EUMEPLAT
European Media Platforms: assessing positive and negative externalities for European culture

D1.6

Europeanisation: operational definition

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Foreword

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This deliverable should be considered in a two-level perspective, since it firstly reports on the process of the generation of the operational definition of Europeanization [Deliverable 1.6 and Milestone 11] and its outcome, and secondly already points to the different usages of this operational definition in the different EUMEPLAT work packages.

'Europeanization' is a fashionable but contested concept. In effect, it encompasses a variety of areas and fields, and for this reason it needs to break it down into more operational variables, likely to be applied as empirical indicators. Trying to find an operational definition, this report reflects the concept of Europeanization throughout the entire project, which neeldess to say, it is a paramount research question for the EUMEPLAT project. The research based on a literature review, and it is presented in this deliverable aims to present and at the same time to tackle common trends of the Europeanization concept, and at the same time to reveal the diversity of this concept, a concept that in the past was largely vague, but in the recent years has become a issue that concerns most of the European citizens.

The methodological approach taken here is that of the semantic map, able to split the Europeanization issues into three main dimensions and nineteen approaches. The tension between Europeanity as an identity marker and Europeanization as a process will play a main part in our analysis. The current sematic field will be used to frame the results of upcoming empirical work-packages: WP2, related to European public discussion and to anti-EU fake news; WP3, related on video consumption and possible Europeanization of taste; WP4, related to collective representation of gender and migration. In their turn, those results will put the framework to the test, and they are expected to loop back in the methodological framework itself, in name of the grounded approach we have followed since the drawing stage of the project.

Some WP1 results, on the other hand, are already presented in this deliverable, especially when they deal with a specific aspect of the process – the EU-ization, or top-down Europeanization – which positions itself in the politico-spatial quadrant of our conceptual map.

The deliverable is therefore divided in three parts. The first one explains the methodological and theoretical assumptions behind the semantic map, the different possible approaches to European common identities, and proposes the operational definition itself. The second part

will draw on some insights from WP1 – which is the only WP completed so far – in order to come to terms with the EU-ization side of the discourse, or the institutional path to Europeanization. As the bottom-up way to Europeanization will be mostly addressed in WP5, it is likely that our overall theoretical frame will be gradually updated and modified, based on scientific evidence and results.

The third part will eventually include the materials we have used for elaborating the theoretical framework – an extended annotated bibliography, a bibliographical review and a more refined paper - which we consider a significant part of the work, worthy to be made available to the scientific community in its turn.

Section I – Towards an operational definition of Europeanity and Europeanisation

Nico Carpentier, Milos Hroch, Sara Cannizzaro, Andrea Miconi and Vaia Doudaki

1 Introduction

The concepts of Europeanity and Europeanisation (E&E in short) are highly complex notions, that are also deeply contested, given their political-ideological load. This contestation is partially situated in academia itself. For instance, Vink and Graziano (2007: 3) write that "The concept of Europeanization may have been, and perhaps still is, essentially contested as to its usefulness for the study of European politics." But more structurally, Europe itself, what is means to be European ("Europeanity") and what it means to become European ("Europeanisation") are also contested notions. Delanty and Rumford (2005: 68) summarise this briefly, by saying that "European identity exists on different levels, cultural and political, and is contested." In a slightly longer version, Heinlein et al. (2012: 14) write that:

> "The Europe of today has become the major arena in which the hegemony of a Western modernity and its economic, political, and cultural claims to global dominance are being fundamentally contested."

As is often the case, this significatory diversity and intrinsic discursive struggle has produced extensive taxonomic responses, with the work of Olsen (2002) and Harmsen and Wilson (2000) as prime examples. Our answer will not be different. But many of the existing taxonomies of E&E are still deeply rooted in their disciplines, which tends to mean that these—already extensive—taxonomies are still reductive. Moreover, these taxonomies tend to find themselves lodged in a position on one side of the discursive-material divide (or dimension, as we prefer to call it), which—as we want to argue—deeply structures (and divides) the theoretical field of E&E. In practice, often one finds oneself either analysing the more culturalist-discursive components of E&E, or analysing the structural-material components of E&E, but hardly ever do theorisations and analyses of E&E do both.

When a more multidisciplinary approach is used, and care is taken to respectfully integrate both the culturalist-discursive and structural-material components of E&E (and their interactions) into one taxonomy, the diversity of taxonomic elements increases drastically. Still, we should immediately add that the author team of this text is still embedded in the field of Communication and Media Studies. This has repercussions for the taxonomy that we present here, as in a number of cases—taking our expertise into consideration—we have still opted for

a number of approaches that are related to the media field. For instance, we focus on the media industry, and not on industry in general. Whenever we have used this—admittedly, still reductionist—strategy, we have flagged its consequences in a footnote.

In order to cope with the diversity of / behind E&E, and to capture this diversity as much as possible, which is the strength of this particular taxonomy, we have chosen to use the notion of the semantic map, and the methods related to semantic mapping. Given the complexity of this enterprise, we have developed a more participatory theory-building method, activating the strength of an entire research consortium—EUMEPLAT.[1] In the first part of this text (sections 2 and 3), this method will be explained, after which the structure and the elements of the semantic map will be discussed in detail. In the second, shorter part of this text (section 4), the application of the semantic map in support of the work packages of the EUMEPLAT research project will be briefly discussed.

2 The semantic map: Principles and methodology

2.1 The concept of the semantic map

Semantic maps, or semantic webs, have been developed and deployed for reading comprehension since the late 1970s and early 1980s (Pearson & Johnson, 1978; Freedman & Reynolds, 1980; Cleland, 1981), and they have been used in a variety of academic fields (see, e.g., Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer, 2007, for its use in linguistics). The process has been described as a "process for constructing visual displays of categories and their relationships" (Freedman & Reynolds, 1980: 677), resulting in “a representation of meanings or uses and the relations between them” (van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998: 86). In these older versions, one particular question was centralized in the visual display, with so-called web strands then providing the main answers to these questions, strand supports providing clarifications to these strands and strand ties interconnecting these different strands and their supports (Freedman & Reynolds, 1980: 677–678).

The semantic map (model) that is being used in this text moves slightly away from these older ways of representing semantic maps, partially inspired by the concept of the field of discursivity. It is a concept used by Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 112), which has been used before in order to visually represent particular fields of discursivity (Carpentier, 2005). In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse-theoretical approach, the structural contingency of discourses is

[1] https://www.eumeplat.eu/

emphasised, where a discourse is seen as an always-particular articulation of a series of elements (or signifiers), held together by privileged elements called nodal points. Visual representations of these discourses (and their articulations), with nodal points connecting to the other elements that constitute a discourse (see, e.g., Walton & Boon, 2014), are remarkably similar to semantic maps, which is very useful for the purpose of this text.

At the same time, the concept of the field of discursivity adds two important ideas to the semantic map method. First, articulations, disarticulations and re-articulations are the object of political struggle, which means that, at one particular point in time, some elements are activated (or articulated) in a particular discourse, but others are not. There is, in other words, a surplus of elements, not yet articulated, which may become articulated and thus affect the meaning of the entire discourse (or they may never become articulated and remain disconnected forever). This is why Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 113) refer to the "infinitude of the field of discursivity", where this field can be seen as an endless reservoir of elements, the site of possibility and the location of the optional. This has implications for the creation of semantic maps, as this can be read as an invitation to also bring in those meanings that are less obvious, namely those that used to be important but became disarticulated over time, those that are not part of a dominant mainstream but are situated at the fringes, and those different options that are (still) engaged in a discursive struggle over dominance.

This brings us to the second (and related) idea. Discourses are "an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 112), which means that they are also object and site of struggle. Some meanings are hegemonic, but still actively resisted by counter-hegemonic projects, that attempt to dethrone the former. This is not restricted to the field of politics, but these struggles can be found in a variety of societal fields, including academia, where one particular discourse (e.g., on Europeanity) is struggled over fiercely, with different actors and traditions defending particular definitions and interpretations (of, e.g., Europeanity). As these discursive struggles are often located along particular axes, these dimensions can be used to structure semantic maps, moving beyond the mere connecting of elements and thus adding more analytical richness to these maps. Given the clear presence of these axes in the semantic field of Europeanity and Europeanisation, this strategy—of adding dimensions as structuring elements—has been used here as well.

2.2 The methodology: The creation of a semantic map on Europeanity and Europeanisation

Creating a semantic map of complex concepts, such as Europeanity and Europeanisation, is a fairly complex process in its own right, and in order to do justice to this semantic complexity, care needed to be taken that the paradigmatic and conceptual preferences of the authors of this document did not overshadow (and restrict) the semantic

richness of these concepts. Methodologically, this work was grounded in, and inspired by, traditional qualitative textual analysis techniques, with particular attention for hermeneutic analysis, and the iterativity that is captured by the notion of the hermeneutic circle (Shklar, 1986).

Process-wise, the starting point was a series of separate literature reviews by the authors of this text, guaranteeing sufficient interpretative diversity from the onset of this project. These literature reviews were then presented at a workshop (which took place in Milan, Italy, on 1 September 2021), which was also the location where the next steps of the analytical strategy were decided. These were the texts presented at this seminar (and have been included in appendix):

- The European Assemblage, by Nico Carpentier (Appendix 1)
- Dimensions of Europeanization: A literature Review, by Andrea Miconi (Appendix 2)
- Europeanization: An annotated bibliography - A Working paper, by Miloš Hroch (Appendix 3)

In a second step, the main author of this text then produced a first visual representation of the semantic map, which was presented at a second workshop (in Barcelona, Spain, on 25 October 2021), discussed and reworked afterwards.

In a third stage, in total 45 members of the EUMEPLAT research consortium[2] were invited to provide further feedback on the draft semantic map. Inspiration was found for this approach in a field that is described as collaborative knowledge building (Stahl, 2006) and collaborative theory construction. In these approaches, the emphasis is on transactive dialogues (Azmitia & Crowley, 2001: 58), which are “conversations in which partners critique, refine, extend, and paraphrase each other’s actions and ideas or create syntheses that integrate each other’s perspectives.” Or, in other words, as Stahl (2006: 230) writes: “Collaborative knowledge building is structured by the intertwining of group and personal perspectives. The role of individual minds should be neither ignored nor fixated on but instead seen in interaction with group understandings.” In our case, we worked with two substages. In a first substage, the visual representation of the semantic field of Europeanity was recreated on an online platform (Miro). All approaches (to Europeanity) were mapped on this visual representation, but in addition, definitions were added to each approach, providing a brief description of each approach.

All EUMEPLAT research consortium members were given access to this online platform, and they were asked to mark on the map (which allowed for additions) three things:

[2] This number excludes two of the authors of this text, who set up the Miro platform consultation. A first group of 36 members were invited on 17 November 2021, the nine others later.

(1) how they used particular approaches in their own work;

(2) critiques on the approaches (and their definitions) included in the (draft version) of the semantic map, and

(3) approaches (or elements of approaches) that were, according to them, missing.

After a series of additions in the online platform Miro, the semantic map was again adjusted, and then printed and brought to a face-to-face workshop, in Athens, Greece, on 13 December 2021. While part of the EUMEPLAT research consortium members were attending the workshop online, a small group of consortium members were physically present, and discussed the version of the semantic map that was presented to them, using post-its to add their comments on the map. Also after this workshop, the semantic map was adjusted (still in Miro). This version has been included in this text, as Figure 1.

After the Athens workshop, the author team consolidated the semantic map, with now its 19 approaches to Europeanity and—in the last phase—turned its attention to deepening the theoretical grounding of the 19 approaches included in the sematic map, through a last and more targeted literature review. This resulted in the overview of the 19 approaches, discussed in part 3 of this text.

Figure 1: The semantic map, with its definitions, in Miro (post-Athens workshop)



3 The semantic map of Europeanity and Europeanisation

3.1 The map's three main dimensions

The final result of this semantic mapping exercise can be found in Figure 2. It situates 19 different approaches to the concepts of Europeanity and Europeanisation on a map that has one main dimension (discursive vs material) and two support dimensions, with the discursive dimension intersecting with the essentialist vs relationist dimension, and the material dimension intersecting with the socio-spatial vs politico-spatial dimension.

The main discursive-material dimension captures a major rift in the conceptual reflections about Europeanity and Europeanisation. There is a considerable body of work (e.g., in political studies) that focusses on material structures and institutions, but also on material bodily practices. If we zoom in on Europeanisation[3] and take Olsen's (2002: 923-924) overview as illustration, we can find what he terms "five possible uses" of the Europeanisation concept: "Changes in external boundaries", "Developing institutions at the European level", "Central penetration of national systems of governance", "Exporting forms of political organization", and "A political unification project". Similarly, Harmsen and Wilson (2000: 13) refer to "eight usages of the term Europeanization", which they label as "Europeanization as the emergence of new forms of European governance", "Europeanization as national adaptation", "Europeanization as policy isomorphism", "Europeanization as problem and opportunity for domestic political management", "Europeanization as modernization", "Europeanization as 'joining Europe'", "Europeanization as the reconstruction of identities" and "Europeanization as transnationalism and cultural integration" (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000: 14-18). With the latter component referring to the interactions of everyday life, or—as Borneman and Fowler (1997: 497)—write, the situations "where peoples of Europe engage in face-to-face encounters with each other" (which is also a materialist approach), only one component (namely the reconstruction of identities) refers to the discursive.

In contrast, the discursive side of the dimension focusses on the meanings allocated to Europe, using a more culturalist perspective. Of course, the concept of discourse can be understood in a variety of ways, ranging from discourse-as-language to discourse as-ideology (Carpentier, 2017), but these many different conceptualisations of discourse all focus on Europe as an idea. As Rietbergen (2015: xxxv) writes—Europe is "a political and cultural

[3] A similar type of argument can be made for the materiality of European identity and Europeanity, but has been left out for reasons on space.

concept" that gives meaning to "the western edge of Eurasia, the earth's largest land mass." In this sense, it is remarkably uncontested. Fornäs (2012: 5) comments,

> "it can hardly be replaced—being inherited since antiquity, not seriously questioned or contested by any alternative name, and therefore not an object of political choice. Other geographic names may well be questioned—think for instance of Macedonia or Kurdistan. But there is an evident consensus on how to name this continent, even though its external boundaries are not fixed."

Europe as an idea moves beyond the meaning given to a particular space, as it also allows to connect different people(s) to this space, articulating them as Europeans, and offering them (or interpellating them, in Althusser's (2014) terms) an opportunity to identify with this political space, also generating affective connections. This discursive side of the dimension has not always been very prominent, even though, already in 2007, Wilson and Millar (2007: 5) wrote that "the question of European identity has been a topic of significant interest in the last decade." Of course, debates about a European identity—which is an important part of this discursive component—have a longer history; Wilson and Millar (2007: 5) cite (section 22 of) the *Declaration on European Identity*, from the 1973 Copenhagen European summit, where nine member states of the enlarged European Community wrote that "The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe."

It is important, though, to emphasize that the discursive-material dimension is not a dichotomy, which has two implications. First, there are a number of approaches (to Europeanity and Europeanisation) that explicitly combine elements from the discursive-material dimension. In particular media (studies) offers an important contribution here, as the production of (what is discursively constructed as) European media content and media representations of Europe (which also materially circulate) show how these components overlap. Second, as one of us has argued (Carpentier, 2021, see also appendix 1 of this document), the discursive and material components are entangled or knotted, which is why the notion of the European assemblage was introduced. Even the above-mentioned reference to Rietbergen's work already indicates that our thinking about Europe combines discursive ("concept") and material ("land mass") components. Creating a hierarchy between the discursive and the material would deny the intimate and incessant interactions between these two components, ignoring the capacity of the discursive to produce meanings about the material, and for the material to invite for particular meanings and to dislocate them through its own materiality. Still, from an analytical perspective, it remains useful to distinguish between these two traditions, as many of the approaches are situated on this discursive-material dimension, clearly tilting towards one side or the other.

The discursive-material dimension intersects with two subdimensions. First, the discursive component of this dimension intersects with an essentialist-relativist subdimension. This (part on the discursive component of the) text has a constructionist (and thus relativist) angle, but this does not nullify the acknowledgement that some approaches that are discursive have clear essentialist claims. These essentialist approaches articulate particular

constructions of Europeanity as fixed and stable; in other words, some elements of Europeanity are seen as necessary and even obvious, without which Europeanity could not exist. In contrast, relativist approaches see meaning as contingent and necessary unstable, constructed in relation with other meanings and identities, producing fragile equilibria of meaning. This does not mean that—in a relativist approach—everything is seen as utterly flexible and caught in a hermetic drift of meaning (Eco, 1992). The universal and the essential do exist, but these always particular positions have been produced, or, in other words, essentialised and universalised. As Butler (1997) argued, foundations exist, but they are "contingent foundations".

The second subdimension that intersects with the discursive-material dimension, and more particular with its material component, is the socio-spatial vs the socio-political dimension. Both components of this subdimension refer to the notion of European space (Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Steinmetz et al., 2017), given the always spatial dimensions of Europeanity. Institutions, organisations, companies, people are localised within, and contextualised by, this European space. Still, different approaches to material Europeanity emphasised different types of materiality, and, arguably, they can be classified through the reference to a social vs political subdimension. The political is defined in a broad sense, as the "dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations" (Mouffe, 2005: 8) or as the "context of conflictuality" (Mouffe, 2005: 9). (Institutionalised) politics is seen as a significant part of the political, but the political cannot be reduced to politics. The socio-spatial component of the subdimension, in contrast, refers to those material structures and interactions that have no (clear and explicit) political characteristics, even though some (e.g., Laclau, 1990) would argue that the social consists out of sedimentations that can always be activated and politicised. Even then, not everything is political all the time, and "Any political construction takes place against the background of a range of sedimented practices" (Laclau, 1990: 35).

Figure 2: The semantic map of Europeanity and its 19 approaches



3.2 The 19 approaches

This part will give an overview of all 19 different approaches to E&E that have been identified. *Grosso modo*, this overview follows the main structure of the semantic map, as captured in Table 1. At the same time, in order to keep this overview more readable—which is quite a challenge—this order is sometimes slightly altered. Moreover, the European media content and media representation approaches are bridges between the two components of the main discursive-material dimensions. This idea also intervenes in the structure as suggested in Table 1. Together, these 19 approaches give a fascinating idea of the multitude of meanings attached to E&E, and the complexities behind any analysis of E&E.

Table 1: The main quadrants of the semantic map

Discursive - Essentialist	Material – Socio-spatial
Discursive - Relativist	Material – Politico-spatial

3.2.1 European spirit

The approach to E&E that we label here the European spirit is a deeply essentialist discursive construction of E&E, which has a long tradition. Even though this idea of Europe can also be seen as European identity, we prefer the notion of spirit (or 'Geist') because of its essentialist load. This is well-captured by Sulstarova (2013: 68) who refers to the "unchangeable European essence or spirit". **What characterises the European spirit approach is that it assumes that the *idea* of Europe is stable and homogeneous, emphasizing the achievements of the European civilization**, often by inferiorising other civilizations, which Shore (1993: 792) calls "a kind of stereotyped 'occidentalism'".

First, we find this approach with some key philosophers. For instance, Jaspers (1947) explicitly talks about the "European spirit" and states that Europe is "the bible and antiquity". According to his words, being European concerns "an immeasurable wealth of spirit, morality, faith" (Jaspers, 1947: 9). Jaspers also offers a second route to know Europe, which is for him captured through three keywords: freedom, history and science. Sulstarova (2013: 68), analysing the writings of Albanian intellectuals, refers to the importance of particular historical narratives, about when "they think Albania was attached to European civilisation or culture", which is constructed in opposition to "the rest of history", which is then referred to as "inauthentic, unfortunate, a 'dark age' or accidental to the true European spirit of Albanians." These essentialist politics of the signifier also have their presences in the political realm: Shore (1993: 792), analysing the European Community's definition of Europe, writes that these definitions incorporate "an increasingly fixed and monolithic conception of 'European identity'" that is "if not quite a 'primordial condition', then at least something organic, fundamental, historically given and bounded."

3.2.2 European values

The European values approach to E&E is also positioned on the discursive/essentialist side of the map and **argues that particular values characterise Europe**. An example is in Milan Kundera's (1984) argument that the cultural foundation of Europe is deeply rooted in Latin Christendom, humanist values and liberal democracy. The essentialist idea of Europe becomes articulated through the prism of Europe's values,[4] as, for instance, Judt (2005: 798) writes: Europe is "a paragon of international virtues: a community of values held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate."

An exhaustive list of European values is difficult to produce, as there are many grey zones. Clear examples are: (1) **Human dignity**, including the right to life and integrity (2) **Freedom** (of thought, expression, information, mobility, …), (3) **Equality** (in relation to gender, LGBTQIA+, ethnicity, age, ...), and its links to non-discrimination, equal opportunities and respect for diversity, and (4) **Solidarity**, and its connection to (social) justice, as is, for instance, institutionalised in the welfare state, with its material institutions and redistributive infrastructures. Sometimes a commitment to **peace** is added to this list. These enlightenment values—as Hasan, 2021, labels them—can also be defined as fundamental (human) rights and have been articulated in a number of key European Union documents, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012[2000]), or the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). European society as described (or prescribed) by these values features on institutional communication strategies such as the images posted by the European Commission on its official Instagram account (Barreneche, 2021), but versions of it, including contested ones, inevitably feature on media content circulating on global media platforms.

3.2.3 European democratic model(s)

This approach to E&E defines **Europe as characterised through its democratic nature and practices**. Despite these European democratic practices' diversity, their transversal presence is seen as characteristic for the entire continent. One illustration is Fligstein's (2008: 178) statement: "if Europe stands for anything, it is the completion of the Enlightenment project of democracy, rule of law, respect for the differences of others, and the principles of rational discourse and science."

This approach is partially grounded in a historical approach through references to the 16th-century Italian republics and in particular by referring to Athenian democracy, considered the 'cradle of democracy'. Although so-called Athenian democracy cannot be compared with

[4] Of course, more relativist approaches, for example those studying representations of Europe (as shown on this map) would argue that these particular European values have been hegemonised.

modern democracy as a whole, it shares with modern versions of democracy a high level of citizen involvement in the political process and public administration. European democracy can be understood as a system of clearly defined institutions (with a separation of powers) that operate according to a set of legal rules (within what is called the rule of law), with a particular balance between popular participation and the delegation of power (Held, 1996) and the protection of citizen rights (European Union, 2012).

