

123 <https://www.facebook.com/103935866334074/posts/4689739354420346>

124 <https://www.facebook.com/114038463301316/posts/652028072835683>

125 <https://www.facebook.com/953370261352295/posts/4664225460266738>

Berlin¹²⁶ who does not deport even those who do not get asylum¹²⁷ etc. Sometimes “our values and way of living” are mobilised generically, as just another element in the Us-vs-Them narrative,¹²⁸ in the “clash of civilisations”, as another AfD MP writes, between us and a “parallel society of Muslims”, where “Islam as an exclusionary and imperialistic religion of war cannot be reconciled with the basic principles of the European value system.”¹²⁹

Here we also find the juxtaposition of values- and interests-driven policies actually expressed: by Prof. Werner Patzelt on Hallo-meinung.de.¹³⁰ Referring to Lukashenko, he writes: “In any case, our do-gooders now also realise that we are being criminally blackmailed. They also feel that this blackmail hits our weakest point. That is where we want to be guided exclusively by *values* – and not at any price by *interests*. But what happens when *value*-led politics contradicts important *interests* in the long term? And what if such a contradiction is not about an individual who can certainly decide for himself whether he wants to put his own *interests* aside? But when it is about governing many people who see it as an important part of their freedom to define their own *interests* and then treat them as a priority? And what if they then also associate democracy with the idea that a government should take the majority *interests* of its people seriously?”

Culture is triggered by mention of the church, marriage regulations, the power of language, media critique, an exhibition, and again, it is quite expectable that Culture indicators appear more often in local or national posts rather than than in those of a European scope.

In WP2, we had found that professional media are important voices in the chorus on social media in Germany. When looking at the effects of a Migration post being published by a professional media actor or not, we again find statistically significant differences in the proportions of all our Social Media Representations. All occur more often in Not Media posts, except for Territory which occurs in more than 70 percent of Media posts. As we have seen, the crossing of the border between Belarus and Poland border was the dominant issue in Germany during our research period. This was reported by media, together with the reactions of the national and European Institutions

That Law and Values appear significantly less in media post, might reflect the failure of the EU, or rather its member states, to establish common policies and practices at the EU's external borders and in relation to refugees and other beneficiaries of protection. Since the situation at the Belarusian border was determined by lawlessness and panic-driven, militaristic, ad hoc measure taken by the Polish government, media had little to report in this respect. Whereas, political and civil society actors mobilise fundamental rights and freedoms, primarily the right of asylum, to call for urgent humanitarian and other help.

When looking at the sentiments of the posts in our sample, we find that 85% of them are written in a neutral tone. About ten percent of the others are negative and less than five percent are positive. This is the opposite of our findings in the Gender Report. Of those who express a strong attitude at

126 <https://www.bz-berlin.de/meinung/kolumne/kolumne-mein-aerger/der-groesste-magnet-fuer-migranten-ist-das-rot-rot-gruene-berlin>

127 <https://www.facebook.com/185133101584946/posts/4335498063215075>

128 <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=98634363885091>

129 <https://www.facebook.com/1695216187437098/posts/2832036297088409>

130 <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1496783054036014>

all, the majority in case of Migration express a Negative Sentiment, yet that difference is not statistically relevant for either Europe or Media.

To end on a forward-looking note, we would like to refer to another discovery in our data. The post¹³¹ is by Mediendienst Integration, a project by the Council for Migration (RfM), “a nationwide association of around 190 academics from various disciplines who conduct research on migration and integration issues. The Council sees its central task in critically accompanying political decisions and public debates on migration, integration and asylum.”¹³² Media Service Integration¹³³ describes itself as is “a service platform for journalists. On our website we offer facts, figures and background reports on migration, integration and asylum in Germany. We work closely with researchers and provide experts for reporting.” This could be one of our best-practice examples on how academics can contribute to the public sphere their expertise on Migration, or on Gender or any other subject that requires expert knowledge.

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131 <https://www.facebook.com/206938726107574/posts/2433389043462520>

132 <https://rat-fuer-migration.de/ueber-uns/>

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations – Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Number of Social Media Representations	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1117	14.4	41.5
People	1387	17.9	51.5
Values	897	11.6	33.3
Territory	1309	16.9	48.6
Institutions	1972	25.5	73.2
Culture	1066	13.8	39.6
Total	7748	100.0	287.7

Table 4. Social Media Representations – Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	31	44	30	19	49	41
36	82	108	72	33	125	82
37	94	124	108	42	154	121
38	96	109	100	40	145	106
39	44	87	67	28	93	75
40	45	72	50	49	102	63
41	57	69	50	58	105	67
42	130	110	69	141	189	84
43	78	93	56	88	143	77
44	52	86	34	65	108	73
45	148	191	92	357	306	93
46	120	152	82	257	240	80
47	121	119	73	114	183	89

48	19	23	14	18	30	15
Total	1117	1387	897	1309	1972	1066

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts – Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Number of Posts	% of Posts
0	127	4.7
1	371	13.8
2	580	21.5
3	645	24.0
4	624	23.2
5	290	10.8
6	56	2.1
Total	2693	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment – Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Number of Posts	% of Posts
Negative	324	12.0
Neutral	2242	83.3
Positive	127	4.7
Total	2693	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons – Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Number of Social Media Representations	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	782	15.8	46.1
People	740	14.9	43.6
Values	434	8.7	25.6
Territory	1220	24.6	71.9
Institutions	1330	26.8	78.4
Culture	459	9.2	27.0
Total	4965	100.0	292.6

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Number of Social Media Representations	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	335	12.0	33.6
People	647	23.2	65.0
Values	463	16.6	46.5
Territory	89	3.2	8.9
Institutions	642	23.1	64.5
Culture	607	21.8	60.9
Total	2783	100.0	279.4

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Number of Posts	% of Posts
0	28	1.6
1	240	14.1
2	396	23.3
3	472	27.8
4	341	20.1
5	167	9.8
6	53	3.1
Total	1697	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Number of Posts	% of Posts
0	99	9.9
1	131	13.2
2	184	18.5
3	173	17.4
4	283	28.4
5	123	12.3
6	3	0.3
Total	996	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Number of Posts	% of Posts
Negative	239	14.1
Neutral	1400	82.5
Positive	58	3.4
Total	1697	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Number of Posts	% of Posts
Negative	85	8.5
Neutral	842	84.5
Positive	69	6.9
Total	996	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1250**** (0.019)	0.1027**** (0.019)	0.1251**** (0.019)
Twitter		-0.4137**** (0.027)	-0.3987**** (0.027)
Interactions		1.727e-05*** (0.0)	1.893e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		-3.121e-08 (0.0)	-3.18e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0073 (0.005)	0.0059 (0.005)
October			-0.1287*** (0.041)
November			-0.2436**** (0.069)
week			0.0164** (0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.12	0.13

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.2091**** (0.018)	-0.2009**** (0.018)	-0.1858**** (0.019)
Twitter		-0.1928**** (0.022)	-0.1889**** (0.022)
Interactions		-1.215e-05** (0.0)	-1.117e-05** (0.0)
Followers		-4.239e-08** (0.0)	-4.35e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0162*** (0.005)	0.0152*** (0.005)
October			-0.0126 (0.044)
November			0.0717 (0.074)
week			-0.0158* (0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.07	0.07

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.1966**** (0.016)	-0.1878**** (0.015)	-0.1617**** (0.015)
Twitter		-0.6925**** (0.055)	-0.6741**** (0.054)
Interactions		-2.584e-05*** (0.0)	-2.263e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		-6.387e-08 (0.0)	-6.403e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0332****	0.0308****

		(0.005)	(0.005)
October			-0.1008***
			(0.036)
November			-0.1256**
			(0.061)
week			-0.0002
			(0.007)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.25	0.26

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.5133**** (0.009)	0.4941**** (0.01)	0.4368**** (0.011)
Twitter		0.1012**** (0.021)	0.0696**** (0.02)
Interactions		1.09e-05** (0.0)	7.083e-06 (0.0)
Followers		6.849e-08**** (0.0)	7.425e-08**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0353**** (0.005)	-0.0301**** (0.004)
October			0.1090*** (0.036)
November			0.2185**** (0.059)
week			-0.0014 (0.007)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.30	0.35	0.38

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
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Europe	0.1326**** (0.016)	0.1174**** (0.014)	0.1272**** (0.014)
Twitter		-0.3447**** (0.009)	-0.3416**** (0.009)
Interactions		5.149e-06 (0.0)	5.74e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-3.137e-08*** (0.0)	-3.123e-08*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0172**** (0.004)	0.0171**** (0.004)
October			0.0089 (0.034)
November			0.0089 (0.057)
week			-0.0054 (0.006)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.29	0.30

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.3052**** (0.014)	-0.3087**** (0.014)	-0.2806**** (0.015)
Twitter		-0.3922**** (0.024)	-0.3812**** (0.024)
Interactions		-1.539e-05** (0.0)	-1.31e-05** (0.0)
Followers		-8.299e-08* (0.0)	-8.39e-08* (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0185**** (0.005)	0.0166**** (0.005)
October			-0.0212

			(0.039)
November			-0.0283
			(0.067)
week			-0.0112
			(0.007)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.21	0.22

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0207 (0.015)	-0.0159 (0.013)	-0.0138 (0.014)
Twitter		-0.0429*** (0.015)	-0.0423*** (0.015)
Interactions		3.984e-06 (0.0)	4.145e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-4.889e-09 (0.0)	-5.559e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0567**** (0.006)	-0.0568**** (0.006)
October			-0.0240 (0.032)
November			-0.0064 (0.053)
week			-0.0003 (0.006)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.10	0.10

Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1316** (0.0587)	0.0831* (0.0483)	0.1409*** (0.0496)

Twitter		-1.8351***	-1.8129***
		(0.0510)	(0.0521)
Interactions		-0.0000***	-0.0000**
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Followers		-0.0000**	-0.0000**
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0598***	0.0567***
		(0.0121)	(0.0120)
October			-0.1483
			(0.1083)
November			-0.0837
			(0.1824)
week			-0.0190
			(0.0201)
Intercept	2.7942***	3.3379***	4.1777***
nan	(0.0488)	(0.0414)	(0.7472)
R-squared	0.0020	0.3403	0.3457
R-squared Adj.	0.0016	0.3391	0.3437
N	2693	2693	2693

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons – Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Number of Social Media Representations	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	137	12.3	23.9
People	177	15.9	30.9
Values	36	3.2	6.3
Territory	424	38.1	74.0
Institutions	278	25.0	48.5
Culture	61	5.5	10.6
Total	1113	100.0	194.2

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Number of Social Media Representations	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	980	14.8	46.2
People	1210	18.2	57.1
Values	861	13.0	40.6
Territory	885	13.3	41.7
Institutions	1694	25.5	79.9
Culture	1005	15.1	47.4
Total	6635	100.0	313.0

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Number of Posts	% of Posts
0	39	6.8
1	172	30.0
2	212	37.0
3	101	17.6
4	35	6.1
5	10	1.7
6	4	0.7
Total	573	100.0

Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Number of Posts	% of Posts
0	88	4.2
1	199	9.4
2	368	17.4
3	544	25.7
4	589	27.8
5	280	13.2
6	52	2.5
Total	2120	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Number of Posts	% of Posts
Negative	98	17.1
Neutral	472	82.4
Positive	3	0.5
Total	573	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media – Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Number of Posts	% of Posts
Negative	226	10.7
Neutral	1770	83.5
Positive	124	5.8
Total	2120	100.0

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2359**** (0.024)	-0.0643** (0.027)	-0.0586** (0.027)
Twitter		-0.4127**** (0.025)	-0.4058**** (0.025)
Interactions		1.994e-05*** (0.0)	2.141e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		-8.364e-09 (0.0)	-1.007e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0020 (0.005)	0.0007 (0.005)
October			-0.1111*** (0.042)
November			-0.2095*** (0.07)
week			0.0173** (0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.11	0.12

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2598**** (0.022)	-0.1853**** (0.026)	-0.1735**** (0.027)
Twitter		-0.1255**** (0.024)	-0.1225**** (0.024)
Interactions		-1.823e-05*** (0.0)	-1.578e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		-1.196e-08 (0.0)	-1.375e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0205**** (0.005)	0.0182**** (0.005)
October			-0.0467 (0.044)
November			0.0195 (0.074)
week			-0.0152* (0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.05	0.06

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.4701**** (0.033)	-0.2620**** (0.031)	-0.2467**** (0.03)
Twitter		-0.6362**** (0.055)	-0.6144**** (0.053)
Interactions		-3.538e-05**** (0.0)	-2.928e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		-2.296e-08 (0.0)	-2.335e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0368****	0.0329****

		(0.005)	(0.005)
October			-0.1191***
			(0.036)
November			-0.1578**
			(0.061)
week			-0.0006
			(0.007)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.09	0.23	0.26

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.3205**** (0.021)	0.2583**** (0.027)	0.2180**** (0.026)
Twitter		-0.0443* (0.024)	-0.0684*** (0.022)
Interactions		2.819e-05**** (0.0)	1.88e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		5.298e-08** (0.0)	6.109e-08*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0560**** (0.006)	-0.0473**** (0.005)
October			0.2110**** (0.041)
November			0.3776**** (0.068)
week			-0.0012 (0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.09	0.18

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
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Media	-0.2585**** (0.015)	-0.0485** (0.022)	-0.0493** (0.022)
Twitter		-0.3447**** (0.01)	-0.3463**** (0.01)
Interactions		9.048e-06 (0.0)	8.629e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-8.624e-09 (0.0)	-7.978e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0108*** (0.004)	0.0112*** (0.004)
October			0.0343 (0.035)
November			0.0489 (0.058)
week			-0.0040 (0.006)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.28	0.28

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.4381**** (0.027)	-0.2853**** (0.03)	-0.2620**** (0.03)
Twitter		-0.3010**** (0.024)	-0.2895**** (0.024)
Interactions		-2.803e-05*** (0.0)	-2.223e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		-3.119e-08 (0.0)	-3.072e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0266**** (0.005)	0.0228**** (0.005)
October			-0.0628

			(0.039)
November			-0.0998
			(0.068)
week			-0.0114
			(0.008)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.14	0.17

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0110 (0.017)	-0.0042 (0.015)	-0.0038 (0.016)
Twitter		-0.0402*** (0.015)	-0.0396*** (0.015)
Interactions		3.672e-06 (0.0)	3.937e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-5.138e-09 (0.0)	-5.679e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0562**** (0.006)	-0.0565**** (0.006)
October			-0.0265 (0.032)
November			-0.0101 (0.053)
week			-0.0004 (0.006)
N	2693	2693	2693
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.10	0.10

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-1.1873*** (0.0557)	-0.4625*** (0.0662)	-0.4470*** (0.0669)

Twitter		-1.7422***	-1.7365***
		(0.0550)	(0.0557)
Interactions		-0.0000***	-0.0000***
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Followers		0.0000*	0.0000*
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0460***	0.0425***
		(0.0117)	(0.0116)
October			-0.1350
			(0.1073)
November			-0.0489
			(0.1807)
week			-0.0137
			(0.0200)
Intercept	3.1297***	3.4350***	4.0686***
nan	(0.0302)	(0.0283)	(0.7426)
R-squared	0.1166	0.3518	0.3549
R-squared Adj.	0.1163	0.3506	0.3530
N	2693	2693	2693

Greece

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Introduction

We are already in the seventh decade of European integration (Treaty of Rome, 1957) and perhaps we are experiencing the longest period of migration from war - torn regions of Africa, Asia and the Middle East following the collapse of communism. Jacques Delors' political vision of a Europe governed by the basic principles of free movement and cooperation between

peoples is in full retreat, mainly because of the economic crisis, and its subsequent political turmoil, seeking answers in nationalism, isolationism, and discrimination. The nightmare scenario of the early 1990's, when under the weight of migratory flows from the former socialist republics, electric walls were erected along the borders of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic seem to resurface. For example, Greece has already erected 140km of walls along its land borders with Turkey, and recently the Greek PM promised an expansion to cover the entire landmass. Within European societies we see the resurgence of fascist and racist movements, riding the wave of rampant xenophobia, a movement that is largely promoted and maintained by the mass media. As a result, poverty, outright hostility, and hatred further complicate the lives of migrants and asylum seekers in the EU.

In Greece, where the effects of the economic crisis are still ongoing, additional pressures are placed on migrants in the social setting of a struggling economy, undocumented work and social exclusion. During the summer months of 2015, some 885,000 people crossed its maritime and land borders, only to end up being trapped inside the country. The refusal of several EU countries to lend assistance further exacerbated the problem. By 2019 and the Evros border crisis, where Turkey allegedly “herded” migrants to its land borders with Greece, the Greek government responded by deploying the police, the army and even local militia. The government narrative promoted by the Greek media blamed migrants for the overburdening of state institutions, while painting the opposition voices of political actors and in Greek society as misguided in the best case or outright treasonous in the worst. As a result, several issues related to migration to varying degrees have entered the public discourse under the pretext of a “migrant invasion”. This report will first present a brief media representation overview of migrants in Greece. Then it will study the legal framework and the adjustments that have been made in recent years, the characteristics of the current refugee crisis and the characteristics of migrants in Greece, factors that determine more specifically the problems faced by migrants in the country. Finally, we will present the results of WP4 quantitative analysis in an effort to provide efficient national context and deeper understanding of these results.

1.1 Background

Social media representations of migrants in Greece are an aspect that has not yet been widely studied. The reason for this is multi - faceted; on the one hand migration is often hidden under a much more polarizing issue: Euroscepticism. Research conducted on the 2015 refugee crisis over Greek - Cypriot newspapers showed that the dominant representations of Europe were negative. In the best-case scenario Europe is shown as fragmented but mostly it's blamed as the perpetrator of the migration crisis through its policies and to a lesser extent it is blamed for inhumanity and barbarism (Avramidou et.al, 2019). Similarly, Stergios Fotopoulos and Margarita Kaimaklioti (2016) have shown that the discussion about migration revolves around management. The online coverage of newspapers further condemned “violent scenes” among migrants and refugees, the ongoing tensions among refugees and unsafe and

unsanitary conditions. Even before the covid period, the situation at the hotspot camps was described by media as a health time - bomb (Georgopoulou, 2016).

On a secondary analysis, we see that the negative representations of migrants pass through various stages. As Pleios informs us (2016) at the beginning of the refugee crisis of 2015 the Greek media initially and probably instinctively represented immigration as they have had ever since the 1990's: a social problem that coupled with unemployment and criminality, demanded a state response (Poulakidakos, 2018). In 2009 Kountouri added that the antiracist movement attempted to bring to the foreground the migrant plight, but it wasn't enough to counter the negative climate that had been cultivated over the previous decades. This point was further elaborated by Fouskas and Koulierakis (2022) that showed a dichotomy in the representations of migrants between solidarity and humanitarianism on the one hand, and the usual xenophobic representations of migrants in the past such as "unwanted", "threat", "health time bomb", "criminals" and "dangerous", "invaders" and "intruders", individuals that altered the "homogeneity of Greece", "uneducated" and "uncultured". Afouxenidis et al. (2017) note that the Greek media were already covering migration as a matter of national security from 2014. Finally, Pleios (2016) showed the distinct stages of covering the immigration issue: at the early stages of the refugee crisis the media reacted with negative representations that gradually changed to positive ones for as long as the European Union followed the policy of open borders. Unfortunately, the moment this policy reversed the coverage of migrants in Greece swapped to negative, xenophobic and outright racist.

Lafazani (2018) in her article "Crisis and Immigration in Greece: From Illegal Migrants to Refugees" traces how the label of "illegal" migrant and refugee take their form and meaning within a wider social, economic, and political context. A year prior Chouliaraki (2017) studied the self - representations of migrants and refugees in digital news on Syrian refugees using their mobile devices to report to the world their plight. Chouliaraki discovers that even the practice of taking a selfie was appropriated, marginalized, and often accused in western news media. Kalfeli (2020) studied news framing of immigration during the 2015 refugee crisis and discovered two different periods (2011 - 2014 & 2015 onwards) that alters immigration from a domestic problem to a wider European crisis. Her findings show that immigration was a source of conflict and polarization in Greek society and was employed as an election political issue, either as a demand for more order and security or exploited by depicting migrants as victims alone.

As it pertains to social media, Way & Serafis (2022) studied online representations of migrants both in Turkey and Greece during the Evros incident and discovered that the openings of stories in online news leaned heavily on the authoritarian and populist talking points of their respective governments. Their comparative analysis showed how the two countries facing the crisis further inflamed tensions by targeting migrants as the "pawns of the enemy". In the same period, Archakis and Tsakona studied migrant jokes shared online in a comparative study that focused on two periods (1990 - 2010 & 2014 onwards). Through their analysis the Greek national identity was reinforced, while further marginalizing minority groups. Perifanos and Goutsos (2021) also developed a multi-modal hate speech detection algorithm for social media focusing on Twitter. The interesting finding of this study was the fact that the algorithm

started recognizing non-toxic tweets as toxic because of the use of words such as “Islam” or “refugee”. This finding shows a worsening effect from the study conducted in 2018 by Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou. Their study using a discourse historical approach demonstrated how refugees were blamed in the social media discourses by connecting the refugees to natural disasters and phenomena such as plague.

1.2 Legislation

Greece historically has deliberately put obstacles in the way of granting residence permits to migrants. In 2001 a single work permit could cost around 300,000 drachmas and many months of uncertainty. A major obstacle was that a work permit and a residence permit were two different procedures, making it virtually impossible for migrants to stay in Greece and work legally. Permits lasted only for a year and as a result, due to bureaucracy, it was often necessary to submit new applications without even having examined the old ones. With the signing of the Schengen Treaty by Greece, three types of residence permit (Visa) were established including Golden Visa (issued upon investments of €250,000).

The legal codification of migration took place in 2004 under the EU’s pressure and the increasing migratory flows. Changes were made despite political objections, since the granting of permits was, among other things, an important source of revenue for the state. The milestones in this effort for Greek law are the Citizenship Code (2004) and the Immigration and Social Integration Code (2015). The latter was amended in 2015 by Law No. 4332/2015, which finally provides for a single procedure for applying for a work permit and residence permit. Thus, based on Law No. 4332/2015, residence permits were allowed for exceptional reasons, such as developing special ties with the country, seasonal or voluntary work, studies and family reunification.

The most important development in the new legislation drive was that second-generation migrants had for the first time the right to Greek citizenship, as did children attending Greek schools. Although significant progress has been made in terms of legislation, simplification of procedures (codification, Citizen's Advocate) and transparency (the "Citizenship" system), in practice the procedures remain extremely time-consuming. The codification of bureaucracy came with an array of supporting documents requiring applicants to return to their countries of origin to collect papers from services that may be due to war or other limitations unavailable to them. Finally, it is important to note that while the legalization of migrants nominally allows for their social integration, it has a massive negative impact in their ability to find work, as it removes the formal basis of inequality that stems from the lack of a residence title in the country (Papadopoulou, 2007).

Regarding asylum procedures, the Law No. 4636/2019 "On International Protection and other provisions" was an important breakthrough. The new law systematizes and updates in a single piece of legislation all the provisions governing the recognition and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, the status of refugees or persons entitled to subsidiary protection, the reception of applicants, the procedure for granting and revoking international protection status, as well as the consolidation in a single piece of legislation of the national provisions incorporating the EU Directives which constitute, for the most part, the Common European Asylum System.

Religious freedom is protected under the 13th article of the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic, by recognizing that religious conscience as inviolable. Further, the enjoyment of civil and political rights does not depend on one's religious beliefs.

Regarding racial discrimination, according to the article 81A of the Penal Code as amended and in force, the commission of any crime, where the victim is selected on the basis of his or her race, color, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin, disability, sexual orientation, identity, or gender characteristics, carries increased penalties. Victims and witnesses of racist violence who are not citizens of EU Member States may be granted a residence permit for humanitarian reasons under the article 19A of Law No. 4251/2014, as amended by Law No. 4332/2015.

The National Council against Racism and Intolerance was established in 2015, with the participation of representatives of the Administration and Civil Society (Law 4356/2015), whose responsibilities include the preparation of a National Action Plan against Racism and Intolerance. The Ministry of Migration Policy was first established in 2016 and was abolished in 2019 by the new government. Half a year later, the government decided to establish the Ministry of Immigration and Asylum. Another significant adverse development was the withdrawal of AMKA (social security number) from migrants.

1.3 National context

During the time of the study (01.09.2021 - 30.11.2021) there were several key events that shaped the representation of immigration in Greece. Of these, by far the most important was the clash of the Greek PM with a Dutch journalist, Ingeborg Beugel, during a press conference over the issue of illegal pushbacks (10.10.2021). The journalist accused the PM of lying over the living conditions of migrants still housed in hotspots and of subterfuge of the fact that the Greek government carried out pushbacks. The PM personally attacked the journalist in response and the Greek press followed by spearheading a smear campaign against the journalist. Beugel was facing court charges for human trafficking for assisting a refugee, who the media then presented as her lover. Other allegations levied against her included her using migrants as personal slaves, who were charged with “walking her dogs”. As a result of such attacks the journalist was physically apprehended by “irate” citizens and was stoned, leading to her fleeing the country. During the same period a Greek activist who rescued hundreds of people at sea was habitually attacked by the press for espousing Turkish propaganda and as a result his nomination for an honorary award for his work from the President of the Republic was retracted without further explanation.

Migration and the politics of the Greek government were also reinforced by several EU officials and politicians who issued favorable statements during the period, such as Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and the President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen, who praised Greece for “guarding the borders of Europe”. These statements were overrepresented and often exaggerated by the Greek media. Similarly, the Greek government

took refuge in that praise when confronted by the opposition for human rights violations. An interesting piece of news that never made it into the mainstream Greek media was also the process of bringing Frontex to trial in the European Court of Human Rights for abuses in the Aegean Sea.

The government also faced severe criticism over violations of labor laws in cases of migrants employed in low status low pay works, such agriculture, delivery and so forth.

Migrant trafficking networks seems to be a persistent challenge afflicting both European institutions and the Greek government. Indicative of this vulnerability and weakness, directly related to the migration issue, is the fact that at the end of September 2021 the meeting between the Greek Deputy Minister of Citizen Protection, Lefteris Economou, with Germany's Parliamentary Deputy Minister of Interior, Infrastructure and Communities, Stefan Mayer, incorporated discussions focusing on addressing migrant trafficking networks. The issue of police cooperation was raised in the context of European structures, with an emphasis on stopping irregular immigration and effectively dealing with trafficking networks, from Asia and the Middle East to Europe (iefimerida, 2021). Later on (November 2021) Europe was found in turmoil with regard to migration flows, for four days after the worst migrant shipwreck in the English Channel a European intergovernmental meeting was held in Calais to enforce the fight against 'trafficking networks' (kathimerini.gr, 2021).


Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

The analysis is based on 18.272 cases of migration representations in Greek social media. Of these, one third of the posts refer to values, one in four refers to EU institutions and one in five to matters of territory. Only 15% of the posts refer to legal matters and a very small percentage of posts (less than 4%) refer to human stories.

During the period under examination (September - November 2021) the most prominent social media topics were the crisis on the Poland - Belarus borders and the illegal push - backs of migrants and refugees to Turkey by Greek authorities. Greek left opposition parties, NGOs and individual citizens were demanding from the Greek government and the EU institutions to abide by EU law and international treaties and provide refugees with shelter and decent living conditions. On the other side of the political spectrum, there were posts referring to national security and endangered ethnic values by the inability of the Greek government to stop immigration.

Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 18272.


In figure 2 the data reveal a peak in migration representations from week 44 (01.11.2021 - 07.11.2021) to week 48 (29.11.2021 - 05.12.2021). The most prominent news topic during this period is the crisis across Belarus - Poland borders. This is a very important incident for Greeks since it resembles the Greek - Turkish border crisis at Evros in 2019. [Popaganda.gr](#), a popular news portal addressed to leftist youth reports: “The European Union accuses Belarus of deliberately encouraging migrants to enter the EU via Poland, Lithuania and Latvia as a way of exerting pressure”. Parallels to the Evros event appeared during the same period. [Liberal.gr](#) reports: “Without strong external borders, Lukashenko will blackmail Europe just as Erdogan tried to do through Greece, says the head of the Parliamentary Group...”. [Pameevro.gr](#), a news blog, reports: “The (Greek) government is oriented towards extending the fence at the Greek-Turkish border in Evros, as indicated by recent diplomatic initiatives of Greek officials in Brussels”. A facebook group called “Citizens of Mytilene” framed the crisis not only as an outside threat to Poland’s sovereignty but also as a threat from within the EU. [The post says](#) “GERMANY AGAINST POLISH NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. It is truly chilling to see the hypocritical German aggression that has been manifested recently against Poland. The crime of the right-wing Polish government is simply that it is serving its national mission. It respects itself, the citizens who have magnificently elected it for the second time, and the interests of the state. A second crime of the Poles is that they are a very homogeneous nation (...)”. Individual users asked for the EU to step in to help Poland defend its borders using the hashtag #IStandWithPoland.

There were however opposing voices too. A prominent activist [writes on twitter](#) “The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called it a "brutal attack" at the EU's borders. Brutal attack by migrants and refugees with children, tents, and bags. Christian Europe. Increasingly far right. Falling lower and lower”.

Another debate that took place in the Greek online public sphere during the same period was the denial of the Greek government that it encouraged migrants push backs to Turkey,

accusations that the Government dismissed as (turkish) propaganda. A user posed on twitter [a question](#) to a prominent Greek journalist: “@NChatzinikolaou The European Commission, the BBC, the New York Times, CNN, Deutsche Welle, UNHCR, Amnesty International, who are talking about pushbacks at the Greek borders, have they all conspired against the innocent Greek state? Are they all Turkophiles?”


Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 18272.

Indeed in figure 3 we can see that the most important dimensions regarding migration representations are values, territory and institutions. Their presence is noted mostly from the middle of week 43 up to week 48 with a peak during the 46th week.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 18272.

More than 40% of posts include only one dimension, close to one third includes two, while less than 10% of posts include more than three dimensions. Posts referring to values also refer to territory and / or institutions. For example a post from a news portal rosa.gr reports: “The mayor of Riace in Calabria was given a 13-year prison sentence and a fine of €700,000, signed by the far-right. What harm did he do? He has consistently shown solidarity with migrants and refugees. 🤝 Lucano's solidarity efforts were also deeply political, at a time when xenophobic nationalism dominated the Italian political scene”. A facebook group under the name “[Stop war on migrants](#)” posted: “The Global Conference on Border Security, taking place in Athens on 5-7 October at the Caravel Hotel, comes to recognize the valuable role of the Greek State in "preventing migratory flows" over the past years. From the system of racist camps expanded by the SYRIZA-ANEL government to the current anti-immigration policy of the New Democracy, the anti-immigration war is constantly intensifying new racist legislation making camps even more closed prisons with new walls, barbed wire and fingerprint entry-exit systems, from the Samos camp to the Malakasa camp. New ministerial decisions that facilitate asylum application rejections and deportations by recognizing Turkey as a safe country, intensify pushbacks from the border and even from the mainland, dramatically cut financial benefits and housing structures for large numbers of asylum seekers, pushing thousands of people into economic and mental destitution. At this World Congress, Greece will "export racist repression know-how" to other countries that do not have similar experience, which is why it is the focus this year (...).


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 14010.

Regarding Sentiment, the majority of posts (more than 90%) refer to migration using a neutral tone. Although very few in total, posts with negative sentiment are almost double than of those with positive ones.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 14010.

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Posts on migration with referrals to Europe are less than the ones without. More precisely, out of 7,061 posts that refer to Europe, 13.7% refer to law, 20.5% to values, 34.6% to matters of territory and 30% to institutions. On the other hand, posts without EU referrals (n = 11.211) 18.2% refer to legal matters, 39.4 to values, 14.3% to territory and 23.1% to institutions. With the exception of law dimension, chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of all Social Media Representations when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe (p = 0.0). We can conclude therefore, that Territory is a dimension that is present when talking on migration from a European point of view, while Values is the most prominent issue when referring to migration from a national or international angle.


Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 14010 in each pair of comparison.

Again, only one dimension is noted in almost half of the cases for both categories of posts. Posts referring to the EU include more frequently two dimensions (33.6%) compared to posts without EU referrals (24.2%). Similarly, posts with 3 dimensions are more frequent when referring to the EU (12.6%) than without (6.6%).

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 14010.


Social media representations in posts referring to Europe are slightly more than of non-European posts (1.58 and 1.17 mean values respectively). A t-test confirms that the difference is statistically significant ($p=0.0$).

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.5821	1.1743	****	0
SD	(0.817)	(0.857)		

When it comes to Sentiment, chi-square tests reveal that when comparing Europe-related content to non-Europe-related content, statistically significant differences appear only on posts incorporating either neutral or positive sentiment ($p=0.008$ and $p=0$ respectively). Social media posts framed by positive sentiment come mostly from political affiliated media covering the work of political actors, parties or politicians. For example a left - wing newspaper, [Epohi](#) reports: “The case of the Somali asylum seeker Mohammad Hanad Abdi, who was sentenced to 142 years in prison, while he rescued 33 people at sea, was highlighted at an international level by thanks to MEP of SYRIZA - Progressive Alliance, Stelios Kouloglou, and with it, the issue of the treatment of people who are trying to find a safe haven”. Posts with a negative sentiment have a low frequency and don’t vary significantly between Europe and non - Europe posts (2.2% and 2.4% respectively).


Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. $N = 14010$.

Results from Logit regressions confirm that Territory and Institutions representations are more likely to occur among Europe posts than in Not Europe posts. The effects are around 30 and 15 percentage points respectively. At the same time Law, People and Values are more likely to be observed in Not Europe posts, with effect sizes of around 5, 7 and 17 percentage points respectively. However, there are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of non-neutral sentiments (positive and negative sentiments together) between Europe and Not Europe posts. Finally, results from an OLS regression show that there are more Social Media Representations present in the Europe posts than the Not Europe posts.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 presented in Appendix B. N = 14010 in each estimation.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media

Posts by Media (1,468) are less common than posts by Not Media (12,542). Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of People, Values, Territory and Public sphere representations when comparing posts about Media and not about Media ($p = 0.0$ in all cases except for Law $p = 0.155$). Territory and Institutions occur more often in Media posts, while Law, People are Values are more frequent among Not Media posts.


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 20 and Table 21 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 14010 in each pair of comparison.

From Table 2, we can conclude that there are, on average, more Social Media Representations among Media posts than Not Media posts. The mean values for the Media and Not Media posts are 1.46 and 1.28 respectively and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$). The result seems to be driven by the fact that there are more Media posts with 2 or 3 Social Media Representations and slightly more Not Media posts with 1 Social Media Representation.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 22 and Table 23 presented in Appendix C. N = 14010.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.4625	1.2857	****	0
SD	(0.876)	(0.863)		

Chi-squared tests conclude that when comparing posts about Media and not Media there is statistically significant difference for posts with Negative Sentiment ($p < 0.05$), while there are no statistically significant differences regarding the occurrence of other sentiments ($p = 0.446$ for Neutral, and $p = 0.143$ for Positive).


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 24 and Table 25 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 14010.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 show that there are minor differences between Media and Not Media posts, also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirms that Territory occurs more often among the Media posts as compared to the Not Media posts. The effect is around 25 percentage points. At the same time, Law, People, Values, Institutions and non-neutral Sentiments are more likely to be observed in Not Media posts, with effect sizes of around 15, 5, 2.8, 6 and 5 percentage points respectively.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 26, Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32. presented in Appendix C. N = 14010 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

In Figure 9 we see that Territory has the largest coefficient estimate of Europe, while Values has the smallest coefficient. Similarly, in Figure 13 that Territory has the largest coefficient estimate of Media and Values has the smallest. As we have already mentioned during the period under examination there were numerous posts regarding the crisis on the Polish - Belarussian border. However, another topic that shows up is cases of human trafficking and incidents occurring during migrants' way to Europe.

From the non- media Europe-related social media posts the most influential post reflecting Territory dimension (8,382 reactions) comes from the Prime Minister's facebook account and a video with his declarations for the new camp in Samos.

The [PM post](#) says: "Today is a really important day for Samos, as we are making good on our commitment to finally close the shameful structure, and at the same time officially inaugurate the new structure which, as we committed, was created with European funding outside the urban fabric. The new structure is modern, secure, with controlled entry and exit points. Its purpose is to temporarily accommodate refugees and migrants until it is assessed whether they should be granted asylum or returned under international agreements to their countries of origin or to Turkey. On my previous visit to the old camp, I saw thousands of persecuted people, in appalling conditions, in a camp that was a disgrace to human dignity. This structure has been abolished and given back to the local community. This government has made good on its political commitment to secure and justly guard our country's borders. And special congratulations are due to the women and men of the Coast Guard, who do a great job at sea, day and night, 365 days a year".

Kyriakos Mitsotakis October 1, 2021 · 🌐

Σήμερα πραγματικά είναι μια σημαντική μέρα για τη Σάμο, καθώς κάνουμε πράξη τη δέσμευσή μας να κλείσουμε οριστικά τη δομή της ντροπής, και ταυτόχρονα να εγκαινιάσουμε επίσημα τη νέα δομή που, όπως δεσμευτήκαμε, δημιουργήθηκε με ευρωπαϊκή χρηματοδότηση εκτός του αστικού ιστού.