It is important to note that the European democratic model(s) approach is positioned on our semantic map as an in-between on the essentialist and relativist axis. Some approaches define European democracy as an essential characteristic of Europe (which brings us close to the value-based approach). In contrast, others argue for a multitude of European democracies (Crepaz, 2017) or point to the problems related with democracy in Europe, in particular the democratic deficit in the EU (Steffek et al., 2008). It is sometimes also emphasised that European democracy is not necessarily guaranteed (Kratochvíl & Sychra, 2019), and can thus become disarticulated from the construction of Europe. These different—more critical—variations allow for more relationist articulations of European democracy.

3.2.4 European culture(s)

In this approach, E&E is connected to (a) European culture(s), which is placed on the discursive/relativist side of the map. In contrast to its more essentialist versions of E&E spirit and values, this approach is **characterised by an emphasis on the diversity, openness and contingency of European culture**, with culture defined as the network of meanings, representations and imaginings (Lewis, 2008: 18). This is also the reason why sometimes the plural is used, to indicate that there is not one fixated and homogeneous European culture. European culture(s) refers to a multitude of societal (sub)fields: the cultural configurations of particular groups, **frameworks of knowledge (e.g. history or science), a diversity of practices (e.g., food preparation and eating), and more institutionalised fields (e.g., media, literature/arts, religion, and academia)**.

European culture(s) is a relativist concept, which means it is seen and acknowledged as a construction with its rigidities and stabilities. Much like representations of E&E, European culture(s) become constituted through antagonistic relationships with ‘constitutive outsides’, but the borders between inside and outside are (seen as) fluid and changeable, and the outside can be present within Europe.

An example is that of technological innovation, since a ‘European scientific culture’ is a place in which specific visions of Europe become inscribed in particular designs for technological systems (Misa & Schot, 2005). Linking innovation to Europeanisation, Cassata and Leorenzini (2019) explain how technology serves as a grid to interpret Europe in action and as a powerful index of a trans-national history of scientific cooperation, integration and

excellence (see, e.g. large-scale technological projects like Airbus, Ahrens, 2020). However, Queirós and Carvalho (2019) outline the tension between the pursue of 'excellence' in European science, and that of the 'integration' of the 'peripheral' countries. Furthermore, constitutive outsides within this scientific culture are nothing less than the European citizens, often represented in policy as passive and rarely described as innovative knowledge-producers themselves (Chakraborty & Giuffredi, 2019).

3.2.5 European community

This approach to E&E is grounded **in the definition of Europe as an imagined community**, similar to the way nations have been labelled imagined communities, **to capture the sense of belonging that characterise national communities, and their constructed nature** (even when its existence at a European level is often contested, see Oleart & Van Weyenberg, 2019). This places the concept on the discursive side of the dimension.

The concept of imagined communities was coined by Anderson (2006) for the analysis of nationalism. He saw the nation as an imagined political community, "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 2006: 6). It is imagined because "The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." (Anderson, 2006: 6) This issue of scale also arises at a European level, as Toplak and Šumi (2012: 21) write "No European can ever begin to hope to meet and know all the rest of Europeans."

Crucial to this approach is the focus on the affective link between the community and those who connect to it. There is a sense of belonging, that matters in this approach. Anderson, (2006: 7), for instance, speaks (in relation to national communities) about a "deep, horizontal comradeship", even though different intensities are possible. As Lähdesmäki et al. (2021: 28) indicate in their chapter on the politics of belonging, this also applies to Europe: "the concept of belonging allows us to understand diverse social processes that shape the individual's sense of belonging and relationship to a specific entity, such as Europe, also based on the ideas of citizenship, participation, and membership."

3.2.6 European identity

This approach to European identity is positioned on the discursive side of the E&E map, and can be seen as the relativist pendant of the European spirit approach. In the European identity approach, **European identity exists, but it is seen as constantly constructed, invented and negotiated** (Delanty, 1995; Hall & du Gay, 1996). It represents a sharing of spaces, histories, cultures, religions, languages, …. European identity can thus be

apprehended as (the construction of) a **shared space, which is geographical, territorial, linguistic, symbolic, cultural, historical, and/or institutional** (Sassatelli, 2009; Risse-Kappen, 2010; Miller & Day, 2012).

Based on this non-essentialist approach, European identity is constructed in relation to other identities in a dynamic and dialogical fashion. This points to a diversity of constitutive outsides (such as non-European agents of colonialism, Islam or the undemocratic Other in the form of the Soviet Union) (Delanty, 1995; Hansen, 2002), that have played a role in the discursive construction of this European identity. Moreover, this understanding of European identity does not reject the existence of, and belonging to, multiple collective identities, but incorporates co-existing regional, national, supra-national, religious, linguistic and other identities (Delanty & Rumford, 2005; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). This also implies that identities are object of political interventions and negotiations (Rumelili, 2008) (in the broad sense of 'political', see Mouffe, 2005), with different actors deploying a diversity of strategies, working from their particular interests.

These dynamic processes do not exclude conflict. Conflict and difference are seen in this approach as integral components of European identity-building. What is crucial is whether difference becomes a starting point for inclusion and diversity (with European integration and cosmopolitanism), or for intolerance, discrimination and exclusion (as the European history of Colonialism and Nazism has shown), and whether conflict is part of a constructive process for social change (see Mouffe, 2013; Lederach, 2003) or it becomes a destructive violent antagonism.

3.2.7 European territories

With this approach, we move into the more materialist perspectives. Here in particular, E&E is grounded in the existence of **a European territory, which is a geographical (therefore very material) space occupied by those people considered Europeans**. The geography of the European territory is the land-mass of the European continent, even though its boundaries, in particular to the east, have never been clearly set (Barreneche, 2021): "Since the east–west axis has shifted so many times in European history, it is not possible to specify where 'Europe' ends – or where it begins." (Delanty & Rumford, 2005: 35) Still, there is a materiality to the continent and the (nation-)states tend to privilege concentration of their citizen-bodies within these boundaries (Clark & Jones, 2009).

In this approach, E&E can be seen as the (re)organisation of territory, where Europe is made up of sovereign states neatly occupying the European continental space, or those prescribing horizontal (as opposed to strictly hierarchical) interactions among national, subnational, supranational and transnational actors, including non-EU states and non-EU organisations. Theoretically, the expansion (or contraction) of the European territory can also

be seen as a form of (de-)Europeanisation, which builds on Marciacq's (2012) argument that Europeanisation is a deeply politico-geographical concept.

Moreover, E&E also becomes articulated with material trans-border mobility and transnationalism (Gille & Ó Riain, 2002: 275), with the European territory as its theatre, and with the activities of migrants traveling to entertain their own communities in recipient countries, and thus working as the antithesis of globalisation (Portes et al., 1999). This mobility generates contact zones, as well as social and material spaces within the territory where (European) cultures can meet and interact.

3.2.8 European people ('Europeans')

This brings us to the related European people approach to E&E, which argues that **Europe is constituted by its people, materialised as bodies who share the same territory**. This also explains the proximity of this European people approach to the European territory approach, in the same socio-spatial / materialist quadrant of the semantic map.

Theoretically, European people can be conceptualised as "spatial identities of human beings" (Paasi, 2001: 25). Ostergren and Le Bossé (2011: 8) write, in their book *The Europeans*, that they "prefer to define Europe for now as a uniform denoted region, a realm whose people share a cultural tradition that sets them apart from peoples elsewhere in the world." Later, they continue to point to "Europeans and the unique physical settings in which they live, both now and in the past", which is "basic to understanding how Europeans live their lives and define the limits of their everyday space." (Ostergren & Le Bossé, 2011: 39)

These European bodies are attributed particular characteristics. In some cases, these differences are material as well. Again Ostergren and Le Bossé's (2011: 76) book is an illustration, when they write that: "Europe also has the oldest population in the world. People across most of Europe enjoy important advantages in health care, diet, and working environments, and they are living longer lives." When Keinz and Lewicki (2019: 3), in their work on European bodies and the embodiment of Europe, raise the question "whose body epitomises europeaness", they take the diversity of bodies on the European territory as starting point, but immediately argue that some bodies are considered "normal / desired / legitimate" (Keinz & Lewicki, 2019: 1), while others are not—see Cantat (2015: 18) on Europe's racism. Even when 'Europeans' is a potentially open category, "whiteness, secularism, legitimate class and gender performances" (Keinz & Lewicki, 2019: 1) play significant roles in deciding who is considered to be (a legitimate) 'European'.

The discursive component plays a significant role in these politics of definition, which is why Sassatelli's (2009) book is called *Becoming Europeans*, but the European people approach, in its materiality, is still relevant as it points to the importance of the presence of

European bodies, their material practices, and particular socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., age distribution).

3.2.9 European interactions and dialogues

In this approach, E&E is seen as **constituted through the diversity of interactions between European bodies**. In this sense, the notion of the European community, driven by a sense of belonging (situated at the discursive side of the model), is complemented by a more material component, which is the **material performance of this belonging**. These European interactions can be communicative and/or bodily. European interactions and dialogues can be performed at macro-levels or micro-levels (or both), as Borneman and Fowler write. These situations "where peoples of Europe engage in face-to-face encounters with each other" (Borneman & Fowler, 1997: 497) illustrate that E&E can also be located at the very micro-level of embodied practices.

For instance, these bodily interactions can consist of European travel and tourism, as analysed by Jacobsen (2003: 72) who looks at intra-European holiday travel and transnational mobility of bodies as E&E forms. Another example is Erasmus+, a programme of student exchanges (see Van Mol, 2018) which is based on the expectation "that a sense of European citizenship and identity can be fostered by bringing young Europeans together" (Van Mol, 2018: 449-450).

When European interactions are communicative and dialogical, these interactions can be mediated, interpersonal or in groups. These different versions can sometimes overlap, for instance, when European bodies gather for the collective viewing of the Eurovision song contest – which can be framed as a media event presenting a pan-European platform that attracts hundreds million viewers (Motschenbacher, 2016: 3). Although virtual, the ESC voting system through which the audience evaluate contest participants can be seen as another form of European dialogues and interactions, which are deeply material (with their discursive compnents). Motschenbacher (2016: 34) describes it as "an indicator for the degree of integration into the European community" and a tool for amplifying the voice of immigrant minorities.

3.2.10 European (media) industries and capitalist economies

The E&E approach focussing on media industries and capitalist economies is situated in the material/socio-spatial area of the semantic map. E&E is seen as **characterised by the presence of capitalism, with its potential negative effects countered by the welfare state**. As Schmidt (2002: 14) argues, Europeanisation has acted both as a conduit for global forces

and as a shield against them, opening member states to international market competitions at the same time as they protect them through monetary integration and the Single Market.

There is not one European capitalism but there are *many*. According to Schmidt (2002), there are three ideal types of capitalism (market; managed; state capitalism). In Europe, we can see different varieties of these models, with Amable (2003) distinguishing between Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, continental European and Southern European model, with the latter also being approached by Central and Southeast European countries.

As to the connection between the media and the European roots of capitalism – which is a well-discussed issue – a pattern emerges, regardless of specific interpretations of such connections. In Weber, decisive innovation would spread in the XVII century, with the effects of the Reformation and the alleged rise of a new entrepreneurial spirit in Northern Europe (2002: 64-76). Wallerstein instead points to the 1450-1640 timespan – the "long sixteenth century" – as the period in which Europe created its first "capitalist world economy" (1974: 68). More radically, Braudel dates back the origin of world-systems in the classical ages, with capitalism blooming in the Italian XIII century (1979: 57, 112-113).

All these interpretations show the importance of capitalism for E&E, but also how Europe's leading position has come to an end *before* the age of contemporary media, which have spread after the re-centring of world economy and the rise of the USA. While European domination could rely on the press as a symbolic form (Briggs & Burke 2002: 122-138), the other technologies have appeared during the period dominated by the USA; the weakness of European media systems arises as a consequence of this long-duration process.

3.2.11 European public service media

Public Service Media (PSM) are considered to be **a typical European form of media organisation, and part of what Syvertsen et al. (2018) call the 'media welfare state'**,[5] providing **a corrective for European capitalism in the media field**. Originating in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, PSM is characterised by features as the universal diffusion of the signal; an ambition to be comprehensive; a generalised mandate; the pluralism of contents; and non-commercial goals (Blumler, 1992: 7-12). Also a highly normative approach is usually considered to be part of the PSM mission (Van den Bulck et al., 2018: 96-97). This material approach to E&E thus focusses less on the market component of the European economic

[5] Syvertsen et al.'s (2018) book focusses on Northern Europe.

order, but sees the social correctives of this order—as exemplified by the material-organisational presence of PSM—as 'typically' European.[6]

Nevertheless, the role of PSM fluctuates according to the degree in which the state is accepted as a regulator. In Western Europe, PSM has gone through a golden age, before—in the 1980s and 1990S—the explosion of mass advertising and commercial competitors (Bourdon, 2011: 35-36). In the UK, the BBC found a balance between the American and the State-driven European model, resulting in PSM showing an "adversary attitude towards" public officials and still keeping the distance from purely commercial solutions (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 233). In what once was Socialist Europe, PMS did not exist in the strict sense, as public media were controlled by the state. There too diversity existed, with Mihelj and Huxtable (2018: 84-87) discussing three patterns, determined by the strength of communist parties and the closure of the system: the "market state socialist", the "reformist state socialist" and the "hard line state socialist" system.

Some attempts of experimenting with European PSM can also be detected. For instance, there are the French-German channel ARTE or the European Broadcast Union (EBU) programs, from *Jeux Sans Frontières* to the *Eurovision Song Contest*. The development of European PSM is difficult, though, as a pan-European audience is not always easy to convince (or find) (see below). In all countries there is a low interest in European / EU issues, when they are not related to national problems (Trenz, 2004: 293), and trust in PSM also varies significantly from place to place (Balčytienė & *Juraitė, 2015:* 26-27). European media in general are stalling, with no clear orientation about how to report European news, and questions about whether (or not) to play an advocacy role for EU (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011: 155).

3.2.12 European media[7] content

European media content is an approach to E&E that refers to **the media content produced by European media organisations and industries**, e.g. pan-European television channels (Chalaby, 2002). The focus of this approach is on the more material media *products*. We can distinguish European (media) content from content consumed in Europe, with the latter referring to, for instance, Hollywood films screened in European countries. As Muscio (2008: 181) writes: "there is a concrete 'Europeanization' of media productions through an array of

[6] Again, our focus on media and communication processes hides the existence of organisational correctives in other fields. One (still related) example are public libraries.

[7] Our special attention for media and communication-related processes hides the existence of many other European products, some of which have been produced through transnational collaborations. The earlier mentioned Airbus example (Ahrens, 2020) is only one of many.

policies and institutions." European content can also be produced by national media organisations that are then defined as European, for instance, focussing on co-productions (Drake, 2018), or on content financed through European institutions (e.g., the MEDIA sub-programme of Creative Europe).

Ideas regarding the remit of public service media, also in promoting a European public sphere, combined with efforts to counter a feared US-cultural imperialism, led in the 1980s-1990s to the establishment of transnational European media projects. For example, Euronews, launched in 1993, is a multilingual transnational news broadcaster with a remit to bring a European perspective to news and current affairs (Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010; Machill, 1998; Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2012). Also, ARTE, established in 1991, is a transnational multilingual broadcaster producing European media content, mainly documentaries, films, series, news, and art programmes, promoting European culture (Kościński, 2019; Brüggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009).

This approach also highlights collaborations between national broadcasters, in producing European media content. European television, audio-visual and film co-productions (and distribution) are supported among others, by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and by EU-funded Eurimages. In the period 2010-2015, film co-productions accounted for one-fourth of overall film production volume in Europe (Talavera Milla, 2017).

Examining these efforts and projects to produce European media content, scholars have addressed issues of mission, sustainability and fragmentation, but also of the promotion of elitism (Kościński, 2019), and the lack of support for (the creation of) a European public sphere (Rothenberger, 2012; Garcia-Blanco & Cushion, 2010).

3.2.13 Representations of Europe

While the European media content approach to E&E focusses on the material programs that are produced, the representations of Europe approach **focusses on whether and how Europe is represented *within media content***, which brings in a discursive approach. Together with European media content, this approach forms a (media) bridge between the discursive and materialist components of the map's axis, even though this particular approach is tilted towards the discursive side. This approach thus considers how media texts *construct* Europe (and E&E), emphasising certain features whilst omitting others, and generating contested or partial representations in the process.

The construction of E&E through media representations can occur in a wide variety of ways (as this semantic map also shows more in general), also relating to, for instance, ethnicity, religion, gender, immigration, history, eating and drinking, science and technology, arts, music, architecture, and literature. If we take religion as one of the many possible examples, then we find that, for example, Nelsen and Guth (2016) argue that religion plays a

key role in the production of the idea of Europe. The Catholic Church occupies a privileged social and media position within European society, with the Pope's visits constituting media event across various media platforms (Evolvi, 2018). However, this representation of E&E through the lens of religion relies on two representational strategies i.e. 1) creating constitutive others, and 2) not representing certain features or events. In this respect, Asad (2003) explains how E&E representations often favour Christianity at the expenses of other faiths. In particular, Islam is one of Christianity's oldest constitutive outsides (Carpentier, 2021), and is often represented as a threat in media cultures across Europe, for example across Scandinavian countries (Lundby et al., 2017) and the United Kingdom (Cannizzaro & Gholami, 2016). In regard with representational omissions, Evolvi (2018) lists the media stories that are often overlooked, namely those representing the perspectives of Muslims, atheists, and Catholics (e.g. protesting against freedom of speech, same-sex unions or abortion), who constitute the non-hegemonic facets of European religiosity.

3.2.14 European audiences

The bridge between the European people and European media content are the European audiences.[8] The focal point of this approach, European audiences, can again be defined in different ways. For instance, they can be termed 'European' through **the shared behaviour** (or artificial aggregation) **of audiences in European national states** (a people-centric definition), **or through their exposure to European media content** (a content-centric definition). European audiences with their material media consumption behaviour are still located on the material side of this axis, but they do have their links with the discursive component. This link to the discursive component originates from the different definitions of audience: They can be seen a pre-existing aggregation of people sharing similar views–an imagery (Morin, 1962)–or as a latent collectivity through the similarities in their consumption practices, with this (cultural) content able to transform it in an imagined community, by replacing the role played by the novel and daily newspapers in shaping national identities (Anderson, 1983).

Even when this approach emphasises the Europeanness of these shared views or consumption practices, Pan-European successes are more the exception than the rule. As Sassoon (2006: 1193 and 1356) puts it, Europeans prefer their own fiction or fiction imported from the USA. Similar evidence can be found in the movie market, where national movies are more commonly watched (with Hollywood standing as a "special resource"); and for TV – to

[8] European publics is also used to label this approach, but this connects them more to the European public sphere, which will be discussed later.

the point that even *Jeux Sans Frontières* was more popular in the national versions than in the European format (Bourdon, 2011: 109 and 149).

As the fragmentation of audiences is mirrored by the fragmentation of distributors (Higson, 2015: 137-138), efforts in EU co-productions also struggle with finding a common European taste. An European audience is visible only in the case of media events, which by definition are *rare*: this may be the case of sport competitions and royal weddings, and even more that of the fall of the Berlin wall (Dayan & Katz, 1992: 21-22). The latter (media) event was seen to offer a chance to strengthen Europe, which—at least in the media field—has only materialised partially.

3.2.15 European public sphere (EPS)

The European public sphere (EPS) approach to E&E **focuses on the practices of European citizens, engaging in (allegedly rational) decision-making, providing them with an opportunity to be politically active at a European level**. The EPS is also seen constituted by public discussions on EU (or European) issues in the national media of EU-member states (Walter, 2017: 87).

Again, the focus of this approach is on the more material component of decision-making, which places it on the material side of the axis (this time with a politico-spatial focus), even when we look at Habermas's (1974: 49) definition of the PS, as "A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body." Moreover, the EPS's materiality is in its infrastructure. The EPS consists of interconnected media structures that allow European voices to materially circulate and engage in interactions. Still, the EPS approach also runs into the discursive side of the axis, with references to the nature of the content being distributed.

In this approach, the focus is very much on the degree in which EPS is realised, which is usually established in terms of the synchronisation of issues. There is considerable scepticism that there is much of an EPS, though. Interest in EU issues peaks when national politics or economies are directly affected by them (Trenz, 2004: 293; Peters & De Vreese, 2004: 5; Barisione & Ceron, 2017: 95). In other words, the *vertical* connection between EU member states and the Union is rarely matched by a *horizontal* sharing of ideas among the countries (Koopmans, 2003: 3; Machill et al., 2006: 60). The absence of a strong EPS is explained, in this approach, by a combination of both long-duration and recent processes. In the first case, as Europe is made of many countries of *comparable* relevance, integration is unlikely to emerge (Todorov & Bracher, 2008). The second strand is defined by Castells' (2002: 236) flows/places dyad: While technological and financial innovation fosters the globalisation process at the EU level, people increasingly shield themselves underneath domestic identities, either national or regional (Catalan independentism, or the Brexit). Here the weakness of EPS

is considered hardly surprising, as the majority of people would prefer a *local* form of identity, as a response to the spread of supra-national flows.

3.2.16 European (political) institutions

In this politico-spatial material approach, E&E becomes focused on the political-institutional component of European governance, which includes the **creation of supra-national political institutions** (e.g., related to the EU), but **also refers to privileged collaborations between national actors** (e.g., national welfare state institutions). For some authors, it is the key component of Europeanisation processes and the construction of Europeanity. We already referred to Olsen (2002: 923-924), who, for instance, defines five uses of Europeanisation: “Developing institutions at the European level”, “Central penetration of national systems of governance”, “Exporting forms of political organisation” are among these five and relate directly to this approach.

Questions that are raised in this approach are about how (part of) Europe should be governed, how institutions should be organised and how authority and power should be distributed, exercised and controlled. Often, these debates are about EU-isation, which focus on how policies are created and then become (or not) part of the policy regime of the EU member states. EU-isation retains the analytical focus on the EU and the transfer of rules, policies and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate states, potential candidate states, and their actors (Smith, 2013: 5).

EU-isation partially differs from Europeanisation because of its “focus on the EU and because it is predominantly concerned with ‘political encounters’” of the EU and Member State representatives (Flockhart, 2010: 790-791). There is also resistance against EU-isation, sometimes labelled Euroscepticism, with a Eurosceptic as “someone who is opposed to the powers of the European Union” (Brack & Startin, 2015: 239). The latter concept captures distrust in EU institutions, reluctant experience of European integration and dissatisfaction with EU policies (Buturoiu, 2016; Ohler, 2018).

3.2.17 European law

E&E processes and transformations are institutional and connected to, and supported by, legal transformations. This includes **the creation of a European law and governance order, the convergence of national legal systems, and what Snyder (2000: 4) calls the “juridification of politics”, for instance, through the creation of the European Court of Justice.** This approach has a discursive element, in the sense that law and regulation are also discourses, but simultaneously, because of their implementations and enforcements, they are acknowledged to be also material (and thus an assemblage).

Similar to discussions in the European political institutions approach, we find here a focus on the creation of a European (EU) legal order, combined with the partial convergence of national legislative frameworks. As Ferreira (2009: 171, italics removed) writes about the Europeanisation of law: “In a narrower perspective, it can be understood as the coherent body of rules (iuris corpus) of a supranational character that binds the Members States of the European Union (EU). In a wider perspective, it can be understood as the influence of EU principles and concepts over Member States’ legal orders in pure national cases, whereby EU European law is an autonomous source of inspiration.” In particular in the latter case, there are many convergences and divergences, also depending on the different legal areas.

Moreover, we should be careful not to focus exclusively on the EU. The EU did indeed develop itself by building a corpus of Union law, but it did so in dialogue or conflict with the Council of Europe, which developed its own body of Conventions. In relation to the media field, there are, for instance, the CoE “European Convention on Transfrontier Television” and the EEC Directive “Television without Borders”, both in 1989, with nearly identical scope. The ongoing struggle over which institution is in charge of media led to the situation where in 2011 a fully worked-out revision of the CoE Convention was scrapped.

3.2.18 European new social movements

The European New Social Movements (ENSM) approach to E&E moves away from an emphasis on formal political systems, and focusses on “Europeanisation from below” (Della Porta, 2020), **where the self-organised citizenry—including grassroots civil society organisations and NGOs, but also more fluid mobilisations—is acknowledged to present and perform alternative visions and practices of ‘another Europe’**. This includes pleas to increase solidarisation, stimulate dialogue, cooperation, and interactions among European citizens, and to strengthen European civil society. Within an EU context, ENSM are seen to represent an opportunity for European citizens to become politically engaged, which also includes their ability to contest the European Union’s policies (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009).

In ENSM, with their material-organisational structures, issues of human and citizen rights intersect with ideas about European identity and politics, and the main debates concerning Europe. Their narratives of alternative European futures are often expressed as an opposition against the EU project. For ENSM, the EU project is often at odds with the forms of cosmopolitan solidarity they defend, as the EU project is considered to promote institutionalised forms of exploitation, marginalisation and discrimination (Cantat, 2015; Fominaya & Feenstra, 2020), as manifested in the EU’s neoliberal economic logics and handling of the economic crisis (Bieler, 2011; Bieler & Morton, 2004), of migration and the environmental issues (Fominaya & Cox, 2013; Van der Heijden, 2010).

Considered typical for ENSM is that they are rhizomatically connected with diverse groups and organisations (Della Porta & Caiani, 2009), which renders them different from the arbolic structures of the state. This rhizome also includes media organisations, more in particular citizen media (Rodríguez, 2011), community media (Howley, 2009) and protest media (Casero-Ripollés, 2020) that are sometimes affiliated with particular ENSM or are ENSM in their own right (e.g., Community Media Forum Europe and AMARC, see AMARC-Europe, 1994). Diverse in form, these media organisations have as their main characteristics that they serve their communities and their protest causes, publish content alternative to mainstream media and are managed by their members in participatory, horizontal and democratic ways (Carpentier et al., 2003; Howley, 2009; Casero-Ripollés, 2020).

3.2.19 European citizens(hip)

The European citizen approach is the politico-spatial version of the European people approach. As a concept, citizenship describes the relationship between the members of a polity and the nation-state, delineated through rights and duties (Kivisto & Faist, 2007; Isin & Wood, 1999). **European citizenship then describes the political relationship between these members and the supra-national European structure** (Cesarani & Fulbrook, 1997; Guild et al., 2019; Menéndez & Olsen, 2020). It generates rights and obligations for European citizens and thus incorporates these citizens into a legal (European/EU) order, aspiring to establish a form of political membership beyond the nation-state. To capture the complexity of overlapping/multi-level citizenships in the European framework, scholars working with this approach have sometimes referred to citizenship as post-national citizenship (Delanty, 1995; 2007; Soysal, 1997).

European citizen rights are largely equated with EU rights, described through detailed legal frameworks (Guild et al., 2019; Menéndez & Olsen, 2020), which span the entire spectrum of civil, political and social rights (see, Marshall, 1992). These include freedom of movement, rights in education, employment, economic activity, the right to vote and get elected, etc., and they are, to a large extent restricted versions of, and subservient to, nation-state citizen rights. The delineation of European citizen duties is fairly limited, as many citizen responsibilities (e.g., taxation, military service) remain at state level.

Supra-national or post-national forms of citizenship are sometimes associated with cosmopolitan and/or radical apprehensions of citizenship (Delanty, 1997; 2007; Cantat, 2015), which relate to a sense of collective responsibility oriented more towards fellow-citizens than to the state or to institutions. Under this (sub)approach, European citizens engage in collective action for the rights and prosperity of citizens of the world, which include migrants and non-nationals. Hence, European citizenship becomes constructed in a dynamic fashion emanating from both below and above, where European citizens are not simply constructed by European

institutions and socio-political conditions, but also construct both themselves and the European political spaces (Bellamy et al., 2006).

3.3 Europeanisation and the time dimension

Europeanisation is a concept that articulates Europeanity with a temporal dimension and a process of intensification, which necessitates an additional discussion. It, in other words, captures a *becoming*, and less a being or a state (see Figure 3). Different authors refer to this becoming in different ways, and in relation to different fields and approaches. To give a few examples: Featherstone (2003: 3) calls Europeanisation a "variety of changes within European politics and international relations", but then specifies that it needs to be a "process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests." Triandafyllidou and Spohn (2003: 6) refer to "the modes and degrees of the Europeanisation of nation-states and their change over time." And Delanty and Rumford (2005: 1) use the concept of emergence, when (critically) evaluating the uses of the Europeanisation concept, for instance, when writing: "Current theorizing on Europeanization is primarily concerned with conceptualizing the emerging shape of the European […]."

This change process varies, though, in many different ways, which has produced considerable conceptual vagueness, but also political (discursive) opportunities. Nevertheless, this vagueness has brought Delanty and Rumford (2005: 4) to the following warning:

> "The discourse of Europeanization is dominated by superficial metaphors suggesting a teleological project legitimated by grand EU narratives, such as 'widening' and 'deepening' or 'ever closer union'; vague, if not inaccurate, sociological terms, such as 'integration' and 'inclusion', and morphological metaphors such as 'multi-levelled' governance."

One way to capture the many differences in the object and nature of change, incorporated in the concept of Europeanisation, is to return to the semantic map, and its main dimensions. On the one hand, the discursive-material dimension allows us to see how at the discursive level, Europeanisation captures the increased presence and discursive weight of the Europeanity discourse. In more minimal versions, it captures the creation or establishment of a European identity, European values and European culture(s), and the discourse of Europeanity itself, making them available for identification and providing meaning to Europe as a cultural space. But Europeanisation can also capture, in more maximalist versions, the hegemonisation of Europeanity, victoriously concluding the discursive struggle with other – competing – place-based identities (Delanty & Rumford, 2005: 20; Sassatelli, 2009: 1). This is what, for instance, Risse-Kappen (2010: 10) refers to this discussion as the "Europeanization of national identities".

When we bring in the more essentialist-relativist (sub)dimension, we can also see how the more essentialist discursive formulations are strategic attempts to hegemonise the Europeanity discourse (see, for instance, Alpan, 2014: 4). For instance, the idea of the European spirit presupposes, validates and normalises a particular discourse on Europeanity, often driven by notions of superiority. Even when we cherish some of the values in/behind the European values approach (and the European democratic model(s) approach), we should still acknowledge that their central position is constructed, and that different articulations of these values, different performances of these values, and even different (central) values always remain possible (but not necessarily desirable).

On the other hand, the discursive-material dimension also allows us to acknowledge the material component of Europeanisation. Here, the notion of change gains different meanings, with, in some cases, simple absolute increases of presence. For instance, in the European territory approach, or the European people approach, an absolute increase of the volume of land or people has been labelled Europeanisation. One example here is the enlargement of the EU (Preston, 1997; Schimmelfennnig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The same applies for the presence of European governance, regulatory, legal or capitalist structures, or particular entities, with, for instance, the presence (or absence) of European media organisations or industries, European civil society organisations, or European (political) institutions. In other cases, Europeanisation concerns a relative or proportional increase, where national structures or entities often act as reference points. Here, for instance, Europeanisation captures the proportional increase of European media organisations in relation to media organisations that function at national or regional levels. Similarly, an increase of co-productions—collaborations between national media organisations—is seen as the Europeanisation of media production (Mitric, 2017; Hammett-Jamart et al., 2018). Yet the same argument could be made for the proportionate increase of interactions and/or dialogues between European people, or for the proportionate increase of rational deliberations between European citizens on matters of European concern.

The mere emphasis on volume—either in absolute numbers or as proportions—is an important component of material Europeanisation, but it needs to be complemented by a variety of other components, such as resources and capital (e.g., Vos, 2021: 8), status and prestige, power and influence, and quality of life (Hristova et al., 2015: 3). Arguably, this extension still (partially) concerns volume, with, for instance, the increases in volume of the budgets of European (political) institutions in comparison with national (political) institutions, either individually or aggregated. But this extension also moves us beyond the merely quantifiable, as Europeanisation is also seen to relate to increases in the reach (or impact) of European structures or entities, on diverse political and social fields.

This brings us also to a second extension, which moves even further away from quantity-based approaches. This extension focusses on qualitative (material) changes, where the similarities between structures and entities, situated in different parts of Europe, are seen to increase (possibly in relation to one or more external reference points, or constitutive

outsides). Featherstone's (2003: 3) opening questions about Europeanisation—in his edited book *The Politics of Europeanization*—bring the notion of convergence in this debate: "Does it mean convergence across Europe? How and why do differences remain?" Here, material Europeanisation refers to the processes of homogenisation, harmonisation, convergence, or synchronisation.[9] Of course, these concepts all carry particular normative loads—in particular homogenisation—which sometimes tend to problematise Europeanisation, but they all capture, in their own ways, the idea of increased similarities, never all-encompassing and totalising, but always situated at one or more particular levels or domains of the social.

This more extended definitions of material Europeanisation also bring in the European assemblage idea (Carpentier, 2021), as we can see, and need to acknowledge the interactions between the discursive and material components of this dimension. Then, discussing European material structures and entities, it is hard to escape from the politics of definition, and argue that for material structures and entities to be considered as European, they need to be defined as European, and thus be articulated into a European assemblage, with both discursive and material components. Similarly, discourses about Europeanity and Europeanisation cannot do without their material components—otherwise there would be nothing to signify. Moreover, that materiality also has its own agencies, impacting on the discursive component of the European assemblage. For instance, if (or when) European citizens materially decline the invitation to perform Europeanity, also the discourse of Europeanity itself becomes affected (and potentially dislocated). Similarly, if (or when) European civil society organisation succumb to the lack of resources, and disappear, then the discourse on Europeanisation from below also weakens.

This also allows us to sketch a working/operational definition of Europeanisation (see also Table 1), which is seen here as a concept that refers to the (1) structural time-based changes (2) to the European assemblage, which (3) consists out of an entanglement of discursive and material components (4) that perform being European—or Europeanity—(5) in a diversity of ways. The discursive components are structured on an essentialist/relativist axis, while the material components are structurds on a socio-spatial/politico-spatial axis. Given the complexity of these Europeanisation and Europeanity, analytical interventions can use the map in a variety of ways, e.g., focussing on the whole, on one dimension, on one component of one dimension, or on one approach.

Before closing this discussion on Europeanisation, and its time / change dimension, we also need to be aware of the possibility of decreases in the weight of the Europeanity discourse, or in the presence of European material structures, a process which is labelled de-Europeanisation. For instance, Müller et al. (2021: 521), referring to (EU) foreign policy processes, mention the following definition of de-Europeanisation:

[9] The inclusion of synchronisation has been inspired by Hamelink's (1983) notion of cultural synchronisation.

> “It describes a contemporary reality in which EU foreign policy-making runs against the grain of certain member state declared values/interests, where member states are less willing to engage in collective policy-making and where the results of that policy-making are, on occasion, explicitly undermined by member state practice up to, and including, regular and even systematic use or threatened use of the veto. In part, this is argued by policy makers to be a function of a broader contestation of core values.”

They then continue with describing three key elements of the nature of de-Europeanisation—in relation to (EU) foreign policy—namely, the “reconstruction of professional roles” “in exclusively or predominantly national terms” (Müller et al., 2021: 524), the “repudiation of fundamental norms” and the “structural disintegration of collective policy-making institutions” (Müller et al., 2021: 525) Smith’s (2021: 638) comment, that “there is a strong link between processes of national political change (in particular the rise of populist or nationalist political forces) and the phenomenon of de-Europeanisation”, also brings in the notion of the discursive, and in particular the notion of discursive struggle, in this case in relation to the struggle between Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation discourses. Smith (2021: 648) makes this point, in relation to the “foundational norms of EU foreign policy”, in the following terms: “there is evidence of discursive challenges to foundational norms of EU foreign policy, but this is at least matched by evidence that discourse and rhetoric have not bled through into consistent or cumulative defection from the normative framework.”

Shifting more into the discursive analysis of de-Europeanisation processes, and away from the EU, Delanty (1995: 63) discusses an older example, namely how Russia, after the Communist revolution of 1917, moved away from (the signifier) Europe: “Also paradoxically, the communist ideology, which was a western import, severed Russia from the West after 1917. This de-Europeanisation of Russia was also reflected in the choice of Moscow as capital and the renaming of St Petersburg, first as Petrograd and, after Lenin's death in 1924, as Leningrad.” He also adds that, in the post-communist period, the resignification of (part of) the “Eastern Bloc” as European, can be seen as a form of re-Europeanisation (even if this ignored the also-existing sentiment that Central Europe has always been European). Delanty (1995: 137) writes: “For many, the Central Europe project is potentially a means of 're-Europeanisation' and reintroducing some of the values and aspirations eliminated by the Soviet system.”

Figure 3: Adding the Europeanisation time dimension to the semantic map



4 The EUMEPLAT Working Packages' operational definitions

The discussion on E&E in the previous two parts is not only an intellectual-conceptual exercise, however important this may be. This discussion also aims to feed the on-going and scheduled research for the different EUMEPLAT work packages (WPs). In this part, we will describe this process, and how this semantic map has been / will be translated in the different EUMEPLAT WPs, to support their particular (and very different) needs.

4.1 The dialogical process on the basis of the semantic map

The semantic map of E&E is an attempt to capture the conceptual diversity hidden behind these two notions, which comes out when a more multidisciplinary perspective is used. Important in its own right, the richness of this semantic map still poses a challenge for researchers who wish to use it in empirical research. In particular, when looking at the operationalisations of the semantic map for quantitative research, this becomes utterly complex and potentially impossible, for example, due to the difficulty in operationalising abstract concepts, such as ‘spirit’ or ‘representation’. But also in the case of qualitative research, the richness of the semantic map poses serious challenges for researchers.

Because of these complexities, the author team of this text chose a different—more participatory and de-centralised—strategy, defining the semantic map as a source of inspiration and dialogical tool for interactions with the different WPs of EUMEPLAT, all experts in their own domain, and capable and eager to translate the semantic map (and those areas/approaches of interest to their WPs) into operational definitions that could support their WPs, which are very different, in the best possible ways.

In practice, this implies that the semantic map was (re)defined as a menu, for the WPs to select from. A series of dialogues between the author team and different WP leaders (and their teams) then allowed for the creation of operationalisations, adjusted to the particular WP needs. In other cases, draft operationalisations were analysed afterwards through the lenses of the semantic maps, allowing for the identification of potential shortcomings and their remediations.

4.2 The WP's translations of the main operational definition

As some of the WPs already started (or were running in parallel with the development of the semantic map, as was the case with WP1) we are able to give a brief overview of how these dialogues resulted in particular translations of the main operational definition of E&E.

In the case of WP1, the focus was placed on the more material dimension of the sematic map, paying particular attention to European media content, the European law approach and shared (European) audience consumption patterns (see also below, in 4.3).

In WP2, which is methodologically grounded in a quantitative content analysis of a series of media platforms, the coding of Europeanisation uses five dimensions: political, economic, scientific, legal, and cultural, which was inspired by the European cultures and values approaches, but also by the European (capitalist) industries, political institutions and law approach. In addition, many of the different approaches have become separate coding items.

In WP3, the focus will be placed on European (platformised) media content (production) and European audiences (consumption) of these platforms.

In WP4, the different approaches (and their key concepts / term) will feed into the semi-automated quantitative content analysis. In addition, for the qualitative representational analyses, in particular the discursive dimension of the semantic map will be used as a series of sensitizing concepts, with special attention to the hegemonisation of particular articulations of E&E in relation to gender, ethnicity and migration.

For WP5, the main dimensions of the entire semantic map will be used, to structure the scenario-development in relation to the future of E&E, in its intersection with platformisation.

4.3 The examples from WP1

Ahead of the other WPs, WP1 already provided knowledge about the European media landscapes, with research mostly positioned at the material side of the semantic map. For what concerns media as infrastructure, for instance, the digital divide still plays a part in terms of high-speed and broadband access. At the intersection with the discursive quadrant of the semantic map, dealing with media content, WP1 research confirmed the persistent role of American movies and fiction, and the ever-lasting Hollywood hegemony.

When it comes to Europeanisation, and the patterns of shared (audience) behaviour, WP1 has identified a series of trends – and two of them deserve to be mentioned here. The first one is related to audiovisual media use. Radio is still the most trusted medium in Europe, without significant changes in daily listening over time, or differences in relation to overall

economic indicators (i.e., number of employees and advertising spending). On the other hand, TV is still very popular, despite concerns about its credibility. The daily time spend on watching TV is no longer decreasing; in some Eastern European countries it is even increasing. One can wonder if this tendency is somehow related to a broader decrease of trust and social capital in the EU Member States.

A second trend can be identified in relation to the diffusion of mobile communication. Whilst overall indicators show a series of differences concerning the digital economy and ICT diffusion, the mobile phone is the most used platform everywhere in Europe. For instance, internet diffusion ranges from 98% in Denmark to 71% in Bulgaria; social media access, from 88% in the Netherlands to 62% in Bulgaria. Moreover, if we zoom in on the distribution of social media use, by gender and by age group, we find a similar pattern in each country, regardless of the overall diffusion of those services in each country. In particular, if we focus on the intersections between the five age clusters (18-24; 25-34; 45-54; 55-64; 65+) and the two genders, on the one hand, and the 24 considered countries, on the other, we can see that relative differences for age groups and gender between the countries are small. The internal variance is very low within any sub-cluster. In other words, the overall differences for the diffusion and usage of social media are considerable. But at the level of *variation*, for some reason, differences tend to disappear, and the internal distribution across age and gender—independently from the absolute values—seems to be shaped by the same force.

How many Europes there are in media history, is one of the main questions behind WP1, and in this case, there are good indications that there is probably only *one*, at least in relation to these trends. This idea becomes even more relevant when we consider another main trend coming out of the WP1 research—apparently taking together Polish career women and French farmers, elderly Austrians and Portuguese youth—namely that these similarities are driven by (*North*) *American* platforms.

5 A brief conclusion

Creating taxonomies—or semantic maps—is a treacherously complex task, which is bound to run into limits and obstacles. Our combination of a multidisciplinary approach, with a structural reflection on the discursive-material divide (and how to overcome it), and with a participatory theory-building strategy has nevertheless produced an impressive set of approaches, each still distinct from each other.

Still, semantic maps are always living entities, trying to capture an ever-changing diversity of meanings, which requires almost-permanent updates. In this sense, our semantic map offers a precious overview of the diversity of meanings allocated to E&E, but at the same time, it is also an invitation to other scholars to reflect about the taxonomic choices and the changes that are bound to occur in the meanings of both Europeanity and Europeanisation, in

being European and becoming European, which are—we should add—both, in the end, constructed forms of becoming.

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Section II – On EU-ization

Stylianos Papathanassopoulos

1 Introduction

Although a unified Europe at the policy level is still no more than a vision, the EU has succeeded in creating a hybrid model with which to deal with these processes. Although this is far from the European Union Federation to which the most passionate enthusiasts hope, it is nevertheless more state-like than any other arena for international cooperation.

EU Member States exhibit both similarities and crucial differences. But, compared with other international organizations the EU Member-States have similar economic and political systems, and since 2000 some of them even have a common currency. This makes it possible for the EU to work based on common values, and to a certain extent, on common objectives.

'Europeanization' is a fashionable but contested concept, it can be understood as a complex process of political and policy change, i.e., of 'transfer', since it affects all EU Member States. In effect, there is not agreement on what Europeanization is. On the other hand, recent developments like the eurozone crisis or Brexit have led the news media at least in the EU countries to start discussing about Europe, Europeanization and the future of the EU. Trying to find an operational definition of Europeanization, this report argues that the main and principal goal of the EU is the *Europeanization* and *harmonization* of the regulatory aspects in most of the sectors of the economy. Within this context of can see a narrowed dimension the Europeanization, the so-called *EU-ization*. It can be considered as a modern variant of Europeanization and at least in the media domain it can be regarded as the drive lever of incremental engagement of the EU in the media sectors of its member states (and not only). While 40 years ago the EU (then European Communities) was seen as an outsider of the media landscape, nowadays the EU is welcomed in all aspects of the communication domain of the member states.

2 Europeanization or EU-ization

As Radaelli (2000: 26–27) notes 'large-scale policy transfer is involved in the so-called *acquis communautaire*, the body of European legislation that candidate countries must accept before joining the Union' (see also Bauer et al. 2007). This is because the dynamics of Europeanization can be 'understood in terms of a limited set of ordinary processes of change, well known from other institutionalized systems of governance' (Olsen 2002: 923).

In other words, Europeanization 'is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policymaking' (Ladrech 1994: 70).

In this respect, another but similar procedure takes place in order the EU to achieve its main and principal goal, i.e., the Europeanization and harmonization of the regulatory aspects in most of the sectors of the economy. Namely, how are policies created and then become (or not) part of the policy regime of member states? In this respect, one has to take into consideration a narrowed dimension (or even the normative approach) of the Europeanization, the so called 'EU-ization' (Flockhart, 2010). EU-ization, others have called it Unionization, differs to Europeanization due to its

> focus on the EU and because it is predominantly concerned with 'political encounters', where specific political entities such as the EU and Member State representatives engage in the transfer of institutional and organizational practices and policies. EU-ization is a small, but important part of the much broader and longer-term process of Europeanization, which is predominantly concerned with 'cultural encounters' Flockhart, 2010: 790-91).