Η νέα δομή είναι σύγχρονη, ασφαλής, με ελεγχόμενη είσοδο και έξοδο. Σκοπός της είναι να φιλοξενεί προσωρινά πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες έως ότου αξιολογηθεί αν αυτοί πρέπει να πάρουν άσυλο ή να επιστραφούν βάσει των διεθνών συμφωνιών στις χώρες προέλευσής τους ή στην Τουρκία.

Σε προηγούμενη επίσκεψή μου στο παλιό ΚΥΤ, αντίκρισα χιλιάδες κατατρεγμένους ανθρώπους, σε άθλιες συνθήκες, σε έναν καταυλισμό ο οποίος αποτελούσε ντροπή για την ανθρώπινη αξιοπρέπεια. Η δομή αυτή καταργήθηκε και αποδίδεται στην τοπική κοινωνία.

Η κυβέρνηση αυτή έχει κάνει πράξη την πολιτική της δέσμευση για ασφαλή και δίκαιη φύλαξη των συνόρων της πατρίδας μας. Και αξίζουν ξεχωριστά συγχαρητήρια στις γυναίκες και στους άνδρες του Λιμενικού Σώματος, που κάνουν σπουδαία δουλειά στη θάλασσα, μέρα-νύχτα, 365 μέρες το χρόνο.

<https://primeminister.gr/2021/10/01/27602>



5.5K 552 comments 215 shares

The most popular media post on Territory dimension (492 reactions) comes from skai.gr Facebook account and says: "Austrian Chancellor: "Today, at the external borders of the EU, these phenomena are better dealt with and the approach is different than it was in 2015, when with European resources, i.e. European taxpayers' money, migrants were pushed through Greece to other European countries".

SKAI.gr September 4, 2021 · 🌐

Αυστριακός καγκελάριος: "Σήμερα, στα εξωτερικά σύνορα της ΕΕ, αντιμετωπίζονται καλύτερα αυτά τα φαινόμενα, είναι διαφορετική και η προσέγγιση απ' ό,τι ήταν το 2015, όταν με ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους, δηλαδή χρήματα των Ευρωπαίων φορολογούμενων, οι μετανάστες προωθούνταν μέσω της Ελλάδας σε άλλες χώρες της Ευρώπης"



SKAI GR
Κουρτς: Η Ελλάδα φυλάει καλύτερα απ' το 2015 τα σύνορα της ΕΕ - Η δήλωση που θα ενοχλήσει την Άγκυρα | ΣΚΑΪ

198 54 comments 3 shares

A popular post on the incident between the Greek PM and the Dutch journalist comes from the pressproject.gr news portal (1,975 total reactions). The post says: "Kyriakos Mitsotakis reacted in a particularly strong way when the Dutch journalist Ingeborg Beuchel asked him: "When will you stop lying about push backs and about what is happening with refugees in

Greece". Visibly cornered, Mitsotakis replied : "I know that in your country you can ask direct questions. I do not allow you to insult me in this building," while his suggestion that "we block the flows from Turkey and call on the coast guard to return them" caused a sensation".



The Press Project

November 9, 2021 · 🌐

Με ιδιαίτερα έντονο τρόπο αντέδρασε ο Κυριάκος Μητσοτάκης όταν η Ολλανδή δημοσιογράφος Ινγκεμποργκ Μπέουχελ τον ρώτησε : «Πότε θα σταματήσετε να λέτε ψέματα για τα push backs και για όσα συμβαίνουν με τους πρόσφυγες στην Ελλάδα». Ο Κ. Μητσοτάκης εμφανώς στριμωγμένος απάντησε: «Γνωρίζω ότι στην χώρα σας μπορείτε να κάνετε ευθέως ερωτήσεις. Δεν σας επιτρέπω να με προσβάλλετε σε αυτό το κτίριο», ενώ αίσθηση προκάλεσε η πρότασή του «εμποδίζουμε τις ροές από την Τουρκία και καλούμε το Λιμενικό τους να τους επιστρέψουν».



THEPRESSPROJECT.GR

«Ο Μητσοτάκης τα έχασε εντελώς. Χαρακτήρισε την αλήθεια "προσβολή"» λέει η δημοσιογράφος που ρώτησε για pushbacks - The Press Project - Ειδήσεις, Αναλύ

👍👎 1.3K

113 comments 76 shares

Another post including both dimensions, Territory and Values, is from [Rosa news website](#). The post says: "The mayor of Riace in Calabria was given a 13-year prison sentence and a fine of €700,000, signed by the far-right. What harm did he do? He has consistently shown solidarity with migrants and refugees. 🤝 Lucano's solidarity efforts were also deeply political, at a time when xenophobic nationalism dominated the Italian political scene. ❌ There was the target of far-right attacks throughout his tenure as mayor from 2004 to 2018, when he was arbitrarily deposed under the days of far-right Lt. Interior Minister Matteo Salvini. 🏛️ Last Thursday, a Lokri court sentenced him to thirteen years and two months in prison for "aiding and abetting illegal immigration" and related charges. #Solidarity #Refugees



ROSA

October 2, 2021 · 🌐

🇮🇹 Στον δήμαρχο του Ριάτσε στη Καλαβρία επιβλήθηκε ποινή φυλάκισης 13 ετών και χρηματικό πρόστιμο 700.000 ευρώ, με την υπογραφή της ακροδεξιάς. Τι κακό έκανε; Δείχνει με συνέπεια αλληλεγγύη σε μετανάστες και πρόσφυγες.

👉 Οι προσπάθειες αλληλεγγύης του Λουκάνο ήταν επίσης βαθιά πολιτικές, σε μια εποχή κατά την οποία ο ξενοφοβικός εθνικισμός κυριαρχούσε στην ιταλική πολιτική σκηνή.

✖ Υπήρξε στόχος επιθέσεων της ακροδεξιάς καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της θητείας του ως δημάρχου από το 2004 έως το 2018, οπότε και καθαιρέθηκε αυθαίρετα, επί ημερών του ακροδεξιού υπ. Εσωτερικών Ματέο Σαλβίνι.

👤 Την περασμένη Πέμπτη, ένα δικαστήριο στο Λόκρι τον καταδίκασε σε δεκατρία χρόνια και δύο μήνες φυλάκιση για «συνέργεια σε παράνομη μετανάστευση» και αντίστοιχες κατηγορίες.

#Solidarity #Refugees



ROSA.GR

Με φυλακή 13 χρόνια τιμωρούν τον Ιταλό Δήμαρχο που άνοιξε το χωριό του στους πρόσφυγες | ROSA.GR

👍👎 660

22 comments 43 shares

A popular facebook post (566 total reactions) that refers to Values coming from a [health news blog](#) says: “ My name is: MYRTO PAPADOMICHELAKI and I'm alive!!!! And I wish I had a voice to shout it out loud! In spite of all those who would like me to die... so they can make a statue of me. Council of State October 4, 2021. Myrto, in the minds of most Greeks you are the 15-year-old teenager who on 22/7/2012 was the victim of a murderous attack on the island of Paros by a Pakistani-born illegal immigrant (because he did not come from a war zone, nor did he seem to have crossed the border after living in Greece for 4 years). You survived this attack with 100% disability, unlike your unfortunate fellow citizens Manos Kantaris aged 44 and Nikolaos Mustakas aged 25 who suffered a violent and unjust death. The former left 4 children and the latter left his parents inconsolable. The two families did not receive the slightest support from the state, because, as we know, the dead cannot ask for anything. They have no voice, no voice.”

Λέντι
October 3, 2021

Με ένα - ΜΕΡΤΣ ΠΡΑΥΛΟΒΙΒΙΛΑΝΙΧ
και ένα - Ζαλάντσαφφτ!

Και θα δείτε να είναι πάντα νότιο καινούριο δυνατό!
Εί παρουν όλων αυτών που ένα τους βλάπτει να είναι παλιό... για να μου είναι ο θάνατος.

Σταβόλο Επικράτος 4 Οκτωβρίου 2021 177

Μερτά μου στη συνάντηση των παραπονεμένων Ελλήνων είναι η 15χρονη θέρμη που στις 22/7/2012
έπαυσε όλο δικαστικό επίθετο στο ναυό της Πάρος από ένα τριών περασμένων κοσμογονής
κοινωνικοποίηση (για να βρει στο εμπόρευμα) και παρουν το σύνολο ορεινών βουνών ή
χρονών στην Ελλάδα. Σπαρτάρας επάνω από την επίθεση με 100% αντιστάση, σε αντιστάση με τους άλλους
σημειώτες σου Μάκη Κωνσταντίνου 14 και Νικόλαο Μουστακίδη 25 ο οποίος υπέστησαν βίαια και άδικο
δίκαιο. Ο πρώτος άρχισε 4 παιδιά και ο δεύτερος τους γονείς του επαγγελματία. Οι δύο οικογένειες δεν
έλαβαν την παραμικρή στήριξη από την πολιτεία, γιατί ως γινώσκον οι νεκροί δεν μπορούν να ζητήσουν
τιποτέ. Δεν είναι λόγο, φίλοι!

Είπα όμως επάνω της πύλας και πολείες από εκείνο το απόγευμα μέχρι και σήμερα με ποικίλες
μεταφορές σε νοσηρεία και κέντρα αποκατάστασης για να κερδίσω με υποτιμηθεί διαίχτης την
κίνηση την οριάν, την Ζαυρόρακη που σου άρεσε, την κομισαί που αγνοήθηκε, το όνομα που είλας...
Έλας χροιάς από από την θέρμη την οποία δείλας και την βία της του κράτους για ένα κόσμο
που ανέχεται στο μέγαλο στο 2000 εκτός αυτών που παρήγαγε εμάς.

Φυσικά ορατά της, κοροϊφάρας που άρχισαν να κερδίζουν άρματα. Αποκατάσταση (σημαί),
κρεμαστή, φάρμακο για το σπέρμα για το σπέρμα, για τους πόνους (βέβαιος) τα πρωτότυπα φάρμακα και ένα
μετάσχημαί με το σύνολο κόσμου.

Νοσηλευτική βία της και ούτως εξήλας κάθε μέρα, και κτηική παρακοινωνία στο κέντρος
πολλών αδελφών ως άτομο με πολλά υποκαείμενα νοσήρια υπονομεύει υλικά ως βίαιες παρουνες,
σημειώματα και βία της, τα οποία γινώσκον να γινώσκον και βία της εντός, να γινώσκον και βία, ως
και φάρμακο, μετά την πρώτη και κομμοδένειο και άλλα πολλά.

Το Αρτείο πρωτότυπο κερδισί στις απόψεις της οποίας ελπίδες σε διαρκή τους ΑΥΤΟΗ ένα όνομα
σημαί τα οποία δεν ήταν δυνατό να προβλεφεί, επομένως δεν δικαιούσε κάπο μέρος από το ελληνικό
κράτος ως Ελλάδα πόλη για τις αναρρώσεις βλαβής της οποίας έχει υποστεί. Αν όλη τις άρχισε, αν οι
εκείνοι για να μην ούρα την άδικο που έχει υποστεί, και γινώσκον παράλληλα την βία της που
δεν είναι να αντιμετωπίσει ο κάθε Έλληνας πόλη.

Είς αναρρώσεως ως μέρα με τον όρο ΑΥΤΟΗ (Με μια διαρκή της) ΑΥΤΟΗ που γινώσκον στην Ελλάδα.
Αν τους γινώσκον σε άλλη περιπέτεια, φέρει η μέρα ένα ήρωα διαρκή, Παρ στην Ελλάδα διαρκή
πρώτα τους οποίους πέρασαν τα άλλα κράτη, αλλά δεν φέρουν να υπάκουε και με στα πρώτα
περασμένα στις αναρρώσεως της αναρρώσεως υποστεί Ελλάδα πόλη ως απόδρασμα από αυτά
το κράτος. Είς ο καθένας άρμα να τα, γιατί να πλάσσει το Ελληνικό κράτος για απόδραμα σημαί σε ένα
Έλληνα? Δεν είναι σωστό. Το άρμα και βία της είναι πάντα βία της.

Στην όρο γινώσκον η επίθεση εναντίον γυναικών δεν αναρρώσε ως όλο δείς επίθετο με
100% αντιστάση όπως και σημειώματα στο απόδραμα θάνατος.

Είς ανάληψη επίθετο? Είς αποκατάσταση άρμα, γινώσκον δεν αναρρώσε ΠΟΛΥΩΝΑ. Αν ήταν
πρωτότυπο είπα και παρουν από το Πόσεντα που το 2012 δεν ήταν εμπόλεμο Ζαυρό ή τα πρώτα
διαρκή της αντιμετώπιση!

Αν σε αποκατάσταση κίνησης, Έλληνας ο ΜΕΤΣ θα φέρουν την βία της, η ελληνική βία της θα σε
αντιδράσει σου στήριξη, οι αντιστάσεις από τα ρατσιστικά και της βία των γυναικών, παιδικών,
κοινωνικών, προσαίμα, θα σε φέρει ως σημαί του αγώνα της και θα διαρκή στην στήριξη σου
την όλη της για ότι σου στήριξη διαρκή της παρουν δεν βία της και από αυτούς παρουνες!
Υπόλοιπα όνομα που μέρα στήριξη σε βία της χωρίς να ορανότα. Υπόλοιπα επίθετο φίλοι που
αναρρώσεως ήρωα και βία της να σε στήριξη (ε. βία της) και βία της προσαίμας για το
επιθετικό ταξί στο εμπόρευμα με σκοπό την όραση βία της της αγίας σου!

Ο άρμας παρουνε αναρρώσε κινώσε? Το γιατί δεν το γινώσκον Ελλάδα όμως να το μέλα, ίσως τα άρμα
αυτά που τον έκλεισε, χωρίς να τους γινώσκον.

Είς μέρα με αναρρώσε και η επίθεση αποκατάσταση της αγίας σου για να μειώσουν οι πόνο σου, να
βρονταί το χροιά σου να υπάκουε η όραση βία της στο λόγο και την αυτονομία σου είναι δυνατό.
Δεν με αναρρώσε τα επικοινωνιακά κέρματα. Δεν με αναρρώσε η διαρκή της και το φάρμα, το κινώσε της
έλας. Αυτό κινώσε Μία λέξη. Το δεί σου μέρα κινώσε η βία της και ίσως.

Είς οι επάνω της που πέρασαν είναι φέρουν την πολιτικοποίηση κομμοδένειο της όλη χωρίς να
αναρρώσεως την παραμικρή στήριξη για την επίθετο που άρμα της Ελλάδας. Σπαρτάρας να
θλίψη σου την στήριξη της σε όλη με βία της του επικοινωνιακού ορεινός τιποτέ δεν έχει κινώσε στο
καρμα, όταν παρουν τους νωμούς. Το μέλας δικαιο και την ΑΕΤΣ παρουνες. Μήλας κινώσε της
πολιτεία.

Είς 4 Οκτωβρίου κινώσε η αναρρώσε στο σταβόλο επικράτος αναρρώσε Μερτά μου σε αυτό που
αγία με ένα όνομα στις δικαιο να βρονταί ΕΣΔΝΑ και ΜΟΝΟ, κομμοδένειο υπάκουε ότι η οικογένεια
σου δεν ήγει το παραμικρό ως φοιτητή ούτως, σπίνουτα δείλα σου με όλη την όραση αποκατάσταση
αίθετο και όνομα, δικαιο ένα όνομα σε καρδίας και τίπο τον αού σου (για γινώσε).

Η όρα των αποκατάσταση έρωτα. Η ελληνική δικαιο είναι μαζί σου Μερτά μου η ορα σου? η
έλας σε ένα που Ελλάδα. Κράτος ποικίλες υποκατάσταση την παρουν σου την Ελλάδα όλο
μα Ελλάδα πόλη η μία όρα σου είναι να βία της?

Ο άρμας όμως δεν υπάκουε ού. Υπόλοιπα και το επικοινωνιακό δικαιο, όπου η Ελλάδα μπορεί να
διαρκή όλα τα μέλα να αναρρώσε τους Έλληνας πόλη.

Υ.Σ. Μία διαρκή τιποτέ μετά πορουνε στο αγία μετά στο σπέρμα του κερματικού δεν γινώσε για αγία.
Είς σου η Ελλάδα σου το δεί σου επικοινωνιακό σπέρμα? Σπίνουτα δεί σου το όρα να μην διαρκή να να
μην αρρώσε. Να το κινώσε να είναι διαρκή στο φάρμα σου.

Από τη μάχη της Μελίς Κασσίου.



Conclusion

The period under investigation was a heated one for the Greek government on the issue of migration. In our study more than 40% of posts referred to one of the dimensions defined while one in four used at least two of them. The most popular dimensions were Territory, Values and Institutions. The least used were Law and to a lesser degree, People.

The incident between the Greek PM and a Dutch journalist caused a wide discussion on social media about the pushbacks performed by the Greek authorities, which up to that point were only reported by the opposition media. Media affiliated to the government put the emphasis on positive statements held by EU officials and political leaders praising Greece for its efforts to guard the European borders. Moreover, the incidents at the Polish - Belarusian borders were associated, verbally or not, with the crisis between the Greek - Turkish border of Evros in 2019. In both cases, migrants were seen as a threat and their effort to enter the EU a matter of national security. Indeed, the Territory dimension was the dominant representation for the migration issue in our study. However, this was reinforced by daily news about refugees found dead or alive along the coasts of Greek islands and the Aegean Sea.

The discussion on values and human rights was prominent in the non - Europe related posts, mainly from opposition parties, NGOs, Facebook groups and twitter accounts that attacked the government for its lack of empathy and interest in safeguarding migrants' human rights, labor rights and decent living conditions. News stories of human interest, considered to affect people in perceiving migration in a favorable way, were mostly absent in the period under examination.

Even though the debate around migration and the right to asylum are causing a polarization mostly in the online public sphere, our research recorded only a few posts with negative sentiment. That does not mean that social media users are in favor of government practices but that they use a rather neutral language to refer to the issue at hand.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Representation	Media Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	3003	16.4	21.4
People	624	3.4	4.5
Values	5876	32.2	41.9
Territory	4045	22.1	28.9
Institutions	4724	25.9	33.7
Total	18272	100.0	130.4

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions
35	59	6	65	13	89
36	70	3	70	18	102

37	73	11	90	18	108
38	50	9	67	15	80
39	68	9	74	10	96
40	76	11	107	23	115
41	52	4	62	14	71
42	59	9	64	19	99
43	33	3	36	15	61
44	24	2	32	12	38
45	1029	233	2304	1785	1748
46	674	151	1404	1372	1192
47	645	149	1325	674	806
48	91	24	176	57	119
Total	3003	624	5876	4045	4724

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	2256	16.1
1	6642	47.4
2	3810	27.2
3	1198	8.6
4	104	0.7
Total	14010	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	322	2.3
Neutral	13501	96.4
Positive	187	1.3
Total	14010	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	966	13.7	21.6
People	57	0.8	1.3
Values	1460	20.7	32.7
Territory	2442	34.6	54.7
Institutions	2136	30.3	47.9
Total	7061	100.0	158.2

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	2037	18.2	21.3
People	567	5.1	5.9
Values	4416	39.4	46.3
Territory	1603	14.3	16.8
Institutions	2588	23.1	27.1
Total	11211	100.0	117.4

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	208	4.7
1	2131	47.7
2	1499	33.6
3	568	12.7
4	57	1.3
Total	4463	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	2048	21.5

1	4511	47.3
2	2311	24.2
3	630	6.6
4	47	0.5
Total	9547	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	96	2.2
Neutral	4273	95.7
Positive	94	2.1
Total	4463	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	226	2.4
Neutral	9228	96.7
Positive	93	1.0
Total	9547	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0031 (0.007)	-0.0389**** (0.008)	-0.0370**** (0.008)
Twitter		-0.2103**** (0.016)	-0.1393**** (0.021)
Interactions		4.258e-05** (0.0)	3.844e-05* (0.0)
Followers		-1.638e-07 (0.0)	-1.438e-07 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0193**** (0.003)	0.0174**** (0.003)
October			-0.0441* (0.026)

November			-0.1738****
			(0.038)
week			0.0053
			(0.004)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.04	0.05

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0667****	-0.0701****	-0.0697****
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Twitter		-0.0316****	-0.0262***
		(0.006)	(0.009)
Interactions		2.81e-05****	2.828e-05****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-2.335e-07***	-2.333e-07***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0025	0.0024
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0057
			(0.014)
November			-0.0257
			(0.02)
week			0.0020
			(0.002)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.05

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.1368****	-0.1623****	-0.1622****
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Twitter		-0.1420****	-0.0334*

		(0.015)	(0.02)
Interactions		0.0002***	0.0002***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-6.19e-08	-5.657e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0202****	0.0178****
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			0.0068
			(0.036)
November			-0.1494***
			(0.049)
week			-0.0050
			(0.005)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.03

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3117****	0.3326****	0.3247****
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Twitter		0.1254****	-0.0055
		(0.012)	(0.016)
Interactions		-0.0002****	-0.0002***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		4.493e-08	4.571e-08*
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0479****	-0.0452****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.1185***
			(0.038)
November			0.4562****
			(0.044)

week			-0.0195**** (0.004)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.12	0.15	0.16

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1935**** (0.007)	0.1362**** (0.008)	0.1353**** (0.008)
Twitter		-0.3289**** (0.01)	-0.2374**** (0.015)
Interactions		2.037e-05 (0.0)	1.149e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-7.152e-09 (0.0)	-7.554e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0078** (0.003)	0.0057 (0.004)
October			0.0076 (0.035)
November			-0.0918** (0.046)
week			-0.0104** (0.004)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.09	0.09

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0088*** (0.003)	-0.0032 (0.003)	-0.0027 (0.003)
Twitter		-0.0540**** (0.004)	-0.0472**** (0.005)
Interactions		1.476e-05****	1.45e-05****

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		5.118e-09	5.087e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0140****	-0.0141****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0023
			(0.01)
November			-0.0182
			(0.015)
week			0.0012
			(0.001)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.10	0.10

Table 19. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.4078*** (0.0151)	0.3014*** (0.0146)	0.2980*** (0.0147)
Twitter		-0.6619*** (0.0250)	-0.4895*** (0.0353)
Interactions		0.0002*** (0.0000)	0.0002*** (0.0000)
Followers		-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0062 (0.0067)	0.0021 (0.0067)
October			0.0655 (0.0688)
November			-0.0757 (0.0869)
week			-0.0276***

			(0.0079)
Intercept	1.1743***	1.7815***	2.9492***
nan	(0.0088)	(0.0254)	(0.2963)
R-squared	0.0482	0.1172	0.1216
R-squared Adj.	0.0481	0.1168	0.1211
N	14010	14010	14010

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 20. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Representation	Media Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	293	13.6	20.0
People	31	1.4	2.1
Values	405	18.9	27.6
Territory	702	32.7	47.8
Institutions	716	33.3	48.8
Total	2147	100.0	146.3

Table 21. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Representation	Media Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	2710	16.8	21.6
People	593	3.7	4.7
Values	5471	33.9	43.6
Territory	3343	20.7	26.7
Institutions	4008	24.9	32.0
Total	16125	100.0	128.6

Table 22. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Representations	Media Count	% of Posts
0	152	10.4
1	692	47.1

2	438	29.8
3	165	11.2
4	21	1.4
Total	1468	100.0

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	2104	16.8
1	5950	47.4
2	3372	26.9
3	1033	8.2
4	83	0.7
Total	12542	100.0

Table 24. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	46	3.1
Neutral	1409	96.0
Positive	13	0.9
Total	1468	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	276	2.2
Neutral	12092	96.4
Positive	174	1.4
Total	12542	100.0

Table 26. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0169 (0.012)	-0.1628**** (0.013)	-0.1602**** (0.013)
Twitter		-0.2578****	-0.1889****

		(0.01)	(0.014)
Interactions		2.206e-05	1.873e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-3.021e-08	-2.862e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0158****	0.0142****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0547**
			(0.026)
November			-0.1833****
			(0.037)
week			0.0063*
			(0.004)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.05

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0354**** (0.008)	-0.0325*** (0.009)	-0.0318**** (0.009)
Twitter		-0.0228**** (0.006)	-0.0177** (0.009)
Interactions		2.735e-05**** (0.0)	2.758e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		-1.875e-07** (0.0)	-1.85e-07** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0014 (0.002)	0.0014 (0.002)
October			-0.0137 (0.014)
November			-0.0407** (0.02)

week			0.0038**
			(0.002)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.02

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1708**** (0.014)	-0.2804**** (0.017)	-0.2781**** (0.017)
Twitter		-0.2096**** (0.015)	-0.1018**** (0.021)
Interactions		0.0002*** (0.0)	0.0002*** (0.0)
Followers		-1.73e-08 (0.0)	-1.772e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0137**** (0.004)	0.0117*** (0.004)
October			-0.0338 (0.037)
November			-0.2154**** (0.049)
week			0.0020 (0.005)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.03

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1861**** (0.011)	0.2435**** (0.013)	0.2426**** (0.013)
Twitter		0.1288**** (0.015)	-0.0087 (0.018)
Interactions		-0.0003***	-0.0003***

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		2.805e-08**	3.098e-08***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0412****	-0.0391****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.2293****
			(0.041)
November			0.6834****
			(0.048)
week			-0.0405****
			(0.004)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.05

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1561****	-0.0560****	-0.0522***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Twitter		-0.3961****	-0.3071****
		(0.012)	(0.017)
Interactions		4.495e-07	-7.802e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.545e-09	1.906e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0081**	0.0060*
		(0.003)	(0.004)
October			0.0365
			(0.035)
November			-0.0201
			(0.046)
week			-0.0175****
			(0.004)

N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.07	0.07

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0041 (0.005)	-0.0369**** (0.005)	-0.0362**** (0.005)
Twitter		-0.0658**** (0.005)	-0.0601**** (0.006)
Interactions		1.157e-05*** (0.0)	1.141e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		4.899e-09 (0.0)	4.884e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0141**** (0.003)	-0.0142**** (0.003)
October			0.0015 (0.01)
November			-0.0164 (0.015)
week			0.0011 (0.001)
N	14010	14010	14010
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.11	0.11

Table 32. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1769*** (0.0241)	-0.2473*** (0.0266)	-0.2409*** (0.0266)
Twitter		-0.8625*** (0.0265)	-0.7012*** (0.0367)
Interactions		0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)

Followers		-0.0000	-0.0000
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0040	0.0002
		(0.0067)	(0.0066)
October			0.1208*
			(0.0680)
November			0.0828
			(0.0860)
week			-0.0426***
			(0.0079)
Intercept	1.2857***	2.0787***	3.7853***
nan	(0.0077)	(0.0261)	(0.2937)
R-squared	0.0039	0.0982	0.1031
R-squared Adj.	0.0038	0.0978	0.1026
N	14010	14010	14010

Italy

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Introduction

The present report investigates how the topic of gender is presented on Italian social media (Facebook and twitter) over the period September – November 2021 based on a number of representations and the type of sentiments governing the overall content of the relevant posts.

The analysis being implemented adopts a quantitative and qualitative approach with the aim of justifying to the best possible way the major trends being emerged as to the ways the topic of migration is placed under discussion among social media users.

The analysis draws on the theoretical framework of media representations and is based on the manual coding being conducted on individual posts, following the parameters set by a codebook, a process then supplemented by the automatic coding of new posts by means of machine learning techniques.

The investigation of how social media texts frame the topic of migration was based on the frequency of occurrence of a number of predefined media representations dimensions, considered important in the case of

gender topic: Law, People, Culture, Values, New Social Movements. These dimensions, combined with the assessment of sentiments (negative, neutral, positive) governing social media posts, gave rise to fundamental narratives appearing online with regard to migration, operating as the basis for understanding how Europe is represented on platformised settings of communication.

Background

Issues related to the arrival and integration of migrants have become increasingly contentious in Italy and Europe over the past decade, as right-wing populist parties have made the issue a key element of their respective political platforms. Since the so-called EU migration crisis of 2015–16, much has been written on emergency resettlements, Germany's acceptance of Syrian refugees, Frontex's budgetary increases, the lack of EU-wide solidarity towards frontline member states or the absence of a broader strategy to tackle the issue in the medium- to long-term perspective.

As we'll see in the next paragraphs, the migration debate in Italy is full of contradictions. But also the one taking place at the EU-level as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is highly problematic. A UN-appointed Special Rapporteur recently called out the double standards on Ukraine's war-displaced¹³⁴. For example, in the winter of 2021, between 2,000 and 4,000 migrants of Middle Eastern descent were forced to camp out on the Belarus–Poland border for weeks on end, leading to multiple deaths.

Legislation

Italian law clearly distinguishes between immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. The matter has been regulated many times, with the last systematic intervention contained in the Decree 142/2015 [known in the media as "decreto accoglienza", which would translate in hospitality decree], that implemented the European directive 33/2013.

The so-called hospitality is based on the following steps. Firstly, the law imposes assistance to all people reaching the Italian soil. After that, immigrants are hosted in the Hospitality Centers - which are usually overcrowded and violently ruled. On paper, they should guarantee the procedures for people's identification, with illegal immigrants pushed back, and those credited with the status of asylum-seekers – as they come from war zones or emergency situations – transferred to the centers for the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees [the so-called SPRAR, Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati]. Refugees, once recognized as such, are granted with all rights and benefits foreseen by the international standards and treaties.

Practically speaking, the system does not work: the majority of immigrants does not have any ID, and identification is impossible [and as consequence, pushbacks are difficult as well]. Usually, immigrants stay for a long time in the centers - unless they cross the borders unnoticed - until they are repatriated or assigned to the associations active in the sector of integration and hospitality [which normally have a legal accreditation released by the Council of Ministers].

¹³⁴ See UN News, Top Rights Expert Questions 'Double Standard' on Ukraine's War Displaced, 28 July 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123502>.

Family reunifications are allowed for immigrants with a legal status and a valid green card, at the condition that the applicant is capable of hosting the coming members of the family [basically, he/she needs a flat].

Italian citizenship is recognized to the immigrants in the following cases:

- If they marry an Italian citizen;
- After legally living in Italy for no less than ten years [Law 91/1992, Article 9, Point 1];
- As to the so-called “second-generation immigrants”, though they are born in Italy, they become Italian citizens only when they turn 18 and become technically adult [Law 91/1992, Article 4, Point 2].

Religious freedom is guaranteed by the Italian law, based on the 1948 Constitution of the Republic.

Crimes against immigrants and non-Italians are charged with aggravations for, literally, “actions motivated by ethnic, national, racial or religious hate” [Article 604 of the Penal Code]. Article 604-bis of the Penal Code also forbids discourses supporting racial hate, racial or ethnic superiority, or any “instigation” to crimes and discriminations of this kind.

Being part of the European Union, it is subjected to communitarian policies and regulations, such as the Dublin III (Regulation 604/2013)¹³⁵ Moreover, it is a member of the Schengen Agreement¹³⁶. Several Decrees have been issued implementing the Directives of the European Union on international protection¹³⁷: a recent integration of EU Directives on international protection was the Decree-Law 46/2017 introduced a comprehensive regulation concerning the protection and treatment of unaccompanied minors, focused on the best interest of the child.

Recently, during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior (2018–2019), Salvini sponsored the so-called “Security Decrees”, two legal measures that profoundly changed rules on the reception of asylum seekers and assistance for refugees. Some provisions of the security decrees, for instance the one precluding asylum seekers from access to civil registries, were later ruled illegitimate by Italy’s Constitutional Court¹³⁸. The legislation was partly amended following the end of Salvini’s time in government, but the current former minister (Meloni) has now promised to revive his decrees during the 2022 electoral campaign.

At the level of legislation relating to our analysis period (September–November 2021), it is important to mention the Flow Decree 2021 (adopted with Prime Ministerial Decree of 21 December 2021), which established the maximum quota of non-EU seasonal and non-seasonal subordinate workers at 69,700, and self-employed workers who will be able to enter Italy. This decree was then revised in 2022.

¹³⁵ EUR-Lex, EU asylum policy: EU country responsible for examining applications, 2021.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legisum%3A23010503_1

¹³⁶ EUR-Lex, The Schengen area and cooperation, May 2020.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legisum%3AI33020>

¹³⁷ UNHCR Italia, Italian Laws on Asylum.

<https://www.unhcr.org/it/cosa-facciamo/protezione/diritto-asilo/italia/legislazione/>

¹³⁸ See Annalisa Camilli, “La consulta bocchia i decreti sicurezza e il governo ne rimanda le modifiche”, in *Internazionale*, 10 July 2020, <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2020/07/10/corte-constituzionale-decreti-sicurezza-modifiche>. In 2020 the legislation was amended, although the framework it introduced remained in place.

National context

At the end of 2021, Italy was ruled by a wide coalition including the populist party Movimento 5 Stelle [having the relative majority of seats, after the 2018 elections], and both right-wing [Lega and Forza Italia] and left-wing forces [Partito Democratico]. The only major party at the opposition was the right-wing nationalist Fratelli d'Italia, which would win the 2022 general elections [as a matter of fact, in Italy the former opposition always wins the elections: right-wing coalition in 1994, 2001, and 2008; left-wing in 1996, 2006, and 2013]. The Prime Minister was former European Central Bank Director Mario Draghi. Two major issues in the agenda were: the economic state of the country; and the implementation of Covid-related measures.

At the economic level, the discussion was mostly about the use of the so-called PNRR, the recovery plan launched by the European Commission. We may add that the major economic law ruling taxation and the allocation of public funding – either known as “legge finanziaria” [“finance law] or “legge di stabilità” [stability law] – is always presented in the last months of the year, and often approved in its very last days. This might explain the centrality of the issue in the Italian debate.

As to the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic, Recent studies have shown that migrants are at higher risk of morbidity and mortality due to COVID-19 infection because of their living and working conditions and barriers in accessing healthcare. The end of 2021 was the time of the introduction of the so-called Green Pass, the Italian implementation of the EU Covid certificate. On October 15, the Green Pass has become mandatory to access all public places – including transportation and workplaces – with the only exceptions of grocery stores and pharmacies. The Green Pass initially relied on the vaccination, testing and recovery formula: by proving to have recovered from Covid; with the vaccination certificate; or with a negative PCR test. Despite the Council of Europe had explicitly prohibited any discrimination towards citizens not willing to take the shot, the Italian Green Pass has been imposed in a totally illiberal way. Right after its introduction, the discussion has started about how to furtherly limit the freedom of the unvaccinated, eventually resulting in the so-called Super Green Pass, officially approved by a government decree on December 6, 2021.

In Fall 2021, finally, migration was probably not on the radar, for two practical reasons. Firstly, public debate was occupied by other issues [see above]. Secondly, discussions around immigration usually peaks in Spring and Summer, when – due to weather conditions – the arrivals from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean increase. Notice that in Italy it is widely believed that immigrants mostly come from the sea and from Muslim countries – and media stereotypes play a main part here – while in fact the majority of them arrives from the Balkans and from the land route [and from non-Muslim countries as well].

Anyway, while the COVID-19 pandemic led to diminished migration flows as a result of border closures and other public health measures, the problem has not gone away. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the waves of Ukrainian refugees momentarily revived the issue. Yet, the treatment and acceptance of Ukrainian refugees across Europe compared to those of African or Middle Eastern descent is by no means comparable. This exposed significant double standards at the heart of EU migration policy, harming its credibility in the process.

While some efforts have been advanced at the EU level – such as the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration or the 2020 communication of the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum¹³⁹ – it is clear that short-term fixes still dominate Europe’s approach to irregular migration flows. These have failed to respond to the multi-faceted challenges that influxes of migrants can bring to many countries of first arrival, as well as the underlying need to propose structural reforms capable of providing legal pathways for migrants to safely reach Europe.


¹³⁹ See European Commission, A New Pact on Migration and Asylum (COM/2020/609), 23 September 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0609> ; Stefano Manservigi, “The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum: A Tsunami of Papers but Little Waves of Change”, in IAI Commentaries, No. 20|88 (December 2020), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/12498>.

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

Figure 1 shows the % occurrence (distribution) of Social Media Representations among all Social Media Representations in the data. In our case, we see in the notes that we have 10691 Social Media Representations occurring in total (N=10691). The data to create the figure can be found in column “% of Social Media Representations” of the indicated table.

Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 10691.


In general, the three SM representations that (overall) emerge are People (XX.X%), Law (XX%) and Values (XX.X%). Italian social media that deal with migration mainly publish posts and tweets on:

- "stories" of people or narratives that have people (especially migrants or refugees) as protagonists. These are contents about a person's own experience, or a general experience based on migration: history, experience, life conducted both in the country of origin or/and in Europe
- law, such as posts/tweet related to legal aspect of im/migration
- or certain values connected to migration, such as in/equality, discrimination, dignity, solidarity, diversity and so on.

Figure 2 shows that there are two spikes in all Social Media Representations in week 39 (that occurred in the beginning of October 2021) and in week 46 (that occurred in the middle of November 2021). This graph represents the trend of news on Migration that appeared in the contents of Italian social media. Two “peaks” are evident:

- The first concerned the news about the approval by the Polish parliament of the construction of the wall on the border of Poland, to prevent immigration from Belarus
- The second peak related to the effects of the migration crisis on the border between Poland and Belarus.

Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 10691.

We found interesting differences in social media representations trends during the observation period, in particular at the beginning of October 2021:

- Law, which mainly contained the news relating to the approval by the Polish Parliament of a law that allows the construction of a wall on the border with Belarus to stem the arrival of migrants
- Values, which concern the discussions relating to the fact that the aforementioned wall would endanger the European values of welcome and solidarity
- Cultures, a set of contents in which a cultural product is often mentioned which consists of the publication of the Immigration Report of Caritas Italiana and the Migrantes association

The second peak is from mid-November 2021 and mainly concerns the Social Media Representations of People, Territory and Institution: there are many news and posts related to the stories of migrants on the Polish border and institutional declarations regarding the migration crisis.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 10691.