EU-ization can be considered as a modern variant of Europeanization and provides us with a contemporary condition within which the Europeanization process operates (Mannin, 2013; 19-20).

One could add that EU-ization is an EU-centric perspective and at the same time is situated in time and space (Smith, 2013). In effect, it is the process of diffusing and internalizing norms, values, and beliefs over time and space throughout Europe states, including the EU, and European citizens.

EU-ization, retains the analytical focus on the EU and the transfer of rules, policies and practices between the supranational EU and Member States, candidate states (CS), potential candidate states (PC), and their actors (Smith, 2013: 5).

One could say, that since EU-ization applies to policy transfer, it has a top-down dynamic and focuses on the effects the EU institutions, policies, and legislation have on domestic institutions, policies and legislation of the member states and candidate countries.

It is somewhat narrowed compared to Europeanization which involves infection among interested parties and vested interests, but it seems to produce tangible results (decisions, regulation, and guidelines) compare to a wider but vaguest concept and practice of the Europeanization.

In other words, EU-ization primarily involves transfers of organizational and institutional practices and policies within the EU or directly interacting with the EU; especially those transfers that are predominantly regulatory and situated within the historical scope of states' accession to the EU.

Of course, it is inconceivable to imagine EU-ization without prior processes of Europeanization, just as it is increasingly difficult to imagine contemporary processes of Europeanization without some degree of EU-ization.

Changes in EU laws and treaties have undoubtedly modified national traditions of policymaking, and the freedom of manoeuvre of national decision-makers. This can be seen in many areas of economic and social life, although national traditions do often reassert themselves strongly in the form of strategies for resisting change, and in the details of implementation.

In the case of media policy, in most cases, if not all, "member states have sought to retain primary responsibility for media policy, with the EU relegated to a supportive role. The Commission, on the other hand, acting as a "purposeful opportunist" … and as a "policy entrepreneur" … has sought both to expand its competences and to coordinate a European response to the new international market and technological challenges.' (Humphreys 2003; 2006)

The outcomes of these 'interactions and interplays have obviously varied from one sector to another. Whilst the processes of EU-ization have modified public policies, political agendas, and governing styles of national political actors, they have also had to meet the challenges to those changes from within member states (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2011).

One should thus be able to assess whether EU policies have been implemented and to what extent implementation could be considered as a first stage of EU-ization leading to further develop Europeanization and European integration. Bugdahn, (2005: 178-180) defines the 'Europeanization of a policy area as a situation in which actors at the EU level have taken a policy decision with the intention ... to prescribe or influence the choice of a member state's policy/administrative option in a policy area.'

This can be likened to what Cole and Drake (2000: 27) refer to Europeanization (in practice EU-ization) as *independent variable* whereby it can be demonstrated that the EU has produced policy change in specific policy sectors and national institutions and actors participate more intensively in the EU decision-making process. Another form of Europeanization that Cole and Drake refer to is one of *emulative policy transfer*, i.e., as a process by which policies and practices are copied by one member state from another. (see Humphreys, 2003)

EU-ization could be also used as a *smokescreen for domestic political strategies* and as a powerful domestic political resource for driving through change (see also Cole and Drake (2000). A controversial example here would be the way in which a particular construction of Europe can be used as a means of blocking or encouraging change in candidate member states. For instance, the EU though the Commission asks, if not demands, that candidate countries align their media systems in general and broadcasting in particular to the EU Directives (Rosenbaum, 2003). Ex-East European countries also had prerequisites for EU membership including, for example, adjusting their broadcasting systems to the TWF Directive and transforming their state television companies to Western-style public service broadcasters (Papathanassopoulos, 2018).

3 Discussion

Europeanization is perhaps a misnomer here since it could be regarded as a process whereby member states are influenced by strong national models rather than a European one, though it is possible that such a model may provide a framework for EU policies. Policy transfer, however, is constrained when there are no national cases to be imitated as in the case of media ownership. For example, the EU member states, such as the UK, Italy, Netherlands and to a certain extent France and Germany, one after the other have formed regulatory authorities which have been strongly influenced by the example of the US FCC (Federal Communications Commission).

If the broad outlines of Europeanization have been explored at some length – here and elsewhere – are the outcomes of Europeanization straightforward and unproblematic? The immediate response is to accept that despite the tangible outcomes (Radaelli, 2000) or impacts (Lodge, 2002), neither its pace nor its direction is entirely predictable.

Sometimes, the EU can influence domestic administrative arrangements (Lippert et al., 2001: 981-2) and may trigger domestic change by prescribing concrete institutional requirements with which the member states must comply. This can be seen as a form of *positive integration*.

At times, by changing the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors, the EU may have less of a direct and positive influence. This can be termed a form of *negative integration*.

As Humphreys (2007: 199) points out, EU policy can lower barriers as well as raise them, can bring things down to a lower common denominator as well as to seek to 'improve' matters. For this reason, he terms the former *negative integration* and the latter *positive integration.*

Regardless how we see these kinds of discussions, it should be clear by now that we are looking at an extremely complex set of considerations. There is, first, the matter of the direction of influence: it could be 'bottom-up (that is, from member state→EU), top-down (EU→ member state), horizontal (state→state) and roundabout (member state→EU→member state)' (Lenschow, 2006: 57).

One can also envisage 'Europeanization' as *a two-stage process*: one from above, orchestrated from Brussels, and confined to formal members (in this case it could be said that Europeanization could be narrowed to *EU-ization)*; and one from below, covering the whole 'European' continent, where an equally large number of countries still are non-members (which does not make them any less 'European'). Once again, Europeanization can also emanate from *Euroscepticism* too. As Segesten and Bossetta note:

> "Although Euroscepticism implies an opposition to the EU and European integration, a Europeanized media discourse on Euroscepticism may facilitate mutual understanding and foster cross-border dialogue among Europeans" (2019: 1052).

The latest financial and subsequently eurozone, and what its implications are for the European project were sound examples where the media discourse about the debt-countries

was a major issue that was both Europeanized and discussed in a similar manner across national contexts, their media outlets, and their readerships (Papathanassopoulos, 2015). In other words, while in the past news on European issues had a small presence in the European media (de Vreese, 2002), during the eurozone crisis most, if not all, topics like Europe, the EU, eurozone and its future were almost on a daily basis in the media of the EU countries at least (Picard, 2015).

The second matter to consider is how influence is reconstituted into some form of impact, be it a *new structure of governance or rules*, a new way of implementing directives or perhaps even stalling on these.

The third matter to consider is whether the influence and transference into some measurable impact is positive or negative in the sense that Peter Humphreys has set out. Do these lead to a 'better' and 'higher' and more 'laudable' policy regime or does it simply lower the barriers?

The real problem in trying to deal with these complexities is that the EU, though unified, has to balance competing interests. There is a rich diversity in language, culture, economic preferences, administrative methods, and political and social priorities across the 27 member states. These have tended to be magnified by the intense and often conflictual bargaining process in Brussels.

The latter creates what is a dominant feature of the EU's policy-making procedure, i.e., its emphasis on finding a balance between the opinions of interested parties in order to arrive at a consensus and then to a common approach against the international environment (Michalis, 2007).

This is almost certainly what has happened in the communications field: larger European countries created pressure for change and therefore for new policies; the negotiation process that followed brought forth a compromise which, in turn, became a Directive that was intended to be applied in all the EU countries.

4 Media Systems and EU-ization

We can trace this process in respect of the EU's involvement in the media and the wider communications field, initially in the television system, then telecommunications and finally in the information and communications technology and digitalisation.

While the question of the EUs competence in these matters has continued to fascinate many commentators, there is now no doubt that the EU has fully embraced the entire communication sector – from the old 'audio-visual' media sector right through to the 'global information society' (see also Papathanassopoulos, 2018; Humphreys, 2008).

What is for sure is thar EU-ization does not exist without the prior process of Europeanization, and Europeanization, in its current iteration, cannot work and expand its scope and focus without the accomplishments that EU-ization offers.

The case of the communications field seems to be a good example of the process of the EU-ization and policy transfer since it reflects and reveals a "permanent state of reconstruction

and reconstitution" (Flockhart, 2010: 805). The EU, through the European Commission, has initiated a number of initiatives in the media field and it has assumed that since the new convergent communication landscape raises a number of questions with a pan-European dimension, it is the appropriate body to deal with these. Today, the EU intervenes in all aspects of the communications field and the European Commission considers itself the watchdog of the harmonised European communication landscape though this may be a bit of an exaggeration as sometimes its proposals are rejected as was the case with a proposal in mid-2008 to create an EU Telecoms Authority with broad regulatory powers.

This is almost certainly what has happened in the media field: larger European countries created pressure for change and therefore for new policies; the negotiation process that followed brought forth a compromise which, in turn, became a Directive that was intended to be applied in all the EU countries. We can trace this process in respect of the EU's involvement in the communications field, initially in the television system, then telecommunications and finally in the information and communications technology and digitization. In effect, its competence now embraces the entire communication sector (see also Humphreys and Simpson, 2008). These stages of involvement are examined in the next section.

The EU, through the European Commission, intervenes in all aspects of the communications sector and the European Commission considers itself the watchdog of the harmonized European communication landscape. This may, however, be an exaggeration. For example, the above noted proposal of 2008 regarding the formation an EU Telecoms Authority with broad regulatory powers was not accepted by the Member States.[1]

In the communications field, the aim of the then European Community to harmonize and eventually to 'Europeanize' the audio-visual sector began in 1983 with the publication of the 'Realities and tendencies of European television' (CEC 1983) report which led to a much-discussed Green Paper (CEC 1984) and then to the well-known Directive (CEC 1989 and 1997a) for a *Television without Frontiers*, which became the *Audiovisual Media Services* Directive in 2007 with its subsequent revisions as we will see in.

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[1]In effect, the European Council in November 2008, decided to reject the European Commission proposals to reform the electronic communications field. The Commission planned to establish a new authority to serve as its main advisor on all European telecoms' regulatory affairs. The body would have had the power to block remedies imposed by national regulators if they contradicted European regulations. Before the European Council, the European Parliament also had rejected in September 2008 the Commission's proposal to establish a strong new EU.

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ANNEXES

Annex I

The European Assemblage, by Nico Carpentier

The European Assemblage: A Discursive-Material Analysis of European Identity, Europaneity and Europeanisation

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Different academic disciplines have deployed a diversity of approaches to European identity, Europeanism and Europeanisation, with often a strong emphasis on their material-structural components. This article uses a discursive-material analysis, that acknowledges the importance of the material, but places it in a non-hierarchical relation with the discursive. Grounded in an extensive literature review on European identity, Europeanism and Europeanisation, the article first highlights the discursive nature of these concepts, how they engage in struggles with other place-based identities and discourses, and how the articulations of these concepts themselves are deeply contingent, with a long history of essentialist articulations. In the second part, the material components of these three concepts (and in particular Europeanisation) are analysed, then allowing for a plea to understand Europe as an assemblage, where Europe is seen to be performed in always unique and contingent articulations of the discursive and the material.

Keywords: European identity, Europeanism, Europeanisation, being European, becoming European, discourse theory, new materialism, entanglement, assemblage

INTRODUCTION

Europe is many things, but it is also an idea, or – as Rietbergen (2015: xxxv) writes – 'a political and cultural concept' that gives meaning to 'the western edge of Eurasia, the earth's largest land mass'. This reference to Rietbergen's work already indicates that our thinking about Europe combines discursive ('concept') and material ('land mass') components, but at the same time it is remarkable how dominant the material-structural analyses in particular academic fields (e.g. media studies and political studies) remain, and how rare analyses of the entanglement of these two components in general are.

This article organises a reflection on Europe through the lens of the discursive-material knot (Carpentier 2017), a theoretical model of entanglement, grounded in the articulation of discourse theory and new materialism. Three concepts will serve as entry points into these discussions – European identity, Europaneity and Europeanisation – first emphasising their

discursive nature, and the contingency of their articulation, and then shifting gear to analyse their – and in particular Europeanisation's – material dimensions. These two analyses then support the idea of the European assemblage, as always particular, changeable and politically contested articulations of Europe's discursive and material components.

DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF IDENTITY AND SPACE

The relationship between identity and space is complex, mediated through a variety of discursive constructions. One starting point to reflect about this relationship is through the concept of the nation. While more primordialist versions of the nation bring out an essentialist argumentation, grounded in kinship and common descent, authors such as Anderson (1996: 4) – in *Imagined Communities* – understand the 'nation-ness' as a cultural artefact. This immediately brings in a logic of contingency, as Wodak et al. (2009: 186–187) write in *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. They argue that there is not one national identity, but that the signifier of the nation is articulated in a variety of ways, and integrated into a variety of discourses, that all struggle over the nation's meaning. Moreover, there are also a variety of identifications with the signifier of national identity possible. In other words, national identity is not a static concept, but always open to contestation, re-articulation and struggle. The nation does have a spatial component, as, for instance, the notion of the homeland indicates, but when the signifier of the nation becomes articulated with the state, we enter the realm of nationalism, which combines the nation-as-people and the nation-(as-)state, as Billig (1995: 24) argues. Nationalism still has the nation as a nodal point but it adds a second nodal point, namely sovereignty, which implies that nations have political authority which is translated into their entitlement to establish a state for themselves.

Place-based identities are not restricted to the level of the state, though. One example is the notion of urban identity, which refers to 'the collective identity of inhabitants of a city, including shared ideas of belonging, attachment, affiliation, and community' (Mah 2014: 7). As also rural, regional and subnational identities exist, there are several other concepts that have been developed to refer to these types of identifications, as, for instance, localism and regionalism. And there are supranational or (pan-)continental identities, of which the European identity is one example. Again, we find here a sense of belonging (to a community) and sharing – of (a) similar space(s), history/ies, culture(s), religion(s), language(s) or other elements – but this time in relationship to an entire continent, with all the diversity that this entails. Still, as Delanty and Rumford (2005: 50) write: 'European identity is a question of collective identity and as such, theoretically, is no different from the question of national identity.' Even though some authors argue that a European identity does not exist (see Paasi 2001; Pinterič 2005), it is arguably – similar to other place-based identifications – an object of discursive struggle (Aydın-Düzgit 2012: 8), further complicated by the existence (and active identity-building interventions) of the European Union.

As Galpin (2017: 22) writes, these place-based identities are not mutually exclusive. They can coexist, in hierarchical or non-hierarchical ways. This so-called 'marble cake' identity model (Risse 2010: 25) does not always apply to all place-based identities, because – as, for instance,

Hooghe and Marks (2009) have argued – these identities are sometimes articulated in mutually exclusive fashions. Still, this is part of a broader discussion on the overdetermined nature of identities (Laclau 1996: 103), as human subjectivity exists through the contingent intersection of a wide variety of identities – including place-based, gender, family, sexual, ethnic, professional and other identities. Not only are these different identities object of discursive struggles, resulting in particular hegemonic articulations, within different (political) communities, but individuals will also identify in always unique ways with these intersecting identities, only adding to the specificity and contingency of their articulations. This contingency also implies that the balance (and hierarchy) between these different identity components may shift over time. For instance, Habermas's (2001) analysis of what he calls the 'postnational constellation' combines the idea that the role of the nation-state as object of identification has decreased, with a search to establish new grounds to protect the democratic nature of new constellations.

DISCOURSES ON EUROPEANITY

The identifications with a European identity can be further unpacked, as the signifier Europe is articulated in a variety of ways. In other words, subjects can identify as European, but being European can have different meanings. Different concepts have been used to capture this being European: Europeanity, Europeanness and Europeanism, but they all assume that Europe can be constructed as distinct, also bringing in different constitutive outsides that support this European particularity. For instance, Smith (1991: 174) mentions 'the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, artistic classicism and romanticism, and above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy'.

An older example is Jaspers' (1947) discussion of the 'European spirit', where he starts by saying that Europe is 'the bible and antiquity', then lists an impressive number of authors and places, only to add that it concerns 'an immeasurable wealth of spirit, morality, faith' (Jaspers 1947: 9). But Jaspers also offers a second route to know Europe, which is for him captured through three keywords: freedom, history and science. Not unlike Jaspers, a considerable number of the discourses that articulate 'being European' are deeply essentialist, fixating Europe as 'a paragon of international virtues: a community of values held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate' (Judt 2005: 798), slowly forgetting the lessons of the Second World War that were still deeply engrained in Jaspers' writings.

These essentialist discursive configurations are not restricted to more philosophical writings, but, as Stavrakakis (2005: 82) remarks, European identity, and being European, also features prominently in a series of (pre-)European Union policy documents, including the *Solemn Declaration of the European Union* (1983) and the *Single European Act* (1987). Another example is the *Treaty of Lisbon* (2007), which – at its very start (namely in Article 2) – lists a series of values that are claimed to constitute the European Union, including gender equality, non-discrimination and justice.

More relationist approaches (e.g. Delanty 1995) argue that Europeanity is (and has been) constructed in antagonistic relationships with constitutive outsides. Interestingly, also Jaspers (1947: 7) mentions several of these constitutive outsides when he refers to the European colonisation of the globe, 'when the white man asserted his privilege', but also when he points out that 'Europe was never alone', as it was threatened by 'the Persian, Islam, the Mongols, the Normans, the Hungarians, the Turks'. Delanty (1995: 2) concurs with the existence of this particular discursive construction of Europe, but combines it with the need for critique: 'there appears to be widespread consensus today that the cultural foundation of Europe is deeply rooted in Latin Christendom, humanist values and liberal democracy (Kundera, 1984). I hope to be able to show that these beliefs are ungrounded, or at best mystifying <…>.' Non-essentialist approaches point to the diversity of the constitutive outsides that have played a role in the history of the discursive construction of Europe, and I want to very briefly touch upon three important ones. Colonialism is one key component of, and stage in, the construction of Europeanity. Colonialism was (and is), as Said (1995) argued, structured through a set of binary oppositions – savage/civil, primitive/modern, close to nature/ technologically developed, etc. – that constructed Europe as superior. To use Said's (1995: 7) words: 'it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures.' A second, even older constitutive outside of Europeanity is Islam. The long-term treat of the conquest of Europe, by Muslims, consolidated Christianity as a 'powerful myth of legitimation' (Delanty 1995: 26), which removed much of the internal diversity from sight. It resonates until today, where in later constructions, also in relation to Turkey, Europe is articulated as 'greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, [while] the world of Islam is still mired in religion and primitivity' (Aydın-Düzgit 2012: 34). Finally, a third constitutive outside that was particularly important during the 20th century, was the undemocratic other, partially internal and partially external to Europe. What Delanty (1995: 111) called the 'fascist myth of Europe' became seen, after the Second World War, as non-European, thus constructing another Europeanity. Similarly, the Cold War pitched the undemocratic Soviet Union other against Europe, again rearranging the geographical map of Europe – excluding, for instance, key cities of *Mitteleuropa*, Prague and Budapest – and aligning Europe with the USA across the Atlantic. This latter construction of Europe led to the symbolic removal of the Soviet Union from Europe altogether (Paasi 2001: 12) and supported a call for the Central-Eastern European countries to 'Return to Europe' (Risse 2000: 14), together with concerns about the americanisation of Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet empire (but also of communist Yugoslavia and Albania), this constitutive outside lost much of its strength, and as Schlesinger (1992: 20) commented – with some visionary talent – already in the early 1990s, 'Islam has in some respects begun to fill the void brought about by the Soviet empire's collapse.'

DISCOURSES ON EUROPEANISATION

Europeanisation is a related discourse that articulates European identity and Europeanity with a temporal dimension and a process of intensification. It is, in other words, a discourse of

becoming, which authors such as Risse (2010: 10) label as the 'Europeanization of national identities'. This change process varies, though, as in more minimal versions, it captures the *creation* or *establishment* of a European identity and the discourse of Europeanity, making it available for identification and providing meaning to Europe as a cultural space. But Europeanisation also captures, in more maximalist versions, the *hegemonisation* of a European identity and Europeanity, victoriously concluding the discursive struggle with other – competing – place-based identities (Delanty, Rumford 2005: 20; Sassatelli 2009: 1).

As European identity and the Europeanity discourse can have many different – often competing – articulations, also the question what it is that needs to be intensified becomes open to articulation. This brings Delanty and Rumford (2005: 19) to write that 'the discursive logic of Europeanization is highly contingent. There are no authoritative definitions of what constitutes the "we", the "other", "inside" or "outside".' When the focus is on European versus national identity, then Europeanisation can imply the (fear for the) destruction or erasure of national identity (Edensor 2002: 111), or the co-existence of European identities with other identities (Motschenbacher 2016: 134), where in the latter case an intersectional approach to Europeanisation is used (Risse 2010: 25). In the case of the Europeanity discourse, Europeanisation can, for instance, imply the glorification of European culture as was witnessed during the periods of intense colonialism, the erasure of religious diversity through the hegemonisation of Christianity (combined with an anti-Islam rhetoric), or what Delanty (1995: 11) calls a 'Eurocentric ethno-cultural project'. Alternatively, Europeanisation can also be grounded in a recognition of a multipolar world, where the experiments of democracy, participation, pluralism and agonism become intensified. To use Laclau's (1996: 57) dynamics of the particular and universal, Europeanisation is not a given and universal concept, it is a particular discourse that is engaged in a struggle for hegemony, in order for its desirability to become universal (at least in Europe). Simultaneously, there are many particular elements that struggle over the meaning of the discourse of Europeanisation itself, trying to hegemonise (or universalise) this discourse.

Finally, analyses of the Europeanisation process are also connected to different locations and actors. First, discourses are dependent on communication platforms to circulate and offer themselves for identification, but these platforms have their specificities, that can allow and disallow for discourses to reach particular groups. These barriers are not always unsurmountable, as translations, (cross-)referencing and content exchanges remain possible. The theoretical concept that has often been used here is the notion of the European public sphere, which refers to both the circulation of European identity and Europeanity discourses ('being European') and to the process of Europeanisation ('becoming European'). It is important here to recall Habermas's (1974: 49) seminal definition of the public sphere when he wrote that 'A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.' This serves as an immediate reminder that not only media organisations form (part of) the public sphere (Koopmans, Statham 2010; Pérez 2013), but that also, for instance, the educational field plays a significant role (Soysal 2002).

Together, these (different parts of the) public spheres (or public spaces) allow for the circulation of the diversity of (competing) discursive components that make up European identity and Europeanity, which also includes – but is not restricted to – addressing Europe (and the European Union as political entity) explicitly. For instance, Statham (2010: 5) argues that these public spheres increase the European Union's visibility, which in turn provides an opportunity for citizens to become politically engaged, which also includes their ability to contest the European Union's policies. Europeanisation also implies what Statham (2010: 5) calls 'the transformation of national public spheres', where content (and the discourses embedded within it) transcends national boundaries. It is what Habermas (2006: 102) describes as the process where 'the circuits of communication within the national arenas open themselves up to one another while themselves remaining intact'. Moreover, a diversity of actors enters these public spheres (or spaces) (Sassatelli 2009: 42). Obviously, these include 'Eurocentric institutions, most notably the European Union itself' who are 'encouraging or, depending upon one's point of view, imposing Europeanisation upon reluctant populations' (Miller et al. 2012: 1). But this also includes, for instance, social movements, a process that authors such as della Porta (2020, see also della Porta, Caiani 2009) have labelled 'Europeanisation from below'.

EUROPEAN MATERIAL PRACTICES

My emphasis on the discursive interpretations of European identity, Europeanity and Europeanisation hides the dominance of the more materialist approaches in many fields of study. If we focus on Europeanisation[2] and take Olsen's (2002: 923–924) overview as illustration, we can find what he terms 'five possible uses' of the Europeanisation concept: 'changes in external boundaries', 'developing institutions at the European level', 'central penetration of national systems of governance', 'exporting forms of political organization', and 'a political unification project'. Similarly, Harmsen and Wilson (2000: 13) refer to 'eight usages of the term Europeanization', where only one component (namely, the 'reconstruction of identities') refers to the discursive.

These rich and valuable analyses of the materiality of Europeanisation focus – first of all – on structural and institutional changes, whether this refers to legal, political or economic changes. Delanty (1995: 9) points to the state, economy, culture and society, adding that 'When we survey the history of the European idea it can be seen how it was always articulated in terms of the first three.' Delanty (1995: 9) discusses here the creation of political unity (ranging from 'Holy leagues and alliances of Christendom' to the European Union), in close connection with the creation of a capitalist order – a vital component that is often neglected. These transformations are also connected to, and supported by, legal transformations, including the creation of European law, the convergence of national legal systems, and what Snyder (2000:

[2] A similar type of argument can be made for the materiality of European identity and Europeanity, but has been left out for reasons of space.

4) calls the 'juridification of politics', for instance, through the creation of the European Court of Justice.

Delanty's (1995: 9) critique on the absence of society-focussed approaches, with which he referred to the absence of discussions on civil society and public sphere, have – in the meanwhile – largely been remedied. For instance, a decade later, Delanty and Rumford (2005: 7) themselves published *Rethinking Europe*, which had the explicit ambition 'to go beyond institutional frameworks to examine the dynamics of society'. For instance, discussions about the Europeanisation from below deal with the material 'transformation of national NGO sectors' (Gray, Statham 2005: 879), and the creation of supra- and transnational NGOs. Also the discussions on the European public sphere(s) are deeply material, as these are concerned with the creation of material structures that allow publics to engage in political conversation (overcoming material borders), but also with the audiences' practices of non-interactive simultaneity (watching screens at the same time) and material interaction. Relatedly, discussions on European film (studies) not only warn that 'research into European cinema still equals research into discrete national cinemas' (Bergfelder 2015: 315), but also point to transnational co-productions, distribution and strategies of accessibility (e.g. dubbing and subtitling).

As Borneman and Fowler's (1997: 497) focus on the situations 'where peoples of Europe engage in face-to-face encounters with each other', it illustrates that Europeanisation can also be located at the very micro-level of embodied practices. European (nation-)states, with their territories, tend to privilege and facilitate intra-border movements, creating material concentrations of the bodies of their citizens. Europeanisation here implies increased material trans-border mobility, generating contact zones, or 'social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power' (Pratt 1991: 34). Here, as Keinz and Lewicki (2019) argue, also the materiality of the body itself matters, to be inscribed with racialised, gendered, classed discourses of (non-)Europeanity.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN DISCURSIVE-MATERIAL ASSEMBLAGE

These discourses and materialities of European identity, Europeanity and Europeanisation are deeply entangled, with permanent and intense interactions between these two components of social reality. At the same time, the discursive-material approach that was used in this article also allows emphasising the importance of both components and their entanglement, while in different academic fields, they are exposed to different levels of attention, with the discursive still remaining often under-represented. Arguably, instead of analytically privileging one of the two components, it might be more fruitful to focus on European assemblages, that – in always unique ways – combine discourses, signifying practices and many different materials. For instance, public spheres are very much locations where Europeanity is discursively and materially *performed*, in a variety of ways, sometimes implicitly, and sometimes with explicit reference to Europe, sometimes focussing on European (and in particular European Union) governance structures, and sometimes on everyday practices.

This necessary articulation of the discursive and material matters allows emphasising that Europeanity and Europeanisation are more than the mere aggregation of governance structures, industries and bodies. Without the – explicit or implicit – presence of the signifier Europe in this assemblage, with some degree of identification (and the affects that this brings about), these aggregations are built on an imaginary transcendence of the European (nation-)states and their national identities. In other words, if citizens on interconnected public spheres define their interlocutors as others, and not part of the European self, then there is little reason to refer to European identity, Europeanity and Europeanisation.

This discursive-material approach also foregrounds the contingency of these constructions. European identity, and the discourses of Europeanity and Europeanisation are not given and essentially fixed. They are deeply contested, and sometimes in their entirety rejected. But when their right of (discursive) existence is accepted, we are still dealing with intense discursive struggles over their exact articulations. This is where the discourses of Europeanity and Europeanisation also touch each other, because being European is also always becoming European, and becoming European has many different directions. And this is where the ethical comes in, as – when confronted with this multitude of possible constructions of European identity, Europeanity and Europeanisation, and the dangers of European antagonistic nationalism – we also need to ask the question what it means to become *better* Europeans.

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NICO CARPENTIER

Europietiškumas kaip rinkinys: diskursyvioji ir materialioji europinės tapatybės, europietiškumo ir europeizacijos analizė

Santrauka

Skirtingos akademinės disciplinos paprastai taiko skirtingas europinės tapatybės, europietiškumo ir europeizacijos tyrimo prieigas, dažniausiai akcentuodamos šių tyrimo objektų materialiuosius ir struktūrinius elementus. Šiame straipsnyje taikoma diskursyvioji–materialioji analizė, kuri pripažįsta materialiųjų elementų svarbą, bet įtraukia šiuos elementus ne į hierarchinį, o į horizontalųjį santykį

su diskursyviaisiais elementais. Remiantis išsamia europinę tapatybę, europietiškumą ir europeizaciją nagrinėjančios mokslinės literatūros apžvalga, pabrėžiama diskursyvioji šių sąvokų prigimtis. Straipsnyje analizuojama, kaip minėtos sąvokos įsitraukia į kovą su kitomis vieta grindžiamomis (place-based) tapatybėmis ir diskursais; akcentuojamas šių sąvokų junginių esminis atsitiktinumas, žvelgiant iš ilgą istorinę patirtį turinčių esencialistinio pobūdžio junginių perspektyvos. Antrojoje straipsnio dalyje analizuojami materialieji minėtų sąvokų dėmenys, išskirtinį dėmesį skiriant europeizacijos sąvokai. Galiausiai ši analizė pateikiama kaip argumentas, kad Europa būtų suprantama kaip junginys, kuriame ji realizuojama per visada unikalius ir atsitiktinius diskursyviųjų ir materialiųjų elementų junginius.

Raktažodžiai: europinė tapatybė, europietiškumas, europeizacija, buvimas europiečiais, tapimas europiečiais, diskurso teorija, naujasis materializmas, įsitraukimas, junginys

Annex II

Dimensions of Europeanization: A literature Review, by Andrea Miconi

Dimensions of Europeanization: A literature Review

EUMEPLAT Working Paper

Andrea Miconi, IULM University

Draft #5

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[0] Abstract

The paper will propose a literature review concentrated on the Europeanization issue, which stands as a paramount research question for the EUMEPLAT project. Needless to say, bibliography has been filtered according to some specific interests, and therefore will not include such topics as European legislation; political sciences; international law; and the like. In a provisory way, I have identified four main areas, based on the emphasis respectively placed on: the *geographical* dimension, or the alternative paths to Europeanization; the *political* dimension, and the state of the alleged European public sphere; the *identitarian* dimension, dealing with the role of imagination, values and beliefs; and finally, the *media* dimension, with a focus on the so-called soft power.

[1] The Geographical Dimension: Is Europeanization a Universal Concept?

As the concept of Europeanization encompasses a variety of areas and fields, it is necessary to break it down into more operational variables, likely to be applied as empirical indicators. Here we will start with a first attempt, based on a well-known – albeit not recent - typology. In the table below, I also tried to split these categories into some sub-dimensions, more directly related to the media market, and to our research tasks.

Table 1: Dimensions of Europeanization [adapted from Harmsen & Wilson 2000]

Dimension of Europeanization	**Definition**	**Media-related definition**
As the emergence of a European governance	Role of EU institutions	Role of EU institutions in regulating media markets, and favoring common rules
As national adaptation	National policies aiming at developing EU integration	To which degree national media regulations are becoming more look alike
As policy isomorphism	Indirect Europeanization, due to mutual inspiration and imitation	
As problem and opportunity for domestic political management	Combination between EU and national frameworks	
As modernization	Assimilation of peripheral nations to the core	How about the Eastern Media system? Differences and characteristics of the Turkish media system
As "joining Europe"	Adoption of EU/Western model by new members or candidates	
As the reconstruction of identities	Role of culture and identity	In which way the media are reflecting or producing an European identity?
As transnationalism and cultural integration	Interactions and exchanges among different national cultures	To which extent EU countries exchange cultural products?

With a similar systemic intention, Olsen [2002] has come to identify five different ideas of Europeanization, which are shortly supposed to be: change in external territorial boundaries; development a proper European governance; penetration of EU rules into local institutional systems; political project aiming at unifying the continent; and finally, exportation of European rules beyond the European territory itself. The latter is a very specific case, that will not be addressed in this document, as we will not work on the exportation of European culture [well, not in this project, at least]. As to the big picture, we are getting around the usual issue of a

supranational entity taking its shape, and traditional States defining their role, by contrast or by concordance. This is what Saskia Sassen refers to as the “assemblage” between national and global powers, and what Negri and Hardt would more ambitiously describe as a transition between the stage of the imperialism and that of the Empire. Given the impossibility of dealing which such issues, though, let us take a different stance.

As it appears, a first option for coming to terms with the “Europeanization” category is to assume that the category itself would take on different meanings, according to one’s specific perspective. In other words, there are no universal concepts to be applied, here, whereas different regions may look at the integration process in a different perspective. Based on a first [and still rough] review of scientific literature, four alternative views emerge, which deal with the observation points of European Community as a whole; Western European countries; Central European countries; and Eastern European countries [and perhaps Southern Europe as well, in this latter case, the similarity between the two systems being a traditional issue in comparative media studies].

For what concerns the European Union itself, Europeanisation is a matter of *legitimacy*: how the EU is perceived from the citizens in all member States, and to which extent people feel to be represented by their representatives in Bruxelles. As a matter of fact, in this case we will have to talk about EU-Europeanization, by definition – and by following Stelios’ strongly sustained idea. What seems to be interesting, is that everybody is concerned with the crisis of European legitimacy – whereas *nowhere* in literature does it say anything about this legitimacy reaching its full extent.

Yes, debate about European weakness peaks in correspondence with specific critical events – the 1992 Danish referendum; the introduction of the common currency; the economic downturn and the Greek case; the Brexit; the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic – but no lost paradise appears in this story, and no foundational moment to be recalled, in order to legitimate the present situation. To such a point that, as a matter of fact, surveys show how Europe *per se* – “EU as a whole” – is less popular than its discussed institutions: the Parliament, the Commission, and more surprisingly, even the Central Bank [Rose 2015, 26]. And, how is that?

Let us now briefly consider the standpoint of the different regions included in European Community, rather than that of the Union itself. In Western European countries, the Europeanization process somehow rhymes with that of globalization, and has to do with the *postnational* organization of contemporary economy and society. Ruggie’s concept of *space of flows* – notoriously appropriated by Manuel Castells - can aptly frame the process too, as we will discuss again in the next section.

A main difference emerges in the case of Central Europe, where the – so to speak – panEuropean project is also perceived as an actual *realization of the ultimate national values* [i.e., Radeljić 2021]. Needless to say, there are no clear boundaries between Western, Central and Eastern countries - or media systems, as Mancini and Zielonka pointed out. What I am

trying to figure out, is whether this distinction makes any sense or not, and in which way it might affect the organization of media systems, and the taste of audiences scattered in Europe.

According to some scholars, in Eastern Europe the Europeanization process is finally one with the *modernization* process, it being perceived as the right occasion for getting rid of old habits, social roles, and the more. With this specific respect, a similarity can be found with some analysis of Italian, Greek and Turkish cases, and therefore [well, arguably] with the Mediterranean media system. A more advanced indication is that proposed by Peruško, Vozab and Čuvalo [2021], which break down the general category of transition into three specific processes: delinking between State control and media management; overall growth of audiences and media markets; and possible "harmonization" at the European level. A possible objection has been raised against this statement, which rather separates two periods: the post-1989 decade, when "catching up with the West" was widely advocated for in all Eastern Europe; and the more recent years, with this rhetoric fading almost everywhere – either because the goal is already achieved, or it has lost its attractiveness [Manierska 2015, 151].

Here I happen to have two main doubts, anywise, connected to each other: to which extent this statement reflects a common feeling, or it is rather derived from the standpoint of a bunch of EU-oriented scholars; and how to avoid the risk of any orientalist bias, which is almost implicit in the *Eastern* category itself. Only in the case of Eastern Europe, it seems, *exogenous* factors have been widely taken into account, while in classical Robert Ladrech's idea [1994, 71], for instance, they come to play a main role in explaining the different ways to Europeanization, in any context.

As this document is intended to be a first draft to be discussed, I will limit myself to recap the four main perspectives I have found: Europeanization as a *legitimacy problem* [EU]; Europeanization as a *post-national transition* [Western Europe]; Europeanization as the *fulfillment of national values* [Central Europe]; Europeanization as a *modernization process* [Eastern and, partially, Southern Europe].

Reviewed literature:

Castells M., Caraça M., & Cardoso G. [eds.], 2012, *Aftermath*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Castells M. & al. [eds.], 2018, *Europe's crises*, London, Polity.

Castro Herrero L. & others, 2017, *Rethinking Hallin and Mancini Beyond the West: An Analysis of Media Systems in Central and Eastern Europe*, "International Journal of Communication" 11, 4797–4823.

Fuchs C., 2020, *Nationalism on the Internet*, New York, Routledge.

Dobek-Ostrowska B. & Glowacki M. [eds.], 2021, *Democracy and Media in Eastern and Central Media 25 years On*, New York, Peter Lang.

Habermas J., 2009, *Europe: The Faltering Project*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Habermas J., 2012, *The Crisis of European Union: An Answer*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Hallin D. & Mancini P. [eds.] 2012, *Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Harmsen R. & Wilson M. T., 2000*, Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization*, "Yearbook of European Studies", 14, 13-26.

Ladrech R., 1994, *Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", 32, 1, 69-88.

Mancini P. & Zielonka D., 2012, *Introduction*, "International Journal of Press/Politics", 174, 3, 379-387.

Manierskza E., *The East Meets the West in Contemporary Eastern European Films*, in N. Bondebjerg, N. Redvall & A. Higson [eds.], *European Cinema and Television. Cultural Policy and Everyday Life*, London, Palgrave, 151-168.

Negri A. & Hardt M., 2000, *Empire*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Olsen J.P., 2002, *The Many faces of Europeanization*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00403.

Peruško Z., Vozab D. & Čuvalo A., 2012, *Comparing Post-Socialist Media Systems. The Case of Southeast Europe*, London and New York, Routledge.

Radeljić B. [ed.], 2021, *The Unwanted Europeanness?*, Berlin, De Gruyter.

Rose R., 2015, *Representing Europeans. A Pragmatic Approach*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Ruggie J., 1993, *Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations*, "International Organization", 47[1], 139-174.

Sassen S., 2006, *Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

[2] The Political Dimension: Is There a European Public Sphere?

It is not possible to work on European integration without considering public opinion as a main issue. For the purposes of WP2 and [perhaps] WP4, in this sense, we will make use of the Eurobarometer polls, as a starting point for exploring some issues, which are considered to be relevant in European public debate. But still, what about the way these issues *are measured* by Eurobarometer – is it reliable, and acceptable? For sure, it would provide a clear assessment of some allegedly European values - gender equality, welfare state, maybe green economy – we could use at our advantage.

As we know - from Habermas' post-national galaxy to Saskia Sassen's assemblages - it is quite obvious to state that citizens perceive themselves to be part of both European Union and their country. At the practical level, though, we are also aware of national belonging being the most important in all 27 Member States, with no exceptions detected. Two different explanations are possible, here [well, out many others we could find]. The first one is rooted in

recent history, as in Manuel Castells' application of the space of flows/space of places dyad: on the one hand, technological and financial innovation fosters the globalization processes at the EU level; on the other, in a vein of defensive reaction, people increasingly tend to shield themselves between domestic identities, either national or regional [i.e., Catalan, Flemish, Northern Italian, and then the Brexit, and all sovranist tendencies]. With this respect, the lack of legitimacy of EU institutions can hardly come as a surprise, as by definition – at least in the classical Castells' theory – the majority of people would prefer a *local* form of identity, as a response to the spread of supranational flows, which are less likely to produce a shared sense of belonging and a commonly accepted meaning. The second idea rather relies on long-duration processes: Europe being a continent of many countries of *comparable* size and cultural relevance, an integration and a synthesis would unlikely emerge – in a nutshell, this is the honorable Tzvetan Todorov's position. For what concerns the research on cultural markets, this idea would also lead to Donald Sassoon's history and to Franco Moretti's application of quantitative models, all dealing with *long durée* methodology and geo-cultural patterns.

When it comes to the implementation of these ideas in our project, I can simply make a couple of guesses. Firstly, WP1 could provide a partial answer to the last dilemma, as we will go back to 1990s and, in the sole case of movie market, to the mid-1980s: a variance in European contents circulation – even if a limited time-span is covered – can maybe tell us something about national culture being a long-duration heritage, or rather a backfire effect of globalization and EUEuropeanization. For sure, though, we would have data related to the circulation of cultural contents, which have not directly to do with public opinion. Secondly, this scheme can be the more useful for framing the institutional side of the process: European media legislation, for sure, along with such initiatives as Creative Europe program, public funding, dubbing policies, pan-European media events [or the Erasmus mobility, more broadly speaking].

Now, it is rather time to face the main problem: research on public opinion have been mostly, when not solely dealing with *political* contents. In such a way, attention is placed on institutions and collectivity, rather than on individuals, so as to individuate common trends in the super-national discussion and confirming – in a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy - the actual existence of a common public sphere [i.e., Trenz 2004, 293, 311]. Similar results can be found in De Vreese and Peter's analysis of EU-issues media coverage [2004, 5], and in a wider survey on news framing in four countries – Netherlands, Denmark, UK, and Germany – characterized by variable acceptance of European identity [de Vreese, Peter & Semetko [2001]. As the latter survey takes into account the launch of the common currency and its media coverage, the authors explicitly prioritize collective instances over individual issues, and main events over the daily coverage [de Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001, 117]. Once again, we are reaching a sort of self-evident explanation: that interest in EU issues peaks during specific periods - whether they are head of State summits, diplomatic crisis, releasing of strategic directives - rather than in "routine periods" [Peters & de Vreese 2004, 14]. In a similar vein, local coverage of European problems is proved to increase, not surprisingly, when those problems immediately affect national life, and the more so for what concerns all economic and

social themes clustering around the *austerity* keyword [Barisione & Ceron 2017, 95]. In both cases, the plain "synchronization of issues" has to be considered as a weak form of Europeanization, not deeply affecting the cultural and political economy of the area [Machill, Beiller & Fischer 2006, 64-65, 76-77]. A different position is sustained by Barisione and Michailidou, which take this tendency for serious, thus hypothesizing the rise of a "public Europeanism", shaped by the "cosmopolitan" tendencies embedded in digital media [2017, 8]. To what extent the coverage of a few critical moments can provide people with a common understanding of reality, though, is still to be discussed.

Let us consider, on the other hand, the spread of more common ideas; the background noise of daily life and routine. In this case, research show how people's feeling is still largely based on the state of *national* public opinion, with spoken language inevitably playing a main part [Koopmans 2003, 3; Machill, Beiller & Fischer 2006, 60]. Here two classical dimensions emerge, which are referred to as *vertical* and *horizontal* Europeanization: with the first accounting for the institutional assemblage between the Nation-State and the union; and the latter for the dialogue among different countries, populations, or social formations. Sifft and others take a similar stance, while studying the longitudinal evolution of media coverage in five countries – Germany, UK, France, Austria, and Denmark – from 1982 to 2003. As they run a content analysis on the main newspapers, the findings go that discussion of European themes has been growing in all the five countries, whereas circulation of contents and opinion-sharing *among the countries* remains quite rare [2007, 143]. In other words, newspapers have been offering more space to the relation between their own State and the Union, without widening the horizon to the relations amongst countries. In their view too, in the end, two dimensions emerge, that they respectively refer to as monitoring of governance and visibility of EU institutions; and integration and cultural exchange [2007, 132]. The two levels basically correspond to the aforementioned vertical/horizontal dyad.

Here we can conclude with a simple remark. While looking for common trends, recent research eventually reveals a discontinuous pattern, with national audiences being mostly interested in local issues, and properly European themes getting some attention only upon very specific circumstances – such as political crisis, EU-national negotiations, and so forth. One may wonder though, if this is a plain state of fact – or rather *we have been looking in the wrong place*. Not only public opinion as such might not even exist, as it is a result of the poll procedure itself, but what if the overall Habermas' conception of public sphere is somehow banal and elementary, to quote Pierre Bourdieu – with no attention for its internal tensions and stratifications?

Reviewed Literature:

Barisione M. & Ceron A., 2017, *A Digital Movement Opinion? Contesting Austerity Through Social Media*, in M. Barisione & A. Michailidou [eds.], *Social Media and European Politics*, London, Palgrave, 77-104. Barisione M. & Michailidou A., 2017, *Do We Need to Rethink EU Politics in the Social Media*

Era? An Introduction to the Volume, in M. Barisione & A. Michailidou [eds.], *Social Media and European Politics*, London, Palgrave, 1-23.