From the below Figure we can see that at least one or more Social Media Representation occurs in the vast majority of posts. Posts belonging one or two Social Media Representations are the most common cases, with more than 30% of the post. Additionally, we can conclude that a large number of posts (more than 65%) have one or two Social Media Representations present.

Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 6130.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 6130.


As was to be expected, about 85% of the posts have a neutral sentiment. There are a little more negative (7,8%) sentiments than positive (6,2%), but we found non-neutral sentiments only in 14% of the posts. There were several instances of posts (long and with several statements) where the sentiment was both positive and negative, so they were marked as neutral (as if the two positions balance each other).

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Posts not Europe (5995) are much more frequent than posts about Europe (4696). Chi-squared tests conclude that there aren't statistically significant differences in the proportions of all Social Media Representations when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe. In particular:

- The Social Media Representations of "Territory", "Institution", "Value" and "Culture" occur significantly more often in Europe posts than Not Europe posts;
- The Social Media Representation of "Law" occurs more often in Europe post, but there isn't significant differences when comparing posts about Europe and Not Europe: Chi-quared $p > 0.1$;
- The Social Media Representation of "People" occurs more often in Not Europe post, but there isn't significant differences when comparing posts about Europe and Not Europe: Chi-quared $p > 0.1$.

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 6130 in each pair of comparison.

From the information in Table 1, we can conclude that there are on average more Social Media Representations among Europe posts than Not Europe posts. The mean values for the Europe and Not Europe posts are 2.166 and 1.3964 respectively and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$).

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	2.1666	1.3964	****	0
SD	(1.054)	(0.842)		

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 6130.

Not Europe posts are more neutral, while Europe posts are more negative or positive.

However, the differences are very minimal.


Chi-squared tests confirm that these differences are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for Neutral and Negative sentiment, but they aren't statistically significant for Positive sentiment ($p > 0.1$).

Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 6130.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 6130 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 9 show that there are several differences between Europe and Not Europe posts also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirm that Institution and Territory are more likely to occur among Europe posts than Not Europe posts. The effects are around 22 and 11 percentage points respectively.

The posts/tweets refer in these two Social Media Representations, on the one hand on the declarations of European leaders and Merkel on the migration crisis and on the discussions on the funding related to the request for the construction of walls and barbed wire. On the other hand, there are also several posts that refer on the border between Belarus and Poland. In some news there is even talk of "fortress Europe" to indicate the issue of the borders of the European Union.

At the same time, there are no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of the other Social Media Representation between Europe and Not Europe posts. In fact, we can recall here both the issues of welcoming Ukrainian refugees and news stories relating to the expulsion of illegal immigrants.

Finally, results from a Logistic regression point to that a higher number of Social Media Representation are statistically more likely to be observed in Europe posts than the Not Europe posts.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media


Posts by Not Media (7737) are more common than posts by Media (2954) (See Table 22 and Table 23). Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of the Social Media representations when comparing posts about Media and not about Media ($p < 0.001$ in all cases).

Law, People, Territory and Institutions occur more often in Media posts, while Values and Culture are more frequent among Not Media posts.

In the media we have found several posts/tweets of news on:

- regulatory measures, in particular the so-called "Decreto Flussi" proposed by Minister Luciana Lamorgese in September 2021, and approved by the government at the end of the year, as we mentioned in the first paragraph of this report
- stories of immigration, news episodes connected to clandestine immigration or the expulsion from Italy of clandestine immigrants and irregular (in addition to the several stories of the exodus of migrants who from Belarus try to cross the border of Poland to enter in Europe).

Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 6130 in each pair of comparison.

From the information in Table 2, we can conclude that there are on average slightly more Social Media Representations among Not Media posts than in Media posts. The mean values for the Media and Not Media posts are 1.83 and 1.72 respectively and a t-test confirms that the difference in means is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$). As we see in the below chart, the result seems to be driven by that there are 1 or 2 Social Media Representations both in Not Media and Media posts.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.8302	1.7132	****	0.0001
SD	(1.054)	(1.004)		

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 6130.

The data shows that posts/tweets on Italian news media are more neutral than on Not Media. Therefore, there is a Not-neutral (more positive or more negative) sentiment on the Users Generated Contents. Chi-squared tests conclude that there are statistically significant differences the proportions of any of the sentiments when comparing posts about Media and not about Media (association analysis "Sentiment" versus "Media" or "Not Media" $p=0.00$).

We can believe that on the subject of immigration, there is more probability of finding user generated contents with positive or negative sentiment, compared instead to news media contents.

Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 6130.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 show that there are several differences between Media and Not Media posts also when controlling for additional variables. Results from Logit regressions confirms that People occur more often among the Media posts as compared to the Not Media posts. The effects are around 15 percentage points.

At the same time Value and Culture are more likely to be observed in Not Media posts, with effect sizes of around 15 and 10 percentage points respectively.

Although Law, Territory and Institution are more present in media posts, these variables seem to be such statistically significant predictors of esteem: the presence of these Social Media Representations has in fact similar proportions in both Media and non-Media posts.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 6130 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

This section is to give examples of posts that reflect the results from the quantitative analysis. Four examples of posts will be presented.

Two posts are related to Figure 9 – “Coefficient estimates Europe” and two posts are related to Figure 13 – “Coefficient estimates Media”.

In our case, “Institutions” has the largest coefficient estimate of Europe and “Culture” has the smallest coefficient estimate of Europe.

This below is a post that we think reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts that are represented by Institutions and is about Europe.

We have found numerous posts related to the discussion within the EU on whether or not to build walls or to put barbed wire at the borders to limit the flow of migrants.

Twelve EU states had approved the request to Brussels to finance walls or barbed wire on the external borders of the European Union. Even the Italian leader Salvini had declared himself in favour. The stop to the initiative came directly from the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen, who rejected the proposal.



This is a post that we think reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by Culture and is NOT about Europe.

In this Social Media Representation we have found several posts referring to cultural initiatives (theater, shows, TV programs) organized in Italy on the occasion of the International Day of Migrants and Refugees of 25 September 2021.

Franco Picarone
27 settembre 2021 · 🌐

A CETARA PER 'MARINE JAZZ' CON I GIOVANI MIGRANTI DEL S.A.I. DI LACEDONIA

Ho trascorso la serata della Giornata Internazionale del Migrante e del Rifugiato a Cetara, con i giovani ospiti del S.A.I. di Lacedonia, il Servizio di Accoglienza e Integrazione per minori stranieri non accompagnati, in occasione di 'Marine Jazz', evento conclusivo del "Marine Litter". Un progetto che ha consentito di recuperare rifiuti dal mare e di analizzare lo stato di salute del fondale e delle acque nel tratto che va da Salerno a Positano. Bellissima e suggestiva la sfilata di tanti giovani migranti con gli abiti e gli accessori realizzati con materiale riciclato. Il progetto ha coniugato la tutela dell'ambiente, i pescatori, la cooperazione sociale, la solidarietà, l'università e la ricerca, l'arte e la musica. La collaborazione sinergica tra istituzioni, mondo scientifico, mondo produttivo e terzo settore funziona bene in questo caso e bisogna incentivarla in modo permanente, soprattutto per i risultati culturali che produce.



👍 17277... 🗨️ 50

Commenti: 4 · Condivisioni: 3

People has the largest coefficient estimate of Media and Value has the smallest coefficient estimate of Media.

This is a post that we think reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by People and that is posted by Media. News about the migrant crisis and the stories of migrants on the border between Belarus and Poland found a lot of space in the media.

← **Tweet**

 **Tg La7** 🏆
@TgLa7

Iniziati rimpatri di profughi che bivaccano al confine con la Polonia nel tentativo di entrare in Europa. L'impasse sbloccato dopo intervento di Putin. Resta drammatica la situazione: migliaia di migranti accampati al freddo e al gelo
[#TgLa7](#) [#19novembre](#)

 [tg.la7.it](https://www.tg.la7.it)
Putin convince Lukashenko a frenare sui migranti: iniziato i...
Iniziati i primi rimpatri di profughi che bivaccano nei boschi al confine con la Polonia nel tentativo di entrare in Europa....

3:32 PM · 19 nov 2021

2 Mi piace

This is the post that we think reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by Value and is posted by NOTMedia.

I valori più citati sembrano essere quelli dell'accoglienza e della solidarietà verso il migrante, in particolare verso i rifugiati e richiedenti asilo provenienti da zone di guerra, crisi o povertà. In particolare, sui social media italiani (Not Media) ci si riferisce ai profughi che giungono "dal mare" sulle coste italiane (es. dalla Libia o dall'Afghanistan).



Caritas Ambrosiana
4 settembre 2021 · 🌐

Accolti da Caritas 14 profughi afgiani

Arrivati 14 profughi afgiani negli appartamenti di Casa Suraya.
Già individuate altre 5 strutture all'interno della rete ecclesiale.
Gualzetti: «collaboriamo con le istituzioni per l'accoglienza. Ma auspichiamo una soluzione per chi non è riuscito a scappare»

Quattordici profughi afgiani sono arrivati questa notte nei due appartamenti allestiti nei giorni scorsi nei pressi di Casa Suraya, il centro di via Padre Salerio a Milano, aperto nel 2013 dalla Caritas Ambrosiana e gestito dalla cooperativa Farsi Prossimo per accogliere i siriani che allora erano giunti nel capoluogo lombardo fuggendo dal regime di Bashar al-Assad.

Arrivati grazie ad uno dei ponti aerei organizzati nei giorni scorsi dal governo italiano, sono stati assegnati dalla Prefettura alla cooperativa Farsi Prossimo promossa dalla Caritas Ambrosiana dopo aver trascorso la quarantena nell'hub di prima accoglienza gestito dalla Croce Rossa e dalla Protezione civile ad Avezzano.

Gli ospiti sono stati suddivisi negli alloggi: la famiglia più numerosa composta da 8 persone di cui 5 bambini in quello al piano terreno, gli altri (3 coppie, di cui una composta da un fratello e una sorella) in quello al piano superiore. Gli operatori riferiscono questa mattina che sono ancora provati dal viaggio e dai giorni difficili che hanno dovuto affrontare ma sono anche sollevati per essere riusciti a mettersi in salvo scappando dal regime dei talebani. Per loro comincerà una nuova vita che partirà dalla domanda di asilo per accedere al programma di protezione previsto per i rifugiati politici.

Nel frattempo, in attesa di conoscere il numero di profughi afgiani che sarà necessario ricollocare nel territorio della Diocesi, su richiesta delle Prefetture di Milano, Monza-Brianza, Varese e Lecco gli operatori della Caritas Ambrosiana hanno avviato una ricerca di posti tra le strutture ecclesiali. Ad oggi ne sono già state individuate 5, di cui 3 appartamenti parrocchiali, che saranno messi a disposizione delle Prefetture e che, a seconda delle necessità, potranno essere accreditate per entrare a far parte del sistema di accoglienza statale.

Inoltre i volontari delle Caritas parrocchiali coordinati da Caritas Ambrosiana sono pronti ad offrire sostegno ai profughi ospitati nei vari territori, in base alle necessità che potranno emergere. Per questa ragione resta aperta la raccolta fondi lanciata nei primi giorni dell'emergenza e rimane operativo il centro logistico di Burago per smistare su tutto il territorio in maniera ordinata gli aiuti.

SOSTIENI ANCHE TU I PROGETTI DI ACCOGLIENZA PER I PROFUGHI AFGHANI
<https://donazioni.caritasambrosiana.it/.../Emergenza...>

Caritas Ambrosiana

Invia messaggio

👍 214 Commenti: 1 Condivisioni: 36

Conclusion

In this analysis, several phenomena emerged that constituted social media representations on the migration phenomenon at the end of 2021 in Italy.

Some phenomena have emerged as more present and linked to the European context, while others have had a national representation.

The main representations relating to Europe concerns the migration crisis which at that time particularly concerned the entry of migrants from Belarus. This aspect has involved the European institutions and has brought out the differences between European countries, some in favour and others against the construction of borders: for which the theme of the European "Territory" has characterized several posts on Europe. There have also been numerous dramatic "stories" and images of migrants at the borders, especially in the news media.

In the legislative field, in addition to the resolutions on the use of European funds for the management of migrant flows towards Europe, in Italy the news appeared on Italian social media

was the "Decreto Flussi" (mentioned at the beginning of the Report), which regulates in particular entries into Italy from North African and Middle Eastern countries on the Italian coasts and islands (e.g. Lampedusa).

However, the occurrence of the aforementioned facts has also highlighted the value aspects related to immigration in terms of agenda setting, declined in terms of acceptance and solidarity towards refugees and asylum seekers.

References

Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	2188	20.5	35.7
People	2882	27.0	47.0
Values	1962	18.4	32.0
Territory	878	8.2	14.3
Institutions	1540	14.4	25.1
Culture	1241	11.6	20.2
Total	10691	100.0	174.4

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	61	83	59	2	33	42
36	94	128	108	6	55	68
37	109	141	123	3	56	83
38	173	225	253	10	64	148
39	239	288	231	7	54	153
40	177	136	152	5	99	100
41	116	130	140	5	72	98
42	160	162	110	10	110	90
43	120	118	99	17	56	70
44	127	161	102	5	47	65
45	304	493	165	331	370	102

46	281	510	210	373	375	98
47	195	263	176	86	117	106
48	32	44	34	18	32	18
Total	2188	2882	1962	878	1540	1241

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	558	9.1
1	2112	34.5
2	2163	35.3
3	950	15.5
4	333	5.4
5	13	0.2
6	1	0.0
Total	6130	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	481	7.8
Neutral	5261	85.8
Positive	388	6.3
Total	6130	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	995	16.6	36.0
People	1252	20.9	45.2
Values	953	15.9	34.4
Territory	778	13.0	28.1
Institutions	1441	24.0	52.1
Culture	576	9.6	20.8

Total	5995	100.0	216.7
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Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1193	25.4	35.5
People	1630	34.7	48.5
Values	1009	21.5	30.0
Territory	100	2.1	3.0
Institutions	99	2.1	2.9
Culture	665	14.2	19.8
Total	4696	100.0	139.6

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	134	4.8
1	615	22.2
2	989	35.7
3	725	26.2
4	294	10.6
5	9	0.3
6	1	0.0
Total	2767	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	424	12.6
1	1497	44.5
2	1174	34.9
3	225	6.7
4	39	1.2
5	4	0.1

Total	3363	100.0
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Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	242	8.7
Neutral	2339	84.5
Positive	186	6.7
Total	2767	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	239	7.1
Neutral	2922	86.9
Positive	202	6.0
Total	3363	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0049 (0.012)	0.0604**** (0.013)	0.0602**** (0.013)
Twitter		0.1947**** (0.013)	0.1933**** (0.013)
Interactions		-4.017e-06 (0.0)	-4.109e-06 (0.0)
Followers		2.222e-08*** (0.0)	2.264e-08*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0007 (0.003)	-0.0009 (0.003)
October			0.0151 (0.025)
November			-0.0170 (0.045)
week			0.0027

			(0.005)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.03	0.03

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0322** (0.013)	0.0027 (0.013)	-0.0231* (0.013)
Twitter		0.1186**** (0.015)	0.1117**** (0.015)
Interactions		2.555e-06 (0.0)	3.355e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.54e-07**** (0.0)	1.45e-07**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0612**** (0.004)	-0.0574**** (0.004)
October			-0.0044 (0.024)
November			0.1994**** (0.044)
week			-0.0099** (0.005)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.08	0.10

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0442**** (0.012)	-0.0641**** (0.011)	-0.0519**** (0.011)
Twitter		-0.6767**** (0.032)	-0.6697**** (0.032)

Interactions		-2.644e-07	-5.298e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-7.346e-08***	-6.846e-08***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0236****	0.0221****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0299
			(0.022)
November			-0.1173***
			(0.04)
week			0.0063
			(0.005)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.19	0.20

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2726****	0.2755****	0.1999****
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Twitter		0.0206*	-0.0020
		(0.011)	(0.009)
Interactions		-2.513e-06	-1.734e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		3.985e-08****	2.979e-08****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0197****	-0.0117****
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0100
			(0.024)
November			0.1845****

			(0.033)
week			0.0090***
			(0.003)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.17	0.20	0.38

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.4592**** (0.009)	0.5019**** (0.011)	0.4747**** (0.011)
Twitter		0.1297**** (0.013)	0.1188**** (0.013)
Interactions		-6.456e-06** (0.0)	-5.727e-06** (0.0)
Followers		4.591e-08**** (0.0)	3.968e-08**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0037 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.002)
October			0.0221 (0.018)
November			0.0885*** (0.033)
week			0.0018 (0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.32	0.34	0.36

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0104 (0.01)	-0.0540**** (0.01)	-0.0436**** (0.01)

Twitter		-0.4176****	-0.4132****
		(0.025)	(0.025)
Interactions		-4.461e-06	-4.904e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-8.399e-08***	-7.701e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0227****	0.0212****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0044
			(0.019)
November			-0.0988***
			(0.037)
week			0.0048
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.14	0.14

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0234***	-0.0054	-0.0028
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Twitter		-0.1318****	-0.1308****
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interactions		2.881e-07	1.178e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-2.175e-08**	-2.1e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0108***	-0.0111***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			0.0152

			(0.018)
November			0.0243
			(0.032)
week			-0.0046
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.03	0.04

Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.7702*** (0.0247)	0.7066*** (0.0259)	0.6355*** (0.0260)
Twitter		-0.2512*** (0.0271)	-0.2777*** (0.0269)
Interactions		-0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0000** (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0245*** (0.0061)	-0.0159*** (0.0060)
October			-0.0531 (0.0449)
November			0.2525*** (0.0845)
week			0.0124 (0.0095)
Intercept	1.3964*** (0.0145)	1.4557*** (0.0185)	0.8864** (0.3550)
R-squared	0.1417	0.1626	0.1919
R-squared Adj.	0.1415	0.1619	0.1908

N 6130 6130 6130

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	710	24.0	44.0
People	1045	35.4	64.7
Values	212	7.2	13.1
Territory	349	11.8	21.6
Institutions	512	17.3	31.7
Culture	126	4.3	7.8
Total	2954	100.0	183.0

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1478	19.1	32.7
People	1837	23.7	40.7
Values	1750	22.6	38.8
Territory	529	6.8	11.7
Institutions	1028	13.3	22.8
Culture	1115	14.4	24.7
Total	7737	100.0	171.3

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	107	6.6
1	595	36.9
2	514	31.8
3	264	16.4
4	131	8.1
5	3	0.2

Total	1614	100.0
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Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	451	10.0
1	1517	33.6
2	1649	36.5
3	686	15.2
4	202	4.5
5	10	0.2
6	1	0.0
Total	4516	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	85	5.3
Neutral	1478	91.6
Positive	51	3.2
Total	1614	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	396	8.8
Neutral	3783	83.8
Positive	337	7.5
Total	4516	100.0

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1088**** (0.013)	0.0681**** (0.015)	0.0686**** (0.015)
Twitter		0.1655**** (0.013)	0.1635**** (0.013)
Interactions		-3.183e-06	-3.262e-06

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		9.528e-09	9.481e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0006	-0.0006
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0262
			(0.025)
November			0.0018
			(0.045)
week			0.0019
			(0.005)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.03

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.2344**** (0.013)	0.1557**** (0.015)	0.1466**** (0.015)
Twitter		0.1089**** (0.014)	0.1111**** (0.014)
Interactions		5.928e-06 (0.0)	6.539e-06* (0.0)
Followers		9.444e-08**** (0.0)	8.888e-08**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0605**** (0.004)	-0.0570**** (0.004)
October			-0.0007 (0.024)
November			0.1925**** (0.043)

week			-0.0102**
			(0.005)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.09	0.11

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2933****	-0.2015****	-0.1984****
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Twitter		-0.6271****	-0.6234****
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Interactions		-2.728e-06	-2.899e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-3.895e-08**	-3.541e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0229****	0.0214****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0462**
			(0.021)
November			-0.1356****
			(0.039)
week			0.0075*
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.22	0.22

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0884****	0.0897****	0.0678****
	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.009)
Twitter		-0.0921****	-0.0908****

		(0.011)	(0.009)
Interactions		-2.482e-06	-7.392e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		2.975e-08****	2.471e-08****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0192****	-0.0130****
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			0.0285
			(0.026)
November			0.2807****
			(0.033)
week			0.0061*
			(0.003)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.27

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0849****	0.0797****	0.0677****
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Twitter		-0.1035****	-0.1075****
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interactions		-8.825e-06**	-7.787e-06**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		4.127e-08****	3.572e-08****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0046*	-1.949e-05
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.1004****
			(0.021)

November			0.2493****
			(0.038)
week			-0.0027
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.06

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2111****	-0.1478****	-0.1441****
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Twitter		-0.3894****	-0.3878****
		(0.024)	(0.024)
Interactions		-7.565e-06	-7.921e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-5.035e-08*	-4.451e-08*
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0219****	0.0203****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0165
			(0.019)
November			-0.1138***
			(0.036)
week			0.0056
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.15	0.16

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0897****	-0.0658****	-0.0649****

	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Twitter		-0.1229****	-0.1228****
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interactions		-6.001e-07	-7.351e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-8.855e-09	-8.505e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0107***	-0.0109***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			0.0124
			(0.018)
November			0.0232
			(0.032)
week			-0.0043
			(0.004)
N	6130	6130	6130
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.04

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1170*** (0.0302)	0.1214*** (0.0328)	0.0874*** (0.0314)
Twitter		-0.5054*** (0.0283)	-0.5090*** (0.0276)
Interactions		-0.0000*** (0.0000)	-0.0000** (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0259*** (0.0061)	-0.0145** (0.0060)

October			0.0408 (0.0457)
November			0.4531*** (0.0875)
week			0.0067 (0.0098)
Intercept	1.7132***	1.8143***	1.3444***
nan	(0.0149)	(0.0163)	(0.3678)
R-squared	0.0026	0.0563	0.1092
R-squared Adj.	0.0024	0.0555	0.1081
N	6130	6130	6130

Portugal

Authors: Istituto Universitário de Lisboa team

Institution: Istituto Universitário de Lisboa

Introduction

In this report we will analyze the way in which discussions about migration take place on social media platforms in Portugal. To accomplish this, we will analyze the Social Media Representations in discussions about Europe and not about Europe, but also in posts done by media agents and not media agents. This analysis is based on the codification of Facebook and Twitter posts pertaining to our research period (September-November of 2021). Before we perform this analysis, we present a previous chapter dealing with various aspects that might help us to better understand our data

In the first chapter we do a succinct literature review to work related to the portrayal of migrants and forced migrants in the media (Torkington & Ribeiro, 2018; Santos-Silva & Guerreiro, 2020; Garraio et al., 2022) and also in online discussion spaces (Valle-Nunes, 2020; Santos et al., 2020; Miranda et al., 2022). Following this background section, we approach the legal framework in Portugal regarding migration related issues. In this section, we highlight some laws that were at the time in effect in Portugal related to the entering and permanence of foreigners in the country, asylum seeking, the facilitating of visas based on financial investment, and also laws related to cultural integration and against discrimination. Lastly, we contextualize some events of importance that were happening in Portugal throughout the research period. We start by highlighting that this was a period of great political instability in Portugal, and then proceed to underline some events and news specifically related to migration that might have prompted discussions on social media.

Following this first chapter, we proceed to the quantitative analysis of the various posts that make up our sample. In this chapter we intend to understand which Social Media Representations are more prevalent, but

also in which context. We will start by offering a general descriptive analysis of the data in which we try to better understand and explain what events drive it. We then proceed to compare Europe and Not Europe posts as well as Media and Not Media posts. By approaching the statistically significant differences between posts we hope to understand how each of these dimensions are portrayed in the Portuguese Social Media Sphere. Lastly, in this chapter, we provide some illustrative examples of posts found within our dataset that feature the Social Media Representations with the largest and lowest coefficient estimates regarding Europe and Media.

After the quantitative analysis, we present a brief conclusion in which we approach the various results of our analysis and try to relate them with previous literature and the context in which the research period took place.

Background

Portugal has a long history of both emigration and immigration fluxes. However, only since the 1980's has there been a considerate and consistent immigration dimension in the country (Marques et al., 2020). Traditionally, most immigrants that settled in Portugal traced their roots to former Portuguese colonies in Africa and South America (Baganha et al., 2004). Nowadays, while Brazilians still represent the largest foreign community in the country, there is a more diverse and multicultural immigrant community, with a large and significant presence of individuals from the United Kingdom, Cabo Verde, Italy, India, Romania, Ukraine, among others¹⁴⁰. In total, there are about 550 000 foreigners residing in Portugal which represents about 5,2% of the population residing in Portugal (INE, 2021).

The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) considers Portugal to be at the forefront of immigrant integration alongside the Nordic Countries and traditional destination countries¹⁴¹. However, "(...) although there has been a development in Portuguese legislation and in anti-discrimination measures, there has been an increase in racist and xenophobic phenomena in Portugal". (Casquilho-Martins et al., 2022, p.1.). In that sense, Garraio et al. (2022) consider that indicators such as the MIPEX must be contextualized with the rising scholarly evidence regarding the various types of discrimination that foreigners face in Portugal. For instance, Casquilho-Martins et al. (2022) reference various recent crimes in Portugal directed at immigrants, such as the murder of Ukrainian immigrant Ihor Homeniuk at the hands of officers from the Portuguese Immigration and Border Service (SEF), cases of aggression against immigrants by the National Republican Guard, and episodes of vandalism in universities and NGO'S with racist and xenophobic messages targeting foreigners.

The coverage of issues related to migration in Portuguese traditional media outlets often over-emphasizes the "us" while neglecting the "other" (Torkington & Ribeiro, 2018; Santos-Silva & Guerreiro, 2020; Garraio et al., 2022). This leads to a type of presentation that tends to underrepresent the perspectives of both immigrants and forced migrants. One can consider the media coverage surrounding the migration crisis in the mid-to-late 2010's as an example. In previous literature, both Torkington & Ribeiro (2018) and Santos-Silva & Guerreiro (2020) highlight how refugees are presented by the Portuguese media as a homogeneous group whose voices are rarely heard and with no distinctive features. In fact, Santos-Silva & Guerreiro (2020) underscore how the media usually refers to the refugees as just "migrants", potentially contributing to a public misunderstanding of the situation at hand. The lack of representation of foreigner's voices and perspectives can also be found in the coverage of the death of Ihor Homeniuk. Garraio et al. (2022) highlight how the media coverage of this incident led to an important discussion regarding the malfunctioning of immigration institutions in Portugal but failed to represent and bring forth discussions surrounding the personal experiences and racialization faced by immigrants. As stated by Garraio et al. (2022) «In sum, it has been a debate about "us," or rather about how to improve "our" institutions and scrutinize "our" representatives. It was not a debate about the Other, namely about the immigrant who is not perceived as truly belonging to the imagined community nor about the legal framework which determines who can freely cross "our" borders and enter "our" territory» (p.107.).

¹⁴⁰ According to Data from 2021 these are the largest immigrant communities in Portugal (SEF, 2021)

¹⁴¹ Link to Portugal's profile page in the MIPEX website: <https://www.mipex.eu/portugal>

Despite the aforementioned absence of representation of migrant's voices on traditional media outlets, blatant acts of discrimination are not common. However, the same thing cannot be said for online discussions about these topics. In fact, a lot of online interactions surrounding migration related issues appear in stark contrast with the positive political and social posture that is publicly assumed in Portugal (Santos et al., 2020). In their previous work regarding racist hate speech on social media, Miranda et al. (2022) demonstrate that a lot of racist publications and comments were directed at foreigners with the prevalence of an anti-immigration/nationalistic rhetoric. In Valle-Nunes (2020) recent research regarding discriminatory social media comments against immigrants in Portugal, the author concludes that most anti-immigration comments stem from a fear of economic overload, as well as the perceived danger and threat attributed to immigrants. Santos et al. (2022) also highlight that discriminatory comments against refugees are usually based on economic, safety and cultural reasons. While both Valle-Nunes (2020) and Santos et al. (2022) emphasize that there are also plenty of "migration friendly" comments and posts on social media, one cannot underestimate the severity of the sheer number and impact of discriminatory comments and publications found on the Portuguese social media sphere.

In general, the discussion of topics related to migration on social media appears to be substantially different from the discussions that permeate the Portuguese political sphere as well as the traditional media ecosystem. Online discussions seem to accentuate and generalize a kind of discriminatory behavior that is publicly considered in Portugal to be the exception and not the rule.

Legislation

Portugal is part of the Schengen area which allows the free movement of people, capital and goods between the countries that have signed the agreement. In recent years there has been a greater focus on legislation at the European Union Level regarding immigration and refugees due to the war in neighboring countries (e.g. Afghanistan) and also because of health safety reasons during the Covid-19 crisis.

In order to respond to the European Union's and United Nations' resolutions, Portugal designs its own National Plans. There was a National Plan for the Immigrant Integration of 2007-2009 and 2010-2013, and a Strategic Plan for the Migrations (PEM) from 2015 to 2020. In 2019, Portugal approved the National Plan for the Implementation of the Migration Global Pact, which was created by the United Nations in 2018. The 10 guiding principles had 97 actions that were compiled in Portugal in 5 action points that have created different public policies.

The most recent law (before the data collection) regarding the legal regime for the entry, stay, exit and removal of foreigners from the national territory was the Bill n.º 14/2021, 12th February, that added the possibility of getting a visa to foreigners that invest in the interior of the country and the islands Azores and Madeira.

Since 2012 there is the Autorização de Residência para Atividade de Investimento (ARI) - Residency authorization for investment activity - that is usually called "golden visa" and it is given to people that have transferred more than 1.5 million euros to Portugal, created more than 10 workplaces, acquired old houses with high value, usually for renovations or invested high amounts on culture, art, technological innovation and other activities deemed of national interest.

In Portugal, after having a temporary resident visa for over 5 years it can be requested for a permanent one. All migrant citizens are entitled to the provision of comprehensive health care, and citizens with permanent residence, nationals of the UE or equivalent, third-country nationals or stateless people, applicants for international protection and migrants with or without the respective situation legalized are also beneficiaries of the Health National Public Service (SNS). No administrative barriers are foreseen, regardless of the situation. With regard to education, all children, whatever their situation, have full access to education - even the non-legal ones, there is specific legislation in those cases.

Regarding cultural integration and legislation against religious discrimination, the Law n.º 16/2001 is the Law for the Religious Freedom, that is aligned with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the Portuguese Constitution that constitutes Portugal as a laic State. The Criminal Law also provides for the aggravation of penalties in cases of crimes with a racist or xenophobic motive.

The refugees' rights are based in the United Nations Convention on the Refugees Status (the first one being from 1960), which was adopted by Portugal. The asylum right was also based in the United Nation Declaration of Territorial Asylum. In general in Portugal, it is given the asylum status to the foreigners and stateless in which there is a fear of prosecution and/or bodily harm because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinions or insertion in a certain social group.

National context

The research period (September-November 2021) was marked in Portugal by some events and news that might have shaped or influenced the content of the discussions that arose on the social media landscape. From a general standpoint, discussions of a political nature dominated the public's attention. In September, Portugal was in the midst of local elections that resulted in a change of government in the country's capital city of Lisbon. In October, the negotiations surrounding the state's budget for 2022 took center stage. At the time, Portugal was governed by a minority government led by the Socialist Party (PS) which meant that inter-party negotiations were necessary in order for the state's budget to be approved. At the end of October, due to complications in the negotiation process, the state's budget failed to be approved in parliament, resulting in the scheduling of anticipated elections for the end of January. The entirety of this process was heavily covered in the media and gave rise to a plethora of discussions on social media.

Besides the general political atmosphere, it is also important to highlight some events and news specifically related to migration that occurred in Portugal during the research period. In September, a Romanian couple was accused of trafficking and exploiting illegal Immigrants in Alentejo, a region in the center-south of Portugal. The victims were made up of 9 Moldavians, 3 Romanians e 1 Bulgarian. The media reported that the immigrants were not paid a fixed salary, were kept in extremely bad living conditions, and were made to work an excessive number of hours per day. The Romanian couple was also accused of threatening to remove the workers passports if they did not comply with the orders given to them. Both individuals were charged with 13 crimes of human trafficking and 9 crimes related to the facilitating of illegal immigration. This situation was highly discussed in the media and in social media platforms being called "modern day slavery".

In October, André Ventura, leader of the far-right party CHEGA, was forced to apologize to a family of Angolan Immigrants for referring to them as "bandits". This episode traces its roots back to January, when, during a political debate, André Ventura commented on a photograph that featured President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa with that family, stating that the president was taking a photograph with the bandits. Ventura's comments allude to an incident that happened between the family and the police earlier in the year. Generally, it was believed that the police were at fault for this incident, but some blamed the family and considered the police to be the victims. Regardless, at the time, there were still no official convictions for this incident, making Ventura's comments strictly defamatory. The family in question sued Ventura who was forced by the court to apologize. Ventura immediately filed for an appeal that was eventually legally dismissed. Finally, In October, Ventura apologized to the family, but stated that he was only apologizing because he was forced to and wished to avoid further legal complications.


In November, SIC, one of the biggest television channels in Portugal, aired a story about the trials and tribulations of illegal immigrants. The story focused on a group of Moroccans that crossed the Mediterranean Sea to arrive in Portugal. This documentary-style program approached the various legal difficulties faced by these people to obtain the status of asylum seeker.

Throughout the research period, Portugal welcomed many refugees originating from various countries, but especially from the Middle East and the North of Africa. In September, 12 refugees from Syria arrived in Portugal, bringing the total number of refugees residing in the country to 830. In November, a group of 210 refugees from Afghanistan arrived in Portugal. This group was mostly made of women and children and featured many individuals that were considered to be at risk due to the recent Taliban regime established in Afghanistan. By the end of November, there were 476 Afghan refugees residing in Portugal. Mostly this was covered in a positive light showing how the country was helping those in need.

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview


Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. $N = 2270$.

Figure 1 shows that “Territory” is the most frequent Social Media Representation with more than 25% of observations. “Values” and “Law” each represent about 20% of observations. “Institutions” and “People” are less frequent than the previous Social Media Representations, but still represent between 10% and 20% of observations. Lastly, “Culture” is the least occurring Social Media Representation pertaining to less than 5% of observations. As mentioned in the national context section, the research period was marked by events such as the discovery of immigrants being kept in inhumane conditions, the coming of refugees into the country and also controversy surrounding the Portuguese Border and Immigration Service. All these events resulted in a plethora of posts that partly explain the prevalence of the “Law”, “Values” and “Institutions” Social Media Representations. While the “Territory” Social Media Representation was also prevalent throughout the research period, its status as the most frequent Social Media Representation is mainly brought by one specific event, the tensions that erupted in the border between Poland and Belarus with migrants being kept from entering the EU space. Almost every post dedicated to this episode mentioned the crossing of borders by migrants and thus represented the “Territory” Social Media Representation. It’s likely that this event is responsible for the extremely high frequency of this Social Media Representation

Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 2270.

From Figure 2 we can conclude that there was a slight rise in Social Media Representations in week 39 (end of September/beginning of October), and a very noticeable spike in week 45 that remains relevant throughout week 46 (middle of November). The rise in week 39 might be associated with news that the European Commission was trying to establish international partnerships to control irregular migrations in the EU that led to some news reports. In the same timeframe, there were also reports of arrests made by the Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service (SEF), in various Portuguese airports, related to the facilitation of illegal immigration. As for the spike in week 47, it's important to highlight that this period coincided with tensions in the border between Belarus and Poland, with a large number of migrants being held and unable to enter the EU space. This episode involved a substantial number of posts that dealt with topics such as the conditions of migrants, arrests, episodes of violence, the EU's response, among others.

Throughout most of the research period, "Law" and "Values" are usually the most frequent Social Media Representations. However, during the spike in week 45, there is an accentuated rise in the frequency of the "Territory" Social Media Representation, making it, overall, the most frequent Social Media Representation. Once again, this spike in the "Territory" Social Media Representation is predominantly related to the vast number of posts about tensions in the border between Belarus and Poland.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 2270$.

From Figure 3 we can conclude that there were some oscillations across Social Media Representations throughout the research period. However, it's around week 45 that we can see the most noticeable changes. While there is a certain increase in the frequency of the "Law", "Values" and "Institutions" Social Media Representations, it's necessary to highlight the immense spike in the "Territory" Social Media Representation. Once again, this is largely related to posts about conflicts in the border between Belarus and Poland. While these posts approached a variety of topics, the mention of migrants wanting to cross the border was practically universal, resulting in this particular spike.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. $N = 1742$.

As we can see in Figure 4, the most common case is for posts to feature only 1 Social Media Representation (42.1% of posts). Around 36% of posts have 2 or more Social Media Representations, but only 13% have 3 or more Social Media Representations. Lastly, it's noticeable that about 21% of posts do not feature any Social Media Representations.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 1742.

From Figure 5 we can conclude that more than 85% of posts have a neutral sentiment. Additionally, there are slightly more negative posts (8,6%) than positive ones (3,4%). However, in both cases, they represent less than 10% of all posts.

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 1742 in each pair of comparison.