Bourdieu P., 1989-1992, *Sur l'État. Cours au Collège de France*, Paris, Seuil.

Chalaby, J.K, 2002, *Transnational Television in Europe. The Role of Pan-European Channels*, "European Journal of Communication", 17(2), 183-203.

De Vreese, C.H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H.A., 2001, *Framing Politics at the Launch of Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News*, "Political Communication", 18, 107-122.

Koopmans, R. 2003, *Towards a European Public Sphere? Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of*

Europeanized Political Communication, "Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research", 17, 2, 97-118.

Machill, M., Beiler, M., & Fischer, C., 2006, *Europe-Topics in Europe's Media: The Debate about the European Public Sphere: A Meta-Analysis of Media Content Analyses*, "European Journal of Communication", 21, 1, 57-88.

Peters, J., & de Vreese, C.H., 2004, *In search of Europe. A Cross-National Study of the European Union in National Television News*, "Press/Politics", 9, 4, 3-24.

Sifft, S., Brüggermann M., Kleinen-V. Königlsöw K., Peters, B., & Wimmel, A., 2007, *Segmented Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse Perspective*, "Journal of Common Market Studies", 45(1), 127-155.

Trenz, J.-H., 2004, *Media Coverage on European Governance. Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers*, "European Journal of Communication", 19(3), 291-319.

[3] The Identitarian Dimension: Are There any Common Values?

The role of values in shaping a common identity is another possible way to deal with the Europeanization issue - though a quite insidious one. As a sociologist, I see some complications at both the theoretical and the empirical level. In the first case, because of the classical problem of "relation to values" in Max Weber, and all its normative and epistemological consequences. In the second one, and more practically speaking, it is a fact that values and identities are usually accounted for by means of opinion polls, which again, are often biased and, in any case, easily reflect the intentions of the interviewer [or that of the funding institutions]. As a matter of fact, this is the main critique advanced by Pierre Bourdieu – for which public opinion as such *does not even exist* – while also being sustained by Raymond Boudon, in the very seminal book which lies at the heart of contemporary sociology of values. This being said, for simplicity's sake I will divide this literature review into two parts, respectively focusing on the role of *imagination*; and that of *belief*.

In the first case, we are back to the imagined community theory – the role played by imagination [and imagery, images, symbolic forms, tales] in shaping a common identity. As we

know, in Anderson's version it was all about the Nation-State, and the symbolic legitimacy it has eventually taken on with the rise of realist novel and daily newspaper [and national broadcasting, after that]. Not only have this been an explanation of the consolidation of nationalism: it also provides us with a useful model for a materialist history of culture. This notwithstanding, as much as scholars have been trying to adapt the theory to the post-national world – particularly in the cultural studies area – they all eventually came out with the cliché of global *flows* [interconnected, networked, hybrid, disjuncture], thus implying an opposition between the solid pattern of industrial modernity and the liquid or unstable nature of contemporary societies [which is a naïve way to sociology, in my opinion].

For sure, though, it is not easy to figure out which is the *geo-cultural pattern* of the socalled post-national systems - and namely European Union, in our case. That mass media come to play a dominant role, in other words, is no way guarantees that they shape a consistent, systemic identity. Key to European weakness, here, is the lack of pan-European media, to quote Manuel Castells again: when compared to big countries [USA, Russia, China, India], to the wide Hispanophone Latin-American audience, or to the Pan-Arabic networks based in the Gulf. As Giacomo Tagiuri aptly put it, "identity needs contents" – novels, movies, Tv-series, songs, you name it - and European cultural contents are yet to come.

Two clues can be found in media theory, which respectively lead to cultural and technological issues. The first one is the *media event* category, unraveling the anthropological function of broadcasted ceremonies of different kinds, able to unify the normally separated national audiences and give shape to a supernational community. By definition, though, media events are *rare* and exceptional [or they would not be events at all], and therefore it is unclear how and if they can build a common European culture. The second concept is that of *platform* – with no doubt, the main keyword in 2020s Internet Studies. On the theoretical side, the notion of platform is useful as it is somehow synonymous of *pattern* – geo-cultural, political, economic, or simulacral – and it evolved from the descriptive status it held, to becoming the hallmark of contemporary sovereignty. At the empirical [and practical] level, as we know, the problem is that dominant cultural platforms are all American, with the only exception of Spotify. And so, a big question arises about Europeanization itself: shall it take place *in* web platforms, or *outside* web platforms? And if so, by means of which alternative platform, either physical or digital?

Another way to look at this, is to observe the spread of common values across the continent – so to speak, to focus on the grassroots, spontaneous, bottom-up side of the process. In Manuel Castells' recognition, those values are mainly related to: democratic values; geography; social protection; common history; and lastly, common culture [see below for this crucial problem]. Somehow, we still stick to such a classical framework as Ronald Inglehart's, and to his idea of postmaterialist values shaping late capitalist society, which deal with participation, representation and freedom of speech, among other things. Not accidentally, Inglehart's post-materialist thesis was originally inspired by the European case [more precisely, by the *Western* European case, back in the 1970s], due to high-level education systems and – yes - "supranational integration".

When compared to those perspectives, current situation is affected by two main complications. On the one side, economic crisis has given new centrality to economic and – so to speak – materialist needs, shading light on patrimonial imbalances and even triggering, according to some scholars, a new wave of class conflict. On the other, due to immigration and its media coverage – and to economic crisis too – very different values have been spreading across Europe [and on social media], ranging from xenophobia to nationalism. In all evidence, these opinion cascades show a rise in popular sensitivity about some issues – immigration, urban decay, street crime, populist leaderships – not always backed by an actual increase in the trends they are formally justified by. Speaking of values, today, no longer means speaking of the universalistic idea of "multiracial and multicultural Europe" – rather, would lead us to also face quite opposite tendencies.

In the end, this second idea can provide us with some guidelines for the analysis of bottom-up processes, we will have to analyze in WP2 and WP4.

Table 2: Synopsys: Identity, values, and a possible break-down

Framework	**Dimensions**	**Indicators**	**Tasks**
National/postnational	Institutional organization of	National and EU legislation;	European media legislation [WP1]; Regional reports [WP1];
assemblage	media markets	Dubbing policies and linguistic issues; Role of the State and EU, and public funding	Movie market report [WP1]; Economic externalities of platformization process [WP1 and WP3]; Surveillance and resistance [WP5]

Sharing of common values	Sharing of common feelings, ideas and opinions	Public debate and opinion, related to most sensitive issues	Citizen Journalism in ten countries [WP2]; Anti-European Fake News [WP2]; Representation of gender in ten countries [WP4]; Representation of immigration in ten countries [WP4]; Toxic Debate and pluralistic values [WP5]; Gender in societies [WP5]
Imagined community	Sharing of common symbolic forms	Circulation of movies, TV genres and cultural contents	Aggregated analysis [WP1]; Patterns in media production [WP1]; Patterns in media consumption [WP1]; Movie market report [WP1]; Patterns in video platform offering [WP3]; Patterns in video platform consumption [WP3]

Reviewed Literature:

Anderson B., 1983, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso.

Appadurai A., 1996, *Modernity at large. Cultural dimensions of globalization*, Minneapolis, Minnesota UP.

Bhabha H., 1994, *The Location of Culture*, London, Routledge.

Boudon R., 2011, *The Origin of Values. Sociology and Philosophy of Beliefs*, New Brunswick and London, Taylor & Francis.

Bourdieu P., 1973, *L'opinion publique n'existe pas*, "Les temps modernes", 318, 1292-1309.

Bratton B., 2016, *The Stack. On Software and Sovereignty*, Cambridge, MIT Press.

Bréchon P. & Gonthier F. [eds.], 2017, *European Values: Trends and Divides over Thirty Years*, Leiden, Brill.

Castells M., 1996, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Castells M., Caraça J. & Cardoso G. [eds.], 2012, *Aftermath*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.

Castells M. & others [eds.], 2018, *Europe's Crises*, London, Polity.

Costello R. & Robinson N. [eds.], 2020, *Comparative European Politics. Distinctive Democracies, Common Challenges*, Oxford, Oxford UP.

Dayan D. & Katz E., 1992, *Media Events. The Live Broadcasting of History,* Cambridge, Harvard UP.

Fuchs C., 2020, *Nationalism on the Internet*, New York, Routledge.

Fuchs D. & Schneider C., 2011, *Support of the EU and European Identity: Some descriptive results*, in D. Fuchs & H. D. Klingermann [eds.], *Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of EU*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 61-85.

Habermas J., 1998, *The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays*, Cambridge, MIT Press.
Holmes R., 2009, *Experimental identities (after Maastricht)*, in J. Checkel & P. Katzenstein [eds,], *European Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 52-80.

Inglehart R., 1971, *The Silent Revolution in Europe. Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies*, "The American Political Science Review", 65[4], 991-1017.

Inglehart R., 1977, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton, Princeton U.

Sassen S., 2006, *Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton, Princeton UP.

Tagiuri G., 2014, *Forging Identity: the EU and European Culture*, "Survival", 56[1], 157-178.
Todorov T. & Bracher N., 2008, *European Identity*, "South Central Review", 25[3], 3-15.

[4] The Media Dimension: Between Hard and soft power

A fourth possible solution would be to stick to a very classical dichotomy – hard power, and soft power. Europeanization as hard power would therefore include the EU media legislation [by definition], but also the structural organization of media systems, and such issues as property, market concentration, available infrastructures, business models and funding strategies, and so forth. Europeanization as soft power has rather to do with contents, images,

imagery – *how European* the European cultural industries actually are, going back to Donald Sassoon. As a matter of fact, it is my belief that soft power is one of the main problems of European Union – and this is one of the reasons behind the project itself. As we know, in the original definition provided by Joseph Nye hard power is, well, *hard*, as it has basically to do with the military level and the interstate diplomacy (and with a third level of "incontrollable" global trends, among which terrorism); and soft power is mostly thought of as the ability of shaping "the preferences of the others". Here we will have to use these categories in quite a flexible way.

In the first case, our research can be based on Barbara Thomass' work, along with the reflection on structural aspects of Europeanization; in the second case, with the circulation and consumption of European cultural contents, or with the sharing of common ideas in the ten countries. Here too, I tried to frame the research issues by keeping in mind the big picture, as I have no expertise in the field of national and European legislation. As a consequence, I am considering hard power in a wider and perhaps improper sense – as the overall arrangement of cultural markets determined at the level of regulation and infrastructure. For instance, an often-overlooked innovation – or well, that *I use* to overlook – is the introduction of portability in 2018, allowing people to use their video platforms and services in the whole territory of the Union [Herold 2019, 257-258]. To which extent European area is equipped for becoming a single market, though, is a good research question – and this would be, so to speak, the materialist way to Europeanization. At the technological level, for instance, we have to consider the fragmentation of Tv services, including OTT, terrestrial and cable pay-tv, thematic channels, IPTV [Crusafon 2015, 84-85]. This is a problem we are well-aware of, as WP1 data collection is showing an inconsistent pattern, due to both the actual organization of the market and – practically speaking – to the same object easily going by different names [i.e., cable and pay-tv; thematic channel and OTT]. The hegemony of US platforms, all in all, seems to be the main threat to Europeanization, as long as we stick to the structural side of the discourse.

By definition, soft power has more directly to do with the role of media outlets. Once again, circulation of contents among different countries and regions is a main issue, and here we will have good empirical material from WP1. Here I will simply summarize some aspects, which are connected to a series of obstacles to Europeanization:

- as previously stated, and already analyzed by Jérôme Bourdon, a lack of pan-European contents, with properly super-national broadcasting being limited to specific *events*, rather than to daily life coverage. A different position is that of Chalaby [2002, 186], who sorted out a list of the 17 more promising Tv channels "pan-European in scope", but this strikes me as an exception;
- at a more productive level, the fragmentation of distribution companies is making it difficult the reach of a wide pan-European audience, despite efforts being made at the production level [Higson 2015, 137-138];

- consequently, one may wonder if the overall industrial strategy is delivering the expected results. As a matter of fact, we know that co-productions are more easily funded by the European Union [i.e., Drake 2019, 91] – but what if the offer here is overwhelming the *demand*, in absence of a clear understating of European taste?
- finally, due to the hegemony of national culture and education, the difficulty of framing a media product or content in terms of European identity. Just to pick an example: James Bond in Como – and the economic cooperation beneath the scenes - can work as a marker of European identity, or in the end it is nothing but a British spy on an Italian lake?

With respect to the last issue, Milly Buonanno [by the way, we can easily invite her] adopted Hjort's concepts of marked and unmarked transnationalism. The idea is that of distinguishing between a plain, general and "unmarked Europeanness", and a "marked Europeanness", characterized by the "unmistakable evidence of European presence" in the creative process [2015, 210-211]. This is only a guess, but perhaps the in-depth, qualitative analysis of cultural forms – movies, in particular – could be used, in order to understand if and when, or upon which specific circumstances, co-productions become able to bear this "unmistakable evidence" of Europeanness.

Table 3: Synopsis: hard and soft power issues

	Dimensions	Indicators for Media Systems	Tasks	Work-Packages	Notes
Europeanization as Hard Power	*EU Governance*	EU media governance	EU media legislation	WP1, WP5	
	Dimensions of the market	European and national markets	Regional reports	WP1, WP5	
	Role of the State	Role of the State in media systems	Regional reports	WP1, WP5	
	Economic viability	Economic viability of media platforms in European countries	Assessing externalities of media platformization	WP2, WP3, and WP5	
Europeanization as Soft Power	*Is there an European common culture?*	Analysis of contents circulation among European countries	Analysis of movie markets in Europe: number and genres	WP1, WP5	
			Analysis of media markets in Europe: number and genres	WP1, WP5	

			Analysis of video platforms markets in Europe: number and genres	WP3, WP5	
	Are there European common values?	Issues and opinions in on-line public discussion in ten countries	Citizen Journalism in Ten Countries	WP2, WP5	
		Issues and opinions in on-line public discussion in ten countries	Representation of gender in ten countries	WP4, WP5	
		Issues and opinions in on-line public discussion in ten countries	Representation of immigration in ten countries	WP4, WP5	

Reviewed Literature:

Buonanno M., 2015, *Italian TV Drama: The Multiple Forms of European Influence*, in I. Bondebjerg, N. Redvall & A. Higson [eds.], European Cinema and Television. Cultural Policy and Everyday Life, London, Palgrave, 195-213.

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Annex III

Europeanization: An Annotated bibliography – A working paper, by Milos Hroch

Being European

> Democratic values and practices **(representative democracy)**	**Habermas, J., & Pensky, M. (2001). The postnational constellation: Political essays (1st MIT Press ed). MIT Press.** “In the national context, of course, it is harder than ever for politics to keep pace with global competition. I see the only normatively satisfactory alternative as a socially and economically effective European Union, constituted along federalist lines an alternative that points to a future cosmopolitan - order sensitive both to difference and to social equality. Only a Europe in which the domestication of violence engages each and every form of society and culture would be immune from the postcolonial relapse into Eurocentrism. And an intercultural discourse on human rights provides the terms in which a truly decentered perspective must prove itself.” (Habermas, 2001, p. xix) -interdependence; cosmopolitan solidarity -historical perspective on the construction of social welfare states in postwar-Europe -historical perspective and theoretical persp on democratic process in postwar Europe -globalization and democratic processes

	“The legal concept of self-legalisation has to acquire a political dimension: it must be broadened to include the concept of a society capable of democratic mode of self-direction and self-intervention. This is the only way that existing constitutions can be interpreted in terms of the reformist project of the realization of the "just" or "well-ordered" society."” (Habermas, p. 60) -how does globalization affect a) security of the rule of law and the effectiveness of the administrative state, b) the sovereignty of the territorial state, c) collective identity, and d) the democratic legitimacy of the nation-state? EU - postnational constellation -european unification -postnational democracy (p. 88) pp. 102-103 !!! -pan-European political public sphere -cosmopolitan democracy “Within the national sphere the only one that they can currently operate - in they have to reach out toward a European arena of action. And this arena, in turn, has to be programmatically opened up with the dual objective of creating a social Europe that can throw its weight onto the cosmopolitan scale.” (p. 112)
	Blockmans, S. & Russack, S. (2020). Deliberative Democracy in the EU Countering: Populism with

	Participation and Debate. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. "Building on the notion of increasing social, economic and political interdependence in a multi-layered European Union, we devoted the first book to the question whether a sense of solidarity and European identity could be rescued from the bottom up by empowering citizens to 'take back control' of their Union." (p. 15) "Our research revealed, among other things, that people's interest in exploring 'direct democracy' has increased as a result of the EU's polycrisis of recent years – although this trend is far from overwhelming and is even absent in some member states." (p. 15) -second book: Europeanisation of representative democracy is rather uneven across the continent <u>Democracy and Its discontents: European Attitudes to Representative Democracy and Its Alternatives (chapter)</u> "The data from a number of studies of European and global public opinion also indicate that commitment to democracy varies across Europe and that, in some countries, significant majorities find non-democratic models as desirable alternatives. Public opinion remains rather critical and distrustful of political elites; hence many Europeans tend to support direct democracy mechanisms as a way to keep their elites more accountable. This chapter suggests that increasing Europeans' commitment to democracy requires twin changes. First, European democratic

	elites should adopt a different language and develop political narratives that would counteract (and not imitate) the populists' divisive narratives." (p. 37) "The media coverage of European issues is therefore an essential 'transmission' factor for the promotion of Europarties. Only the gradual formation of a European public sphere can lead to a genuine Europeanisation of political parties in terms of fulfilling all the functions that their counterparts perform at national level." (p. 119) "(...) the interactions between national politics and Europarties should not be seen as a zero-sum game. Instead, due to several factors, such as the two-way Europeanisation (the bottomup and top-down effect of Europeanisation), the currently asymmetrical relationship between the national and the transnational level needs to be redressed." (p. 128)
> Enlightenment values (freedom, human dignity, equality, …)	**Foucault, M. (1984) What is Enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, New York: Pantheon Books.** "We must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event, or a set of events and complex historical processes, that is located at a certain point in the development of European societies. As such, it includes elements of social transformation, types of political institutions, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of knowledge and practices, technological mutations that are very difficult to sum up

	in a word, even if many of these phenomena remain important today.” (p. 43) “Humanism is something entirely different. It is a theme or, rather, a set of themes that have reappeared on several occasions, over time, in European societies; these themes, always tied to value judgments, have obviously varied greatly in their content, as well as in the values they have preserved. Furthermore, they have served as a critical principle of differentiation.” (p. 44)
	Seth, C., & von Kulessa, R. (Eds.). (2017). The Idea of Europe: Enlightenment Perspectives. OpenBook Publishers. https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0123 -ideas about Europe from: -Friederich Schiller -Rousseau -Voltaire -Montesquieu -David Hume -Kant -Victor Hugo etc.
	Anderson, P. (2009). The New Old World. London: Verso.

	“Could the Union not be described as the realization of the Enlightenment vision of the virtues of le doux commerce, that 'cure for the most destructive prejudices ' a s Montesquieu described it, pacifying relations between states in a spirit of mutual benefit and the rule of law?” (p. 67) “For 'at its core, one of the reasons that educated people support the European project is because the European values they espouse are identical with the Enlightenment values that have been a hallmark of educated people for over two hundred years. Indeed, if Europe stands for anything, it is the completion of the Enlightenment project of democracy, rule of law, respect for the differences of others, and the principles of rational discourse and science'. With ethical guidelines as compelling a s these, why should the Union fear division over mundane questions of relative advantage ? As higher education spreads,more and more young people will study abroad, and 'the best new jobs' in a shifting economy willincreasingly be 'in services such as banking, real estate, and insurance', or computer programming, requiring higher skills a n d paying higher salaries . Predictable sociological changes should of themselves create a more unified Europe, imbued more evenly with the values of the Enlightenment.” (pp. 99-100) “Social similarity-political balance-intellectual emulation cultural supremacy: such was the general syllogism of Europe, in the consensus of the Enlightenment.” (p. 479)

	Arts, W. & Halman, L. (2004). European Values at the Turn of the Millennium. https://brill.com/view/title/11360 -this book seem to demonstrate that Europe is still far from a homogenous part of the world -book explores Europe´s diversity and homogeneity at the turn of them millenium in terms of fundamental value operations -the result is the cultural map of Europe capturing diversities and similarities in value profiles of the Europeans -differences between Eastern and western European societies; despite the process of unification (of EU) it has not resulted in homogenous culture “Europe is a geographical unit but it is also an area of wide diversity in values and practices and a fascinating variation of social arrangements.” (p. 22) -based on cross-national value research -major comparative datasets from 1970s -5 comparative cross-national research projects -European Values Study (EVS) <a major empirical study of the moral and social values underlying European social and political institutionsand governing conduct. They addressed the following questions>

	– Do Europeans share common values? - Are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what directions? - Do Christian values continue to permeate European life and culture? - Is a coherent alternative meaning system replacing that of Christianity? - What are the implications for the European unification? (p. 10) --- “In order to explore the dynamics of values change, a repeat survey was necessary. A second wave of surveys was designed and pretested during the eighties and launched in 1990. The new wave of surveys, however, was designed not only to monitor changes in Europe, but also to compare the value orientations of Western Europeans with the values of people in Central and Eastern European countries.” (p. 11) --- “Referring to countries, nations, or states without defining or explaining what features should be taken into account, hardly adds new information to the observation that there appear to be differences and similarities. The problem is, however, that it has hardly been thoroughly examined or theorised what these features are or can be.” (p. 14)

	--- “(...) Notions like country, nation, and state are merely ‘black boxes’ hiding many features, which might and will be important.” (p. 14) “However, not only globally are we confronted with both cultural homogenization and cultural resilience. Also within Europe cultural unity and cultural variety exist. Despite homogenization tendencies, it is often found that Europe remains a conglomerate of national cultures that refuses to be leveled down by the invisible hand of economics and the pointing finger of politics.” (p. 16) “(...) the key components of what Inglehart calls postmodernization (Inglehart, 1997): Issues of solidarity, social engagement, quality of life and individual well-being are considered to have become the main concerns of individuals living in postmodern, economically secure societies” (p. 17)
	Wuthnow, R. (1993). Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. -enlightenment, reformation, marxist socialism = unification processes in Europe -the books studies how these innovation processes were articulated in different societies