Overall, there are slightly more Social Media Representations in posts about Europe (1179) than not about Europe (1091) (see Table 8 and Table 9). From the Chi-squared tests, we can conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of all Social Media Representations, except for “Territory” ($p=0,196$), when comparing posts about Europe and Not Europe (Law $p=0,025$; People $p= 0,047$; Values, Institutions, Culture $p=0,00$). Given the inflation of the “Territory” Social Media Representation in Europe posts, because of the episode in the border of Poland with Belarus, it is not abnormal that the difference in proportions between Europe and Not Europe is not statistically significant. It is likely that excluding this episode would result in a more balanced distribution of proportions.

Posts about Europe have a higher percentage of “Law”, “Values”, “Institutions” and “Culture” Social Media Representations. Regarding “Values”, the higher proportion of posts within the EU dataset might be related to the substantial number of appeals to the EU to help migrants stuck in the border between Poland and Belarus, and the consequential report of the EU providing financial help to those migrants. Additionally, there is a plethora of pro and anti-immigration posts that reference Europe as a whole instead of just focusing on the Portuguese reality. In terms of “Law” and “Institutions” we see a significant overlap in posts featuring both these Social Media Representations. Usually, these posts reference a European institution followed by a certain recommendation or directive. For example, there are posts stating that the European Parliament approved a regulation that created a European Agency especially dedicated to Asylum. Additionally, we also have some posts that mention that the European Court declared that Hungary violated the EU Rules by penalizing entities that help asylum seekers. Overall, there is a more diverse range of posts that deal with these Social Media Representations in the Europe dataset. Lastly, regarding “Culture” we find a small number of posts in both the Europe and Not Europe datasets. In that sense, it is likely that the slightly higher proportion of posts found in the Europe dataset is simply related to the wider range of topics approached in the European context.

Posts not about Europe have a higher percentage of the “People” Social Media Representation. The higher proportion of the “People” Social Media Representation in Not Europe posts might be related to the origin of the refugees who came to Portugal during our research period. As mentioned throughout our national context chapter, a lot of people that came to Portugal did not come from Europe and thus their recollection of events was framed within the national context which belongs to the Not Europe category.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 1742.

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.4756	1.1569	****	0
SD	(1.039)	(0.957)		

Considering the information in Table 1, we can conclude that on average there are more Social Media Representations in posts about Europe than posts not about Europe. The mean values for the Europe and Not Europe posts are 1.48 and 1.16, respectively. According to the result of the t-test, this difference in proportions is statistically significant ($p=0.00$). Observing Figure 11, we can understand that there is a very small difference between Europe and Not Europe regarding posts with 1 Social Media Representation. However, there are substantially more posts about Europe featuring 2 or more Social Media Representations. Additionally, there are also a lot more Not Europe posts that do not feature any Social Media Representations.


Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 1742.

We can conclude from Figure 8 that there is a slightly higher percentage of positive posts about Europe (4,9%) than Not Europe (2,2%). This difference might be related to the prevalence of posts about the EU financially helping migrants in the border between Poland and Belarus. Additionally, there is also a substantial number of posts that reference that Portugal would be utilizing EU funds to help in the integration of immigrants in the country. For example, in one of these posts, a Portuguese minister declares that Portugal has an absolute need of immigrants due to a lack of manpower in certain fields and is very happy to welcome them. This post references how the European Recovery and Resilience Facility could help in attracting and integrating immigrants. According to the Chi-squared test, this is the only statistically significant difference (positive Sentiment $p=0,004$; negative sentiment $p=0,696$; neutral sentiment $p=0,178$).

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 presented in Appendix B. N = 1742 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 9 reveal that there are certain differences between Europe and Not Europe posts when controlling for additional variables. Results from logit regressions highlight that the “Territory” Social Media Representation is more likely to be present in Europe posts than Not Europe posts with an effect size of around 29 percentage points. As previously mentioned, this difference in the “Territory” Social Media Representation is related to the high frequency of posts dedicated to tensions in the border between Poland and Belarus. In that sense, it is not unusual that we are much more likely to find this Social Media Representation in posts about Europe than posts not about Europe. Additionally, the “People”, “Values” and “Culture” Social Media Representations are more likely to be found in Not Europe posts, with effect sizes of around 11, 8 and 3 percentage points, respectively.

Regarding People, it’s once again relevant to highlight that a lot of immigrants and refugees that arrived in Portugal during our research period did not come from Europe. Thus, it is not atypical that this Social Media Representation is more likely to be found in the Not Europe dataset. As we previously stated, the “Values” and “Culture” Social Media Representations appear in higher proportion in the Europe category. However, because of the enormous presence of the “Territory” Social Media Representation in Europe posts, both “Values” and “Culture” are actually more likely to be found in posts not about Europe. Additionally, it is also important to consider that the differences in proportions in both variables are not very accentuated and thus it is not abnormal that both “Values” and “Culture” are more likely to be found in posts not about Europe. Lastly, it’s important to highlight that there are no statistically significant differences in “Law”, “Institutions”, Non-Neutral Sentiments (Positive and Negative sentiments together) or the number of Social Media representations.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media

Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 21 and Table 22 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 1742 in each pair of comparison.

Overall, there are slightly more Social Media Representations in Media posts (1195) than Not Media posts (1075) (see Table 21 and Table 22). According to the Chi-squared tests, there are statistically significant differences in all Social Media Representations, with the exception of “Law” (p=0.517), when comparing Media and Not Media posts (People, Values, Territory, Institutions, Culture p=0.00). All these Social Media Representations appear in higher proportion in Not Media posts, except for the “Territory” Social Media Representation, that appears in higher proportion in Media posts.

As mentioned in the background section, the Portuguese media tends to offer a rather impersonal coverage of stories related to the reality of migrants and forced migrants. In that sense, these stories tend to put the spotlight on agents other than the migrants themselves. This results in a kind of coverage that is not as likely to produce emotional, personal, or culturally diverse elements. Additionally, this leads to a very homogenous view of all migrants and once again tarnishes the presence of the previously mentioned elements. Therefore, it is not unusual that we see a higher proportion of almost all Social Media Representations in posts by Not Media agents, that are more likely to portray and represent the reality of migrants and to approach the underlying issues surrounding said reality. The “Territory” Social Media Representation is an exception, being highly featured in media posts. This is likely related to the fact that the Media extensively covered the problems occurring in the border between Belarus and Poland. However, their coverage was mostly concerned with stating facts. For example, a large number of posts simply mentioned that migrants were trying to cross the border and enter the EU. In that sense, the media’s style of reporting actually contributes to the frequency of this specific Social Media Representation.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 23 and Table 24 presented in Appendix C. N = 1742.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.0963	1.6488	****	0
SD	(0.866)	(1.127)		

Considering the information in Table 2 we can conclude that on average there are more Social Media Representations in Not Media posts than in Media posts. The mean values for Media and Not Media posts are 1.10 and 1.65, respectively. According to the t-test, this difference is statistically significant ($p=0.00$). Observing Figure 11, we can understand that there is a higher percentage of Media posts with 0 and 1 Social Media Representations, and a higher percentage of Not Media posts with 2 or more Social Media Representations. Once again, this difference seems to stem from the media’s style of reporting that focuses on simple facts with posts dedicated to usually just one specific topic. For example, the high proportion of Media posts with just one Social Media Representation might be related to the substantial amount of media posts dealing with tensions in the border between Poland and Belarus, with “Territory” being the only Social Media Representation. Also, some media posts simply feature the “Law” Social Media Representation, while stating the various EU proposals and recommendations that surged during our research period. On the contrary, we see a substantial amount of Not Media agents approaching different kinds of elements in the same post which usually translates into Not Media posts being bigger in size but also less impersonal.


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 25 and Table 26 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 1742.

From Figure 12 we can conclude that there is a slightly higher percentage of posts with a neutral sentiment in Media (89,1%) than in Not Media (86,2%). In this sense, while the grand of majority posts feature a neutral sentiment, it's noticeable that this trend is slightly more prevalent inside Media posts. It could be argued that the facts-based reporting done by the media results in a more accentuated prevalence of posts with a neutral tone. Additionally, there is a higher percentage of posts with a positive sentiment in Not Media (7,5%) than in Media (1%). Once again, this difference is explained by the type of reporting done by Media agents and Not media agents. Additionally, it's also noticeable inside our coded dataset that there are a lot more positive posts belonging to Not Media agents featuring, for example, the celebration of dates, the promotion of culturally diverse events, the positive experiences of migrants, among others. According to Chi-squared tests, these differences are statistically significant (neutral sentiment $p=0,012$; positive sentiment $p =0,00$). However, regarding posts with a negative sentiment, the difference between Media posts and Not Media posts is not statistically significant.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32, Table 33, Table 34. presented in Appendix C. N = 1742 in each estimation.

The coefficient estimates in Figure 13 reveal that there are certain differences between Media and Not Media posts when controlling for additional variables. Results from logit regressions highlight that the “Law” and “Territory” Social Media Representations are more likely to be present in Media posts than in Not Media posts with effects sizes of around 11 and 16 percentage points, respectively. Observing our manually coded data, it is understandable that these Social Media Representations are more likely to be found in Media posts. Consistently, we found that these were the most present Social Media Representations in posts made by the Media. More specifically, we found a substantial number of posts that dealt with migrants in the border between Poland and Belarus, but also many Media posts that were essentially reports of decisions, regulations and recommendations made in relation to migration issues. As previously mentioned, the media posts that dealt with these Social Media Representations tended to enunciate the facts without further reflecting upon the situations at hand

Conversely, the “People”, “Values”----- and “Culture” Social Media Representations are more likely to be found in Not Media posts, with effects sizes of around 14, 19 and 3 percentage points, respectively. However, there are no statistically significant differences in “Institutions” and Non-Neutral Sentiments (Positive and Negative sentiments together). Lastly, results from the Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) suggest that there are more Social Media Representations present in Not Media posts than in Media posts. It is unsurprising that these Social Media Representations are more likely to be found in posts by Not Media agents since they tend to be less impersonal and more focused on the reality of migrants and forced migrants. As mentioned throughout this report, the distant and ingroup focused reporting done by the media tends to lessen the prevalence of posts featuring the elements usually associated with the “People” “Values” and “Culture” Social Media Representations.

Illustrative examples

We will now present examples of posts that reflect the coefficient estimates for Europe and for Media observed in Figure 9 and 13, respectively. For both Europe and Media, we will showcase two posts that exemplify the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate and the lowest coefficient estimate regarding Europe and Media.


Starting with Europe, we can see in Figure 9 that the highest coefficient estimate is related to “Territory” and the lowest to “People”. Below we can find an example of a post from the Europe dataset that featured the “Territory” Social Media Representation, and of a post from the Not Europe dataset that featured the “People” Social Media Representation.

Figure 14. Illustrative example of the “Territory” Social Media Representation in Europe posts



In figure 14 we have an example of a post related to the Social Media Representation with the highest coefficient estimate regarding Europe – “Territory”. This is a Twitter post by Público, a Portuguese legacy media newspaper but regarding this topic there were plenty others in the dataset analyzed. The tweet reads the following: “European Union: Dozens of migrants once again try to enter Poland on the frontier with Belarus”. This post clearly exemplifies a reference to the crossing of borders by migrants in a European setting. In fact, the tweet starts with the words “European Union” to highlight that this is a post specifically dedicated to the European context.

Figure 15. Illustrative example of the “People” Social Media Representation in Not Europe posts



In Figure 15 we have an example of a post related to the Social Media Representation with the lowest coefficient estimate regarding Europe – “People”. This is a Twitter post by SIC Notícias, an informational Portuguese legacy media television channel. This tweet states that migrants were rescued in Algarve (a region in the south of Portugal), and then proceeds to quote the migrants themselves who said, “we didn’t have food, water, or anything”. This tweet exhibits the experiences of migrants through their own words, hence being a good example of the “People” Social Media Representation. Additionally, it is not related to Europe since the migrants did not come from a European territory and the post only refers to the Portuguese national context.

Proceeding to Media, we can see in Figure 13 that the largest coefficient estimate is related to “Territory” and the lowest to “Values”. Below we can find an example of a post from a media agent that featured the “Territory” Social Media Representation, and of a post that is not from a media agent that featured the “Values” Social Media Representation.

Figure 16. Illustrative example of the “Territory” Social Media Representation in Media posts



In Figure 16 we have an example of a post related to the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate regarding Media – “Territory”. This is a Twitter post by Expresso, a Portuguese legacy media newspaper. This tweet states that Poland already has 15 thousand military officers on the border with Belarus, and that, for the second consecutive day, migrants have taken down the barbed wire fences to enter the EU. This post describes migrants crossing borders and thus exemplifies the “Territory” Social Media Representation. At the same time, it demonstrates how the media usually covers events on social media, by offering the title of news piece and then presenting a link that leads to the full story on their main website.

Figure 17. Illustrative example of the “Values” Social Media Representation in Not Media posts

 **Amnistia Internacional Portugal**
1 de Outubro de 2021 · 🌐

Sem comida, sem água potável, sem abrigo e sem medicamentos desde, pelo menos, 18 de agosto. Assim estão 32 requerentes de asilo afegãos - mulheres, crianças e homens - retidos na fronteira entre a Polónia e a Bielorrússia.

🗨️ A União deve agir com celeridade e firmeza para denunciar estes abusos flagrantes do direito da UE e internacional, e pôr fim à forma impiedosa como estas pessoas estão a ser tratadas há várias semanas.



AMNISTIA.PT

Polónia: retorno forçado de requerentes de asilo afegãos - Amnistia Internacional Portugal

🙄🙏👍 78

5 comentários 20 partilhas

👍 Gosto 💬 Comentar ➦ Partilhar

In Figure 17 we have an example of a post related to the Social Media Representation with the lowest coefficient estimate in Not Media social media pages – “Values”. This is a Facebook post by the Portuguese strand of the global NGO Amnesty International. The post starts by referring that migrants have been without food, health, water, shelter, and medicine since at least the 18th of August. It then states that 32 asylum seekers, men, women, and children from different nationalities, are withheld at the border between Poland and Belarus. In the second paragraph, it says that the EU should act firmly to denounce this flagrant abuse of both EU and international law and put an end to the ruthless way in which these people have been treated for several weeks. In this post, especially in the second paragraph, we can see a clear appeal to values of tolerance, dignity and compassion in relation to forced migrants.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this report allows us to take some conclusions about the nature of discussions surrounding migration on social media in Portugal. Overall, we can conclude that the “Law” and “Values” Social Media Representations are highly prevalent throughout all the research period. In week 39, both these Social

Media Representations see a rise in frequency. Our main hypothesis is that this rise is related to the emergence of news that the EU was establishing international partnerships to control irregular migrations in its territory, but also to some reports of arrests regarding that same irregular immigration made by the Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service (SEF). Despite the relevancy of this rise, it is undermined by the spike that occurred in the “Territory” Social Media Representation in week 45 and 46. The conflicts in the border between Poland and Belarus translated into an enormous rise in the frequency of the “Territory” Social Media Representation. In that sense, this event ended up shaping a large part of our analysis

Regarding differences between posts about Europe and not about Europe, the results indicate that there is a higher proportion of every Social Media Representation in Europe posts, with the exception of the “People” Social Media Representation. As mentioned in the example post in Figure 15, as well as in the national context chapter, a lot of refugees do not come from Europe which might have contributed to a larger proportion of this Social Media Representation in Not Europe posts. Additionally, the differences in the “Territory” Social Media Representation were not statistically significant which is very interesting given the large discrepancy between percentages found within our dataset.

Lastly, regarding differences between Media and Not Media posts, it’s important to highlight that there is a statistically significant difference in the number of Social Media Representations, with Not Media posts featuring more Representations per post and in general. Additionally, we see a higher proportion of all statistically significant Representations in Not Media posts except for the “Territory” Social Media Representation. The higher proportion of the “Values”, “People” and “Culture” Social Media Representations in Not Media posts might be related to the impersonal and ingroup focused reporting usually done by the Portuguese media in story’s related to migration. This was something heavily mentioned in our background section with several authors (Torkington & Ribeiro, 2018; Santos-Silva & Guerreiro, 2020; Garraio et al., 2022) mentioning this distinctive characteristic.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	443	19.5	25.4
People	298	13.1	17.1
Values	455	20.0	26.1
Territory	612	27.0	35.1
Institutions	360	15.9	20.7
Culture	102	4.5	5.9
Total	2270	100.0	130.3

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions	Culture
35	20	13	24	21	9	0
36	22	21	26	23	21	2
37	33	17	35	31	29	1
38	35	26	44	24	27	20
39	47	31	58	20	32	22
40	27	22	31	24	23	4
41	26	34	38	27	28	10
42	38	21	22	34	32	7
43	14	16	27	23	19	5
44	9	10	12	19	12	8
45	65	29	44	169	57	10

46	47	18	59	119	33	5
47	58	35	30	62	35	7
48	2	5	5	16	3	1
Total	443	298	455	612	360	102

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	376	21.6
1	734	42.1
2	409	23.5
3	177	10.2
4	43	2.5
5	3	0.2
Total	1742	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	149	8.6
Neutral	1533	88.0
Positive	60	3.4
Total	1742	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	224	19.0	28.0
People	107	9.1	13.4
Values	221	18.7	27.7
Territory	372	31.6	46.6
Institutions	198	16.8	24.8
Culture	57	4.8	7.1
Total	1179	100.0	147.6

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	219	20.1	23.2
People	191	17.5	20.3
Values	234	21.4	24.8
Territory	240	22.0	25.5
Institutions	162	14.8	17.2
Culture	45	4.1	4.8
Total	1091	100.0	115.7

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	127	15.9
1	333	41.7
2	205	25.7
3	102	12.8
4	30	3.8
5	2	0.3
Total	799	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	249	26.4
1	401	42.5
2	204	21.6
3	75	8.0
4	13	1.4
5	1	0.1
Total	943	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	60	7.5
Neutral	700	87.6
Positive	39	4.9
Total	799	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	89	9.4
Neutral	833	88.3
Positive	21	2.2
Total	943	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0478** (0.021)	-0.0301 (0.023)	-0.0241 (0.023)
Twitter		-0.1792**** (0.023)	-0.1713**** (0.024)
Interactions		6.304e-05 (0.0)	6.504e-05 (0.0)
Followers		2.067e-08 (0.0)	2.545e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0363**** (0.008)	-0.0375**** (0.008)
October			-0.1129** (0.044)
November			-0.2036** (0.079)
week			0.0194** (0.009)
N	1742	1742	1742

Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.05
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Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0698**** (0.018)	-0.1219**** (0.02)	-0.1134**** (0.02)
Twitter		-0.1005**** (0.021)	-0.0915**** (0.021)
Interactions		5.268e-05 (0.0)	5.557e-05* (0.0)
Followers		-4.158e-08 (0.0)	-3.482e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0052 (0.006)	0.0042 (0.006)
October			0.0236 (0.039)
November			-0.0693 (0.07)
week			0.0053 (0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.04

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0284 (0.021)	-0.0833**** (0.022)	-0.0783*** (0.023)
Twitter		-0.1814**** (0.022)	-0.1780**** (0.022)
Interactions		6.835e-05** (0.0)	6.681e-05** (0.0)
Followers		-2.257e-07**** (0.0)	-2.196e-07**** (0.0)

Sentiment Score		0.0356****	0.0349****
		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			0.0316
			(0.041)
November			0.0186
			(0.075)
week			-0.0048
			(0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.12	0.12

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2031****	0.3385****	0.2921****
	(0.02)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Twitter		0.2557****	0.2156****
		(0.026)	(0.026)
Interactions		8.892e-06	1.431e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		9.778e-08***	5.773e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0444****	-0.0388****
		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			0.0893*
			(0.046)
November			0.2715***
			(0.082)
week			-0.0098
			(0.009)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.12	0.15

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0752**** (0.019)	-0.0339 (0.022)	-0.0356 (0.022)
Twitter		-0.2234**** (0.022)	-0.2238**** (0.022)
Interactions		6.143e-05 (0.0)	6.354e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-8.304e-08*** (0.0)	-8.77e-08*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0062 (0.005)	-0.0055 (0.005)
October			0.0599 (0.038)
November			0.0508 (0.072)
week			-0.0020 (0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.09	0.09

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0235** (0.011)	-0.0283** (0.012)	-0.0276** (0.012)
Twitter		-0.1396**** (0.021)	-0.1371**** (0.021)
Interactions		-8.795e-05** (0.0)	-8.466e-05** (0.0)
Followers		-9.116e-08*** (0.0)	-8.962e-08*** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0054*** (0.002)	0.0054*** (0.002)

October			-0.0247
			(0.024)
November			-0.0630
			(0.046)
week			0.0074
			(0.005)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.19	0.19

Table 19. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0072	-0.0154	-0.0094
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Twitter		-0.0700****	-0.0654****
		(0.016)	(0.016)
Interactions		-6.585e-06	-7.008e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		9.888e-11	7.464e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0412****	-0.0417****
		(0.01)	(0.01)
October			0.0389
			(0.031)
November			0.0243
			(0.055)
week			-0.0057
			(0.006)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.07	0.07

Table 20. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3186*** (0.0482)	0.0342 (0.0500)	0.0106 (0.0519)
Twitter		-0.6010*** (0.0533)	-0.6138*** (0.0545)
Interactions		0.0003*** (0.0001)	0.0003*** (0.0001)
Followers		-0.0000*** (0.0000)	-0.0000*** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0275* (0.0156)	-0.0238 (0.0159)
October			0.0558 (0.1019)
November			0.0165 (0.1783)
week			0.0172 (0.0196)
Intercept	1.1569*** (0.0311)	1.6539*** (0.0539)	0.9392 (0.7338)
R-squared	0.0248	0.1179	0.1230
R-squared Adj.	0.0243	0.1153	0.1189
N	1742	1742	1742

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 21. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	271	22.7	24.9
People	133	11.1	12.2
Values	150	12.6	13.8
Territory	474	39.7	43.5
Institutions	147	12.3	13.5

Culture	20	1.7	1.8
Total	1195	100.0	109.6

Table 22. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	172	16.0	26.4
People	165	15.3	25.3
Values	305	28.4	46.8
Territory	138	12.8	21.2
Institutions	213	19.8	32.7
Culture	82	7.6	12.6
Total	1075	100.0	164.9

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	261	23.9
1	549	50.4
2	208	19.1
3	58	5.3
4	14	1.3
Total	1090	100.0

Table 24. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	115	17.6
1	185	28.4
2	201	30.8
3	119	18.3
4	29	4.4
5	3	0.5

Total	652	100.0
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Table 25. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	108	9.9
Neutral	971	89.1
Positive	11	1.0
Total	1090	100.0

Table 26. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	41	6.3
Neutral	562	86.2
Positive	49	7.5
Total	652	100.0

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0151 (0.021)	0.1074**** (0.03)	0.1146**** (0.03)
Twitter		-0.2099**** (0.024)	-0.2066**** (0.024)
Interactions		8.71e-05 (0.0)	9.093e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-3.877e-08 (0.0)	-3.442e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0337**** (0.008)	-0.0350**** (0.008)
October			-0.1230*** (0.044)
November			-0.2325*** (0.079)
week			0.0214** (0.009)

N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.06

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1228**** (0.017)	-0.1435**** (0.031)	-0.1377**** (0.031)
Twitter		0.0230 (0.026)	0.0271 (0.026)
Interactions		2.859e-05 (0.0)	3.12e-05 (0.0)
Followers		2.951e-08 (0.0)	3.716e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0023 (0.006)	0.0011 (0.006)
October			0.0277 (0.038)
November			-0.0752 (0.07)
week			0.0047 (0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.04

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.2857**** (0.015)	-0.1927**** (0.027)	-0.1911**** (0.027)
Twitter		-0.0509** (0.024)	-0.0508** (0.024)
Interactions		2.914e-05 (0.0)	2.758e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-9.989e-08***	-9.362e-08**

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0305****	0.0300****
		(0.007)	(0.007)
October			0.0429
			(0.041)
November			0.0374
			(0.073)
week			-0.0071
			(0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.14	0.14

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.2277****	0.1847****	0.1580****
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Twitter		0.0004	-0.0076
		(0.028)	(0.027)
Interactions		3.84e-05	3.662e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		4.982e-08	5.829e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0382****	-0.0321****
		(0.008)	(0.008)
October			0.0927*
			(0.048)
November			0.3305****
			(0.085)
week			-0.0108
			(0.009)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.06	0.10

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1764**** (0.018)	-0.0466* (0.025)	-0.0480* (0.025)
Twitter		-0.1866**** (0.022)	-0.1853**** (0.021)
Interactions		5.2e-05 (0.0)	5.361e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-5.875e-08* (0.0)	-6.218e-08* (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0074 (0.005)	-0.0068 (0.005)
October			0.0617 (0.038)
November			0.0514 (0.071)
week			-0.0024 (0.008)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.09	0.09

Table 32. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Culture as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1070**** (0.015)	-0.0344** (0.015)	-0.0329** (0.015)
Twitter		-0.1119**** (0.019)	-0.1102**** (0.019)
Interactions		-0.0001** (0.0)	-9.922e-05** (0.0)
Followers		-6.549e-08** (0.0)	-6.49e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0050**	0.0050**

		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0232
			(0.024)
November			-0.0623
			(0.045)
week			0.0070
			(0.005)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.19	0.19

Table 33. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0282*	-0.0357*	-0.0330
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Twitter		-0.0478***	-0.0472***
		(0.017)	(0.017)
Interactions		-1.364e-05	-1.41e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.759e-08	2.429e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0421****	-0.0424****
		(0.01)	(0.01)
October			0.0397
			(0.031)
November			0.0260
			(0.055)
week			-0.0058
			(0.006)
N	1742	1742	1742
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.07	0.08

Table 34. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.5524*** (0.0513)	-0.1987*** (0.0728)	-0.2110*** (0.0729)
Twitter		-0.5296*** (0.0590)	-0.5273*** (0.0586)
Interactions		0.0002** (0.0001)	0.0002** (0.0001)
Followers		-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0309* (0.0162)	-0.0272* (0.0165)
October			0.0723 (0.1021)
November			0.0589 (0.1786)
week			0.0140 (0.0196)
Intercept	1.6488*** (0.0441)	1.7249*** (0.0479)	1.1107 (0.7349)
R-squared	0.0704	0.1223	0.1281
R-squared Adj.	0.0699	0.1198	0.1241
N	1742	1742	1742

Spain

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Introduction

Background

For a long time, Spain was an exception in Europe because of its more open attitude towards immigration. This is further underlined by the fact that Spain had the highest immigration per capita in the European Union between the years of 1998 – 2009 (Gonzalez-Enríquez, 2017). Negative experiences of the nationalist Franco regime, high dependency on migrant worker labor force and its history as an emigrant country are all potential reasons for Spain's more open attitude towards immigration. However, the Spanish exception was questioned in 2019 as the nationalist and populist party VOX entered into parliament as the country's third largest party. However, anti-immigration rhetoric was not a major factor of VOX's initial success and Spain has remained a country relatively open towards immigration (Bourekba et al., 2023).

Due to the political success and impact of populist parties such as VOX, the representation of immigration of these parties has been given a lot of focus in social media analysis focusing on Spain. For example, Calderón et al. (2020) analyzed the existence of hate speech on VOX Twitter accounts. The authors found that only 1% out of 240 000 tweets contained hate speech and that most of these posts were either offensive or encouraged hate towards immigrants. Further strengthening the negative representation of immigrants by VOX, Jaramillo-Dent (2022) found that members of the party typically represent immigrants on social media as young males belonging to groups and that they are aggressive and violent. Comparing the discursive differences of extreme right- and extreme left-wing parties in Spain, Italy, France and the UK towards the European Union, VOX uses a similar anti-EU discourse as extreme right parties of the other studied countries. In particular, they problematize the loss of sovereignty, blaming the Brussels oligarchy and poses a solution the re-foundation of the EU ensuring a lower degree of power of Brussels (Alonso-Muñoz, 2020).

Studies suggest that Spain has relatively little presence of migration related activity on social media in a European context. Politicians in Spain have been found to post less on immigration issues than in other European countries. The suggested reason for this is that Spain, during the years of study (2015 – 2017), was a country with negative or marginal net immigration (Heidenrich et al. 2020). In a similar vein, immigration-related tweets increased during the COVID-19 outbreak in Spain, but at a similar rate as in the UK, Germany, Italy and USA. The study also finds that Spanish tweets have a sentiment that is on average more negative than positive (Rowe et al., 2021). Several studies have investigated which representations and discourses traditional media in Spain has used towards different aspects of immigration. Many studies point to that traditional media uses a negative discourse towards immigration in Spain. It has been found that Spanish news media outlets consistently use a discourse regarding unaccompanied foreign minors (MENAs in Spanish) that is criminalistic, moralistic and nationalistic. Thus, using a language with negative connotations and that stigmatizes the unaccompanied foreign minors (Gómez-Quintero et al., 2021). Furthermore, on the 17th of May 2021 Spain was affected by a major immigration event when around 8000 Moroccan immigrants crossed the border illegally into Ceuta in Spain. Conducting discourse analysis of the main Spanish news media, Terrón-Caro et al. (2022) discovered that the media often used a negative discourse and a "we versus them" narrative. Consequently, news media often used a populist discourse when writing about the event. However, comparing to the traditional media in Italy and Greece it has been suggested that Spanish media does not visually

represent immigration more negatively than the media in the other two countries (Amores et al., 2020).

Legislation

The existing Spanish laws on foreigners are established in the **Consolidated Text of Organic Law 4/2000, of January 11**¹⁴². It regulates the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration and establishes that the public authorities must promote the integration of immigrants within a framework of co-existence of diverse identities and cultures. That is to say that the public policies and services and the economic, social, cultural, and political participation of immigrants will be promoted by developing specific measures to favor their inclusion into the educational system. This is consolidated by, schooling during the mandatory age, the learning of the official languages, and access to employment are preserved rights.

For this reason, there are many inviolable rights that are recognized for foreigners, which are the foundation of political order and social peace. In this way, foreigners in Spain have the same rights as Spanish citizens regarding the following: the right to freedom of movement and to choose their residence freely (art. 5); the right to public participation, that is, the right to vote in municipal elections (art. 6); the right to meet under the same conditions as Spaniards (art. 7); right to education (art. 9); right to engage in gainful employment or self-employment, as well as to have access to the Social Security system (art. 10); right to health care (art. 12); right to access public housing assistance systems, and long-term foreign residents are entitled to such assistance under the same conditions as Spaniards (art. 13); right to Social Security and social services (art. 14); right to effective judicial protection (art. 20); right to free legal assistance (art. 22)... Also, the right to asylum is recognized by Law 12/2009, of October 30¹⁴³, which aims to establish the terms under which non-EU nationals and stateless persons who have been recognized as refugees may enjoy international protection in Spain through the right to asylum and subsidiary protection. On the other hand, according to the Spanish Constitution, religious beliefs may not be a reason for inequality or discrimination of any person. Article 16 guarantees the ideological, religious and worship freedom of individuals and communities with no other limitation, in its manifestations, than that necessary for the maintenance of public order protected by law, and no one may be forced to declare their ideology, religion or beliefs.

In addition, the law 15/2022, of July 12, 2022¹⁴⁴, on equal treatment and non-discrimination recognizes in Article 2 the right of all persons to equal treatment and non-discrimination regardless of their nationality, whether they are minors or adults, or whether or not they are legally resident, and therefore no one may be discriminated against on the grounds of birth, racial or ethnic origin, religion, conviction or opinion, or any other personal or social condition or circumstance. However, a difference in treatment that can be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and as an appropriate, necessary and proportionate means to achieve equality is not considered discrimination. Consequently, as

¹⁴² <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2000-544>

¹⁴³ <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2009-17242>

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2022-11589>

established in Article 4, any provision, conduct, act, criterion or practice that violates the right to equality is prohibited.

On the other hand, it is important to point out that, according to Article 49 of Organic Law 4/2000, of January 11, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain, it is considered a serious infringement the irregular presence in Spanish territory, for not having obtained or having expired for more than three months the extension of stay, the residence authorization or similar documents, when required, and provided that the interested party has not requested its renewal within said term. In this way, the article 25 bis of the same law, establishes the different types of visas, which must be validly issued and in force, being necessary for immigrants to enter and leave Spanish territory.

National context

An unusually high number of immigrants entered Spain illegally between January and September of 2022. The numbers were 51% higher relative to the same period the year before. This process was accompanied by a series of migratory events that attracted much attention during 2021¹⁴⁵. According to data from the National Statistics Institute, in 2021 there was an increase in the arrival of immigrants to Spain, which resulted in a population growth of more than 34,000 people to 47.43 million inhabitants. This meant that after six consecutive years of growth, the population reached a new high¹⁴⁶. Due to its close proximity to the African continent and the fact that Spain shares borders with Morocco in northern Africa, several migratory events occurred in relation to African migrants. As previously mentioned, on the 17th of May 2021 Spain around 6000 Moroccan immigrants, about 1500 of them minors, crossed the Moroccan – Spanish border illegally into Ceuta. This led to the overflowing of the reception capacity of the city, and it prompted the Spanish Government to mobilize the army to ensure control of the situation¹⁴⁷. In addition, several attempts by immigrants to illegally cross the border into Melilla, which is also situated on the border to Morocco, were made during and before our period of study¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰. Specifically for our period of study, 800 immigrants tried to jump over the wall that separates Spain and Morocco in an attempt to illegally cross the border on the 1st of October 2021. The general trend of an increase of such events and illegal immigration in general caught attention in the media and among political leaders. The majority of the events involved immigrants from Africa trying to enter Spain.

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20211004/migrantes-espana-ilegal-balance/2179960.shtml>

¹⁴⁶ [Notas de prensa INE](#)

¹⁴⁷ [Cerca de 5.000 migrantes entran en Ceuta - RTVE](#)

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20211001/unos-700-migrantes-intentan-saltar-valla-melilla/2177528.shtml>

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20210722/migrantes-entran-melilla-saltando-valla/2135441.shtml>

¹⁵⁰ <https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/09/24/614d9f2cfc6c83b3228b45e0.html>

As a response to the increase in illegal attempts of migrants to enter Spain, in June 2021, the Spanish government approved an extraordinary regularization process for migrants who were in an irregular situation in Spain. This measure made it possible to regularize the situation of thousands of people and give them access to basic rights such as healthcare and education. Later in December 2021, the Spanish government presented a new law for the protection of the rights of migrants, which seeks to guarantee access to basic rights and combat discrimination and racism. The law has not yet been approved and has generated intense political debate in the country.

As a response to such events, the national-conservative political party VOX gave a speech in November 2021 against immigration. Specifically, it has been described as "repugnant" and "discriminatory". When VOX realized its impact, and after several controversies, they assured that they do not use hate speech against immigrants. They are only against the servants of globalism who encourage mass immigration to Africanize Spanish neighborhoods and lower wages. Against this multiculturalism, VOX started the #AgendaEspaña that promotes the increase of national birth rate. Within VOX's rationale, it is highlighted that every country has the right to regulate the conditions of entry of those who aspire to live on the territory and every human being has the right to live, grow and develop as a person in their own national community contributing to its prosperity in accordance with the culture that each one has.

A considerable degree of posts on social media concern migratory events in Latin America due to its historical ties to Spain, and Spain's large immigrant population from Latin America. For example, the Tarapacá migration crisis in Chile, during which around 18 000 Venezuelan migrants crossed the border from Bolivia, was discussed quite extensively¹⁵¹. There was also a border crisis between the USA and Haiti that captured quite a lot of attention on social media in Spain, with the US government deploying border agents against the Haitians trying to enter the country¹⁵². Furthermore, in the beginning of September there was a migration crisis in Mexico during which the government deployed armed forces to control the situation¹⁵³. Consequently, major migratory events in north- and south America have a considerable effect on the national context of Spain during the period of study.

Quantitative analysis

Descriptive overview

Figure 1 provides a descriptive overview of how common the different Social Media Representations are during the study period. People is most common as it accounts for


¹⁵¹ <https://www.elmostrador.cl/destacado/2021/09/24/desalojo-de-migrantes-en-plaza-brasil-de-iquique-defensoria-de-la-ninez-y-sjm-rechazan-violencia-como-respuesta-a-un-problema-humanitario-y-gobierno-se-defiende/>

¹⁵² <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/21/us-treatment-haitian-migrants-discriminatory>

¹⁵³ <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-09-03/mexico-despliega-un-feroz-operativo-para-frenar-la-caravana-migrante-de-chiapas.html>

almost 25% of the Social Media Representations in total. Law, Institutions, Values, and Territory occur in similar magnitude with around 15% - 20% of the Social Media Representations.

Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 4016.

Turning to the temporal frequencies of Social Media Representations, Figure 2 shows two clear peaks in overall frequency: The first is in week 38, which is the third week of September 2021, and the second peak appears in week 44, or the second week of November. The two peaks show different compositions as the first peak is dominated by People, Values, and Institutions, while the second is more related to Territory. That the second peak is very much related to Territory is not surprising as it occurs during the deepening of the Poland – Belarus border crisis in the second week of November 2021¹⁵⁴. Three migratory crisis events were discussed during week 38 in Spain. The Tarapacá migration crisis in Chile, during which around 18 000 Venezuelan migrants crossed the border from Bolivia, was discussed quite extensively since the Police moved migrants against their will on September 24 and protests were held on September 25¹⁵⁵. There was also a border crisis between the USA and Haiti that captured quite a lot of attention on social media in Spain, with the US government deploying border agents against the Haitians trying to enter the country¹⁵⁶. Nationally, around 400 individuals tried to enter into Melilla from Morocco and the border police from both countries had to intervene to calm the


¹⁵⁴ <https://www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-12-november-2021/>

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.elmostrador.cl/destacado/2021/09/24/desalojo-de-migrantes-en-plaza-brasil-de-iquique-defensoria-de-la-ninez-y-sjm-rechazan-violencia-como-respuesta-a-un-problema-humanitario-y-gobierno-se-defiende/>

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/21/us-treatment-haitian-migrants-discriminatory>

situation¹⁵⁷. This event also stirred quite some activity on social media. Considering that all these events were related to people migrating, and the interventions of governments, it is natural that they contributed to the spikes seen in People, Institutions, and Values.


Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 4016.

From Figure 3 it is quite clear that the first peak is driven by Institutions, Values, and People, while the second peak is mostly about Territory. However, all Social Media Representations except Territory stay fairly stable during the analyzed time period.

Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 4016.

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2021/09/24/614d9f2cfc6c83b3228b45e0.html>

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of Social Media Representations among all posts. Around 35% of the post contain no Social Media Representation, and it is the most common case.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 3504.

Finally, Figure 5 shows that most sentiments expressed are neutral, with around 75% of the post pertaining to this category. However, there is a fair number of negative sentiments, while Positive sentiments are scarce. Around 20% of the post have a negative sentiment while less than 5% have a positive.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 3504.

Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

There are roughly the same number of posts talking about Europe and Not Europe in Spain during the study period. There were 1181 posts about Europe and 2323 not about Europe. Figure 6 shows that Social Media Representations are more common when some aspect of Europe is discussed compared to when it is not. There is a statistically significant difference for all Social Media Representations except institutions ($p = 0.0$ for all except Institutions $p = 0.29$). The difference in Territory can to a large extent be explained by the deepening of the Poland – Belarus border conflict as these two countries pertain to our definition of Europe.

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. $N = 3504$ in each pair of comparison.

Turning to the number of Social Media Representations, Table 1 shows that their number is higher in posts about Europe compared to posts not about Europe. There are on average 1.61 Social Media Representations in Europe posts compared to 0.91 in posts not about Europe. The difference in the number of Social Media Representations is statistically significant ($p = 0.0$). Moreover, it is clear from Figure 7 that there is a larger proportion of Not Europe posts that contain no Social Media Representation. This can most likely explain the differences observed in Figure 6. Many Not Europe posts report on international migratory events (mostly in North- and South America), such as the previously mentioned Haiti and Chile migratory crises (see examples). A greater share of these posts simply reports facts about what has happened, without making any references to concepts that can be captured by the Social Media Representations under study, as for example, People, Values, Institutions and (European) Territory (see example¹⁵⁸). On the contrary, when talking about migration in Europe, such as the Poland – Belarus boarder conflict, people’s journeys, values such as peace and solidarity with the migrants are mentioned to a much

¹⁵⁸ <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1444358393691623432>

larger extent (see example¹⁵⁹). This could potentially reflect the fact that migratory events concerning Europe, that occur closer geographically, stir more emotions and require a firmer political response than other international events. Therefore, the need to act through Law or Institutions, which in turn reflect your Values, and the stories of People affected by the crisis are more engaging since the events occur closer geographically.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 3504.


Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.6097	0.9105	****	0
SD	(1.052)	(1.039)		

However, there are no differences in sentiments among Europe and not Europe posts. Figure 8 displays the distributions of sentiments across Europe and not Europe posts and the respective distributions are almost identical. Chi-squared tests do not detect and statistically significant differences (p = 0.691 for Negative, 0.884 for Neutral, and 0.53 for Positive).

Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively


¹⁵⁹ <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1458426781078274050>



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 3504.

Figure 9 displays coefficient estimates of the effect of a post being about Europe, relative to not being about Europe, from Logit and OLS regressions with each variable on the X-axis used as a separate dependent variable. The regressions include a number of control variables which we can conclude affect the differences observed in Figure 6. There are still significantly more posts about Territory when Europe is discussed, which is due to the Poland and Belarus border conflict. The point estimate is around 23 percentage points. However, Institutions and People are more present when Europe is not discussed, with effect sizes of 9 and 4 percentage points respectively. There are no statistically significant differences in Law, Values. The difference from Figure 6 can be explained by the inclusion of a control for the social media platform (Twitter variable). In general, all Social Media Representations are more common on Facebook than Twitter. Moreover, non-neutral sentiment is not significant, while the average number of Social Media Representations is higher among posts discussing Europe.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 presented in Appendix B. N = 3504 in each estimation.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media


Turning to the comparison between social media posts by media and not media, we can start by noticing that posts by non-media are more common (2089) than posts by media (1415) in our data set. There are also several differences in the occurrence of Social Media Representations between the two types of posters. Figure 10 displays the % occurrence of Social Media Representations across the two groups and the largest difference, in which not media is more common than media, is observed in Values, ($p = 0.0$). This is not surprising considering that Media typically report more on the facts about events, whereas non-media posts also share emotions and their related values in the texts. Additionally, Institutions and Law are more frequently discussed by non-media than by media ($p = 0.0$ for Institutions and $p = 0.006$ for law). The social media posts created by non-media talk to a larger extent about migratory events occurring in Spain and the government’s reaction, or lack of reaction, to the event (see example¹⁶⁰). In addition to being represented by institutions, these posts also display more representations of values. As these posts typically desire some change, immigration is framed within Institutions and Law. On the contrary, the reporting of media is more international, and reporting on action of other countries’ institutions, such as the White house (see example¹⁶¹). One potential explanation between the observed differences is the desire and increased posting from non-media posters of changes in immigration by institutions through legislation. Territory is the only Social Media Representation that is

¹⁶⁰ <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1445391827155267586>

¹⁶¹ <https://twitter.com/twitter/status/1441437784686931971>

more frequent among Media ($p = 0.0$), which may be due to the fact that media reporting was highly focused on the Poland and Belarus border conflict and the crossing of borders was frequently mentioned as a fact. For posts by Not media, the focus is also about positive and negative values related to this crisis and other events, which consequently makes Territory relatively less common. Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in the occurrence of People between media and non-media ($p = 0.347$).


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 20 and Table 21 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. $N = 3504$ in each pair of comparison.

From Table 2 it is possible to conclude that there are on average more Social Media Representations in posts by Not Media than by Media. The difference is small, but statistically significant ($p = 0.039$). On average there are 1.18 Social Media Representations among posts by Not Media and 1.10 among Media.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 22 and Table 23 presented in Appendix C. N = 3504.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.0996	1.1776	**	0.0386
SD	(0.978)	(1.166)		

Turning to the sentiments, we can conclude from Figure 12 that there are differences in the sentiments expressed between Media and Not Media. Perhaps a bit surprising, there are more negative sentiments among media posts than non-media posts ($p = 0.016$). Furthermore, there are more positive sentiments among Not media users than Media users ($p = 0.0$). However, this is in line with the previous research of Gómez-Quintero et al. (2021) and Terrón-Caro et al. (2022) who found that traditional media typically uses a negative discourse towards immigrants in different situations. Finally, no statistically significant difference is observed in the proportions of Neutral sentiments among the two groups ($p = 0.362$).


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 24 and Table 25 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 3504.

Finally, we assess whether the observed differences are robust to controlling for other factors. Figure 13 shows coefficient estimates from Logit and OLS regressions of the effect of a post being posted by Media, relative to Not Media, for a number of dependent variables that are displayed on the X-axis. Similar to the results observed from Figure 10, the largest differences are observed for Territory, which is more discussed by Media than Not Media, and Values that is more common among Not Media. The effect sizes are around 11 and -12 percentage points respectively. Furthermore, Institutions are slightly more common among Not Media and there are no statistically significant differences in Law nor People. Finally, there are more non-neutral sentiments among the non-media posts and on average there are less Social Media Representations present in Media posts.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 26, Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32. presented in Appendix C. N = 3504 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

The main objective of this section is to provide four selected posts that reflect the results of the quantitative analysis. Two of these posts should be related to Figure 9, which refers to “Coefficient estimates Europe”, and the other two posts should be related to Figure 13, which refers to “Coefficient estimates Media”. The idea is to present examples of the Social Media Representations where we find the largest differences between Europe and Not Europe as well as Media and Not media posts.

First, in our case, we see in Figure 9 that "Territory" has the highest estimated coefficient of Europe and "Institutions" has the lowest estimated coefficient of Europe.

Figure 14 displays an example of Territory among Europe posts. It is related to the crisis at the border between Poland and Belarus, where thousands of migrants are waiting in the hope of being able to enter the EU, something that has stoked the tension in Ukraine. Based on our experience with manual coding, we believe it perfectly reflects territory-based and Europe-based entries.

Figure 14. Illustrative example of Territory and Europe



Figure 14 displays an example of Institutions and Not Europe. It refers to Joe Biden's government, as an institution, which has closed the border to prevent the entry of more groups and has insisted that migrants arriving illegally will be "returned" to their countries of origin.

Figure 14. Illustrative example of Institutions and Not Europe



Turning to the difference between Media and Not Media, we see in Figure 13 that "Territory" has the highest estimated coefficient of Media and "Values" has the lowest estimated coefficient of Media.

Therefore, Figure 15 displays an example based on our experience with manual coding that we believe reflects the entries represented by territory and published by Media. The post is

published by the newspaper *La Vanguardia* and talks about how thousands of illegal immigrants have used in recent months the Belarusian route to try to enter the EU, but have been trapped at the border.

Figure 15. Illustrative example Territory and Media



Finally, we have chosen the post displayed in Figure 16 published by Puri Causapié (a Spanish politician from the Spanish Socialist Workers Party "PSOE"), which reflects the entries represented by values and NOT published by Media. Specifically, this post talks about how the author of the post, Puri Causapié, after listening to the senate session, highlights the "obsession of the political party Vox to link immigration with crime, this being an old strategy of hate mongering of racists, xenophobes... and yes, fascism. Reminding us of historical facts of disastrous consequences for humanity".

Figure 16. Coefficient estimates Media



Conclusion

This national report outlines the results of the quantitative analysis of media representations conducted in WP4 of EUMEPLAT for Spain. Spain was for a long time considered an exemption in Europe due to the absence of a right-wing party with an anti-immigration rhetoric and its high levels of migration. While this has changed in the recent years with the political success of the right-wing party VOX, Spain has remained a fairly open country towards migration. A series of migratory events that were particular for Spain occurred on the Spanish Moroccan border in 2021, some also during the period of study (September – November 2021). Additionally, a number of migratory crises occurring in Latin America caught attention in Spain due to its historical and present ties with Latin America. However, the border crisis between Poland and Belarus was the most dominated event during the period of study, as for most countries studied in the work package.

The quantitative analysis finds that the social media representations of Law, People, Values, and Territory are more common when Europe is discussed compared to when Europe is not discussed. However, there is no difference in the proportion of discussions relating to Institutions between the two groups. Moreover, there was no difference in the proportions of expressed sentiments between Europe and non-Europe discussions. When analysing media relative non-media generated content it was found that the largest difference was in Values, which is expressed far more by non-media. Additionally, Institutions and Law are more frequently discussed by non-media than by media. Territory is the only Social Media Representation that is more frequent among Media, which may be due to the fact that media reporting was highly focused on the Poland and Belarus border conflict and the crossing of borders was frequently mentioned as a fact. Finally, it was found that Media use a negative sentiment to a greater extent when talking about migration and that non-media is more positive. This is in line with some previous research showing that traditional media in Spain tend to use a negative discourse when reporting on migration (see, e.g., Gómez-Quintero et al., 2021; Rowe et al., 2021).

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	715	17.8	20.4
People	990	24.7	28.3
Values	723	18.0	20.6
Territory	760	18.9	21.7
Institutions	828	20.6	23.6
Total	4016	100.0	114.6

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions
35	18	40	20	29	29
36	44	65	40	29	61
37	49	64	50	16	57
38	48	110	93	43	122
39	55	67	56	32	57
40	64	65	63	15	62
41	51	73	46	27	57
42	59	68	58	31	62
43	46	53	37	22	61
44	34	63	47	22	42
45	82	123	68	291	68
46	74	95	68	149	73
47	77	74	59	35	62
48	14	30	18	19	15
Total	715	990	723	760	828

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	1218	34.8
1	1113	31.8
2	716	20.4
3	362	10.3
4	90	2.6
5	5	0.1
Total	3504	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	709	20.2
Neutral	2735	78.1

Positive	60	1.7
Total	3504	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	344	18.1	29.1
People	468	24.6	39.6
Values	335	17.6	28.4
Territory	488	25.7	41.3
Institutions	266	14.0	22.5
Total	1901	100.0	161.0

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	371	17.5	16.0
People	522	24.7	22.5
Values	388	18.3	16.7
Territory	272	12.9	11.7
Institutions	562	26.6	24.2
Total	2115	100.0	91.0

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	162	13.7
1	427	36.2
2	359	30.4
3	180	15.2
4	49	4.1
5	4	0.3
Total	1181	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	1056	45.5
1	686	29.5
2	357	15.4
3	182	7.8
4	41	1.8
5	1	0.0
Total	2323	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	234	19.8
Neutral	924	78.2
Positive	23	1.9
Total	1181	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	475	20.4
Neutral	1811	78.0
Positive	37	1.6
Total	2323	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1223**** (0.013)	0.0066 (0.013)	0.0078 (0.013)
Twitter		-0.3188**** (0.015)	-0.3181**** (0.015)
Interactions		-5.706e-07 (0.0)	-1.068e-07 (0.0)
Followers		-2.807e-08***	-2.614e-08***

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0011	0.0009
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0012
			(0.026)
November			-0.1012**
			(0.047)
week			0.0130**
			(0.005)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.18	0.18

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1603**** (0.014)	-0.0470**** (0.012)	-0.0440**** (0.012)
Twitter		-0.6031**** (0.021)	-0.6024**** (0.021)
Interactions		6.769e-06 (0.0)	6.86e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.218e-08** (0.0)	1.295e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0056** (0.003)	0.0052* (0.003)
October			0.0081 (0.025)
November			-0.0064 (0.045)
week			-0.0028 (0.005)

N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.40	0.40

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1094**** (0.013)	-0.0192 (0.013)	-0.0156 (0.013)
Twitter		-0.3506**** (0.017)	-0.3507**** (0.016)
Interactions		-1.631e-06 (0.0)	-1.382e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-8.443e-08** (0.0)	-8.14e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0120*** (0.004)	0.0114*** (0.003)
October			0.0082 (0.025)
November			-0.0425 (0.045)
week			0.0014 (0.005)

N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.23	0.23

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2509**** (0.011)	0.2703**** (0.012)	0.2348**** (0.012)
Twitter		0.0479*** (0.015)	0.0352** (0.014)
Interactions		4.128e-06	2.352e-06

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		3.953e-08****	3.35e-08****
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0140****	-0.0127****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0254
			(0.028)
November			0.2850****
			(0.047)
week			-0.0152***
			(0.005)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.11	0.14	0.20

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0168	-0.1009****	-0.0890****
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Twitter		-0.2178****	-0.2161****
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interactions		-8.67e-06	-7.922e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.273e-08*	-9.41e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0074**	0.0065*
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			-0.0415
			(0.029)
November			-0.1644***
			(0.052)

week			0.0093 (0.006)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.06	0.07

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0028 (0.015)	-0.0024 (0.009)	-0.0032 (0.009)
Twitter		-0.0165** (0.008)	-0.0165** (0.008)
Interactions		-1.038e-05 (0.0)	-1.027e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-3.43e-09 (0.0)	-3.488e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.1135***** (0.002)	-0.1135***** (0.002)
October			-0.0009 (0.017)
November			-0.0073 (0.029)
week			0.0016 (0.003)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.44	0.44

Table 19. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.6992*** (0.0374)	0.1349*** (0.0339)	0.1303*** (0.0345)
Twitter		-1.4299***	-1.4299***

		(0.0310)	(0.0311)
Interactions		-0.0000	-0.0000
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Followers		0.0000	0.0000
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0154**	0.0155**
		(0.0078)	(0.0078)
October			-0.0126
			(0.0587)
November			-0.0384
			(0.1034)
week			0.0092
			(0.0115)
Intercept	0.9105***	1.8535***	1.4897***
nan	(0.0216)	(0.0310)	(0.4292)
R-squared	0.0912	0.4560	0.4563
R-squared Adj.	0.0909	0.4552	0.4551
N	3504	3504	3504

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 20. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	256	16.5	18.1
People	387	24.9	27.3
Values	176	11.3	12.4
Territory	447	28.7	31.6
Institutions	290	18.6	20.5
Total	1556	100.0	110.0

Table 21. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	459	18.7	22.0
People	603	24.5	28.9
Values	547	22.2	26.2
Territory	313	12.7	15.0
Institutions	538	21.9	25.8
Total	2460	100.0	117.8

Table 22. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	434	30.7
1	556	39.3
2	302	21.3
3	98	6.9
4	23	1.6
5	2	0.1
Total	1415	100.0

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	784	37.5
1	557	26.7
2	414	19.8
3	264	12.6
4	67	3.2
5	3	0.1
Total	2089	100.0

Table 24. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	315	22.3

Neutral	1093	77.2
Positive	7	0.5
Total	1415	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	394	18.9
Neutral	1642	78.6
Positive	53	2.5
Total	2089	100.0

Table 26. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0394*** (0.014)	-0.0254* (0.014)	-0.0233* (0.014)
Twitter		-0.3240**** (0.014)	-0.3234**** (0.014)
Interactions		-1.212e-06 (0.0)	-7.36e-07 (0.0)
Followers		-2.251e-08** (0.0)	-2.112e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0006 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.003)
October			0.0014 (0.026)
November			-0.0947** (0.046)
week			0.0124** (0.005)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.18	0.18

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0152 (0.016)	-0.0143 (0.012)	-0.0137 (0.012)
Twitter		-0.5901**** (0.021)	-0.5900**** (0.021)
Interactions		6.406e-06 (0.0)	6.547e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.31e-08** (0.0)	1.395e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0051* (0.003)	0.0047* (0.003)
October			0.0031 (0.025)
November			-0.0162 (0.045)
week			-0.0024 (0.005)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.40	0.40

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1457**** (0.015)	-0.1188**** (0.014)	-0.1179**** (0.014)
Twitter		-0.3557**** (0.014)	-0.3572**** (0.014)
Interactions		-5.929e-06 (0.0)	-5.631e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-3.725e-08** (0.0)	-3.538e-08* (0.0)

Sentiment Score		0.0089***	0.0085***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0116
			(0.025)
November			-0.0314
			(0.044)
week			2.881e-05
			(0.005)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.25	0.25

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1572**** (0.013)	0.1233**** (0.014)	0.1050**** (0.014)
Twitter		-0.0611**** (0.014)	-0.0573**** (0.013)
Interactions		5.301e-06 (0.0)	3.189e-06 (0.0)
Followers		2.792e-08**** (0.0)	2.292e-08**** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0120**** (0.003)	-0.0115**** (0.003)
October			0.0297 (0.03)
November			0.3189**** (0.051)
week			-0.0152*** (0.006)
N	3504	3504	3504

Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.12
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Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0534**** (0.015)	-0.0440*** (0.016)	-0.0376** (0.016)
Twitter		-0.1871**** (0.014)	-0.1889**** (0.014)
Interactions		-9.856e-06 (0.0)	-8.91e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-6.829e-09 (0.0)	-4.133e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0062* (0.004)	0.0054 (0.003)
October			-0.0471 (0.029)
November			-0.1795**** (0.052)
week			0.0099* (0.006)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.06

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0135 (0.014)	-0.0279**** (0.008)	-0.0283**** (0.008)
Twitter		-0.0192** (0.008)	-0.0189** (0.008)
Interactions		-1.132e-05 (0.0)	-1.124e-05 (0.0)

Followers		1.097e-09	1.028e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.1139****	-0.1139****
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			0.0022
			(0.017)
November			-0.0009
			(0.029)
week			0.0010
			(0.003)
N	3504	3504	3504
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.44	0.44

Table 32. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0780** (0.0364)	-0.1008*** (0.0318)	-0.1049*** (0.0319)
Twitter		-1.4876*** (0.0286)	-1.4858*** (0.0287)
Interactions		-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0137* (0.0077)	0.0139* (0.0078)
October			0.0080 (0.0586)
November			0.0143 (0.1031)
week			0.0063

			(0.0115)
Intercept	1.1776***	1.9580***	1.6891***
nan	(0.0255)	(0.0281)	(0.4288)
R-squared	0.0012	0.4547	0.4554
R-squared Adj.	0.0009	0.4539	0.4542
N	3504	3504	3504

Sweden

Authors: Frederick Wennborg

Institution: International Organisation for Knowledge Economy and Enterprise Development

Introduction

1.1 Background

To comprehensively understand the climate and attitudes towards im/migration as a political issue, as well as its representation in Swedish media, it is necessary to evaluate the modern development of discourse and manifestation regarding the subject. Sweden is considered to be one of Europe's most diverse countries, where a decade ago up to 20% of its total population consisted of first or second-generation immigrants, with over half of them originating from non-European countries (Schierup et al., 2011). The number of received immigrants has increased since then and reached its peak during the so-called "refugee-crisis" in 2015. Sweden registered 80,000 asylum seekers in the fall of that year and reached a total of 170,000 by the end of the year (UNHCR/Global Trends, 2016). As of 2022, the number of first-generation immigrants registered as living in Sweden has reached 2,145,674, accounting for approximately 20% of the country's whole population (Statistiska Centralbyrån, 2022). Traditionally, the Swedish public has been considered positive towards immigration, though in recent years, rising political polarization has cast doubt on this notion. The changing attitudes towards immigration in Sweden can be linked to a range of factors. However, a significant difference in sentiment regarding government policy on migration can be observed after the 2015/16 refugee crisis (Heath et al., 2019). Nevertheless, some studies have shown that general attitudes towards immigration and immigrants in Sweden remain somewhat positive (Theorin, et al., 2018).

While the impact of media representation on public opinion regarding immigration in Sweden cannot be overstated, it is important to note that the extent of this influence may vary depending on the media outlets and context (Yantseva, 2020). That being said, discernible patterns can be observed in how immigration is portrayed in Swedish

mainstream media. For instance, a study found that media representation of refugees was significantly more common than other types of immigration (Andersson et al. 2017). Furthermore, a generally negative portrayal of immigration was found, with common discourses highlighting its perceived negative effects on social cohesion, the economy, and crime. Regarding sentiment and representation on social media in Sweden, one study found that migration was talked about more negatively on social media than in the mainstream media (Yantseva, 2022). The study also found that social media discourse was more prone to fluctuations and was affected by external events such as the refugee crisis. In conclusion, the discourse surrounding immigration in Swedish media is complex and constantly evolving. While Sweden has traditionally been considered a positive country towards immigration, changing attitudes towards government policies on migration have caused political polarization in recent years. The media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion towards immigration, with discernible patterns in how immigration is portrayed in mainstream media. Additionally, social media is an important factor to consider in the overall discourse surrounding immigration in Sweden, as it has been shown to have a significant impact on public opinion, and can often reflect and amplify existing attitudes found in mainstream media representations.

1.2 Legislation

Sweden has legislation in place to regulate the admission, stay, and rights of asylum seekers and refugees. The Swedish Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen) and the Swedish Act on Reception of Asylum Seekers (Lagen om mottagande av asylsökande) states the legal framework for asylum and refugee status determination in Sweden. These laws establish the process for seeking asylum, the criteria for eligibility, the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, and the obligations of the Swedish authorities to provide reception conditions, including accommodation, medical care, and social support.

In terms of fiscal benefits and public rights restrictions for immigrants in Sweden, immigrants may be eligible for certain fiscal benefits, such as tax deductions and child allowances depending on their status and income. (PwC, n.d) Immigrants in Sweden are entitled to the same healthcare as native citizens, regardless of their legal status. This includes emergency medical care, dental care, and access to prescription medication. (Migrationsverket n.d.) However, there are also restrictions on public rights for immigrants, such as higher fees for access to public higher education for non-EU/EEA citizens.

Religious freedom is protected in Sweden, and it is guaranteed under the Swedish Constitution (Religionsfrihetslag, 1951) and the European Convention on Human Rights. Individuals have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and are free to practice their religion or belief, alone or in community with others, publicly or privately. There is no universal law or regulation that prohibits wearing the burka or hijab in schools or public spaces. However, in an attempt to restrict the wearing of hijab in schools, two municipalities enforced prohibitions which were subsequently nullified by the supreme administrative court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) due to infringement of freedom of expression (Sveriges Radio, 2022).

In terms of laws and public policies to prevent racial discrimination and violence, Swedish law includes the Discrimination Act (Diskrimineringslag (2008:567) and the Criminal code (Brottsbalk 16 kap 8.) There are no specific regulations that prevent the creation of political parties with anti-Semitic and racist beliefs, but such parties may face legal consequences if they violate Swedish hate speech laws.

The Swedish Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen) sets out the rules and regulations for entry into and residence in Sweden. It covers various issues related to immigration, including visas, residence permits, work permits, family reunification, deportation, and refugees. The law aims to regulate migration and protect the rights of both immigrants and citizens. It also includes provisions on illegal entry and stay in the country, as well as specific crimes related to illegal immigration (Riksdagen, 2005).


1.3 National context

Between September 1 and November 30, 2021, Sweden was one year away from its general election. A week before this period, the country's prime minister and head of the Social Democratic Party, Stefan Löfven, announced his immediate resignation prior to the election (SVT Nyheter, August 23, 2021). He was later replaced by Magdalena Andersson, also from the Social Democrats, who became Sweden's first female Prime Minister (Sveriges Radio, November 24, 2021). In the summer of 2021, the Swedish parliament passed a controversial new migration law aimed at imposing stricter controls on immigration (SVT Nyheter, June 16, 2021). The law introduced several changes to Sweden's immigration policies, including tougher rules for family reunification and limits on asylum seekers' right to appeal rejected applications. It also sought to make it harder for those who didn't meet certain criteria to remain in the country. The law caused a split in parliament, with the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) opposing it due to its perceived severity, while the right wing opposition pledged to repeal it if they won the election the following year, arguing that it was too weak. Immigration was set up to be one of the key issues of the election in Sweden, and the oppositional right wing parties jointly proposed new migration policies (SVT Nyheter 2021, May 2). The proposed policies included mandatory age checks for asylum seekers, increased quotas for work visas, and stricter rules for family reunification. The parties argued that the then current migration laws were not effective enough in controlling immigration and did not prioritize the needs of Swedish citizens. Another event that caused headlines in Swedish media was the border crisis between Belarus and the EU, which saw thousands of migrants seeking refuge within EU territory by attempting to cross the border from Belarus (SVT Nyheter, September 14, 2021). This sparked a heated discussion in Sweden, with criticism of the European Union's migration policies voiced by both right wing politicians (Aspling, L. et al., 2021) and columnists (Dahlberg, A., 2021).

2. Quantitative analysis

2.1 Descriptive overview


Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 7786.

According to the data presented in Figure 1, it can be concluded that Values and Institutions are the most prevalent Social Media Representations, accounting for more than 30% of the total observations for each category. Conversely, Territory is the least common Social Media Representation, followed by People. Law has a higher frequency than Territory and People, but still falls short of the occurrence of Values and Institutions. The reason for the distribution of data to appear as such may have multiple causes. The prevalence of Values in the data could be attributed to the fact that most posts contain some form of value judgment related to migration, as observed during manual coding. This could be due to the polarized debate surrounding migration in Sweden, which implies that opinions on the topic are commonly expressed on social media. Moreover, the high frequency of institutional mentions in the dataset could indicate that a significant proportion of posts are related to the management of immigration, either by national authorities or external entities such as the EU.


Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 7786.

As shown in Figure 2, there is a notable increase in Social Media Representations during week 45 of 2021, which falls in mid-November. An explanation for this sudden rise of activity could be in connection with events that transpired during the 2021 Belarus/European Union border crisis (Reuters, 2021). A significant amount of posts that were reviewed during the manual coding seemed to reference the crisis in some manner. Events that made strong headlines during this week were Polish authorities accusing Belarus of preparing a major provocation at the Polish border (DW, 2021), and Belarus threatening to cut off gas to the EU (BBC, 2021). Over this period, Law and Institutions are the most commonly mentioned Social Media Representations with Values exhibiting a comparable frequency of mentions. This is a pattern that holds true for all other weeks included in the interval but with Values generating more mentions than Law. Another significant instance is the progression of Territory, which sees its Social Media Representations rise from 13 mentions during week 44, to 228 mentions week 45 (see table 4). A similar trend can be noted regarding Law. The analysis reveals that the frequency of mentions for Law was moderate compared to that of Values and Institutions in the weeks preceding week 45, which indicates a relatively lower degree of attention directed towards Law in social media representations. However, this pattern shifted in week 45, when Law emerged as the most frequently mentioned variable among the three. The only representation that stays unaffected by the spike during week 45 is People, who do not exhibit any anomalies during this time period.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. $N = 7786$.

Figure 3 shows a substantial increase in all Social Media Representations, except for People, during week 45. However, when reviewing the other weeks analyzed, the trends for each Social Media Representation vary. People consistently maintain their level of mentions, remaining unaffected by the anomaly of week 45. Values and Institutions have the highest overall frequency of mentions and remain fairly consistent, though they experience a slight decline towards week 44. On the other hand, Law and Territory show the most inconsistency in this context, with a noticeable surge in mentions during week 45 compared to their usual frequency in other weeks.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 10205.

According to Figure 4, a significant amount of posts does not contain a Social Media Representation. Posts with zero Social Media Representations are the most prevalent, comprising of 49.8% of the total. Moreover, the rest of the percentage of posts have one or more Social Media Representations present, with posts containing one Social Media representation comprising of over 30 % of the total posts. This indicates that a significant number of posts are not multifaceted in terms of their social media presence.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts




Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. $N = 10205$.

Around 90% of the posts exhibit a neutral sentiment, with the remaining posts having either a positive or negative sentiment. Although positive sentiments are slightly more prevalent than negative ones, the analyzed sample contains relatively few posts with negative or positive sentiments. The reason for this could be multifaceted. One factor could be that posts that are essentially negative through sarcasm or implicit reasoning have not been picked up. Posts that are on the border between neutral and positive/negative are thus categorized as neutral, which may cause neutral posts to appear larger than the others.

2.2 Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe


Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 10205 in each pair of comparison.

The frequency of posts that are not related to Europe (9369) is much higher than the frequency of posts related to Europe (836), (see Table 9 and Table 10 that show total number of posts at the bottom). According to the results of the chi-squared tests, there are significant differences in the proportions of all Social Media Representations between posts about Europe and those not about Europe (with p-values of 0.0 in all cases, except for People where the p-value is 0.001). Moreover, all Social Media Representations occur more frequently in posts about Europe than in those not related to Europe. It is difficult to assess why there is such a significant difference in representation between Europe and not-Europe in the data collection. The high frequency of im/migration-related discussions within the context of Swedish domestic politics on social media platforms may account for the heightened attention given to such posts as compared to those related to migration not involving Sweden. Conversely, it is possible that the representation of migration-related discourse could be influenced by external events or news coverage during a specific time period, such as the 2021 Belarus border crisis, which may have attracted a significant amount of attention and discussion on the topic.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 10205.

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.6124	0.6872	****	0
SD	(1.115)	(0.864)		

Based on the data presented in Table 1, it can be concluded that the average number of Social Media Representations is higher among Europe posts compared to Not Europe posts. The mean value for Europe posts is 1.6124, while for Not Europe posts, it is 0.6872. A t-test confirmed that the difference in means is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0. There are more Europe posts with 2 or more Social Media Representations, while more Not Europe posts have 1 or fewer Social Media Representations. These findings are further supported by Figure 7.


Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. $N = 10205$.

Chi-squared tests conclude that the statistically significant differences vary based on the sentiment, when comparing posts about Europe and not about Europe ($p = 0.004$ for Negative, $p = 0.941$ for Neutral, and $p = 0.085$ for Positive). Negative scores under the threshold value of 0.05, which indicates that there is a statistically significant difference. On the other hand, the p-value for Neutral ($p = 0.941$) is much greater than 0.05, which suggests that the sentiment is not statistically significant. The p-value for Positive is somewhat close to the threshold value of 0.05, but it still exceeds it. Therefore, the results for Positive are not statistically significant either. In light of these results, it can be concluded that the sentiment representation differs significantly between posts about Europe and posts not about Europe, with a statistically significant excess of negative sentiment in the former ($p = 0.004$). This finding suggests the existence of one or several underlying factors influencing the expression of negative sentiment in the context of Europe-related immigration discourse. An in-depth investigation into the individual content of the posts is necessary to accurately identify the underlying cause of this phenomenon. Nonetheless, it is possible that posts related to Europe may be based on one or more significant events that have received widespread attention in European and national media, leading to a more substantial response within the discourse climate. Conversely, posts that are unrelated to Europe may not have received similar media attention and thus evoke a less pronounced reaction.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 presented in Appendix B. N = 10205 in each estimation.

The findings depicted in Figure 9 regarding the coefficient estimates, reveal that there are several disparities between Europe and Not Europe posts. Logit regression analysis concludes that Law, Values, Territory, and Institutions are more frequently present in Europe posts compared to Not Europe posts. On the other hand, People are more commonly observed in Not Europe posts. Nevertheless, there are no statistically significant variations in the occurrence of Non-Neutral sentiments (combining Positive and Negative sentiments) between Europe and Not Europe posts. Furthermore, results obtained from an OLS regression demonstrate that the number of Social Media Representations is higher in Europe posts than in Not Europe posts.

2.3 Comparisons between Media and Not Media


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 20 and Table 21 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 10205 in each pair of comparison.

According to Tables 22 and 23, there is a significant difference between the number of posts by Media (143) and Not Media (10,062). Chi-squared tests indicate that there are statistically significant variations in the occurrence of Social Media representations, namely Values, Territory, and Institutions, between posts about Media and Not Media. While the null hypothesis is rejected for Law ($p = 0.48$) and People ($p = 0.328$), it is supported for the other variables. Moreover, Media posts exhibit a higher occurrence of Law and Territory, whereas People, Values, and Institutions are more frequent among Not Media posts. Due to the significantly lower number of media posts in comparison to non-media posts, they stand out in the context. This may be attributed to immigration being a popular topic in Sweden and therefore receiving a significant representation in social media discussions, resulting in the higher number of posts that are contributed to Not Media. It is also worth noting that among all posts used in the analysis, a regular user's Twitter post is equal to, for example, a conventional media post that cites an article. Moreover, the difference in social media representations reveals that non-media posts are more likely to feature Values and Institutions. This could suggest that social media discussions on immigration mainly involve its national and international management, along with opinions and values related to this matter. Territory, on the other hand, is more prevalent in Media. There could be numerous reasons for this, one being that conventional media more frequently conveys factual events than social media platforms.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 22 and Table 23 presented in Appendix C. N = 10205.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mea n	0.6084	0.7652	**	0.0437
SD	(0.848)	(0.924)		

Based on the information in Table 2, we can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference in the mean number of Social Media Representations between Media and Not Media posts. The mean number of Social Media Representations in Not Media posts (0.7652) is higher than in Media posts (0.6084), with a p-value of 0.0437 indicating that this difference is unlikely to be due to chance. However, it is worth noting that there is a substantial difference in the sample sizes for Media and Not Media posts.


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 24 and Table 25 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 10205.

Based on the results of the chi-squared tests, we can conclude that there is no evidence of statistically significant differences in the proportions of negative, neutral, and positive sentiments when comparing posts about media and posts not about media. Specifically, the p-values for the chi-squared tests were 0.793 for negative sentiment, 0.621 for neutral sentiment, and 0.373 for positive sentiment, indicating that the observed differences in proportions are not statistically significant.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 26, Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32. presented in Appendix C. N = 10205 in each estimation.

The findings in Figure 13 indicate differences between Media and Not Media categories. Logistic regression analysis concludes that "Values" and "Institutions" are more frequently present in Not Media posts than in Media posts, whereas "Territory", "Law", and "non-neutral sentiments" are more prevalent in Media posts. However, no statistically significant differences were observed for the occurrence of "Law", "Territory" or "Non-neutral sentiment" in the number of Social Media Representations between Media and Not Media posts.

2.4 Illustrative examples

Figure 14. Illustrative example from Twitter



This post is discussing the topic of border protection in the European Union (EU). The author expresses the opinion that the EU as a whole has a responsibility to protect its borders, and that attempting to physically cross a border without permission is not a legitimate way to seek asylum. The post also supports the right of Poland and Lithuania to defend their borders, but suggests that "push back" tactics should not be used. It is referring to the then ongoing border crisis in 2021. It corresponds with the results obtained from the EUR dataset, which frequently features posts related to the same crisis in conjunction with Law, which is represented by the mentioning of "asylum" in the post.

Figure 15. Illustrative example from Facebook



Skövde Nyheter

3 september 2021

Naghm Elias och hennes familj med man och fyra barn har bott i Skövde sedan 2016. Familjen är kritiska till hur Migrationsverket kan utvisa barn som bott här så länge att Sverige är deras hem. Maryam, som är yngst, har i princip bara bott i Sverige. Enligt Migrationsverket når familjen inte upp till kraven i lagen för att beviljas asyl i Sverige. "Det räcker inte att situationen i ett land är svår", säger Migrationsverkets presskommunikatör.



SKOVDENYHETER.SE

Familjen har bott i Skövde sedan 2016 – utvisas till Irak efter lång asylprocess: "Barnen har ingen framtid där"

49

22 kommentarer

Gilla

Kommentera

Dela

This post describes a situation in which a family, who has resided in Skövde, Sweden since 2016, faces the possibility of deportation due to their asylum application being denied by the Swedish Migration Agency. The family expresses concern over the Agency's decision to deport children who have lived in Sweden for a considerable amount of time, and for whom Sweden is their home. The Not_EUR dataset features a limited number of posts that align with the category of People. However, those that do often relate to personal narratives of migrants' struggles within the Swedish immigration system, which share similarities with the story presented in the post above.