	-examining social conditions in which such processes came into being, the book draws distinction between: 1) environmental conditions, 2) institutional contexts, 3) action sequences (p. 6) “It is a study of the ways in which social conditions in each period made cultural innovation possible, of variations in the extent to which each movement (as a carrier of its own distinctive ideology) became institutionalized in different societies, and of the ways in which the resulting ideologies were shaped by and yet succeeded in transcending their specific environments of origin.” (p. 5) “The problem of articulation is particularly enigmatic in the case of discourse that specifically challenges the status quo. The Reformation provides a vivid example. Its success depended on securing the resources necessary to organize a vast social movement. In addition to raising the more obscure points of doctrine that aroused the passions of theologians, it became a social movement that required finances, buildings, training centers, legislation, political patronage, and eventually the sword.” (pp. 3-4) “Its discourse did not occur in a social vacuum: tax systems, property rights, and political regimes were all at stake. Somehow the reformers' ideas won the support of large segments of late medieval society at the same time that these ideas were undermining the very basis of that society.” (p. 4) “The irony is that the Reformation's success required it to articulate with its social environment and to

	disarticulate from this environment at the same time. The Reformation spoke to the needs and longings of men and women living in sixteenth-century towns and villages. It seemed relevant enough to persons in power to gain their protection. It frightened others so deeply that they took up arms to stamp out the new ideas. At the same time, the reformers somehow protected themselves from merely doing the bidding of their supporters. They set the terms of their own debates rather than simply providing legitimation for those in power or for those aspiring to power. Once set in motion, their formulations created the conditions ensuring their own perpetuation. They provided moral meanings that cut across broad segments of European society and outlasted the sixteenth century. Ideas came into being that related to the concrets struggles of the sixteenth century but also dealt with lasting questions of freedom, responsibility, will, faith, righteousness, individual discipline, and civic order. The social scientist who studies the Reformation, therefore, must not only ask about the social conditions that shaped its ideology but also inquire into the reasons why these conditions did not shape it more." (pp. 5-6) "An important part of my argument, then, is that the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European socialism were social movements whose development (temporally and geographically) depended on a conjuncture of economic expansion and realignment among ruling elites." (p. 9) "In the largest sense, this is an inquiry into the ways in which the growth of capitalism in Europe since the sixteenth century, and the accompanying development

	of political institutions, has shaped the categories in which formal thinking about ourselves has often taken place." (p. 22)
> Rule of law and human rights	Saltnes, J. D. (2018). The European Union's human rights policy: is the EU's use of the human rights clause inconsistent? *Global Affairs*, vol. 4(2-3), pp. 165-177 DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2018.1535251
	Niemi-Kiesiläinen, J., Peroni, L., & Stoyanova, V. (Eds.). (2020). International law and violence against women: Europe and the Istanbul Convention. Routledge. "The signing of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in Istanbul in May 2011 was a significant development in the protection of women against violence and in the development ofinternational law. The Istanbul Convention confirmsthat States have an obligation to protect women and others against violence." (p. 1) "International human rights instruments have increasingly addressed gender-stereotypical assumptions of violence and the gendered passiveness of the criminal justice system" (p. 2) "International human rights instruments have increasingly addressed gender-stereotypical assumptions of violence and the gendered passiveness of the criminal justice system" (p. 3)

	-violence against women in international law (pp. 3-6) “The goals of the Convention are ambitious and broad. The main goals are the elimination of violence against women and the protection of women against all forms of violence (Article 1(a)). Since violence against women is seen as a manifestation of unequal power relations between women and men and as discrimination against women, the Convention also aims at eliminating discrimination against women and at empowering women (Article 1(b)). The Convention puts violence against women in the context of inequality between the sexes and urges States to address inequality, cultural patterns and stereotypes on women and men that facilitate violence against women and hamper policies aimed at preventing violence and protecting women (Article 12(1)).” (p. 8) -prevention, protection, support -impact of the Convention in EU -in the last chapter of Part I, Sara De Vido explores the impact of the Istanbul Convention as an interpretative tool at the European level. --- “Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex persons (LGBTI) gained much attention in the so-called “Europeanization of socialmovements”.33 For instance, the International Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), founded in 1978, gained access to the European Union (EU) in the nineties, and managed to get sexual

	orientation and gender identity issues on the EU agenda.34 These claims gained momentum in 2006, following the adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and contributing to the “normalisation” of homosexuality in Europe.” (p. 30)
	Dzehtsiarou, K. (Ed.). (2014). Human rights law in Europe: The influence, overlaps and contradictions of the EU and the ECHR. Routledge. “Over the last decade, the case law of both the Strasbourg and the Luxembourg courts has developed towards greater convergence concerning the protection of fundamental rights. Major institutional changes emphasise a genuine willingness to place the rights of the individual at the centre of political concerns.” (p. xii) “In this respect, the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘CFR’ or ‘the Charter’) certainly shows the way forward by widening the scope of the rights delineated by the European Convention and its Protocols (‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’). At the symbolic level, but more importantly at the political and practical levels, the Charter is a solemn commitment to respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ fundamental rights.” (p. xii) “The Charter is a fundamental document that emanates from an autonomous legal order, that of the EU. But the application of the Charter cannot replace external control. This is the role entrusted to the ECtHR. In order to guarantee the ‘effet utile’ of Article 52(3) CFR, according to which the meaning and scope of those

	rights are the same as those laid down by the said Convention and Union law is not prevented from providing more extensive protection, external control is essential. This external control by the Strasbourg Court provides a guarantee against divergent case law, which would be a disaster for the individual holder of rights. Accession is therefore an indispensable tool for the harmonious development of the case law of both European Courts. The Charter and accession are therefore complementary measures. The European Courts (in Strasbourg and in Luxembourg) are working together to ensure improved protection of human rights. This is the global vision for fundamental rights in Europe: a Europe of rights." (p. xxi)
> Shared histories, narratives, epistemologies, cultural production	**Wilson, T. M. (ed.) (2006). Food, Drink and Identity in Europe. New York: Rodopi.** -eating and drinking have increasingly been considered by scholars in the humanities and social sciences as constituent elements in the creation and reproduction of local, regional and national cultures and identities in Europe "(...)such approaches are part of the newer scholarship to Europeanization and European integration (which has turned to issues of social identification in its attempt to identify forces that will enhance or hinder the realization of an ever closer union) focus in particular on the consumptive patterns that have shaped some European national histories, that today help to

	constitute changing identity and culture in various localities and nations in Europe, and which have fostered a variety of forms of Europeanization within the context of European integration" (p. 14) --- "Europeanization is a term which is increasingly being used by scholars, policy-makers, journalists and many more people in the European Union (EU), to describe processes of becoming more European, in a variety of ways and means. While political scientists and international relations experts concentrate on Europeanization as a process of convergence in political structure and form, sociologists and anthropologists have examined Europeanization and its related identifications with 'Europe' as processes which go beyond political and economic adaptations to EU institutions and policies" (p. 16) --- -europeanization = movement of ideas, peoples, things which is radically changing various notions of traditional and modern culture and identity, thereby changing the groundwork of local, regional, and national social, economic and political frames of reference -europeanization = not a subversion of local, regional and national identities and cultures, but a supplement or complement -europeanization is a process in the reconfiguration of various identities in Europe, in a manner which

	contextualizes without supplanting national, regional and local identities (p. 17) --- “Europeanization is a form of cross-border and transnational societal interpenetration, a force in the transformation of the state, a discursive and sociocognitive transformation in almost all levels of European societies, and an overall force in the transformation of modernity in Europe” (p. 18)
	Arnold, K., Preston, P. & Kinnebrock, S. (2019). The Handbook of European Communication History. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. “(...) Both history and European perspectives had been central to many of the pioneering attempts to theorize and make sense of the rise of the distinctly “modern” social, economic, and political transformations in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries. For example, David Hume’s (1741) political essays, including that on “The Liberty of The Press,” were animated by a historical and distinctly European imaginary – in keeping with the fact that a substantial share of his royalty earnings were derived from readers based on the continent” (p. 1) -Hume´s view very ethno- and British-centric -”Yet rather similar historical and European orientations can be found in several subsequent nineteenth-century studies engaging with cross-national and comparative analyses of the evolving forms and practices of

	“democracy,” “public opinion” and the press or (print) media” (p. 2) -Weber, Benjamin, Laswell etc. “The late Enlightenment period was informed and marked by intensified exchanges between the leading intellectuals across Europe. With respect to the leading intellectuals, merchants, and other elites, we may note semblances of a shared cultural and political public sphere from the eighteenth century, especially in the decades leading up to the French Revolution. Indeed, by then, the different nations and peoples were made aware of significant developments and historical moments unfolding in other parts of Europe.” (p. 4) -Durkheim observed a tendency for the formation of common identities in Europe (p. 5) “Ideas and arguments typically associated with concepts such as globalization and (diminishing) “space-time-distanciation” (e.g. Giddens 2002)certainly privileged space over time. But the analysis ofmany such proponents was marked by a rather impoverished historical understanding of earlier phasesand forms of more or less intensified political and economic integration and exchanges, at both Europeanand world levels.” (p. 6) -still defending historical perspective: “There is now much less confidence in the universality or sustainability of the capitalist market and the hegemonic neo-liberal regulatory regime compared to the situation in the 1980s or 1990s. On the other hand,

	new transnational anti-capitalist movements such as Occupy Wall Street or Attac emerged and drew support from mass protests, rather like those, such as Syriza and Podemos, which later manifested in Southern Europe during the 2010–2015 period. Such ground-up developments seemed to clearly signal, in certain subaltern European public spheres at least, that a (re)turn to thinking and debating the meaning of "Europe" along the dimension of time and history was gaining in importance once more. Seemingly new concepts and ideas such as "another Europe is possible" do not merely seek to maintain, but aim to radically reform the inherited path of deeper economic, financial, and political integration within the EU region. They also seek to reach back, appropriate, and re-mobilize key aspects of the strongly European and internationalist spirit that animated the two most significant social movements of the late nineteenth century: the labor movement (with its trade union and socialist political currents) and the women's liberation and rights movement ("first wave" modern feminism)" (p. 7) -cross-national historical studies "Cross-national studies have provided valuablefindings about commonalities and differences in European media structures, public communication, or journalism, but usually they lack historical depth. Variations and convergence cannot be fully understoodwithout looking at longer periods of time in a diachronicperspective and without more structured historical analyses of the emergence and institutionalization of

	specific moments of mediated communication in Europe" (p. 9) "(...)we might say that historical studies of media and communication across different European countries, societal, and cultural settings still remain a young but growing field of studies. However, we are confident that analyses of how mass media, journalism, and public spheres operate as both agents and products of various and complex modernization processes andhow these developed in certain geographical and cultural settings are likely to grow and become increasingly important in the coming years." (p. 11) ""Europe" is more than just a geographical region and, as indicated above, it connotes ideas about specific and shared values or realities characterized increasingly by transnational experiences, multiple links, converging (if not truly common) life-styles, institutions, and problems" (p. 11) (p. 11) Looking at prior cross-national studies, we note that several potential categories can be identified and mobilized to form typologies for communication structures or cultures in Europe, for example: Social class structures and evolving roles/forms of "publics" and public opinion Forms and extent of the separation of politics from media processes Development of media markets and/or journalistic professionalism

	• State control and state interventions Innovators, adopters, or active appropriations of new (media) technologies, capabilities, or media practices • Forms, extent and practices of electoral democracy • Imperial/hegemonic versus subaltern politics/cultures • Varieties of capitalism typologies Egalitarianism vs. stratification, the role of social reform and welfare • Large and small cultures/societies/nations Density of population, rural vs. urban, agrarian vs. industrialized regions • Extent of individualism vs. communitarianism Secularization versus religious belief systems: extent and forms Protestant versus Catholic or Orthodox cultural traditions Northern vs. Southern Europe: environmentally shaped cultures, ways of life Western vs. Eastern Europe: (former) communist and west/liberal countries Extent and traditions of multiculturalism, migration, and colonial heritage

	• Successive hegemonic cities and their core-regions • etc.
	Schlesinger, P. (1992). 'Europeanness' - a new cultural battlefield? Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 5(2), 11–23. -to analyze national identity in Europe is to aim at moving target (how to deal with change) -easiest is to come up with normative approach: need for democratic forms that permit and guarantee the coexistence of different faiths, cultures, and ethnicities in conditions of mutual respect -minimise the importance of defending frontiers associated with the nationalist project of the nation-state, where one state, one culture, one people is taken to be the norm -how to distinguish between the desirable and possible -to talk about Europe is to enter a field of discursive struggle -the nation-state is a political configuration of modernity "I would suggest that the present salience of national identity in European politics confutes the view that the grand narratives are passé, and that there are no compelling tales of solidarity to tell. Both the emergent nation-states of the old East, and the supranationalising European Community are heavily dependent upon

	convincing us that tales of solidarity within bounded communities are both plausible and desirable." (p.14) -old model of national sovereignty will not go, given the reality of global interdependence -collective identities -difficult search for a transcendent unity vs. ethno-nationalist awakening in the former communist bloc and current developments within western Europe -what is European identity = still open question -tendency to reaffirm the principle of the nation-state as a locus of identity and of political control "Europe is simultaneously undergoing processes of centralisation and of fragmentation. These processes pass through the nation-state and are more and more throwing into relief questions of collective identity. Culture is therefore going to be one of the key political battlefields in the 1990s." (p. 22)
	McKitterick, R. (2008). Charlemagne: Formation of a European Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -Charlemagne, king of the Franks from 768 to 814 promoted Christianity, education and learning -hailed as the father of Europe "(...)there are contemporary or near contemporary representations of the ruler and, on the other, as we

	have seen, Charlemagne has come to symbolize the common roots of European political and legal culture, with an impact on ideology and imagination that can be traced across the 1,200 years since he died" (p. 5)
	Schmale, W. (2010). Processes of Europeanization -Processes resulting in the development of a single European culture can be bundled under the term Europeanization. -The majority of these processes played out over the long-term, but accelerated since the second half of the 18th century. Their effect served to construct coherencies out of diversity. -The major processes of Europeanization often correspond to the core characteristics used to refer to epochs such as the Renaissance, the Baroque age, or the Enlightenment. Minor processes of Europeanization emerge in conjunction with a large number of cultural transfers, which hone a number of cultural assets through transfer, enabling them to fit into a number of different contexts. Many objects, concepts, recipes, drinks, pieces of furniture etc. constituting everyday European life are the results of such processes -The first process of Europeanization was presented by the spread of Roman culture through the expansion of the Imperium Romanum. -Roman cultural imperialism was also of decisive importance in the spread of Christianity, which itself is

	not to be classified as a unitary process of Europeanization -Working within these geographical boundaries, the extent of penetration of these various agents of Europeanization (Romanic, Gothic, Renaissance) increased with each new wave. -The cultural model of the Renaissance introduced a new form of Europeanization. -The dawn of the French Revolution saw a considerable increase in the number of processes of Europeanization -One other agent of Europeanization was (and indeed is) the European historiography. First manifesting itself in the 15th and 16th centuries, the word itself was coined in the 18th century, but has reached a pan-European audience only since then. The conception of a singular European culture was first developed by cultural historians of the Enlightenment, receiving a chronology and being read as the story of uninterrupted progress. Although the latter is no longer a modern research paradigm, European history is written and read in a number of languages across Europe. (pp. 1-6)
	Halle, R. (2014). Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities. Champaign, Il: University of Illinois Press.

	-examples primarily from Germany, Poland, Turkey (all three play important roles within the contemporary processes of Europeanization) (p. 187) “For questions of globalization or specifically of Europeanization, this ideational connecting space is important because it is seldom if ever the case that people experience themselves as European. Europe is not a meta-identity. Europe is a space of transit crisscrossing and connecting A and B. Europe is not experienced” (p. 5) “Europeanization promotes border-crossings and the proliferation of imaginative communities. Europe, inasmuch as it is a space, is an interzonal terrain.” (p. 10) “Europeanization is not simply the easy and immediate sublation of the nation state into a broader and more advanced form. It is a different if not alternative imaginative community. This study fundamentally critiques this general assumption found in the discussions of transnationalism, especially those focused on the European Union that understand European transnationalism as supranationalism. Europeanization retains the nation-state and yet unleashes the potential of other forms of social organization to exist in increased significance: the local, regional, global, but also the subcultural, minoritarian, ethnic, migrant, diasporic, exiled, displaced, relocated, nongovernmental. Not just the imagined community, but rather as this study investigates, cinema offers images for various imaginative communities. Unlike print culture, which was bound immediately to linguistic

	and ethnic-national communities, film from its start proved capable of crossing borders and appealing to divergent communities." (p. 22)
	Lobato, R. (2019). Netflix Nations: The Geography of Digital Distribution. New York: NYUP. -Chapter 5, "Content, Catalogs, and Cultural Imperialism," focuses on cultural policy debates relating to Netflix catalogs, especially regarding local content, and examines how regulators in the European Union (EU) and Canada are attempting to develop local content policies for over- the- top services. (p. 16) -from national to transnational television - and back (p. 50) -Netflix (both transnational and global) -HBO (transnational but not global) - because it offers its service only in select markets in Latin America, Central Europe and Asia -the history of broadcast television is closely tied to the history of the nation-state, internet distribution something else
	"A Social History of Europe" by H. Kaelble **Transnational History of Contemporary Europe** General outline: I. Basic Social Constellations

	II. Social Inequalities and Hierarchies III. Society and State -European family -Social mobility -in the first era, between the 1950s and 1960s, differences of income and wealth clearly decreased in most European countries" -the development reversed from the 1970s and 1980s on. The reduced inequality in the distribution of wealth disappeared in most European countries -a decrease in chances to advance socially would have been one of the reasons for the moroseness, pessimism about the future, and growing mistrust of the political and economic elites in Europe from the 1980s and 1990s onward -labor migration to Europe since 1950s *-europeanization through (labor) migration* European Hallmarks: The upheaval of Europe, shifting from "a source of global, massive emigration unique within world history […]" to becoming one of "the most important centers of immigration" (p. 195) The juxtaposition of existing territorial minorities with immigrant minorities who lived in cities … "[this] simultaneously represented older traditional conflicts of

	nationality that were based on vert different grounds" (p. 196) US and Europe differed in the regions of origin of migrants LATAM vis a vis Mediterranean, resulting in the indifferent religious makeup of the countries. European attitudes to immigration were two faceted: European Union members' commitment to full integration opened the borders of wealthier countries to peripheral countries. Yet, it refused to see itself as a land of immigration with respect of foreigners outside of Europe -chapter 8 The Media and the European Public Sphere -postwar period: emerging of European consciousness -internationalization and europeanization after the 1980s: 1) more media privatization 2) internationalization (international media corporations) emerging of a European public sphere through media (growing importance of European decision- making, European public sphere on agenda) -chapter 9 - Social movements, Conflicts and Civil Society -the student movement, regional movements, environmental movements

	Rietbergen, P. (2015). Europe: A Cultural History. 3. (edition). New York: Routledge. -a search for Europe -Europe - and Europeanness? (preface) -Max Weber - Vorbemerkung (foreword to a collection of essays Gesammelte Ausfätze zur Religionssoziologie) -European = rationalism -he ponders those elements of culture that he, and others, felt to be 'typically' European, that on closer inspection also could be considered characteristics of other, non-European cultures and societies and could, therefore, be termed 'universal' -notions of self and other; essence of Europe (valid science & music and architecture), printed press (he does not relate it to science and to print culture, but to education), European institutions As Weber argues, it is a professional bureaucracy that 'determines our very existence, the political, technical and science-organizational preconditions of our life, [through] state officials who also carry the most important daily functions of society.' Following his own logic, he then characterizes as typically European the phenomenon of the bureaucratic, rational, legal state. The link to the existence of an elected parliament may not be a logical one for every reader.