Figure 16. Illustrative example from Facebook



Dagens Arena

17 november 2021 · 🌐



LEDARE | EU:s medlemsländer står splittrade inför 2000 migranter på gränsen till Belarus. Oenigheten är ett större hot än både Lukasjenko och de som nu vill söka asyl inom EU, skriver Susanna Kierkegaard.



Kierkegaard



DAGENSARENA.SE

Lukasjenkos vredesutbrott - Dagens Arena

EU:s medlemsländer står splittrade inför 2000 migranter på gränsen till Belarus. Oenigheten är ...



5

1 kommentar 1 delning



Gilla



Kommentera



Dela

Mest relevanta ▼

This post, by the Swedish online newspaper “Dagens Arena”, discusses the split among EU member states over how to handle a group of 2000 migrants at the border of Belarus. The author argues that the disagreement among the member states poses a greater threat than both the Belarusian President Lukashenko and the migrants seeking asylum within the EU. This post exemplifies the Law category, as it discusses the concept of asylum, which is a frequent topic of discussion within the category in the context of media.

Figure 17. Illustrative example from Facebook

Eskilstuna-Kuriren ✓
4 september 2021 · 🌐

I SOM-undersökningen 2015 instämde 54 procent helt eller delvis i påståendet "Svenska medier berättar inte sanningen om samhällsproblem förknippade med invandring". Men det finns inget empiriskt stöd för detta, skriver Alex Voronov i ledarsidans lördagskrönika.

EKURIREN.SE
Medier bör inte låta sig styras av folks villfarelser
Medier bör inte låta sig styras av folks villfarelser

👍🤔 43 23 kommentarer 2 delningar

👍 Gilla 💬 Kommentera ➦ Dela

The post from the Swedish local paper Eskilstuna-Kuriren, is discussing the lack of empirical evidence supporting the claim that Swedish media is not reporting the truth regarding societal problems related to immigration, despite 54 percent of the respondents agreeing with the statement in the SOM survey of 2015. The author argues against the claim and presents his opinion on the matter in the column of the editorial page. This post exemplifies the Institute category, as it refers to the SOM institute, that conducts annual surveys to study public opinion on various societal issues, such as politics, media, and social values including im/migration in Sweden.

3. Conclusion

This report aimed to provide an overview of the representation of migration in Swedish media and social media during the autumn of 2021. The investigation revealed some noteworthy discoveries. First, a notable increase in Social Media Representations occurred in week 45 of 2021, which may be linked to external events such as the 2021 Belarus/European Union border crisis. This implies that social media representations may be

strongly influenced by external media waves. Second, there is a much higher frequency of posts not related to Europe compared to those related to Europe, with significant differences in the proportions of all Social Media Representations between them. It is unclear why such a difference exists in the data collection, but posts related to Europe may be more reliant on external events, as many posts reviewed during manual coding were linked to the 2021 Belarus border crisis. The study's outcomes also indicate a statistically significant difference in sentiment representation between posts about Europe and those not about Europe, with a significant excess of negative sentiment in posts related to Europe. Finally, the analysis revealed statistically significant differences in both the number of posts and frequency of Social Media representations between Media and Not Media posts, with the latter exhibiting a substantially higher occurrence.

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5. Appendices

5.1 Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1602	20.6	15.7
People	500	6.4	4.9
Values	2608	33.5	25.6
Territory	424	5.4	4.2
Institutions	2652	34.1	26.0
Total	7786	100.0	76.3

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions
35	5	4	9	0	17
36	18	25	69	4	72
37	187	50	236	17	255
38	105	52	220	9	213
39	60	50	207	7	211
40	76	40	251	11	213
41	43	37	158	13	186
42	78	40	201	14	201
43	77	36	219	12	204
44	61	33	142	13	149
45	540	54	432	228	453
46	245	54	262	81	286
47	96	22	181	13	166
48	11	3	21	2	26
Total	1602	500	2608	424	2652

Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	5077	49.8
1	3161	31.0
2	1349	13.2
3	547	5.4
4	69	0.7
5	2	0.0
Total	10205	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	352	3.4
Neutral	8962	87.8
Positive	891	8.7
Total	10205	100.0

5.2 Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	332	24.6	39.7
People	21	1.6	2.5
Values	318	23.6	38.0
Territory	335	24.9	40.1
Institutions	342	25.4	40.9
Total	1348	100.0	161.2

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1270	19.7	13.6
People	479	7.4	5.1
Values	2290	35.6	24.4
Territory	89	1.4	0.9
Institutions	2310	35.9	24.7
Total	6438	100.0	68.7

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	159	19.0
1	227	27.2
2	267	31.9
3	147	17.6
4	34	4.1
5	2	0.2
Total	836	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	4918	52.5
1	2934	31.3
2	1082	11.5
3	400	4.3
4	35	0.4
Total	9369	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	44	5.3
Neutral	733	87.7
Positive	59	7.1
Total	836	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	308	3.3
Neutral	8229	87.8
Positive	832	8.9
Total	9369	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1826**** (0.009)	0.1893**** (0.01)	0.1595**** (0.01)
Twitter		0.0607**** (0.014)	0.0510**** (0.014)
Interactions		5.635e-06 (0.0)	3.756e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.09e-07 (0.0)	8.702e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0102**** (0.002)	0.0107**** (0.002)
October			-0.0620**** (0.014)

November			0.1138****
r			(0.025)
week			-0.0060**
			(0.003)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.08

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0343*** (0.011)	-0.0382**** (0.011)	-0.0360*** (0.011)
Twitter		-0.0400**** (0.006)	-0.0385**** (0.006)
Interactions		-8.859e-06* (0.0)	-8.874e-06* (0.0)
Followers		-2.906e-09 (0.0)	-2.227e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)
October			0.0006 (0.008)
November			0.0131 (0.016)
week			-0.0034* (0.002)
N	10205	10205	10205

Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.02
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Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1210**** (0.014)	0.1090**** (0.014)	0.1081**** (0.014)
Twitter		-0.0458*** (0.014)	-0.0458*** (0.014)
Interactions		3.464e-05*** (0.0)	3.441e-05*** (0.0)
Followers		8.975e-09 (0.0)	9.313e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0085*** (0.003)	0.0086*** (0.003)
October			-0.0175 (0.018)
November			-0.0150 (0.032)
week			0.0016 (0.004)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1202**** (0.003)	0.1194**** (0.003)	0.1051**** (0.003)
Twitter		0.0110**	0.0043

		(0.005)	(0.005)
Interactions		2.022e-06	1.529e-06
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		7.586e-09	6.555e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0030***	-0.0022**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
October			0.0083
			(0.008)
November			0.0582****
			(0.012)
week			-0.0028**
			(0.001)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.40	0.40	0.44

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.1426**** (0.014)	0.1286**** (0.014)	0.1250**** (0.014)
Twitter		-0.0953**** (0.014)	-0.0952**** (0.014)
Interactions		1.357e-05* (0.0)	1.301e-05* (0.0)
Followers		3.295e-08 (0.0)	3.408e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0043	0.0044*

		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			-0.0159
			(0.018)
November			0.0203
			(0.032)
week			-0.0026
			(0.004)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0015 (0.012)	0.0116 (0.01)	0.0120 (0.01)
Twitter		-0.0073 (0.008)	-0.0073 (0.008)
Interactions		5.63e-06 (0.0)	5.592e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-1.557e-07 (0.0)	-1.555e-07 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0540**** (0.002)	0.0540**** (0.002)
October			-0.0175 (0.011)
November			-0.0291 (0.02)
week			0.0032

			(0.002)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.13	0.13

Table 19. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.9253*** (0.0396)	0.8974*** (0.0402)	0.8518*** (0.0401)
Twitter		-0.1315*** (0.0320)	-0.1395*** (0.0322)
Interactions		0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0000* (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0201*** (0.0055)	0.0209*** (0.0055)
October			-0.0655* (0.0335)
November			0.2118*** (0.0622)
week			-0.0142* (0.0073)
Intercept	0.6872*** (0.0089)	0.7938*** (0.0313)	1.3446*** (0.2750)
R-squared	0.0756	0.0814	0.0918
R-squared Adj.	0.0755	0.0810	0.0911

N 10205 10205 10205

5.3 Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 20. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	26	29.9	18.2
People	4	4.6	2.8
Values	22	25.3	15.4
Territory	12	13.8	8.4
Institutions	23	26.4	16.1
Total	87	100.0	60.8

Table 21. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	1576	20.5	15.7
People	496	6.4	4.9
Values	2586	33.6	25.7
Territory	412	5.4	4.1
Institutions	2629	34.1	26.1
Total	7699	100.0	76.5

Table 22. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	81	56.6
1	45	31.5
2	10	7.0
3	6	4.2

4	1	0.7
Total	143	100.0

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	4996	49.7
1	3116	31.0
2	1339	13.3
3	541	5.4
4	68	0.7
5	2	0.0
Total	10062	100.0

Table 24. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	6	4.2
Neutral	128	89.5
Positive	9	6.3
Total	143	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	346	3.4
Neutral	8834	87.8
Positive	882	8.8
Total	10062	100.0

Table 26. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0237	0.0513	0.0352

	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Twitter		0.0454***	0.0369***
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interactions		1.675e-05***	1.227e-05**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.09e-07	8.73e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0083****	0.0090****
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0540****
			(0.014)
November			0.1492****
			(0.025)
week			-0.0080***
			(0.003)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.05

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0274	-0.0589**	-0.0588**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Twitter		-0.0427****	-0.0412****
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Interactions		-1.091e-05**	-1.075e-05**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.802e-09	-1.265e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)

Sentimen t Score		-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)
October			-0.0005 (0.009)
Novembe r			0.0096 (0.016)
week			-0.0033* (0.002)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R- squared	0.00	0.01	0.01

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1223*** (0.044)	-0.1886**** (0.045)	-0.1906**** (0.045)
Twitter		-0.0752**** (0.015)	-0.0760**** (0.015)
Interactio ns		4.022e-05**** (0.0)	3.955e-05**** (0.0)
Followers		1.172e-08 (0.0)	1.229e-08 (0.0)
Sentimen t Score		0.0071*** (0.003)	0.0072*** (0.003)
October			-0.0150 (0.018)
Novembe r			0.0009 (0.032)

week			0.0010 (0.004)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0304** (0.012)	0.0179 (0.014)	0.0130 (0.013)
Twitter		-0.0122* (0.007)	-0.0185*** (0.007)
Interactions		9.199e-06**** (0.0)	7.715e-06**** (0.0)
Followers		4.769e-09 (0.0)	7.046e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0062**** (0.001)	-0.0055**** (0.001)
October			0.0255*** (0.009)
November			0.1251**** (0.014)
week			-0.0064**** (0.001)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.02	0.11

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
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Media	-0.1178*** (0.044)	-0.2252**** (0.045)	-0.2287**** (0.045)
Twitter		-0.1302**** (0.014)	-0.1311**** (0.015)
Interactions		1.927e-05** (0.0)	1.807e-05** (0.0)
Followers		3.894e-08 (0.0)	4.012e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0025 (0.003)	0.0027 (0.003)
October			-0.0131 (0.018)
November			0.0390 (0.032)
week			-0.0033 (0.004)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0183 (0.029)	-0.0148 (0.026)	-0.0155 (0.026)
Twitter		-0.0097 (0.008)	-0.0099 (0.008)
Interactions		5.984e-06 (0.0)	5.926e-06 (0.0)

Followers		-1.462e-07	-1.46e-07
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0539****	0.0539****
		(0.002)	(0.002)
October			-0.0173
			(0.011)
November			-0.0277
			(0.02)
week			0.0031
			(0.002)
N	10205	10205	10205
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.13	0.13

Table 32. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1568** (0.0712)	-0.3827*** (0.0765)	-0.4105*** (0.0765)
Twitter		-0.2531*** (0.0351)	-0.2656*** (0.0351)
Interactions		0.0001*** (0.0000)	0.0001*** (0.0000)
Followers		0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		0.0120** (0.0056)	0.0136** (0.0056)
October			-0.0425 (0.0339)

November			0.3265***
			(0.0636)
week			-0.0186**
			(0.0074)
Intercept	0.7652***	0.9806***	1.6652***
	(0.0092)	(0.0343)	(0.2799)
R-squared	0.0004	0.0142	0.0333
R-squared Adj.	0.0003	0.0137	0.0325
N	10205	10205	10205

Turkey

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Institution: Bilkent University Bilim Kenti

Introduction

This report analyzes the nature of approaches towards the issue of im/migration in Turkey as produced and distributed by social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, and by user-generated media. The time scope of the media posts analyzed for this study spans between September 1 2021 and November 30 2021, a successive period of 12 weeks. The data analyzed for this report is composed of two datasets, migration Europe and migration Not-Europe, both showing 9 dimensions of law, people, culture, values, territory, institutions, interactions and dialogues along with sentiments. Accordingly, the manual coding of these dimensions will seek answers to questions as to whether it is possible to find certain tendencies pointing out a European public sphere or if the coverage demonstrates the domination by the national perspective in Turkey. It will also inquire the differences and similarities between social media and user-generated media and between migration and gender datasets in general.

Background

By 2021, when the research of this national report was extracted, 3,737,369 refugees came to Turkey from the Syrian Arab Republic to be followed by Iraq with 153,634 refugees and Afghanistan with a number of 140,709 immigrants. According to the UN Refugee Agency report, 8% of the total 4.1 million refugees who arrived in Turkey by 2021 were asylum seekers. As the number of refugees

from Middle Eastern countries continues to grow, media engagement with issues concerning refugees indicate a larger part in Turkish media. Accordingly, the research conducted in WP4 highlights the content, the directions and the dynamics of this engagement in the politically-oriented Turkish media.

International migration has emerged as one of the biggest challenges countries have faced especially for the last quarter of the 20th century. (Deniz,2014) Political instability, violation of human rights, oppressive political regimes, the lack of jobs and the increasing level of unemployment, geographical characteristics and characteristics of public life, the threat of war, and the challenges against one's life and property are among the most pressing issues people of immigrating countries face today. In Turkey's case, similar problems are on the agenda both in the context of dealing with migration problem and in the context of the most immediate internal problems of the country. According to Daniş (2004), the emergence of technological tools which made social life in the developed countries more visible, namely the increasing use of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram added to the causes that resulted in the migration of people in masses. These platforms, Daniş claims, have attracted the immigrants to have similar life styles especially in terms of social freedom and purchasing power. The same media has also become a platform where citizens and agencies in the target countries distribute and share opinions. The social media conversations of the citizens regarding the rights and conditions of the immigrants, the government plans about their future residence in Turkey, the economic and social problems the increasing number of the immigrants might cause for the country have been among the most debated topics and researchers, in recent years, have focused their studies on the potential sentiments and concerns these data can reveal. Ayvaz and Öztürk (2018) have discussed the power of social media in creating and spreading influences on the public "owing to the increasing global coverage and high impact of social media." In their sentiment analysis, Ayvaz and Öztürk investigated Twitter posts, both in Turkish and English languages, in order to read the directions of the sentiments shared among the citizens on the issue of Syrian refugee migration.

Emphasizing the fact that young people's opinions and decisions will play a vital role in the future of Turkey, Nişancı and Nişancı (2022) have explored the social media usage of university students and found out that the negative sentiments toward the idea of Syrians making up a large proportion of the society in the future prevailed. A similar study by Bozdağ (2019) has sought for the prevailing responses in the face of questions regarding the future citizenship of Syrians in Turkey. This study revealed that the discourses leading to the issues of Syrian citizenship brought in negative responses. Keating & Janmaat (2020) have observed that negative perceptions about immigrants usually emerge when opinions such as "immigrants pose an economic and cultural threat" are spread in the target country. This observation is also very relevant in this report especially in the context of the posts where Syrian refugees are portrayed as an economic burden on Turkey. İşçi and Uludağ (2019) have explored street interviews on Youtube and found out that the attitudes toward the social and economic status of Syrian immigrants are constructed mainly through social media. Afyonoğlu and Buz (2021) expanded their research when they conducted it in the seven districts of Turkey where they worked with the students enrolled in state universities. Their study also showed that the students in these seven districts accounted for the impacts of family, environment, and social media for their responses.

Legislation

Turkey is host to 4 million refugees. It is the country with the largest number of refugees in the world. 3,6 million refugees are from Syria. Additionally, approximately 370,000 registered refugees are mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Somalia (European Commission, 2020). According to the

UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2022), most of the refugees live in host communities (98%) while less than 2% of the refugees live in temporary accommodation centres which are operated by the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM). The support of refugees is based on a contract between the European Union and Turkey. The so-called Refugee Deal or Refugee Pact is the agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the European Union (EU) of 18 March 2016, which was concluded in order to achieve a halt or at least a reduction in the movement of refugees via Turkey to the EU, as a result of which the refugee crisis in Europe of 2015 was triggered. Accordingly, the operational budget of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey is 6 billion euros. It covers health care and protection but also the extension of municipal infrastructure, training of caregivers and refugees, as well as consultancy and support of employment and business development for both refugees and local vulnerable people. International protection of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers is mainly enforced in international treaties. 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol were enforced to protect and clarify the legal rights of the refugees within the principles of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. In Turkey, the Turkish Constitution 1982 and Turkish Foreigners Code are the main codes which regulate the rights of immigrants and refugees. Asylum Regulation (1994) which was changed in 1999 regulates the rights of asylum seekers. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was enforced in April 2014 with the new changes in the asylum system, especially on legal procedures and bureaucratic issues. The Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) number 2014/6883 dated 22 October 2014 is one of the last regulations which was enforced for Syrian refugees. At the international level, UN-HCR and at the national level the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority and Directorate General of Migration Management are the two main national institutions which are dealing with refugee issues in Turkey (Güneş Peschke, 2018).

National context

As the country with the largest immigrant population in Europe, Turkey emerges as one of the most dynamic spots to offer a comprehensive analysis about the reception of im/migration. Functioning as the bridge between Asia and Europe, Turkey is subject to migration both from outside and from within. Each year, the number of immigrants coming to the country as well as those who want to go to European countries from Turkey rises (UNHCR, 2021). Studying the dynamics of migration in Turkey, Taşkın Deniz (2014) has observed that three movements of immigration can be referred in the case of Turkey: the country as the resource of migration, the country as the transition point especially to European countries, and as the target country, an attractive spot especially for refugees from the Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, since Turkey's territory is quite vast and includes different geographical characteristics together with different economic and cultural formations, the internal migration from the East to the West of the country is another aspect of the problems that are on the agenda.


Quantitative Analysis

Descriptive overview

The statistical data in Figure 1 demonstrates that the dimensions of values and institutions are the most referred aspects of migration in the 400 coded posts. The dimension of institutions mentioned in these posts address the problems and concerns about the regulations and control of migration flows into the country. The values dimension which is nearly as high as the dimension of institutions suggests that the concerns addressed in the posts point out the concerns about social life, equality, discrimination, and solidarity programs among others. Interestingly, these posts refer to the law dimension at a low level which suggests that the legal issues around immigration are not adequately

represented on social media. For instance, one post addresses the problem of permanent residence especially in cities and refers to the problems of integration and education, yet without reference to existing laws or official regulations.


Figure 1. Social Media Representations - Distribution among Social Media Representations



Notes: Created with data from Table 3 presented in Appendix A. N = 3079.

It is usually the actors representing the institutions or refugee groups involved in the actions that are addressed. As demonstrated in Figure 2, at certain weeks such as weeks 43, 45, and 47, the dimension of institutions reach peak levels while the dimension of law sustains a static level throughout all weeks. Additionally, these are the weeks when dimension of territory and values also reach peaks.

Figure 2. Social Media Representations - Relative importance over time




Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 3079.

It is important to note that the dimension of law demonstrates a static level during the scope of the research. While, for instance, the aspect of institutions fluctuate dramatically between weeks or the

dimension of people, after a stable level for six weeks, reaches a spike during weeks 42 and 43, the issue of law remains an underrepresented topic in the posts coded for this research. The fact that all four dimensions, namely institutions, territory, values, and people peak during these certain weeks results both from provocative news about some Syrian refugees and from Erdoğan's statements about the borders between Turkey and Europe. Some of the illustrative examples mentioned below exemplify the provocative news showing Syrians deliberately posing with bananas referring and making fun of the rise in the prices of vegetables and fruits in the fluctuating economy of Turkey. These news which drew a great extent of public reaction coincide with prime minister Erdoğan's statement when he expressed his plans to open the borders between Turkey and Europe. Following his implications that European countries should take more responsibility of the refugees, the dimensions of territory and values peak in media debates.


Figure 3. Social Media Representations - Evolution over time



Notes: Created with data from Table 4 presented in Appendix A. N = 3079.

Figure 4 reveals that nearly half of the social media posts (40%) is dominated by one representation while representations over 25% of the all posts remain only 2. However, a small percentage as 5% employ four representations with one dimension represented nearly at zero level.


Figure 4. Number of Social Media Representations - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 5 presented in Appendix A. N = 2984.

The general sentiment among all posts on immigration is neutral which demonstrates a dramatically higher level than negativity or positivity. The result presented in Figure 5 also shows that when the sentiment is not neutral, it is negative more often than positive. Since most of the posts, especially Media posts, on migration describe situations or convey statements about refugees rather than commenting on these situations, the sentiment that follows them is neutral. However, not Media posts reveal a certain level of negativity. These posts are usually created in a way to generate public reaction about the refugees. Some of these posts, as seen in Example 2, represent migration as a threat to the economic and social structure of the country. Such posts express subjective opinions about the impossibility of accommodating refugees in Turkey in the future, the difficulty of full integration to the society with an emphasis on the need to send Syrian refugees to their country in the near future.

Figure 5. Sentiments - Distribution among all posts



Notes: Created with data from Table 6 presented in Appendix A. N = 2984.


Comparisons between Europe and Not Europe

The statistics in Figure 6 demonstrate that institutions and territory dimensions on the Europe data are the highest among other dimensions. On the same table, there is a dramatic decrease of the same dimension on institutions in Not Europe posts. In other words, in the posts directly related to Europe or a European public sphere, there is often a reference to institutions. When compared to Not Europe posts, the dimension of territory is also very high indicating the amount of references to frontiers and geographic boundaries.

The differences between these comparisons reveal two important aspects: First, it is obvious that the institutions referred in these posts are largely European institutions or the interacting institutions between Turkey and Europe. Similarly, representation of territory in terms European borders and regulations are largely dealt. These two dimensions show a dramatically higher level of difference between Europe and not Europe posts. When the posts on the Europe data sheet are studied carefully, the institutions are referred together with key words such as borders, refugees, organizations and societies, international aid, and efforts for official communication. The related posts often involve direct statements from politicians which explains the doubling level of people in Not Europe posts. Statements belonging to Erdoğan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Minister of Internal Affairs Süleyman Soylu are often directed at European institutions calling for immediate action or official answers for the problems caused by the flow of Syrian immigrants.

The same data page also indicates a relatively low level in terms of law when compared to the Europe dataset. It is an interesting indication that in posts with a high level of representation of institutions, there is no or little reference to law or legal issues. In some posts, for instance, the Migration Office is often taken as the agent, yet the legal regulations or law on the status of refugees is rarely consulted or questioned.

Figure 6. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 7 and Table 8 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above each pair of bars. N = 2984 in each pair of comparison.

As demonstrated in Figure 7, the representation of only one dimension is quite similar in Europe and Not Europe posts. Interestingly, in the case of three representations there are

significant variations between the two datasets. In Representation N “0,” Europe dataset includes a 10% of the same variable while Not Europe dataset employs the more than 35% in the posts. Similarly, in N2, Europe dataset engagement with one certain representation is revealed as almost three times more than Not Europe dataset. As for N3, the difference between the two datasets in terms of one representation is substantial with Europe dataset demonstrating a doubling percentage when compared to Not Europe dataset.

Figure 7. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 9 and Table 10 presented in Appendix B. N = 2984.

Table 1. Number of Social Media Representations by Europe and Not Europe - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Europe	Not Europe	Significance	P value
Mean	1.54	0.8723	****	0
SD	(0.87)	(0.846)		


As for sentiments, posts on Europe and Not Europe data sheets show an approximately equal result: both datasets have largely a neutral sentiment toward the issue of immigration. However, the divergence in terms of positive sentiments shows a dominating level of positivity in Europe related posts. As also revealed in the level of negative sentiments in Not Europe posts, the level of negativity can be explained by number of biased or hate speech posts employed in the Not Europe posts. As explained above (Figure.5), Europe-related posts show an engagement with regulations, official procedures, attempts, and to convey direct statements. Contrarily, Not Europe dataset engages more with the people who own those statements, or public reactions as they find voices in the social media are too often emphasized. In a sense, negative sentimentalities are either repeated too often or reinforced.

Figure 8. Sentiment - % occurrence among Europe and Not Europe posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 11 and Table 12 presented in Appendix B. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Europe and Not Europe in variable above pair of bars. N = 2984.

Figure 9. Coefficient estimates Europe




Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Europe variable from Model 3 of Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 presented in Appendix B. N = 2984 in each estimation.

Comparisons between Media and Not Media

Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13 show the varieties concerning the difference between Media and Not Media posts. According to Figure 10, it can be stated that the dimension of institution is the most referred dimension employed by Media posts. However, the employment of institutions by user-generated media decreases by half when compared to media posts.


Figure 10. Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 20 and Table 21 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above each pair of bars. N = 2984 in each pair of comparison.

Values emerge as the most mentioned issue in Not media posts which explains the reference to daily life, assumptions, beliefs mentioned in these posts. The dimension of law appears the lowest in both Media and Not Media posts while in Not Media posts the reference decreases by half. These varieties between these two types of media emerge as very different from each other showing almost no parallels in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Number of Social Media Representations - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively




Notes: Created with data from Table 22 and Table 23 presented in Appendix C. N = 2984.

Table 2. Number of Social Media Representations by Media and not Media - Mean, standard deviation (SD) and results from t-test of difference in means

	Media	Not Media	Significance	P value
Mean	1.4764	0.9314	****	0
SD	(0.829)	(0.883)		

The issue of sentiment spread by these Media and Not Media posts again shows a similarity to the one between Europe and not Europe datasheets. The general sentiment is largely neutral when compared to the use of negative and positive sentiments. This result can be observed in many of the posts coded since they most intend to report situations or events yet without commenting on them (illustrative examples). However, it is also notable that user-generated media has a higher level of tendency in employing a negative language. This tendency can be explained through many posts where individuals employ and share hate speech, try to attract public attention to especially economic social issues, or when they share visuals or statements concerning the immigrants' inability in integrating into Turkish society. This last aspect is too often stressed in Not Media posts.


Figure 12. Sentiment - % occurrence among Media and Not Media posts respectively



Notes: Created with data from Table 24 and Table 25 presented in Appendix C. P value from chi-squared test of equal proportions between Media and Not Media in variable above pair of bars. N = 2984.

The fact that the p value amounts as "0" both in Media and Europe data sheets remains to be discussed further in the light of the results coming from the other countries.

Figure 13. Coefficient estimates Media



Notes: Coefficient estimates and their 95 % confidence intervals of Media variable from Model 3 of Table 26, Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31, Table 32. presented in Appendix C. N = 2984 in each estimation.

Illustrative examples

Example 1: Post from the EUR dataset that reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Europe (Institutions, see Figure 9).



Translation: After President Tayyip Erdoğan's words "Turkey is not Europe's refugee warehouse", Europe has opened the purse strings. The European Parliament's Budget Committee approved 150 million euros for Syrians in Turkey. After President Tayyip Erdoğan's words "Turkey is not Europe's

refugee warehouse", Europe, which has been on fire, has opened the purse strings. The European Parliament's (EP) Budget Committee has approved an additional €150 million for the programme to support refugees in Turkey. The EP Budget Control Committee announced that the European Union's (EU) 2021 budget was amended to provide additional humanitarian support to Syrian refugees in Turkey with 29 "yes" votes. Reminding that Turkey hosts approximately 3.7 million Syrians, the statement noted that the budget amendment aims to continue humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people. The amendment will provide €150 million to finance cash support under the Social Cohesion Assistance (SCA) programme for asylum seekers in Turkey, the statement said. The budget amendment needs to be approved by the EP Plenary to enter into force.

109 of the on-topic posts are related to institutions. The very most of them discuss the migration crisis in Turkey in the context of the European Union. Typical posts request more financial support from the European Union, and state that it is not possible that Turkey protects Europe completely against migration (e.g. Twitter post: "President Erdoğan: "It is inevitable that European countries will also be affected by the migration pressure Turkey will be exposed to from its southern and eastern borders.""). 13 posts reflect the negative relation to Greece, especially in the context that Greece abuses refugees and push them back to Turkey. Nearly the same amount of posts discuss the migration crisis at the Poland-Belarus border.

Example 2: Post from the Not_EUR dataset that reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Europe (People, see Figure 9).



Translation: 8 migrants were detained on the allegation of 'eating bananas for provocation': They were sent to Provincial Directorate of Migration Management for deportation
<https://hbr.tk/SIY0zs=:https://www.haberturk.com/sinir-disi-edilecekler-son-dakika-muzlu-paylasimda-sicak-gelisme-haberler-3237906>

94 posts on Facebook and Twitter are related to the dimension of people. 38 posts were about illegal refugees in Turkey and the deportation of refugees in Turkey. 10 posts dealt with an incident which happened in October 2021. According to a news post from October 30, 2021, on the website of Haber Turk, a Turkish TV channel, 8 people of Syrian nationality were detained during a street interview in Izmir after some people shared the image and movies of eating bananas on social media after a person stated that he could not buy bananas. The suspects were sent to the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management for deportation. Especially two Facebook posts, one from Haber Türk and one from Haber Siverek were commented and discussed in a controversial way. Many of the comments reflect resentments against (*Yazıklar olsun. Kendi vatandaşlarımızı sözde Ensar olduklarımıza daha ne kadar ezdireceğiz bilmiyorum. Her türlü imkanları önlerine sermiş bir şekilde kendimizi memleketimizde mülteci ettik.* Translation: Shame on us. I don't know how much longer we will oppress our own citizens to those whom we are so-called Ansar. We have made ourselves refugees in our homeland by putting all kinds of opportunities in front of them.), only some of the comments are critical about the decision (*Suriyede savaş varmışış Nasıl sınır dışı edilecekmişış.* Translation: There's a war in Syria. How will he be deported?) or even hatefull against the government (*akp terör örgütü vatan hainliğinden derhal yargılanmalı* Translation: akp terrorist organisation should be tried immediately for treason. The posts of Haber Siverek reported about the Turkish Humen Rights organisation which stated that "these people were detained in front of the media in violation of their basic human rights". Significantly, many comments react hatefully against the organisation (*Mazlum Der üyeleri de sınır dışı edilsin 😊* Mazlum Der members should also be deported 😊) and expressed their agreement with the decision of the Provincial Directorate (*Milleti kışkırtmak ve ülke düzenini bozmaktan dava açılmalı hatta ve Mazlum Der üyeleri ne uyarı vermek amaçlı para cezası verilmeli.* Translation: A lawsuit should be filed for provoking the nation and disturbing the order of the country, and even a fine should be imposed on Mazlum Der members as a warning).

Example 3: Post posted by media that reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the largest coefficient estimate of Media. (People, see Figure 13).



Translation: A group of migrants who illegally crossed to Greece from Edirne to European countries were caught by Greek security forces. Migrants claimed that they were beaten, stripped of their clothes and shoes and pushed to Turkey in violation of international law. Pakistani national Yahya Hamed said, "There are 4-5 collection centres there. They beat us a lot before sending us back. They beat us with sticks in every camp, they take our clothes. They beat some of them with plastic pipes."

95 on-topic media posts dealt could be identified in the dimension People. 33 posts were from the Europe dataset, 62 posts were from the Not Europe dataset. Besides the dominance of posts about deported refugees because of posts where they ate bananas, as mentioned above, there were a significant amount of media posts which covered critical incidences about the supposedly bad treatment and push-back of refugees. Interestingly, among Not Media posts about Greece-related topics did not appear significantly in the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Media.

Example 4: Post posted by not media that reflects (based on our experience from the manual coding) the posts represented by the Social Media Representation with the smallest coefficient estimate of Media. (Value, see Figure 13).



Translation: They turned our beautiful country into a refugee immigrant paradise and a hell for its own citizens.

25 on-topic not-media posts could be identified in the dimension Values. Significantly, nearly all not-media posts in the Not Europe dataset are complaints about refugees, often in a racist way. The authors blame the refugees for their predicament or discomfort in their country.

Conclusion

Relying on the coded data shown above, this report has aimed to ask some questions about the possible influence of a "European public sphere" on media representations of immigration. It also asks for possible readings which can contribute to the understanding of Europeanization and platformization of news during that process. It can be argued that the coded posts seem to refer to the issue of immigration mainly from a national perspective. It can also be added that the notion of migration is understood in terms of international migration and asylum seekers due to the unique geographical characteristics of Turkey. The time scope of the survey is also a period when immigration from outside is widely debated in political and economic arenas. Firstly, reading the quantitative analysis helps to understand the nature of posts since Turkey's coded data in total largely refers to institutions and values compared to other dimensions. The general narratives revolve around the need for action, regulation, control and sufficient response toward the immigrant groups. Rather than referring to legal issues and official interactions with European

countries regarding the issue of immigration, social media conversations express concerns about the immediate condition of immigrants in Turkey. This tendency also explains the high level of values as the primary dimension mentioned in Not Europe and Not media posts. User-generated posts and Not Europe posts address the problem of values in order to refer to problems such as integration, freedom, and social life with refugees. Interestingly, the analysis of both datasets - Not media and Not Europe - mention legal issues as the least employed dimension. Therefore, the issue of immigration as can be seen in the analyses is dealt largely in the absence of legal intervention but with a strong emphasis for institutional and value-based action.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Tables supporting the section on Descriptive overview

Table 3. Social Media Representations - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	277	9.0	9.3
People	626	20.3	21.0
Values	814	26.4	27.3
Territory	495	16.1	16.6
Institutions	867	28.2	29.1
Total	3079	100.0	103.2

Table 4. Social Media Representations - Frequency by week

Unnamed: 0	Law	People	Values	Territory	Institutions
35	35	52	78	43	71
36	16	46	65	33	48
37	20	48	51	25	72
38	14	44	62	36	86
39	21	36	70	32	62
40	17	41	45	23	38
41	22	35	57	34	74
42	13	28	50	15	52
43	21	88	67	47	63
44	22	47	54	33	45
45	26	76	68	89	119
46	14	33	48	42	58
47	30	47	83	38	64
48	6	5	16	5	15

Total	277	626	814	495	867
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Table 5. Number of Social Media Representations in posts - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	934	31.3
1	1224	41.0
2	643	21.5
3	163	5.5
4	20	0.7
Total	2984	100.0

Table 6. Sentiment - Frequency and % occurrence among all posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	254	8.5
Neutral	2600	87.1
Positive	130	4.4
Total	2984	100.0

Appendix B. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Europe and Not Europe

Table 7. Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	98	8.9	13.7
People	87	7.9	12.2
Values	189	17.2	26.5
Territory	271	24.7	38.0
Institutions	453	41.3	63.5
Total	1098	100.0	154.0

Table 8. Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	179	9.0	7.9
People	539	27.2	23.7
Values	625	31.5	27.5
Territory	224	11.3	9.9

Institutions	414	20.9	18.2
Total	1981	100.0	87.2

Table 9. Number of Social Media Representations Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	74	10.4
1	277	38.8
2	275	38.6
3	77	10.8
4	10	1.4
Total	713	100.0

Table 10. Number of Social Media Representations Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	860	37.9
1	947	41.7
2	368	16.2
3	86	3.8
4	10	0.4
Total	2271	100.0

Table 11. Sentiment Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	43	6.0
Neutral	598	83.9
Positive	72	10.1
Total	713	100.0

Table 12. Sentiment Not Europe - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Europe posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	211	9.3
Neutral	2002	88.2
Positive	58	2.6
Total	2271	100.0

Table 13. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0520**** (0.011)	-0.0078 (0.012)	-0.0097 (0.012)
Twitter		-0.1274**** (0.013)	-0.1278**** (0.013)
Interactions		-3.081e-05* (0.0)	-2.842e-05* (0.0)
Followers		-4.611e-09 (0.0)	-5.442e-09 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0104**** (0.003)	-0.0100**** (0.003)
October			0.0515** (0.023)
November			0.0961** (0.039)
week			-0.0100** (0.004)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.07	0.08

Table 14. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.1317**** (0.02)	-0.2406**** (0.021)	-0.2420**** (0.021)
Twitter		-0.2215**** (0.016)	-0.2203**** (0.016)
Interactions		-1.246e-05 (0.0)	-1.142e-05 (0.0)
Followers		2.391e-08 (0.0)	2.292e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0229**** (0.005)	-0.0226**** (0.004)
October			0.0518* (0.031)

November			0.0546
			(0.054)
week			-0.0036
			(0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.09	0.09

Table 15. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	-0.0102	0.0253	0.0249
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Twitter		0.0652***	0.0661***
		(0.022)	(0.022)
Interactions		9.325e-05***	9.316e-05***
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-6.568e-08**	-6.59e-08**
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0092**	0.0093**
		(0.004)	(0.004)
October			0.0061
			(0.036)
November			-0.0038
			(0.061)
week			0.0020
			(0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.01	0.01

Table 16. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.2136****	0.2061****	0.2014****
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Twitter		-0.0267	-0.0265
		(0.017)	(0.017)
Interactions		3.301e-06	4.845e-06

		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.577e-08	1.502e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0159****	-0.0151****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0302
			(0.028)
November			0.0997**
			(0.049)
week			-0.0062
			(0.005)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.10	0.11	0.12

Table 17. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.3471**** (0.011)	0.2194**** (0.015)	0.2208**** (0.015)
Twitter		-0.2106**** (0.015)	-0.2114**** (0.015)
Interactions		2.045e-05 (0.0)	1.86e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-1.749e-08 (0.0)	-1.633e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0115*** (0.004)	0.0113*** (0.004)
October			-0.0668** (0.032)
November			-0.0826 (0.054)
week			0.0074 (0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984

Pseudo R-squared	0.14	0.19	0.20
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Table 18. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.0401*** (0.014)	0.0357** (0.015)	0.0387*** (0.015)
Twitter		-0.0594**** (0.014)	-0.0579**** (0.014)
Interactions		2.326e-05 (0.0)	2.275e-05 (0.0)
Followers		-7.351e-08** (0.0)	-7.212e-08** (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0306**** (0.007)	-0.0308**** (0.007)
October			0.0066 (0.025)
November			-0.0472 (0.043)
week			0.0034 (0.004)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.05

Table 19. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Social Media Representations as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Europe	0.6677*** (0.0371)	0.3436*** (0.0434)	0.3364*** (0.0435)
Twitter		-0.6256*** (0.0427)	-0.6254*** (0.0425)
Interactions		0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Followers		-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)

Sentiment Score		-0.0304***	-0.0294***
		(0.0084)	(0.0084)
October			0.0726 (0.0639)
November			0.1672 (0.1119)
week			-0.0104 (0.0116)
Intercept	0.8723***	1.3576***	1.7084***
nan	(0.0178)	(0.0406)	(0.4303)
R-squared	0.1005	0.1809	0.1823
R-squared Adj.	0.1002	0.1796	0.1802
N	2984	2984	2984

Appendix C. Tables supporting the section on Comparisons - Media and Not Media

Table 20. Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	92	11.3	16.7
People	180	22.2	32.7
Values	88	10.8	16.0
Territory	152	18.7	27.6
Institutions	300	36.9	54.5
Total	812	100.0	147.6

Table 21. Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Social Media Representation	Count	% of Social Media Representations	% of Posts
Law	185	8.2	7.6
People	446	19.7	18.3
Values	726	32.0	29.8
Territory	343	15.1	14.1
Institutions	567	25.0	23.3
Total	2267	100.0	93.1

Table 22. Number of Social Media Representations Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	61	11.1
1	221	40.2
2	217	39.5
3	47	8.5
4	4	0.7
Total	550	100.0

Table 23. Number of Social Media Representations Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Nr of Social Media Representations	Count	% of Posts
0	873	35.9
1	1003	41.2
2	426	17.5
3	116	4.8
4	16	0.7
Total	2434	100.0

Table 24. Sentiment Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	29	5.3
Neutral	488	88.7
Positive	33	6.0
Total	550	100.0

Table 25. Sentiment Not Media - Frequency and % occurrence among Not Media posts

Sentiment	Count	% of Posts
Negative	225	9.2
Neutral	2112	86.8
Positive	97	4.0
Total	2434	100.0

Table 26. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Law as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.0741****	-0.0224	-0.0220
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)

Twitter		-0.1361****	-0.1355****
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interactions		-3.851e-05**	-3.595e-05*
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		-1.038e-09	-1.869e-09
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0108****	-0.0105****
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0510**
			(0.023)
November			0.0930**
			(0.039)
week			-0.0097**
			(0.004)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.08	0.08

Table 27. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with People as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1259****	0.0386	0.0372
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Twitter		-0.1119****	-0.1115****
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Interactions		1.238e-05	1.229e-05
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Followers		1.369e-08	1.329e-08
		(0.0)	(0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0274****	-0.0274****
		(0.005)	(0.005)
October			0.0349
			(0.031)
November			0.0127
			(0.055)
week			-0.0003

			(0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.04

Table 28. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Values as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.1569**** (0.024)	-0.1703**** (0.031)	-0.1711**** (0.03)
Twitter		-0.0282 (0.024)	-0.0275 (0.024)
Interactions		5.647e-05* (0.0)	5.627e-05* (0.0)
Followers		-3.428e-08 (0.0)	-3.444e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0081* (0.004)	0.0081* (0.004)
October			0.0078 (0.036)
November			-0.0047 (0.061)
week			0.0023 (0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.02

Table 29. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Territory as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.1146**** (0.015)	0.0080 (0.02)	0.0092 (0.02)
Twitter		-0.1308**** (0.018)	-0.1270**** (0.018)
Interactions		-9.6e-06 (0.0)	-6.109e-06 (0.0)
Followers		1.671e-08 (0.0)	1.508e-08 (0.0)

Sentiment Score		-0.0116****	-0.0106***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
October			0.0459
			(0.03)
November			0.1419***
			(0.051)
week			-0.0094*
			(0.005)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.05

Table 30. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Institutions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.2631**** (0.016)	-0.0179 (0.023)	-0.0167 (0.023)
Twitter		-0.3294**** (0.017)	-0.3293**** (0.017)
Interactions		-6.432e-07 (0.0)	-1.051e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-1.121e-08 (0.0)	-1.079e-08 (0.0)
Sentiment Score		0.0166**** (0.005)	0.0167**** (0.005)
October			-0.0481 (0.034)
November			-0.0327 (0.056)
week			0.0037 (0.006)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.15	0.15

Table 31. Marginal effects of Logistic regressions with Non-neutral Sentiment as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	-0.0204 (0.017)	-0.0806**** (0.02)	-0.0822**** (0.02)
Twitter		-0.1134**** (0.016)	-0.1142**** (0.016)
Interactions		3.922e-06 (0.0)	2.718e-06 (0.0)
Followers		-5.615e-08* (0.0)	-5.492e-08* (0.0)
Sentiment Score		-0.0302**** (0.007)	-0.0303**** (0.007)
October			0.0102 (0.025)
November			-0.0411 (0.042)
week			0.0031 (0.004)
N	2984	2984	2984
Pseudo R-squared	0.00	0.05	0.06

Table 32. Coefficient estimates of OLS regressions with Number of Dimensions as dependent variable

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Media	0.5450*** (0.0396)	-0.1612*** (0.0605)	-0.1603*** (0.0602)
Twitter		-0.8679*** (0.0515)	-0.8631*** (0.0513)
Interactions		0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Followers		0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Sentiment Score		-0.0264*** (0.0083)	-0.0252*** (0.0084)
October			0.0927

			(0.0650)
November			0.2182*
			(0.1132)
week			-0.0139
			(0.0118)
Intercept	0.9314***	1.6339***	2.1005***
nan	(0.0179)	(0.0476)	(0.4347)
R-squared	0.0554	0.1636	0.1659
R-squared Adj.	0.0551	0.1622	0.1637
N	2984	2984	2984

Conclusions

The goal of the work package is partly to analyse how Europe is represented through the topic of immigration in a representative sample from 10 different European countries. To achieve this, social media discussions from Facebook and Twitter were downloaded from European countries and a theoretical framework of social media representations was developed. The theoretical framework was operationalised so that a smaller part of the downloaded data could be manually coded by partners in each of the 10 European countries. Thereafter, machine learning models were trained on the manually coded data to automatically code, among others, the social media representations and sentiments present in the all the downloaded posts.

We used quantitative techniques to answer the research questions, and it turns out that there does not exist a “European public sphere” – or a common European way of representing migration across the 10 European countries from a quantitative perspective. While there is always variation among some countries, there are some systematic trends in that Institutions and Territory are the most common social media representations, while Values is the least common.

Turning to the comparisons between Europe and Not Europe discussions, we find Territory and Institutions are the most important social media representations with the greatest difference in shares of discussions when comparing European discussions to non-European discuss. In fact, Territory and Institutions are the top-two most important social media representations for almost all countries studied, when comparing Europe and non-Europe discussions.

When comparing how media represents migration compared to non-media it is found that media represent migration a lot more through Territory, while non-media represents migration to a larger extent with Values.

Finally, the sentiments in social media discussions are analysed. We find that there are both more positive and negative sentiments displayed when discussions relate to Europe compared to when they do not relate to Europe. Interestingly, negative sentiments are more common on average when media discusses migration compared to when non-media does so. Further strengthening this picture is the fact that media uses positive sentiments to a smaller extent as well.

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Appendix

Ethical approval



Evaluation by the Ethics Committee of the UOC

Exp.: CE22- PR23

Dr. Marta Aymerich, president of the Ethics Committee of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya

CERTIFIES

That the Committee has evaluated the addenda submitted by Francisco Lupiáñez Villanueva for the project already approved that is entitled "EUMEPLAT: European Media Platforms: assessing positive and negative externalities for European Culture", and considers that

- The ability of the researchers and their collaborators, and the facilities and resources available are adequate to carry out the study.
- The established experimental protocol ensures the integrity and dignity of the participants.
- The protocol is adequate to the objectives of the study and the possible risks and discomfort for participants are adequate given the expected benefits.
- The procedure for obtaining informed consent of participants, including the information sheet, and the procedure for the recruitment of subjects are adequate.
- The researchers of the project will ever respect the obligations derived from the Organic Law 3/2018 on Personal Data Protection and Digital Rights, General Regulation on Data Protection (UE) 2016/679 and the current complementary legislation.

Having met on July 26, 2022, and having considered the ethical implications concerning human experimentation and the processing of personal data, this committee APPROVES the execution of the aforementioned project.

For the record, I sign this document in Barcelona, July 26, 2022.

Signed:

VIDsigner code: F4A1E215E49040B885...

Marta Aymerich Martinez

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Instructions for manual coding

This document provides a detailed description of how to manually code the columns of WP4.

From now on, we refer to a Facebook post or Twitter Tweet as a post.

Unit to be coded:

You should only assess the context of the **TEXT** of the post.



Examples below include pictures, and link texts, that are vital to understanding the dimensions.





Columns:





Each column can be given any of the allowed values regardless of the answers in the other columns.

IMPORTANT: No cells can be left blank. All the cells of the codebook must be filled with an allowed value.

Table 4. Operational definitions used for categories of manual coding.

Column	Values	Description
On topic	YES: 1 NO: 0	<p>A post is on topic if the context of the text is directly or indirectly related to human im/migration.</p> <p>I.e., the international movement of people to a destination <u>country</u> of which they are not natives or where they do not possess <u>citizenship</u> in order to settle permanently or temporarily. (See below for examples of posts on topic)</p> <p>If the context of the text is not directly or indirectly related to human im/migration, then the post is off topic. Examples of off topic posts could be posts talking about migration of animals, migration related to IT (data migration, software migration etc.), etc.</p>
Law	YES: 1 NO: 0	<p>When the post has to do with the legal aspect of im/migration, and how clearly it describes the specific legal statuses of im/migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers [as the differences among these statuses are usually not clear at all].</p> 
People	YES: 1 NO: 0	<p>When the post is about the im/migrants themselves and their own voice: history, experience, journeys, travel diaries, profession, life conducted both in the country of origin and in Europe.</p> 
Culture	YES: 1 NO: 0	<p>Whether the post is about migration in terms of Artistic expression and cultural production (of any kind); Cultural habits and practices (including daily life); Cultural institutions, including education, the</p>

		<p>media, science, and the Church; Lifestyle, when related to migration (i.e., multiethnic cities, im/migrants' activities);</p> <p>Posts under this dimension could refer to Artwork/cultural production/media products by/concerning im/migrants; Im/migrants' daily life habits and customs; Educational practices concerning im/migration; Art/cultural centers, educational institutions, scientific institutions, Churches and religious foundations, dealing with im/migration/im/migrants.</p> 
<p>Values</p>	<p>YES: 1 NO: 0</p>	<p>Whether the post is about migration in terms of/ whether the post is about im/migration in terms of: Ideas and beliefs related to immigrant/refugee in/equality, non/discrimination, in/tolerance, dignity, peace, solidarity, diversity, freedom (of thought, expression, information, movement), related to im/migration.</p> 
<p>Territory</p>	<p>YES: 1 NO: 0</p>	<p>When the post refers to borders or frontiers being crossed in order to migrate from one country to another, where at least one of the countries mentioned is a European one. Mentioning of place of departure and/or place of arrival.</p> 
<p>Institutions</p>	<p>YES: 1 NO: 0</p>	<p>When the post is about institutions involved in the field of im/migration regulation, control, governance, and so forth: national institutions, local institutions, European institutions, global institutions, and NGOs.</p> 
<p>Interactions & Dialogue</p>	<p>YES: 1 NO: 0</p>	<p>When the post mentions the encounter between im/migrants and natives (hospitality, professional initiatives, hosting, integration, joint activities of any sort).</p>

		
Sentiment	POSITIVE: 2	<p>When the sentiment of the post is predominantly positive. Words such as glad, happy, good, better, etc. appear in the post. If the sentiment is more positive than negative, it should be coded as positive.</p> 
	NEUTRAL: 1	<p>When the sentiment of the post is predominantly neutral. Typically, the post conveys facts or describes a story without any positive or negative sentiments.</p> 
	NEGATIVE: 0	<p>When the sentiment of the post is predominantly negative. Words such as sad, bad, worse, disappointed, miserable, etc appear in the post.</p> 

Europe	<p>YES: 1</p> <p>NO: 0</p>	<p>The post is about Europe when it makes a reference to either the institutions of the EU, or any kind of interaction between at least TWO European countries (see list below).</p> <p>If a geographical area that includes at least two European countries is mentioned, such as “southern Europe”, the post is about Europe.</p> <p>If a post mentions two regions that pertain to different European countries and which are smaller than countries, the post is about Europe. For example, if a post mentions Rome and Prague, it is coded as being about Europe.</p> <p>A post is NOT about Europe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • if only ONE European country is mentioned • If the geographical area fundamentally transcends Europe (e.g., the Mediterranean, Eurasia, ...).
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The European countries (for this operational definition) are:

Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Vatican City State.

[Lexicons Keywords](#)

The following is an overview of all keywords used for each language for the categories of Migration and Europe.

language theme keywords

Bulgarian migration

#Световен ден на бежанеца,ВКБООН,Върховния комисариат на ООН за бежанците (ВКБООН) ,ГД на ЕСНО,Генерална дирекция Европейска гражданска защита и европейски операции за хуманитарна помощ,Изгнаник,КПП,Културна несъвместимост,Лодка с мигранти,Мория,Спасяване,агресия,асимиляция,бежанец,бежанка,бежански лагер,бежанци,бой,включване,граница,добри работници,експат,етнически групи,етническо включване,етническо равенство,етническо разнообразие,жестокост,заселване,интеграция,ксенофобия,културно включване,културно разнообразие,лодкари,мигрант,мултикултурен,набожност,насилие,нелегални работници,побой,подземен град,преместване,престъпление,приобщаване,пропусквателен пункт,разнообразие,разследване,расизъм,расово

включване,расово разнообразие,религиозен фанатизъм,спасение,статут на бежанец,трафик,убийство,хуманитарна помощ,център за настаняване,Убежища,Убежище,имигрант,имигранти,имигрантка,мигрант,мигранти,миграция,подслон

Bulgarian Europe

#ДеннаЕвропа,#ЕС,#Европа,#Европейсисъвет,#Европейсказеленасделка,Брексит,Брюксел,Договор за ЕС,ЕС,ЕС закони,Евродепутат,Еврозона,Европа,Европейска комисия,Европейска сигурност,Европейска центраална банка,Европейски директиви,Европейски регулации,Европейски съвет,Европейски съд,Европол,Евроскептик,Еврпейска политика,Еврпейско законодателство,Еврпейско управление,Меркел,Съвет на Европа,Управление на Европа,Фронтекс,Шенген,държава-член,държави-членки,държава на помощ,евро,евро зона,евро субсидии,евро фондове,евродепутати,евродепутатски,еврокомисар,европейска валута,европейска директива,европейски,европейски директиви,европейски закон,европейски субсидии,европейски фондове,евроскептицизъм,единен европейски пазар,строгост,фон дер Лайен

Czech migration

интеграční,Agentura Evropské unie pro otázky azylu,Evropská pohraniční a pobřežní stráž,Evropská rada pro uprchlíky a exil,Evropský komisař pro humanitární pomoc a řešení krizí,Frontex,Generální ředitelství pro humanitární pomoc a civilní ochranu,Moria,Společný evropský azylový systém,Světový den uprchlíků,dislokace,diverzita,emigrant,etnická diverzita,etnická inkluze,etnická rovnoprávnost,etnická rovnost,etnická rozmanitost,etnická skupina,etnické skupiny,expat,hranic,hranice,hranicemi,hranicích,humanitární pomoc,ilegální migrant,ilegální pracovník,inkluze,inkluzivní,integrace,kulturní diverzita,kulturní inkluze,kulturní rozmanitost,multikulturalismus,multikulturní,nelegální pracovník,nezletilý migrant bez doprovodu,nezletilá osoba bez doprovodu,nezletilý cizinec bez doprovodu,nucený odsun,náboženský fanatismus,násilný,násilí,násilím,ostrov Lesbos,ostrově Lesbos,přemístění,přesun,rasismus,rasista,rasistický,rasová diverzita,rasová inkluze,rasová rozmanitost,tábor,táborech,táboru,tábory,táborů,ubytovací zařízení,ubytovací zařízení pro uprchlíky,uprchlické tábory,uprchlické zařízení,uprchlickém táboru,uprchlický,uprchlický tábor,uprchlický tábor,uprchlický tábor Moria,uprchlický člun,uprchlických táborech,uprchlických táborů,uprchlictví,uprchlík,uprchlickým táborem,utečenec,vyhoštění,vyhoštěný,vystěhovalec,vysídlení,xenofobie,xenofobní,zachránit,zatlačení,zatlačila zpátky,zatlačit zpátky,zatlačují zpět,zatlačí zpět,zločin,zločinný,záchrana,Úřad vysokého komisaře OSN pro uprchlíky,člun s uprchlíky,azyl,hledání azylu,imigrace,imigrant,migrac,migrant,migrační,žadatel o azyl

Czech Europe

#EU,#EUgreendeal,#Evropa,#Evropská unie,#denevropy,Brexit,Brusel,Bruselu,ECB,Erasmus,Erasmus+,Europol,Evropa,Evropané,Evropskou unii,Evropská centrální banka (Evropskou centrální bankou,Evropská komise,Evropská pohraniční a pobřežní stráž,Evropská unie,Evropské centrální bance,Evropské centrální banky),Evropské unie,Evropské unii,Evropský soudní dvůr,Frontex,Merkelovou,Merkelová,Merkelové,Rada Evropské unie,brexitem,brexitu,diktát EU [EU Dictate],diktát Evropské unie,eurem,euro,europoslance,europoslancem,europoslanci,europoslanec,europoslanecký,euroskeptici,euroskepticismus,euroskepticích,euroskeptik,euroskeptika,euroskeptikem,euroskeptikovi,euroskeptiků,eurozóna,eurozónou,eurozóny,eurozóně,euru,eury,evropskou,evropskou bezpečností,evropskou dohodu,evropskou politikou),evropskou smlouvu,evropskou vládou,evropskou vládu,evropská,evropská bezpečnost,evropská dohoda,evropská legislativa,evropská nařízení,evropská politika (evropskou politiku,evropská regulace,evropská smlouva,evropská směrnice,evropská vláda,evropské,evropské bezpečnosti,evropské dotace,evropské hranice,evropské nařazení,evropské právo,evropské vládě,evropské zákony (evropských zákonů,evropského,evropském; Evropan,evropskému,evropský,evropský komisař (komisařů,evropský zákon (evropského zákonu,evropských dotacích,evropských zákonech,evropským zákonem),evropskými dotacemi,evropskými zákony),hranice Evropy[European borders],hraniční kontrola,jednotný evropský trh,komisaři),komisařích,kontrola na hranicích [border patrol],migrace [migration],migrantech,migranti (migranty,migrants],migrantům),migrační krize,nařízení EU,pevnost Evropa [fortress Europe],pevnosti Evropa,pevnosti Evropa,pohraniční kontrola,politika úspornosti,pomoc od státu (pomocí od státu,pomocí od státu),reffugee crisis,schengen,schengenském prostoru),schengenskému prostoru,schengenský prostor (schengenského prostoru,směrnice EU,soudní dvůr Evropské unie,uprchlická krize [migration crisis,uprchlíci,vnitřní trh,von der Leyenovou,von der Leyenová,von der Leyenové,úspornost,členské státy,členský stát,členských státech,členským státem,členskými státy

Flemish - Belgium migration

#Vluchtelingendag,Criminaliteit,Culturele diversiteit,Culturele inclusie,Culturele onverenigbaarheid,Culturele onverenigbaarheid,DG ECHO,DG Europese Civiele Bescherming en Humanitaire Hulp,Diversiteit,Etnische

diversiteit,Etnische gelijkheid,Etnische groep,Etnische inclusie,Expat,Expatriate,Geweld,Goede werknemers,Grens,Humanitaire hulp,Illegale arbeider,Integratie,Menselijke ontheeming,Menselijke ontheming,Migrantenboot,Moria,Multiculturalisme,Multicultureel,Racisme,Racist,Rasintegratie,Rassendiversiteit,Rassenintegratie,Redding,Religieus fanatisme,Sans-papiers,Solidariteitsmechanisme,UNHCR,VN Vluchtelingenorganisatie,Verbannen,Vluchteling,Xenofobie,assimilatie,Asiel,Immigrant,Immigratie,Migrant,Migratie

Flemish - Belgium Europe

#EU,#Europa,#Europadag,#EuropeDay,#EuropeseUnie,#eugreendeal,Boris,Brexit,Brussel,Draghi,ECB,EP-leden,EP-lid,EU,EU commissaris,EU-Hof,EU-beleid,EU-commissaris,EU-richtlijn,EU-verdrag,EU-verordening,EU-wetgeving,Eengemaakte Europese Markt,Europa,Europees,Europees beleid,Europees bestuur,Europees recht,Europees verdrag,Europese Centrale Bank,Europese Commissie,Europese Raad,Europese munteenheid,Europese subsidies,Europese veiligheid,Europese wetgeving,Europol,Frontex,Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie,Macron,Merkel,Schenge,Schengen,Straatsburg,austerity,euro,eurocommissaris,europarlement,europarlementarier,europeaan,europeanen,europees parlement,europese,europese fondsen,europese richtlijn,europese steunfondsen,europese unie,eurosepticisme,euroseptisch,eurozone,interne markt,lidstaat,lidstaten,staatssteun,von der Leyen,vrij verkeer

German migration

#RefugeeDay,#Weltflüchtlingstag,Ausländer*in,Ausländerfeindlichkeit,Auswanderer,DG ECHO,Diversität,Eingliederung,Expat,Expatriate,Flüchtling,Flüchtlingslager Moria,Fremdenfeindlichkeit,Gewalt,Grenze,Inklusion,Integration,Kriminalität,Lenarčič,Lesbos,Migrantenboot,Moria,Multiculturalismus,Rassismus,Rettung,Schwarzarbeiter,Seerettung,UNHCR,Verbrechen,Vertreibung von Menschen,Vielfalt,Wirtschaftsflüchtling,Xenophobie,economic refugee,ethnische Gleichheit,ethnische Gruppe,ethnische Integration,ethnische Vielfalt,foreigner,gute Arbeitnehmer,gute Mitarbeiter,humanitäre Hilfe,illegaler Arbeitnehmer,im Exil,kulturelle Integration,kulturelle Unvereinbarkeit,kulturelle Vielfalt,menschliche Vertreibung,multikulturell,rassistisch,religiöser Fanatismus,sea rescue,unaccompanied minor,unbegleitete Minderjährige,unbegleiteter Minderjähriger,verbannt,Asyl,Einwanderer,Einwanderung,Immigrant,Immigration,Migrant,Migration,Zu- und Abwanderung,migrantisch,wandernd

German europe

#EU,#Europa,#EuropeDay,#EuropäischeUnion,#eugreendeal,Austerität,Binnenmarkt,Brexit,Brüssel,Bürokratie,EU ,EU-Abkommen,EU-Gericht,EU-Kommissar,EU-Kommissarin,EU-Politik,EU-Rat,EU-Recht,EU-Richtlinie,EU-Verordnung,EU-Vertrag,EU-Vorschrift,EZB,Euro,Europa,Europarat,Europäische Kommission,Europäische Regierungsführung,Europäische Subventionen,Europäische Zentralbank,Europäischer Rat,Europäisches Regieren,Euroraum,Euroskeptiker,Euroskeptizismus,Eurozone,Frontex,MdEP,Merkel,Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments,Mitgliedsstaat,Mitgliedsstaaten,Schengen,Sparmaßnahmen,Staatshilfen,Vertragsverletzung,europäisch,europäische Fördermittel,europäische Gesetzgebung,europäische Mittel,europäische Richtlinie,europäische Sicherheit,europäische Währung,europäisches Recht,von der Leyen

Greek migration

hotspot Λέσβου,hotspot Μυτιλήνης,hotspot Μόριας,push backs,Υπατη Αρμοστεία του ΟΗΕ για τους Πρόσφυγες,KYT Μόριας,Κέντρο Υποδοχής και Ταυτοποίησης Μόριας,Κώδικας Μετανάστευσης,Λέσβος,Μόρια,Ξενοφοβία,Παγκόσμια Ημέρα Προσφύγων,Ρατσισμός,έγκλημα,ένταξη,ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια,απόδημοι πολίτες,ασύμβατες πολισμικές αξίες,ασύμβατοι πολιτισμοί,βάρκα με μετανάστες,βάρκες με πρόσφυγες,βάρκες με μετανάστες,βία,διάκριση λόγω φυλετικής καταγωγής,διάσωση,δουλευταράδες,εγκληματικότητα,εθνική διαφοροποίηση,εθνική καταγωγή,εθνοτικές ομάδες,εθνοτική ισότητα,εθνοτική ποικιλομορφία,εθνοτική πολυμορφία,εκπατρισθέντος ,εκπατρισμένος,εκτοπίσεις πληθυσμών,εκτόπιση πληθυσμών,ενσωμάτωση,εξορισμένοι,εργάτες γης,θρησκευτικός φανατισμός,ιστιοφόρο με μετανάστες,ισότητα εθνοτήτων,καλοί εργάτες,καταυλισμός Μόριας,κοινωνική ένταξη,κοινωνική ένταξη μεταναστών,λέμβοι με μετανάστες,λέμβους μεταναστών,μετακίνηση κοινοτήτων,μετακίνηση πλυθησμών,παράνομη εργασία,παράνομοι αλλοδαποί εργάτες,παράνομος εργάτης,ποικιλομορφία,πολιτισμική ένταξη,πολιτισμική ποικιλομορφία,πολιτισμική πολυμορφία,πολιτισμική διαφοροποίηση,πολιτισμική ποικιλομορφία,πολιτισμική πολυμορφία,πολυπολιτισμικές,πολυπολιτισμική,πολυπολιτισμικός,πρόσφυγας,πρόσφυγες,ρατσιστικές,ρατσιστική,ρατσιστικό,σκληρά εργαζόμενοι,σύνορα,τμήμα Ανθρωπιστικής Βοήθειας και Πολιτικής Προστασίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής,φυλετικές διακρίσεις,φυλετική διάκριση,φυλετική διαφοροποίηση,φυλετική

ποικιλομορφία,φυλετική ισότητα,άσυλο,αιτούντες
άσυλο,μετανάστες,μετανάστευση,μετανάστης,μεταναστευτικές,μεταναστευτική,μεταναστευτικός

Greek Europe

#40ΕλλάδαΕΕ,#ΕΕ,#ΕΥ,#EuropeDay2021,#eugreendeal,#ΕυρωπαϊκήΈνωση,#Ευρώπη,'ευρωπαϊκοί
πόροι','ευρωπαϊκό νόμισμα',Brexit,Conventions,Digital Act,EKT,EU,Euro,Europol,Frontex,Treaties,competition,von der
Leyen,Βρυξέλλες,ΕΕ,Επίτροπος,Ευρωβουλευτές,Ευρωβουλευτής,Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή,Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική
Τράπεζα,Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο,Ευρωσκεπτικισμός,Ευρώ,Ευρώπη,Ημερα της Ευρώπης,Κοινή Αγορά',Κοινή Ευρωπαϊκή
Αγορά',Κομισιόν,Λιτότητα,Μέρκελ,Ουρ.Φ.Ντ.Λαϊεν,Ούρσουλα φον ντερ Λάιεν,Σένγκεν,Συμβουλίου της ΕΕ,Συμβούλιο της
ΕΕ,Συνθήκες ΕΕ,ανταγωνισμός,επίτροποι,επίτροπος,ευρω,ευρωβουλευτών,ευρωζώνη,ευρωπ.,ευρωπαϊκά
κονδύλια',ευρωπαϊκές,ευρωπαϊκές επιδοτήσεις',ευρωπαϊκές συνθήκες,ευρωπαϊκή,ευρωπαϊκή διακυβέρνηση,ευρωπαϊκή
νομοθεσία,ευρωπαϊκή οδηγία,ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική,ευρωπαϊκή συνθήκη,ευρωπαϊκής ασφάλειας,ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής
ασφάλειας,ευρωπαϊκοί,ευρωπαϊκός,ευρωσκεπτικιστές,ευρωσκεπτικιστής,ευρώ,ζώνη του Ευρώ,κανονισμός της
ΕΕ,κοινοτική νομοθεσία,κράτη - μέλη,κράτος - μέλος,κρατη-μελη,κρατος-μελος,νομοθετική ρύθμιση της ΕΕ,οδηγίες,χώρα -
μέλος,χώρες - μέλη

Italian migration

inclusività etnica,(used in other contexts i.e. lavoro in nero>cash in hand jobs),Confine,Rifugiato,Salvataggio,aiuti
umanitari,aiuto umanitario,asilo politico,asylum,barca con migranti,barcone,carretta,carretta del mare,carrette del
mare,clandestini,clandestino,crimine,diversità,diversità etnica,diversità culturale,diversità
razziale,emigrant,emigrant*,emigration,emigrazione,esiliati,esiliato,espatriato,extra EU
migration,extracomunitari,fanatismo religioso,frontiera,gruppi etnici,gruppo etnico,illegal immigrant,illegal
immigrant,immigrat* illegal*,inclusione,inclusione razziale,inclusivo,incompatibilità culturale,incusività
culturale,integrazione,lavoratore illegale,lavoratori onesti,multiculturale,razzismo,uguaglianza
etnica,violenza,xenofobia,Asilo,Immigrazione,Migrante,Richiedenti
asilo,immigrato,immigrazione,migranti,migrazione,richiedente asilo

Italian europe

#EU,#Europa,#EuropeDay,#UnioneEuropea,#eugreendeal,#greendeal,Angela,BCE,Banca Centrale
Europea,Brexit,Bruxelles,Commissione Europea,Comunità Europea,Consiglio Europeo,Consiglio d'Europa,Corte
europea,Direttiva europea,EU,Eu,Euoscettici,Euro,Europa,Euroscetticismo,Frontex,Governance europea,Governo
europeo,ItalExit,Legislazione europea,Merkel,No Euro,No-Euro,Norma europea,Policy europe,Politiche
europee,Regolamentazione europea,Schengen,Trattto europeo,Unione Europea,Ursula,Von der Leyen,aiuti di stato,aiuti
europei,austerità,direttiva europea,europarlamentare,eurozona,finanziamento europei,fondi europei,frugali,linee-guida
europee,mercato comune,mercato unico,moneta unica,normativa europea,parlamentare europeo,regolamentazione
europea,sostegni,sovvenzioni statali,stati membri,sussidi,valuta unica

Portuguese migration

#diadorefugiado,(foreigners),(gipsies),(paquistanis),ACNUR,Campo de Moria,DG
ECHO,Fronteira,Lenarcis,Lesbos,Moria,Multicultural,Racismo,Refugiada,Refugiado,ajuda humanitária,balsa,barco de
migrantes,bons trabalhadores,ciganos,crime,deslocamento de pessoas,diversidade,diversidade cultural,diversidade
racial,diversidade étnica,estrangeiros,exilado,expatriada,expatriado,fanatismo religioso,grupo étnico,igualdade
étnica,inclusão,inclusão cultural,inclusão racial,inclusão étnica,incompatibilidade
cultural,integração,multiculturalismo,paquistaneses,racista,resgate,trabalhador
ilegal,violência,xenofobia,Asilo,Migrante,Migração,imigrante,imigração,migratório/migratória

Portuguese europe

#EU2021PT,#Europa,#EuropeDay,#UE,#diadaeuropa,#eugreendeal,#istoéEuropa,#uniaoeuropeia,BCE,Brexit,Brux
elas,Europol,Frontex,PRR,Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência,UE,ajudas do estados,ajudas estatais,austeridade,banco
central europeu,comissária europeia,comissário europeu,comissão europeia,conselho da UE,conselho
europeu,diretiva,diretiva europeia,estado membro,estados membros,estados-
membros,euro,eurocepticismo,eurocéptico,eurocépticos,eurodeputada,eurodeputadas,eurodeputado,eurodeputados,eur
opa,europeia,europeias,europeu,europeus,fundos europeus,governança europeia,governo europeu,legislação
europeia,lei europeia,lei europeias,leis europeias,mercado europeu,mercado interno,mercado único,merkel,moeda
europeia,política europeia,presidência portuguesa,regulamento europeu,schengen,segurança europeia,subsídios
europeus,tratado europeu,tribunal de justiça,troika,tribunal europeu,von der Leyen,zona euro

Spanish migration

#DiaDelRefugiado,ACNUR,Ayuda humanitaria,Crimen,DG ECHO,Desplazamiento humano,Diversidad,Diversidad cultural,Diversidad racial,Diversidad étnica,Fanatismo religioso,Frontera,Grupo étnico,Igualdad étnica,Inclusión cultural,Inclusión étnica,Inclusión,Inclusión racial,Incompatibilidad cultural,Integración,Lenarčič,Moria,Multicultural,Open Arms,OpenArms,Patera,Racismo,Refugiada,Refugiado,Rescate,Trabajador sin papeles,Trabajador sin permiso de trabajo,Violencia,exiliado,expatriada,expatriado,multiculturalismo,racista,sin papeles,sin permiso de trabajo,xenofobia,Asilo,Immigrante,Migración,emigrante,inmigración,migrante,migratoria

Spanish europe

#EU,#Europe,#EuropeDay,#EuropeanUnion,#UniónEuropea,#eugreendeal,BCE,Banco Central Europeo,Boris Johnson,Brexit,Bruselas,Charles Michel,Comisario europeo,Comisión Europea,Consejo europeo,Corte europea,Directiva europea,Draghi,Estado Miembro,Euro,Europa,Europarlamentario,Europea,Europol,Eurozona,Fondos Europeos,Frontex,Gobernanza europea,Legislación europea,Ley Europea,Macron,Mercado Interior de la Unión Europea,Mercado interior,Merkel,Moneda europea,Next Generation EU,Política europea,Regulación europea,Schengen,Seguridad europea,Tratado europeo,Tribunal Europeo,UE,austeridad,ayuda estatal,ayuda pública,beneficiario neto (net recipient),directiva europea,euroesceptico,europeo,euroscetticismo,países frugales (frugal countries),receptor neto,troika (troika),von der Leyen

Swedish migration

DG Echo,Främlingsfientlighet,Moria,Rasism,UNCHR,Xenofobi,bra arbetare,brott,duktiga arbetare,etnisk grupp,etnisk inkluderering,etnisk integration,etnisk jämlikhet,etnisk mångfald,flykting,flyktingbåt,flyktingdagen,flyktingström,gräns,humanitär hjälp,illegal arbetare,inkluderande,integration,kulturell inkludering,kulturell integration,kulturell mångfald,kulturkrock,kulturell konflikt,multi-kulturell,mångfald,mångfald mellan raser,ras integration,ras-inkludering,ras-mångfald,rasist,religiös fanatism,räddning,utlänning,utvisad,våld,Asyl,Migration,emigrant,invandrare,invandring,migrant

Swedish europe

#Europeday,#EU,#Europe,#EuropeanUnion,#eugreendeal,Boris,Brexit,Brussel,ECB,ECB:s,ECD,EU,EU direktiv,EU direktiv EU Direktivet,EU domstolen,EU regelverk,EU-bidrag,EU-fonder,EU-fördrag,EU-insatser,EU-institution,EU-institutioner,EU-institutionerna,EU-kommissionären,EU-kommissionen,EU-kommissionär,EU-kommissionärer,EU-kommissionärerna,EU-lag,EU-lagar,EU-medborgare,EU-medel,EU-parlamentariker,EU-parlamentet,EU-politik,EU-politiker,EU-politikerna,EU-rätt,EU-rätten,EU-rådet,EU:s,EUs,EUs bidragsfonder,EUs inre marknad,EUs lagar,EUs regelverk,EUs stödpaket,Euro,Euron,Europa,Europas,Europeiska Centralbanken,Europeiska centralbanken,Europeiska rådet,Europol,Européer,Eurozonen,Frontex,Inre marknaden,Kommissionen,MEP,Macron,Merkel,Schengen,brexit,eu-valuta europeisk valuta,euro,euro-skepticism,euro-skeptiker,europeisk,europeisk säkerhet,europeiska,europeiskt ledarskap,europeiskt styre,europé,européer,eurozon,eurozonen,eurozonens,kommissionen,medlemsland,medlemsländer,paneuropeisk (paneuropean),schengen,statsbidrag,svångremspolitik,von der Leyen,åtstramning,åtstramningspolitik

Turkish migration

Absorption,Acculturation,Admission,Asylum request,Avrupa Topluluğu İnsani yardım Bürosu,Benimsemek,Bir ülkeye girme,Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği,Bütünleşme,Dahil etme,Din fanatikliği,Dini fanatizm,Entegrasyon,Etnik eşitlik,Etnik grup,Etnik kapsayıcılık,Etnik çeşitlilik,Farklılık,Gurbetçi,Göç dalgası,Göç kontrolü,Göç kısıtlamaları,Göç sorunu,Göçmen botu,Göçmen teknesi,Hudut,Immigration control,Immigration issue,Irk kapsayıcılığı,Irk çeşitliliği,Irksal kapsama,Irkçılık,Issue of absorption,Kalifiye işçi,Kapsayıcılık,Kaçak işçi,Kurtarma,Kültürel anlaşmazlık,Kültürel uyumsuzluk,Kültürel çeşitlilik,Lesvos,Mülteci,Mülteci kampı,Mülteciler günü,Nüfusun yer değiştirmesi,Restrictions on migration,Social inclusion,Suç,Sürgün,Sınır,Sığınma,Toplumsal katılım,Uyum sorunu,Vahşet,Wave of immigration,Yabancı düşmanlığı,Yabancı korkusu,Yardım Bürosu,Yasa dışı işçi,Zorunlu yer değiştirme,iltica,kabul,kültür tezatlığı,kültürel kapsayıcılık,kültürel uyum,uyum sağlamak,zor kullanma,Çeşitlilik,Çok kültürü,Çok kültürlülük,İltica talebi,İmdadına yetişme,İnsani yardım,İnsani yer değiştirme,İyi işçi,Şiddet,Dışarıdan gelip yerleşme,Göç,Göçmen,Sığınak,barınak,göçücü,yer değiştirme,İltica,İçeri göç

Turkish Europe

9 Mayıs,AB,AB Komisyonu,AB sınırları,AB Üyesi Devletler,AB'nin Başkenti,Almanya,Alım gücü (purchasing power),Avrupa,Avrupa (Europe),Avrupa Birliği,Avrupa Birliği Yasal Düzenlemesi,Avrupa Birliği anlaşması,Avrupa Birliği politikaları,Avrupa Günü,Avrupa Kararnamesi,Avrupa Merkez Bankası,Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması,Avrupa güvenliği,Avrupa

heyeti,Avrupa hukuku,Avrupa konseyi,Avrupa pazarı,Avrupa yardımı/fonları,Avrupa yasası,Avrupa yönetişi,Avrupa İnsan Hakları mahkemesi,Avrupa şüpheçiliği,Batı şüpheçiliği,Batıdan gelen ödenekler,Beyin göçü (brain drain),Brexit,Brüksel,Frontex,Genç işsizlik (youth unemployment),Kadın hakları (women's rights),MV,Merkel,Milletvekili,Onur Ayı (Pride month),Onur yürüyüşü (Pride Parade),Schengen,SuTP (Syrians Under Temporary Protection),Ursula von der Leyen,Vekil,Yasak (restriction),avro,devlet yardımı,fon,heyet üyeleri,hoşgörüsüzlük,iltica (asylum-refuge),kadın,kadın cinayetleri,kadın hakları,kararname,kurul,meclis,mevzuat,müktesebat,mülteci,sertlik,tahammülsüzlük,tüzük,ulusal yardım,Üye Devlet,çevre anlaşması,İstanbul Sözleşmesi,İstanbul Sözleşmesi (Istanbul Convention),Şanselör,şiddet (violence)

Newsmedia

The following TwitterHandles are interpreted as newsmedia.

Country	Twitterhandle	Country	Twitterhandle	Country	Twitterhandle
PORTUGAL	@JornalNoticias	ITALY	@Avvenire_Nei	GREECE	@espressonews_gr
PORTUGAL	@Radio_Comercial	ITALY	@qn_lanazione	GREECE	@tovimagr
PORTUGAL	@SICNoticias	ITALY	@qn_carlino	GREECE	@StarChannelGr
PORTUGAL	@cmjornal	ITALY	@Radio24_news	GREECE	@GreeknewsGr
PORTUGAL	@dntwit	ITALY	@giornalissimo	GREECE	@imerisiagr
PORTUGAL	@SPORTTVPortugal	ITALY	@dagospia3	GREECE	@pronewsgr
PORTUGAL	@tvi24pt	ITALY	@Affaritaliani	GREECE	@leftgr
PORTUGAL	@Publico	ITALY	@corrieremilano	GREECE	@Newsgr1
PORTUGAL	@noticiaaominuto	ITALY	@webecodibergamo	GREECE	@inewsgr
PORTUGAL	@abolapt	ITALY	@qnazionale	GREECE	@dikaiologitika
PORTUGAL	@observadorpt	ITALY	@UrbanPost_It	CZECH	@iDNEScz
PORTUGAL	@Record_Portugal	ITALY	@ilsussidiario	CZECH	@novinkycz
PORTUGAL	@ojogo	ITALY	@TheItalianTimes	CZECH	@blesk_cz
PORTUGAL	@expresso	ITALY	@virgilio_it	CZECH	@Aktualnecz
PORTUGAL	@CMTVNoticias	GERMANY	@tagesschau	CZECH	@SeznamZpravy
PORTUGAL	@SolOnline	GERMANY	@derspiegel	CZECH	@RESPEKT_CZ
PORTUGAL	@Visao_pt	GERMANY	@BILD	CZECH	@Hospodarky
PORTUGAL	@RTPNoticias	GERMANY	@dwnews	CZECH	@EuroZpravycz
PORTUGAL	@TSFRadio	GERMANY	@zeitonline	CZECH	@echo24cz
PORTUGAL	@ojeconomico	GERMANY	@welt	CZECH	@E15news
PORTUGAL	@Renascenta	GERMANY	@SZ	CZECH	@infocz_web
PORTUGAL	@JNegocios	GERMANY	@ZDFheute	CZECH	@lidovky
PORTUGAL	@dnoticiaspt	GERMANY	@sternde	CZECH	@Tydencz
PORTUGAL	@dinheiro_vivo	GERMANY	@RTLde	CZECH	@denkcz
PORTUGAL	@revistaSABADO	GERMANY	@ntvde	CZECH	@DReferendum
PORTUGAL	@TimeOutLisboa	GERMANY	@rtl_aktuell	CZECH	@A2Iarm
PORTUGAL	@antena1rtp	GERMANY	@faznet	BELGIUM	@HLN_BE
PORTUGAL	@itwitting	GERMANY	@FOCUS_TopNews	BELGIUM	@een
PORTUGAL	@NoticiasMagazin	GERMANY	@tazgezwitscher	BELGIUM	@RTBFinfo
PORTUGAL	@asbeiras	GERMANY	@de_rt_com	BELGIUM	@vrtnws
PORTUGAL	@Lusa_noticias	GERMANY	@handelsblatt	BELGIUM	@lesoir
SPAIN	@el_pais	GERMANY	@Tagesspiegel	BELGIUM	@lavenir_net
SPAIN	@LaVanguardia	GERMANY	@morgenpost	BELGIUM	@destandaard
SPAIN	@EspanaDiarioES	GERMANY	@netzpoltik	BELGIUM	@7sur7
SPAIN	@elmundoes	GERMANY	@tonline	BELGIUM	@Play4_be
SPAIN	@telecincoes	GERMANY	@ndr	BELGIUM	@demorgen

SPAIN	@abc_es	GERMANY	@dpa	BELGIUM	@vivacite
SPAIN	@HuffPost	GERMANY	@heiseonline	BELGIUM	@gva
SPAIN	@publico_es	GERMANY	@rponline	BELGIUM	@sudpresseonline
SPAIN	@A3Noticias	GERMANY	@WAZ_Redaktion	BELGIUM	@hbvl
SPAIN	@elconfidencial	GERMANY	@rbb24	BELGIUM	@Knack
SPAIN	@20m	GERMANY	@RND_de	BELGIUM	@lapremiere
SPAIN	@okdiario	GERMANY	@capitalMagazin	BELGIUM	@cinetelerevue
SPAIN	@europapress	GERMANY	@ndpolitik	BELGIUM	@BrusselsTimes
SPAIN	@elperiodico	GREECE	@GreekReporter	BELGIUM	@lecho
SPAIN	@elespanolcom	GREECE	@newsbombgr	BELGIUM	@tijd
SPAIN	@noticias_cuatro	GREECE	@ANT1TV	BELGIUM	@metrobelgique
SPAIN	@informativost5	GREECE	@protothema	BELGIUM	@Jobat
SPAIN	@eldiarios	GREECE	@NewsItFeed	BELGIUM	@HLN
SPAIN	@larazon_es	GREECE	@vice_gr	BELGIUM	@DeGentenaar
SPAIN	@El_Plural	GREECE	@News247gr	BELGIUM	@AntenneCentreTV
SPAIN	@_infoLibre	GREECE	@CNNgreece	BELGIUM	@LaGazette_be
SPAIN	@expansioncom	GREECE	@Real_gr	BELGIUM	@metrobelgie
SPAIN	@elEconomistaes	GREECE	@Kathimerini_gr	BELGIUM	@GRENZECHOnet
SPAIN	@diariARA	GREECE	@TOPONTIKI	BELGIUM	@moustiquemag
SPAIN	@EFEnoticias	GREECE	@TheTOC_gr	SWEDEN	@Expressen
ITALY	@fanpage	GREECE	@skaigr	SWEDEN	@Aftonbladet
ITALY	@Corriere	GREECE	@ertofficial_	SWEDEN	@expressenstory
ITALY	@fattoquotidiano	GREECE	@in_gr	SWEDEN	@SportExpressen
ITALY	@notizieit	GREECE	@Contragr	SWEDEN	@dagensnyheter
ITALY	@LaRepubblica_it	GREECE	@iefimerida	SWEDEN	@metromode_se
ITALY	@MediasetTgcom24	GREECE	@newsbeast	SWEDEN	@GoteborgsPosten
ITALY	@Agenzia_Ansa	GREECE	@enikos_gr	SWEDEN	@SvD
ITALY	@LaStampa	GREECE	@HuffPostGreece	SWEDEN	@ExpressenNoje
ITALY	@HuffPostItalia	GREECE	@zougla_online	SWEDEN	@dagensindustri
ITALY	@ilmessaggeroit	GREECE	@typosthes	SWEDEN	@AftonbladetNoje
ITALY	@mattinodinapoli	GREECE	@ta_nea	SWEDEN	@GTnyheter
ITALY	@ilgiornale	GREECE	@EFSYNTAKTON	SWEDEN	@Kvallsposten
ITALY	@leggoit	GREECE	@ThePressProject	SWEDEN	@ABDebatt
ITALY	@RaiNews	GREECE	@apokalyptikodel	SWEDEN	@AftonbladetBoom
ITALY	@tpi	GREECE	@parapolitika	SWEDEN	@ExpressenDebatt
ITALY	@ilpost	GREECE	@protagongr	SWEDEN	@AftonbladetK
ITALY	@espressonline	GREECE	@capitalgr	SWEDEN	@bladetledare
ITALY	@chenews_it	GREECE	@newpostgr	SWEDEN	@AftonbladetPlus
ITALY	@TgLa7	GREECE	@LastNewsGr	SWEDEN	@ExpressenLedare
ITALY	@Adnkronos	GREECE	@ethnosgr	SWEDEN	@ExpressenKultur
ITALY	@Gazzettino	GREECE	@insomniagr	SWEDEN	@Folkbladet_news
ITALY	@Linkiesta	GREECE	@tvxs	SWEDEN	@Folkbladet
ITALY	@UnioneSarda	GREECE	@naftemporikigr		
ITALY	@ilsecoloxix	GREECE	@stokokkino1055		

Sentiment Lexicons

The sentiment lexicons for each language are too large to show in this appendix, as both positive and negative word-sets generally contain well over 1000 items per language. The sentiment lexicons used in this project can be downloaded from <https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/rtatman/sentiment-lexicons-for-81-languages?resource=download>.

Results of training the Algorithms by language and type

Lines in red indicate generally that no reliable algorithm could be created, either because of absent or sparse source data or because of a too low ROC AUC (<0.7). Purple lines indicate that while the result may seem reasonable the training set may be too small to have a reliable algorithm (possible overfitting). Yellow lines have a low precision (<0.7).

Table 5. Validation metrics for Machine learning models

Lang	Prediction	Model	ROC AUC	Acc.	Prec.	Recall	Speci.	TP	TN	FP	FN	Train	Test	Base
ES	OnTopic	GBT	0,989	0,9342	0,9487	0,9250	0,9444	74	68	4	6	718	152	870
ES	Institutions	GBT	0,783	0,7015	0,8800	0,5641	0,8929	22	25	3	17	332	67	399
ES	Territory	XGB	0,872	0,7753	0,8421	0,6957	0,8605	32	37	6	14	310	89	399
ES	Values	RF	0,842	0,7576	0,7500	0,7500	0,7647	12	13	4	4	366	33	399
ES	Sentiments	LR	0,735	0,6364	0,5946	0,9565	0,2857	22	6	15	1	353	44	397
ES	People	LR	0,825	0,7377	0,8125	0,5000	0,9143	13	32	3	13	739	61	800
ES	Law	GBT	0,939	0,8630	0,9211	0,8333	0,9032	35	28	3	7	727	73	800
ES	IsEurope	GBT	0,993	0,9816	1,0000	0,9670	1,0000	88	72	0	3	637	163	800
ES	Culture													0
BE	OnTopic	LR	0,969	0,9301	0,9213	0,9318	0,9286	82	91	7	6	796	186	982
BE	IsEurope	XGB	0,988	0,9816	0,9767	0,9882	0,9744	84	76	2	1	637	163	800
BE	People	LR	0,785	0,7708	0,8235	0,6364	0,8846	14	23	3	8	752	48	800
BE	Law	GBT	0,728	0,6984	0,7143	0,7353	0,6552	25	19	10	9	735	63	798
BE	Values	LR	0,746	0,6667	0,7000	0,5600	0,7692	14	20	6	11	349	51	400
BE	Territory	LR	0,940	0,8857	0,9677	0,8108	0,9697	30	32	1	7	328	70	398
BE	Institutions	XGB	0,740	0,6939	0,7727	0,6296	0,7727	17	17	5	10	351	49	400
BE	Sentiments	LR	0,788	0,7176	0,6538	0,8500	0,6000	34	27	18	6	325	85	410
BE	Culture	RF	0,850	0,7750	0,8148	0,6286	0,8889	22	40	5	13	319	399	718
DE	OnTopic	GBT	0,938	0,8861	0,8889	0,8889	0,8831	72	68	9	9	691	158	849
DE	IsEurope	GBT	0,948	0,9167	0,9518	0,8778	0,9556	79	86	4	11	736	180	916
DE	People	GBT	0,772	0,6934	0,7544	0,6056	0,7879	43	52	14	28	661	137	798
DE	Law	LR	0,805	0,7126	0,7222	0,6341	0,7826	26	36	10	15	711	87	798
DE	Values	RF	0,831	0,7143	0,9063	0,6042	0,8966	29	26	3	19	323	77	400
DE	Territory	GBT	0,894	0,8140	0,8444	0,8085	0,8205	38	32	7	9	314	86	400
DE	Institutions	RF	0,762	0,7297	0,8125	0,6500	0,8235	26	28	6	14	349	74	423
DE	Sentiments	RF	0,649	0,5962	0,6154	0,5926	0,6000	16	15	10	11	348	52	400
DE	Culture	RF	0,791	0,7119	0,7692	0,6452	0,7857	20	22	6	11	341	59	400
IT	OnTopic	GBT	0,966	0,9203	0,8933	0,9571	0,8824	67	60	8	3	529	138	667
IT	IsEurope	GBT	0,973	0,9709	1,0000	0,9425	1,0000	82	85	0	5	690	172	862
IT	People	LR	0,855	0,7688	0,8030	0,6883	0,8434	53	70	13	24	701	160	861
IT	Law	GBT	0,804	0,7586	0,7708	0,7872	0,7250	37	29	11	10	775	87	862
IT	Values	RF	0,739	0,7368	0,7826	0,6429	0,8276	18	24	5	10	414	57	471

IT	Territory	XGB	0,839	0,7700	0,8293	0,6800	0,8600	34	43	7	16	371	100	471
IT	Institutions	XGB	0,828	0,7653	0,8095	0,6939	0,8367	34	41	8	15	373	98	471
IT	Sentiments	XGB	0,603	0,6032	0,6364	0,4516	0,7500	14	24	8	17	408	63	471
IT	Culture	RF	0,918	0,8261	0,8421	0,7619	0,8800	16	22	3	5	425	46	471
PT	OnTopic	LR	0,953	0,9038	0,9216	0,8868	0,9216	47	47	4	6	424	104	528
PT	IsEurope	GBT	0,986	0,9451	0,9896	0,9223	0,9836	95	60	1	8	638	164	802
PT	People	LR	0,754	0,6923	0,7647	0,6190	0,7778	13	14	4	8	763	39	802
PT	Law	LR	0,942	0,8810	0,9024	0,8605	0,9024	37	37	4	6	717	84	801
PT	Values	RF	0,920	0,8364	0,9545	0,7241	0,9615	21	25	1	8	344	55	399
PT	Territory	XGB	0,883	0,8816	0,9143	0,8421	0,9211	32	35	3	6	324	76	400
PT	Institutions	GBT	0,882	0,8194	0,8667	0,7429	0,8919	26	33	4	9	328	72	400
PT	Sentiments	LR	0,805	0,7818	0,8276	0,7742	0,7917	24	19	5	7	346	55	401
PT	Culture	LR	0,938	0,8864	0,9444	0,8095	0,9565	17	22	1	4	355	44	399
GR	OnTopic	LR	0,986	0,9609	0,9231	1,0000	0,9265	60	63	5	0	548	676	1224
GR	IsEurope	LR	0,949	0,8920	0,9109	0,9020	0,8784	92	65	9	10	711	176	887
GR	People	LR	0,910	0,8182	0,8871	0,6875	0,9271	55	89	7	25	710	176	886
GR	Law	LR	0,851	0,7711	0,7429	0,7222	0,8085	26	38	9	10	804	83	887
GR	Values	LR	0,869	0,8103	0,8519	0,7667	0,8571	23	24	4	7	421	58	479
GR	Territory	LR	0,831	0,7500	0,8750	0,5957	0,9111	28	41	4	19	387	92	479
GR	Institutions	LR	0,893	0,8118	0,9063	0,6905	0,9302	29	40	3	13	394	85	479
GR	Sentiments	LR	0,916	0,8356	0,8824	0,7895	0,8857	30	31	4	8	406	73	479
GR	Culture	LR	0,727	0,7222	0,6667	0,5714	0,8182	4	9	2	3	461	18	479
SE	OnTopic	GBT	0,989	0,9683	0,9412	1,0000	0,9355	64	58	4	0	513	126	639
SE	IsEurope	GBT	0,980	0,9817	1,0000	0,9674	1,0000	89	72	0	3	639	164	803
SE	People	LR	0,773	0,6286	0,8462	0,3143	0,9429	11	33	2	24	732	70	802
SE	Law	RF	0,857	0,7941	0,8800	0,7174	0,8846	66	69	9	26	632	170	802
SE	Values	XGB	0,722	0,6667	0,7500	0,4737	0,8500	18	34	6	20	325	78	403
SE	Territory	XGB	0,956	0,8793	0,9130	0,8077	0,9375	21	30	2	5	345	58	403
SE	Institutions	RF	0,729	0,6818	0,7143	0,6522	0,7143	15	15	6	8	359	44	403
SE	Sentiments	LR	0,773	0,7458	0,7200	0,6923	0,7879	18	26	7	8	344	59	403
SE	Culture	RF	0,714	0,6429	0,6000	0,8571	0,4286	6	3	4	1	389	14	403
CZ	OnTopic	LR	0,943	0,8554	0,8861	0,8235	0,8889	70	72	9	15	574	166	740
CZ	IsEurope	GBT	0,930	0,8901	0,9368	0,8641	0,9241	89	73	6	14	745	182	927
CZ	People	GBT	0,853	0,7630	0,8642	0,6422	0,8922	70	91	11	39	789	211	1000
CZ	Law	LR	0,819	0,7630	0,8871	0,6180	0,9167	55	77	7	34	750	173	923
CZ	Values	RF	0,764	0,6912	0,8333	0,5405	0,8710	20	27	4	17	455	68	523
CZ	Territory	XGB	0,801	0,7436	0,7917	0,5588	0,8864	19	39	5	15	445	78	523
CZ	Institutions	GBT	0,894	0,8537	1,0000	0,7273	1,0000	16	19	0	6	482	41	523
CZ	Sentiments	XGB	0,600	0,6027	0,6857	0,5714	0,6452	24	20	11	18	450	73	523
CZ	Culture	RF	0,789	0,7381	0,7143	0,7500	0,7273	15	16	6	5	481	42	523
TR	OnTopic	GBT	0,934	0,9143	0,8925	0,9432	0,8851	83	77	10	5	592	175	767
TR	IsEurope	GBT	0,959	0,9091	0,9175	0,9271	0,8841	89	61	8	7	661	165	826
TR	People	LR	0,759	0,7317	0,7632	0,5472	0,8714	29	61	9	24	701	123	824
TR	Law	RF	0,779	0,7500	0,7671	0,6829	0,8111	56	73	17	26	653	172	825
TR	Values	RF	0,855	0,7500	0,8235	0,6667	0,8421	14	16	3	7	384	40	424
TR	Territory	GBT	0,822	0,7705	0,8421	0,5926	0,9118	16	31	3	11	364	61	425
TR	Institutions	XGB	0,772	0,7195	0,7500	0,7333	0,7027	33	26	11	12	344	82	426
TR	Sentiments	RF	0,739	0,6290	0,5172	0,6250	0,6316	15	24	14	9	364	62	426

TR	Culture	RF	0,722	0,5833	0,6000	0,5000	0,6667	3	4	2	3	414	12	426
BG	OnTopic	LR	0,978	0,9216	0,9538	0,8732	0,9634	124	158	6	18	1127	306	1433
BG	IsEurope	XGB	0,954	0,8617	0,9318	0,8039	0,9302	82	80	6	20	782	188	970
BG	People	LR	0,750	0,6641	0,7317	0,4839	0,8333	30	55	11	32	842	128	970
BG	Law	LR	0,847	0,7938	0,8043	0,7708	0,8163	74	80	18	22	776	194	970
BG	Values	LR	0,834	0,7778	0,8140	0,6863	0,8596	35	49	8	16	461	108	569
BG	Territory	XGB	0,811	0,7222	0,8462	0,5789	0,8824	22	30	4	16	498	72	570
BG	Institutions	LR	0,812	0,7582	0,8780	0,6792	0,8684	36	33	5	17	479	91	570
BG	Sentiments	XGB	0,625	0,5526	0,5526	0,5526	0,5526	21	21	17	17	494	76	570
BG	Culture	XGB	0,954	0,9091	0,8889	0,9231	0,8966	24	26	3	2	513	55	568

Tables related to analysis:

Table 6. Percentage occurrence of social media representations among all posts for each country

Country	Institutions	Law	People	Territory	Values
BE	20.4	24.8	12.2	38.4	34.8
BG	26.1	50.1	2.7	21.9	18.1
CZ	16.1	3.7	3.8	15.1	18.5
DE	59.5	30	38.8	41	30.2
ES	20.8	18.8	22.9	18.3	15.5
GR	30.6	15.9	4	25.3	35.7
IT	20.3	27.5	37.7	11.9	25
PT	17.9	23	13.1	32.1	24.9
SE	18.6	13.8	4.1	3.8	19.2
TR	21.8	7.1	16	14	22.5

OLS regressions supporting results of Between country analysis:

Table 7. Results from OLS regressions for assessing difference between Europe and non-Europe discussions with People, Territory, Institutions, Law, or Values as the dependent variable.

Variable	People	Territory	Institutions	Law	Values
BE_EUR	-0.0705*** (0.0209)	0.0251 (0.0372)	0.4237*** (0.0255)	0.0101 (0.0267)	0.1304*** (0.0268)
BG_EUR	0.0140 (0.0111)	0.3979*** (0.0275)	0.3951*** (0.0297)	0.2468*** (0.0279)	-0.1223*** (0.0249)
CZ_EUR	0.0151*** (0.0048)	0.1914*** (0.0088)	0.3722*** (0.0109)	0.0248*** (0.0050)	-0.0650*** (0.0082)
DE_EUR	-0.1611*** (0.0146)	0.5316*** (0.0120)	0.1131*** (0.0148)	0.0899*** (0.0139)	-0.1895*** (0.0172)
ES_EUR	0.1394*** (0.0135)	0.2494*** (0.0133)	-0.0147 (0.0133)	0.1212*** (0.0140)	0.0875*** (0.0114)
GR_EUR	-0.0414*** (0.0026)	0.3319*** (0.0073)	0.1881*** (0.0079)	0.0023 (0.0055)	-0.1154*** (0.0074)
IT_EUR	-0.0259** (0.0103)	0.2085*** (0.0075)	0.3978*** (0.0080)	0.0037 (0.0095)	0.0347*** (0.0094)
PT_EUR	-0.0525***	0.1930***	0.0659***	0.0434**	0.0272

	(0.0136)	(0.0207)	(0.0170)	(0.0190)	(0.0202)
SE_EUR	-0.0220***	0.3572***	0.1161***	0.2302***	0.1020***
	(0.0050)	(0.0155)	(0.0126)	(0.0152)	(0.0130)
TR_EUR	-0.0880***	0.2370***	0.3398***	0.0450***	-0.0083
	(0.0116)	(0.0162)	(0.0148)	(0.0108)	(0.0156)
BE	-0.0346**	0.2921***	-0.0794***	0.1847***	0.0759***
	(0.0160)	(0.0223)	(0.0111)	(0.0162)	(0.0177)
BG	-0.1607***	-0.0272**	-0.0387**	0.3397***	0.0047
	(0.0091)	(0.0118)	(0.0152)	(0.0207)	(0.0200)
CZ	-0.1476***	0.0130**	-0.0824***	-0.0305***	-0.0228**
	(0.0072)	(0.0063)	(0.0068)	(0.0048)	(0.0091)
DE	0.3089***	-0.0076	0.3870***	0.1825***	0.1946***
	(0.0133)	(0.0093)	(0.0137)	(0.0116)	(0.0163)
ES	0.0014	0.0155**	0.0762***	0.0866***	-0.1014***
	(0.0098)	(0.0077)	(0.0099)	(0.0082)	(0.0097)
GR	-0.1284***	0.0639***	0.1089***	0.0980***	0.1674***
	(0.0071)	(0.0062)	(0.0073)	(0.0053)	(0.0089)
IT	0.2081***	-0.0584***	-0.1129***	0.2130***	0.0082
	(0.0097)	(0.0058)	(0.0065)	(0.0077)	(0.0099)
PT	-0.0262**	0.1496***	0.0122	0.1491***	0.0102
	(0.0121)	(0.0140)	(0.0123)	(0.0131)	(0.0155)
SE	-0.1379***	-0.0744***	0.0394***	0.0588***	-0.0433***
	(0.0071)	(0.0053)	(0.0069)	(0.0053)	(0.0084)
Intercept	0.1811***	0.0831***	0.1367***	0.0605***	0.2266***
	(0.0068)	(0.0053)	(0.0061)	(0.0043)	(0.0077)
R-squared	0.2124	0.2255	0.1612	0.0850	0.0508
R-squared Adj.	0.2121	0.2252	0.1609	0.0846	0.0505
N	50418	50418	50418	50418	50418

Table 8. Results from OLS regressions for assessing difference between media and non-media with People, Territory, Institutions, Law, or Values as the dependent variable.

Variable	People	Territory	Institutions	Law	Values
BE_MED	0.0236	0.2622***	-0.0505*	-0.0631**	-0.1543***
	(0.0236)	(0.0368)	(0.0260)	(0.0261)	(0.0266)
BG_MED	0.0689***	0.3274***	0.3209***	0.2391***	-0.1587***
	(0.0233)	(0.0433)	(0.0449)	(0.0310)	(0.0238)
CZ_MED	0.0434**	0.1550***	0.3108***	0.0558***	-0.0975***
	(0.0181)	(0.0278)	(0.0360)	(0.0195)	(0.0190)
DE_MED	-0.1975***	0.2723***	-0.2550***	-0.1612***	-0.3111***
	(0.0167)	(0.0179)	(0.0184)	(0.0151)	(0.0133)
ES_MED	-0.0123	0.1398***	-0.0463***	-0.0357***	-0.1031***
	(0.0126)	(0.0123)	(0.0127)	(0.0126)	(0.0098)
GR_MED	-0.0232***	0.1852***	0.1524***	-0.0122	-0.1366***
	(0.0037)	(0.0119)	(0.0124)	(0.0082)	(0.0106)
IT_MED	0.1933***	0.0822***	0.0725***	0.0868***	-0.2005***
	(0.0112)	(0.0094)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)	(0.0087)

PT_MED	-0.1002*** (0.0151)	0.2041*** (0.0201)	-0.1662*** (0.0183)	-0.0137 (0.0195)	-0.3152*** (0.0211)
SE_MED	-0.0180 (0.0118)	0.0392* (0.0212)	-0.0717*** (0.0222)	0.0222 (0.0286)	-0.0774*** (0.0229)
TR_MED	0.1099*** (0.0164)	0.1141*** (0.0171)	0.2344*** (0.0172)	0.0700*** (0.0129)	-0.1139*** (0.0150)
BE	-0.0257* (0.0144)	0.1761*** (0.0213)	0.0461*** (0.0172)	0.2118*** (0.0164)	0.1544*** (0.0176)
BG	-0.1243*** (0.0074)	0.0503*** (0.0154)	0.0363** (0.0170)	0.4064*** (0.0172)	-0.0400** (0.0167)
CZ	-0.1031*** (0.0063)	0.0283*** (0.0069)	-0.0216*** (0.0076)	-0.0227*** (0.0046)	-0.0579*** (0.0086)
DE	0.2907*** (0.0101)	0.2338*** (0.0108)	0.4745*** (0.0096)	0.2756*** (0.0088)	0.1224*** (0.0123)
ES	0.0947*** (0.0100)	0.0075 (0.0089)	0.0519*** (0.0106)	0.1441*** (0.0093)	-0.0493*** (0.0105)
GR	-0.0979*** (0.0062)	0.1146*** (0.0069)	0.1149*** (0.0075)	0.1022*** (0.0049)	0.1260*** (0.0085)
IT	0.1868*** (0.0084)	-0.0215*** (0.0071)	0.0096 (0.0082)	0.1940*** (0.0068)	0.0576*** (0.0095)
PT	0.0537*** (0.0143)	0.0748*** (0.0158)	0.1084*** (0.0172)	0.1798*** (0.0161)	0.2009*** (0.0202)
SE	-0.0981*** (0.0063)	-0.0813*** (0.0062)	0.0119* (0.0071)	0.0795*** (0.0052)	-0.0529*** (0.0083)
Intercept	0.1398*** (0.0060)	0.1187*** (0.0059)	0.1747*** (0.0064)	0.0583*** (0.0041)	0.2456*** (0.0076)
R-squared	0.2191	0.1103	0.0845	0.0774	0.0630
R-squared Adj.	0.2188	0.1100	0.0842	0.0771	0.0627
N	50418	50418	50418	50418	50418

Table 9. Results from OLS regressions for assessing difference between Europe and non-Europe discussions with Positive, Neutral, and Negative sentiment as the dependent variable.

Variable	Positive	Neutral	Negative
BE_EUR	-0.0037 (0.0132)	-0.0283 (0.0264)	0.0319 (0.0236)
BG_EUR	0.0181** (0.0080)	-0.0301*** (0.0110)	0.0120 (0.0076)
CZ_EUR	0.0196*** (0.0051)	-0.0406*** (0.0067)	0.0210*** (0.0045)
DE_EUR	-0.0351*** (0.0092)	-0.0204 (0.0147)	0.0555*** (0.0122)
ES_EUR	0.0035 (0.0048)	0.0028 (0.0148)	-0.0063 (0.0143)
GR_EUR	0.0113*** (0.0024)	-0.0092*** (0.0035)	-0.0022 (0.0027)
IT_EUR	0.0072	-0.0235***	0.0164**

	(0.0063)	(0.0090)	(0.0070)
PT_EUR	0.0265***	-0.0073	-0.0193
	(0.0090)	(0.0157)	(0.0133)
SE_EUR	-0.0182*	-0.0015	0.0198**
	(0.0093)	(0.0119)	(0.0079)
TR_EUR	0.0754***	-0.0428***	-0.0326***
	(0.0118)	(0.0154)	(0.0108)
BE	0.0062	0.0062	-0.0124
	(0.0087)	(0.0160)	(0.0139)
BG	-0.0255***	0.1159***	-0.0904***
	(0.0033)	(0.0072)	(0.0066)
CZ	0.0044	0.0708***	-0.0752***
	(0.0040)	(0.0074)	(0.0063)
DE	0.0437***	-0.0362***	-0.0076
	(0.0087)	(0.0133)	(0.0107)
ES	-0.0096**	-0.1020***	0.1116***
	(0.0042)	(0.0110)	(0.0104)
GR	-0.0158***	0.0850***	-0.0692***
	(0.0035)	(0.0070)	(0.0063)
IT	0.0345***	-0.0127	-0.0218***
	(0.0053)	(0.0089)	(0.0075)
PT	-0.0033	0.0018	0.0015
	(0.0058)	(0.0125)	(0.0113)
SE	0.0633***	-0.0032	-0.0600***
	(0.0044)	(0.0076)	(0.0064)
Intercept	0.0255***	0.8815***	0.0929***
	(0.0033)	(0.0068)	(0.0061)
R-squared	0.0216	0.0358	0.0477
R-squared			
Adj.	0.0212	0.0354	0.0474
N	50418	50418	50418

Table 10. Results from OLS regressions for assessing difference between media and non-media with Positive, Neutral, and Negative sentiment as the dependent variable.

Variable	Positive	Neutral	Negative
BE_MED	-0.0277**	-0.0068	0.0345
	(0.0114)	(0.0259)	(0.0238)
BG_MED	0.0253	-0.0506**	0.0253
	(0.0166)	(0.0231)	(0.0166)
CZ_MED	-0.0153	-0.0291	0.0444**
	(0.0104)	(0.0205)	(0.0180)
DE_MED	-0.0533***	-0.0112	0.0644***
	(0.0059)	(0.0178)	(0.0171)
ES_MED	-0.0204***	-0.0136	0.0340**
	(0.0039)	(0.0143)	(0.0140)
GR_MED	-0.0050*	-0.0043	0.0093**
	(0.0027)	(0.0054)	(0.0047)

IT_MED	-0.0430*** (0.0059)	0.0780*** (0.0088)	-0.0350*** (0.0070)
PT_MED	-0.0651*** (0.0108)	0.0289* (0.0165)	0.0362*** (0.0131)
SE_MED	-0.0247 (0.0205)	0.0171 (0.0258)	0.0076 (0.0169)
TR_MED	0.0201* (0.0109)	0.0196 (0.0151)	-0.0397*** (0.0112)
BE	0.0001 (0.0098)	0.0125 (0.0164)	-0.0126 (0.0137)
BG	-0.0363*** (0.0047)	0.1252*** (0.0077)	-0.0889*** (0.0064)
CZ	-0.0039 (0.0045)	0.0737*** (0.0074)	-0.0698*** (0.0061)
DE	0.0186*** (0.0065)	-0.0328*** (0.0106)	0.0142 (0.0089)
ES	-0.0145*** (0.0052)	-0.0817*** (0.0113)	0.0962*** (0.0104)
GR	-0.0260*** (0.0041)	0.0964*** (0.0071)	-0.0704*** (0.0060)
IT	0.0348*** (0.0056)	-0.0300*** (0.0088)	-0.0048 (0.0072)
PT	0.0353*** (0.0111)	-0.0057 (0.0152)	-0.0296*** (0.0112)
SE	0.0478*** (0.0049)	0.0102 (0.0076)	-0.0581*** (0.0061)
Intercept	0.0399*** (0.0040)	0.8677*** (0.0069)	0.0924*** (0.0059)
R-squared	0.0218	0.0365	0.0485
R-squared Adj.	0.0215	0.0361	0.0481
N	50418	50418	50418

ⁱ Knoema, Bulgaria - Net migration rate

(<https://knoema.com/atlas/Bulgaria/topics/Demographics/Population/Net-migration-rate> 10.03.2023)

ⁱⁱ Семинар: Миграция и бежанци - Медийно отразяване и предотвратяване на реч на омразата, 07.2022

(<https://bulgaria.iom.int/bg/news/seminar-migraciya-i-bezhanci-mediyno-otrazyavane-i-predotvratyavane-na-rech-na-omrazata> 11.03.2023)

ⁱⁱⁱ Мулти култи колектив и Факултетът по журналистика и масова комуникация, 04.2022 (<https://fjmc.uni-sofia.bg/news/trening-otrazyavane-na-temata-bezhanci-i-migranti-i-protivodeystvie-na-rechta-na-omrazata> 11.03.2023)