	-definite danger in Weber´s general approach: anachronism, or even a de-historicizing and dehistoricized perspective tending towards a timeless universalism, or Europeanism (justification of the hegemony of the West) -Europe: old Europe, new Europe, old borders, new borders (p. 22 - in pdf pp.) “By the twenty-first century, all over geographical Europe, 'nations', mostly imagined communities created, like the Baltic ones, out of older, regional cultures, have to come to terms with institutional Europe: the Europe of the Union, of Brussels and its seemingly endless stream of rules and laws. But they also face another Europe, which terms itself the actual foundation for that very Union: a cultural Europe that, according to many, makes the political, social and economic Europe both logical and viable.” (p. 24) “There is a Europe beyond the idea and the ideal of it, a Europe forever between old and new borders; a Europe of people who have a shared history, a shared culture that identifies them, and makes them what they are - for, as the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre wrote: 'je suis mon passe' - I am what my past has made me.” (pp. 27-28) “If anything, Europe is a political and cultural concept, invented and experienced by an intellectual elite more specifically whenever there was cause to give a more precise definition of the western edge of Eurasia, the earth's largest land mass. When was there cause to give such a definition? Often in a moment or period of

	crisis, of confrontation. After all, it is only when self-definition is necessary that people become self reflective and describe their own identity." (p. 29) "Europe has been described first, as an asian princess of that name, subsequently, as a Greek demigoddess, and finally as the queen of the world. Europe has been expressed metaphorically in images and words that encode emotions. In short, Europe has been the result of ways of thinking, of ideologies that actively contributed to the creation of realities. Europe has even become an objective geographical concept. Because of all that, Europe now is a more or less strongly felt bond between those living in it. Europe is situated in that area of tension which links dream to deed, thinking to doing. But it has always been and still is an excluding criterion for those who want to distinguish themselves from an outside world as well." (p. 29) -the idea of Europe was often voiced: 1) ideal community, 2) a utopia, 3) the instrument of a political elite -roots of today anti-migration tendencies: Black Monday 1987 (19 October) - the sociopolitical climate hardened and sometimes appallingly racist rhetoric developed obviously geared to isolate the new Europeans - who is European and who is non-European "Often indiscriminately, all this opprobrium was lumped together under labels such as non-European, non-Christian, Islamic. In an intricate, dangerous way, this

	'populist' discourse got mixed up with the debate about the process of European unification." (p. 542) -over the past decade, anti-unification and anti-foreign rhetoric is growing (p. 544)
	Motschenbacher, H. (2016). Language, Normativity and Europeanisation: Discursive Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest. London: Palgrave. -intersectional discourse analysis between National and European) -the centre of attention is not the differences between the nations in the contest but discursive mechanisms that unite them (Europeanisation) -Europeanisation is not distributed equally "(...) the most recent crises affecting the European landscape, that is, the Brexit, Grexit and refugee crises , have revealed quite drastically that what is still missing in this process of Europeanisation is the development of a credible European identity as the basis for cross-European solidarity" (p. 2) "Europeanisation is not equally distributed among social categories, since male , young and well-educated people as well as those with a higher income and socioeconomic status or with left-wing political attitudes show higher European identification rates" (p. 3)

	“National identities are typically conceptualised via certain defining criteria, whereas Europeanisation exhibits a conceptual openness which potentially provides a space for various cultural identities (e.g. heterogeneous national, religious or linguistic identities) and can be characterised as poststructuralist in the sense that it is, to some extent, contextually negotiable what it means to be “European” or to belong to “Europe”.” (p. 4)
	Judt, T. (2005) Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin Press. -investigation & interrogation of European pasts - one of the achievements and sources of European unity (the experience of holocaust etc unites us) ”Vienna in 1989 was a palimpsest of Europe's complicated, overlapping pasts. In the early years of the twentieth century Vienna was Europe: the fertile, edgy, self-deluding hub of a culture and a civilization on the threshold of apocalypse. Between the wars, reduced from a glorious imperial metropole to the impoverished, shrunken capital of a tiny rump-state, Vienna slid steadily from grace: finishing up as the provincial outpost of a Nazi empire to which most of its citizens swore enthusiastic fealty.” (p. 2) -Vienna for Judt is a good place from which to 'think' Europe

	-Austria embodied all the slightly self-satisfied attributes of post-war western Europe -Vienna = between East and West; remained neutral before joining the EU “Europe's recovery was a 'miracle'. 'Post-national' Europe had learned the bitter lessons of recent history. An irenic, pacific continent had risen, 'Phoenix-like', from the ashes of its murderous—suicidal—past” (p. 5) “World War One destroyed old Europe; World War Two created the conditions for a new Europe.” (p. 6) <u>Epilogue - From the House of the Dead: An Essay on Modern European Memory</u> -experience of holocaust defines Europeans (it is "our European entry ticket") “Serbia will continue to languish on the European doorstep until its political class takes responsibility for the mass murders and other crimes of the Yugoslav wars. But the reason crimes like these now carry such a political charge—and the reason 'Europe' has invested itself with the responsibility to make sure that attention is paid to them and to define 'Europeans' as people who do pay attention to them— is because they are partial instances (in this case before and after the fact respectively) of the crime: the attempt by one group of Europeans to exterminate every member of another group of Europeans, here on European soil, within still living memory” (p. 804)

	“The Western solution to the problem of Europe's troublesome memories has been to fix them, quite literally, in stone.” (p. 826) “All the same, the rigorous investigation and interrogation of Europe's competing pasts—and the place occupied by those pasts in Europeans' collective sense of themselves—has been one of the unsung achievements and sources of European unity in recent decades.” (p. 830)
	Bergfelder, T. (2005). National, transnational or supranational cinema? Rethinking European film studies. Media, Culture & Society, 27(3), 315–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443705051746 -what has been striking is how little impact the supranational implication of the term ‘European’ has had on theoretical frameworks and methodologies in the area of European cinema -in most cases research into European cinema still equals research into discrete national cinemas -between national and supranational, the study of European cinema can be seen to mirror the central debate of the European project more generally (namely to negotiate and reconcile the desires for cultural specificity and national identity with the larger ideal of a supranational community -the article puts an emphasis on transnational interaction and cross-cultural reception

	-academic discussion of European cinema has over the last 15 years centred on three major issues: the problematization of the term ‘Europe’, the question of national and cultural identity, and the question of cultural distinctions and hierarchies between high and low (or popular) culture (p. 316) -in constantly changing Europea, and in a global media landscape, the notion of European cinema offers possible framework of cultural or industrial interaction -European cinema = more than the sum total of separate and divergent national film styles (p. 329) “Like the European idea on a larger scale, European cinema as a concept is defined by the simultaneous agencies of dispersal and recentring, which perpetually challenge easy solutions to the questions of identity and ‘home’.” (p. 329)
	Delanty, G. (1995). Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan. -post-national citizenship -every age reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity-Europe is a cultural construction, no self-evident entity (it is an idea as much as a reality) -European idea expresses our culture´s struggle with its contradictions and conflicts “With respect to the notion of 'European unity' I shall be arguing that the critical and self-examining traditions in

	European culture have in fact rarely appealed to the idea of unity as their normative standpoint - the exception here being anti-fascist resistance" (p.2) -the idea of Europe has been more connected to the state tradition and elite cultures than with the politics of civil society --- "To speak of Europe as an 'invention' is to stress the ways in which it has been constructed in a historical process; it is to emphasise that Europe is less the subject of history than its product and what we call Europe is, in fact, a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics" (p. 3) "The sociological concept of a 'discourse' can help to explain this: Europe cannot be reduced to an idea, an identity or a reality since it itself is a structuring force. What is real is the discourse in which ideas and identities are formed and historical realities constituted" (p. 3) "The Europe (between idea, identity and reality) is like a football game "The ball is Europe, the players the identity projects and the pitch the geo-political reality on which the game, in this instance the discourse, is played. (...) The European idea is quite simply a political football." (p. 4) -the project of Europeanism & post-national citizen "Since a collective European identity cannot be built on language, religion or nationality without major divisions

	and conflicts emerging, citizenship may be a possible option. Given the obsolescence of the Cold War idea of Europe, there is now a greater need than ever before for a new definition of Europeanism that does not exclude the stranger." (p. 15)
> Shared capitalism	**Schmidt, V. A. (2002). The futures of European Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.** -the challenges of globalization and europeanization -globalization vs europeanization (primarily as sets of economic pressures) -globalization: set of economic, institutional, ideational forces (governments have given up significant amounts of national autonomy) "The loss of national autonomy as well as of control in consequence of global forces and institutions, however, differs in relationship to how much countries share in the decisions of supranational authorities and feel the effects of their control" (p. 14) "As a set of economic pressures, Europeanization has acted both as a conduit for global forces and as a shield against them, opening member states to international competition in the capital and product markets at the same time as they protect them through monetary integration and the Single Market. As a set of institutional pressures, the European Union has gone way beyond any other international or regional economic authority with regard to the vast array of rules and rulings affecting its member states. And as a set of

	ideas, European integration has been driven by a common political project for economic liberalization which has been much more compelling than that of any other regional grouping of countries in the world, and which has served as a complement to the liberalizing ideas related to globalization." (p. 14) "How, then, does one characterize the future of European capitalism? Not as one future but as several, with European countries pursuing different pathways to adjustment in response to the pressures of globalization and European integration. Instead of convergence, we do better to talk of European countries going in the same liberalizing direction, but making different policy choices within the more restricted range available; of moving towards greater market orientation while continuing to conform to three national varieties of capitalism, even if sectors and regions may become more salient in an increasingly integrated European economy; and of persisting with different culturally and historically rooted discourses that serve for better or for worse to generate and legitimize the liberalizing changes in policies and market-oriented changes in practices." (pp. 309-310)
	Menz, G. (2008). Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanization: National Response Strategies to the Single European Market. -Europeanization: top-down and bottom-up -impact of Europeanization, and the way in which a sample of diverse organized European varieties of capitalism may respond to and cope with top-down EU-

	led economic liberalization by devising national response strategies “Scholarly attention has recently shifted from the earlier focus on ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization, involving theshift of decision-making power to the EU, towards the examination of the ‘top-down’ implications and effects of Europeanization on the member states (He´ritier et al. 1996; Schmidt 1996b; He´ritier et al. 2001; Knill 2001; Borzel 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003).” (p. 24) -earlier approaches: 1) functionalist, 2) liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, or 3) institutional approach -more recent analytical endeavor sought to clarify the implications of the 'central penetration of national systems of governance' (p. 24) -the internalization of Europe proceeds not only through implementation and adaptation processes, but also through ways in which the institutional rules of the game are affected at the national level (p. 24) -the study focuses on the top-down impact of Europeanization and its bottom-up regulation -the chapter explores the dynamics of Europeanization and its implications for various systems of organized politico-economic governance throughout the Europe -sketch of the systems in Nordic countries, France, Germany, Netherlands etc.

	Jacobsen, J. K. S. (2003). The Tourist Bubble and the Europeanisation of Holiday Travel. Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change, 1(1), 71–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14766820308668160 -The focus is on the idea of 'travelling parochialism', i.e. whether large proportions of contemporary international holidaymakers and other travellers on their tours within Europe adopt some kind of furtherance of a home-like culture -the idea of the 'tourist bubble' understood here as a territorial and functional differentiation and as an expectation of holidaymakers going abroad -the study analyses the extent to which the notion of the tourist bubble is still benecial in comprehending significant aspects of inter-European holiday travel in relation to current discourses of internationalisation, Europeanisation and cosmopolitanism (p. 71) -international tourism described as "utopia of difference" (van den Abbeele, 1980: 8) -Europeanisation is regarded as an orchestration of diverse and international relations rather than unidirectionality and homogenisation -Moreover, Europeanisation may be seen as the reorganisation of territory. Europeanisation is here conceived of as internationalisation processes within or emerging from Europe, including propensities towards a practical unification of Europe and other parts of the

	globe with many European visitors and/or considerable European influence. -In a tourism research context, Europeanisation encompasses facets of de-differentiation and disembedding of tourism-associated services, predominantly related to interlinkages between the parts of civil society. (p. 74)

Becoming (more) European

> Increased European governance & policies	**Wallace, H, Pollack, M. A. & Young, A. R. (2015). Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.** -intergovernmentalism > supernationalism -new transnational modes are emerging -Theories of European Integration (pp. 15-25): 1) neo-functionalism 2) intergovernmentalism 3) liberal intergovernmentalism 4) the new institutionalism in rational choice 5) constructivism 6) integration theory today -the EU policy process is based on west European experience -the west European experience, in which the EU is embedded, is one of which dense multilateralism is a strong feature (p. 5) “Until 2004 the member countries of the EU, and its various precursors, were west European countries with

	market economies and liberal democratic polities, even though some, notably Greece, Portugal, and Spain, had moved quite swiftly from authoritarian regimes to EU membership in the 1980s, and from 1991 Germany included as new Länder what had been the German Democratic Republic under a communist regime. It is not our contention that these countries are all neatly fitted into a single political and economic mould, but nonetheless they have some strong shared characteristics which permeate the EU policy process." (p. 5) "The EU constitutes a particularly intense form of multilateralism, but western Europe constituted a region of countries with an apparent predisposition to engage in cross-border regime building. In part this relates to specific features of history and geography, but it seems also to be connected to a political culture of investing in institutionalized cooperation with neighbours and partners, at least in the period since the second world war. This is part of the reason why transnational policy development has become more structured and more iterative than in most other regions of the world" (p. 5) "The EU has, since its inception, been active in a rather wide array of policy domains, and indeed has over the decades extended its policy scope. Most international or transnational regimes are more one-dimensional" (p. 6) "Moreover, the same EU institutions, and the same national policy-makers, have different characteristics, exhibit different patterns of behaviour, and produce

	different kinds of outcome, depending on the policy domain and depending on the period. Thus, as we shall see, there is no single and catch-all way of capturing the essence of EU policy-making. All generalizations need to be nuanced" (p. 6) -Five variants of the EU policy process: 1) a traditional Community method 2) the EU regulatory mode 3) the EU distributional mode 4) policy coordination 5) intensive transgovernmentalism
	Featherstone, F., Papadimitriou, D. (2008). The Limits of Europeanization Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. London: Palgrave. "Europeanization represents a seemingly pervasive but variable intrusion of an external dimension into domestic systems. The dividing line between the EU and domestic politics is thus blurred." (p. 1) "'Europeanization' testifies to the capabilities of the EU. It is not only a matter of how the EU impacts on domestic systems – setting laws, creating obligations – but also of how national governments seek to shape the agenda of the EU as a whole, inserting their interests and preferences into common policies and understandings." (p. 1)

	-two-way relationship: ideas and pressures flow in both directions, shaping the politics and economics of each other. Indeed, the relationship takes on further interest -the limits of Europeanization process analyzed on the example of Greek political system “The state administration is weak in implementing and upholding EU commitments. Within government and between government and other domestic actors there is a political struggle over the adaptation to EU policies, especially where there are distributional issues involved. More widely, there is a cultural resistance concerning national identity, traditions, and habits. To some extent this is a matter of cultural pride in the Greek ‘way’ and is based on distinct social values of heritage, reciprocity, and loyalty. Resistance involves both sectional interests and cultural choice.” (p.9)
	Trondal, J. (2010). An Emergent European Executive Order. -RQs: . If a European Executive Order is emerging, how can we identify it empirically? . If a European Executive Order is emerging, how can we explore its core dynamics by explaining -It is suggested that the European Executive Order transforms an inherent Westphalian order to the extent that an intergovernmental dynamic is supplemented by different mixes of supranational, departmental, and/or

	epistemic dynamics. In summary, the transformation of executive orders in Europe implies that the mix of mismatching dynamics is rebalanced towards the latter three (Lieberman 2002). A system transformation is assumed to profoundly affect executive politics by rebalancing decision-making processes, refocusing adherence to organizational goals, shifting executive powers, and ultimately changing policy outcomes (p. 2) -the book also theoretically explores the conditions under which different combinations of decision-making dynamics gain prominence -organizational theory: a powerful tool for approaching emergent European Executive Order (p. 5) - an emergent European Executive Order is multidimensional and lives with inherent tensions between at least four decision-making dynamics. This list is not exhaustive, but suggests the key dynamics of an emergent European Executive Order: 1. Intergovernmental dynamic 2. Supranational dynamic 3. Departmental dynamic 4. Epistemic dynamic “European Executive Order is not neutral tool used by member governments to fulfill prefixed preferences, it i also a Weberian rule-driven Order, an epistemic community of professional experts, and a socializing

	Order that transforms nationally oriented officialt into community-minded supranational officials" (p. 5) "EU-level agencies are increasingly seen as multilevel network administrations that contribute to a subsequent Europeanization of domestic agencies." (p. 21)
	Brand, A & Niemann, A. (2007). Europeanisation in the societal/trans-national realm: What European Integration Studies can get out of analysing football. -Most studies have emphasised top-down dynamics inherent in this particular notion of Europeanisation, whereas bottom-up and/or transnational processes and attempts to analyse their interplay have entered the debate only recently -the study contributes to this debate by focusing on what we describe as the 'societal/trans-national' dimension of Europeanisation: this dimension encapsulates (1) the level and sphere of change; and (2) the type of agency generating or resisting change (p. 2) -analysis of the impact of European-level governance - the case law of European Court of Justice and the Community´s competences in the area of competition policy - on German football ----- "As a starting point, Europeanisation is understoodhere as the process of change in the domestic arena

	resulting from the European level of governance. However, Europeanisation is not viewed as a unidirectional but as a two-way-process which develops both top-down and bottom-up. Top-down perspectives largely emphasise vertical developments from the European to the domestic level (Ladrech 1994, Schmidt 2002). Bottom-up accounts stress the national influence concerning European level developments (which in turn feeds back into the domestic realm). This perspective highlights that Member States are more than passive receivers of European-level pressures. They may shape policies and institutions on the European level to which they have to adjust at a later stage (Börzel 2002). By referring to Europeanisation as a two way process our conceptualisation underlines the interdependence between the European and domestic levels for an explanation of Europeanisation (processes)." (p. 4)
	Featherstone, K., Radaelli, C. M. (Eds.). (2003). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -europeanization of public policy -europeanization of national administrative systems -europeanization as interpretation, translation, and public policies -europeanization as convergence

	-europeanization and organizational change in national trade associations -differentiated europeanizaation (large and small firms in the EU policy process) -europeanization goes east “'Europeanization' has little value if it merely repeats an existing notion. It is not a simple synonym for European regional integration or even convergence, though it does overlap with aspects of both. As a term for the social sciences, it can range over history, culture, politics, society, and economics. It is a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests. In a maximalist sense, the structural change that it entails must fundamentally be of a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 'Europe'. Minimally, 'Europeanization' involves a response to the policies of the European Union (EU). Significantly, even in the latter context, the scope of 'Europeanization' is broad, stretching across existing member states and applicant states, as the EU´s weight across the continent grows.” (p. 3) <u>Europeanization as:</u> 1) historic phenomenon 2) transnational cultural diffusion 3) institutional adaptation

	Europeanization as an analytical tool focus stresses key changes in contemporary politics: -adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest sense at different political levels in response to the dynamics of integration -role of the pre accession process in the continued democratization and 'marketization' of central Europe -emergence of new, cross-national policy networks and communities -nature of policy mimicry and transfer between states and subnational authorities -shifts in cognition, discourse, and identity affecting policy in response to European developments -restructuring of the strategic opportunities available to domestic actors, as EU commitments, having a differential impact on such actors, may serve as a source of leverage (pp. 19-20) -key pp. 19-20 for theorizing europeanization !!!
	Carlson, S., Eigmüller, M., & Lueg, K. (2018). Education, Europeanization and Europe's social integration. An introduction. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 31(4), 395–405. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2018.1550388 -"Europeanization" which either denotes national changes towards European standards and compliance

	with a supranational entity (Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003) or relates to the socio-structural foundations of European integration and its societal consequences (Favell and Guiraudon 2009) (p. 395) -European spirit = education (p. 396 - list of initiatives on national and European level) “All of these actions aim to strengthen the “European dimension” in education and thus to bolster its Europeanization. Simultaneously, this aim is linked to the idea that a Europeanized education will provide a “common ground” for allmembers of the European population, be it in terms of language skills, shared values, mutual understanding, or a shared sense of the past.” (p. 396) “The Europeanization of education is perceived as contributing fundamentally to Europe’s social integration” (p. 396)
	Hudson, R. (2000). One Europe or Many? Reflections on becoming European. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 25(4), 409–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-2754.2000.00409.x -As both supra-nationalism and the emergence of an EU ‘super-state’ and sub-nationalisms challenged the authority of the national state, new multi-scalar complex systems of governance and regulation resulted. -singular or plural identites?

	-the future map of Europe will not be determined by Europeans alone -the legacies of the division within Europe between NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutral states and implications of the neo-imperialist geo-political ambitions of the USA state and military-industrial complex issues <u>What criteria are being deployed to define Europe, Europeans and Europeanness?</u> Where are the boundaries of Europe, both internal and external? Put another way, where is Europe? -questions of singular and multiple identities are explored -processes of defining Europe, specifying its boundaries and of becoming European are complex, contested and contradictory (p.422) “One model for the future would in many ways seek to mimic the USA as a neo-liberal economy and society. It would centre on a singular imagination of Europe, with economy, polity and civil society re-territorialized at the scale of the EU, and with a common and singular European identity and identifiable singular European interests. In this case, the democratic deficit within the EU might be removed via concentrating power at EU scale in a much stronger and sovereign directly elected European Parliament. On the global stage, Europe re-constituted on these lines might well sit alongside the

	neo-liberal military-industrial and Wall Street-Treasury complexes of the USA.” (p. 423) “An alternative future of Europe encompasses a complex mosaic of governance and regulatory processes at local/regional, national and supra-national scales but with direct and transparent democratic accountability at each level. In this case, a closer and more transparent matching of powers, responsibilities and accountabilities at each scale might narrow the democratic deficit. The issue of accountability would be further complicated, however, as this alternative would also embrace complex, multiple and fluid hybrid identities, involving both territorial and territorial dimensions. The latter might raise new issues of democratic deficit. Such a vision of internal diversity and variability would sit uneasily alongside a vision of Europe as a powerful global actor for this would be a Europe in which it would be difficult to pin down a singular and unified European interest. As such, itmight well eschew seeking to play a global role that echoed the USA.” (p. 423) -in conclusion, it suggests a new model of EU citizenship based upon post-national rights in the EU “A strong post-national EU state is thus a necessary precondition for and guarantor of diversity of culture, economy and lifestyle rather than an alternative to it. The EU could therefore change its policies and vision in innovative and progressive ways. It could promote socio-economic diversity and an imagination of Europe that celebrates and supports polyvocal societies and multiple participation within a Europe of complex

	geographies of identities, a Europe of people with shifting, hybrid and multiple identities which will include a progressive European dimension.” (p. 423)
> Harmonisation of national politics	**Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. & Lemaitre, P. (1993). Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd.** -Europe and its nations: political and cultural identities (pp. 61-91) -relevance of the concept of societal security in the analysis of present and future security problems in Europe -tracing problems arising for ethnonational (or other important) communities because of developments at the political level, or arise at the political level because of developments with regard to societal security -nation: combination of cultural and political identity -particular concert: with the process of Europeanisation (stronger and more comprehensive sense of European political community) -Europeanisation might be a possible threat to societal security, but also further Europeanisation might be a response to societal insecurity -Europeanisation - the development of a 'sense of community' (probably, but not necessarily related to political institutions at the European level)

	-p. 62: The meanings of Europeanisation -no fixed meaning, can be used in different ways, for instance to designate: 1) development of European pillar in NATO 2) the development of Europe or Western Europe as an independent 'third force' 3) growing importance of all-European cooperation 4) the expectation that the Europe will be more self-reliant 4.1) in technical terms: that superpower overlay is lifted, which implies the possibility of the re-emergence of a European security complex 5) the formation of a state-like European Union, connecting that process to the process of European integration 6) the development at the individual level in Europe of people seeing themselves as Europeans
	Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409

	-article outlines a research programme that seeks to make sense of new developments in the politics of the EU -multi-level governance approach to European integration “Multi-level governance conceives regional integration as part of a more general phenomenon, the articulation of authority across jurisdictions at diverse scales.” (p. 2) -detected direct connections between domestic groups and European actors that contradicted the claim that states monopolize the representation of the citizens in international relation -analysing how domestic patterns of conflict across the EU constrain the course of European integration “Domestic and European politics have become more tightly coupled as governments have become responsive to public pressures on European integration” (p.2) -theory of regional integration “We claim that identity is decisive for multi-level governance in general, and for regional integration in particular. The reason for this derives from the nature of governance.” (p. 2) “Governance has two entirely different purposes. Governance is a means to achieve collective benefits by coordinating human activity. Given the variety of

	public goods and their varying externalities, efficient governance will be multi-level. But governance is also an expression of community. Citizens care – passionately – about who exercises authority over them. The challenge for a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional need for human cooperation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self rule, and the preference for self rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority. To understand European integration we need, therefore, to understand how, and when, identity is mobilized." (p.2) -post-functionalist because the term reflects an agnostic detachment about whether the jurisdictions that humans create rare, or are not, efficient "We argue that strong territorial identity is consistent with both support and opposition to regional integration; what matters is the extent to which identity is exclusive and whether it is cued by Eurosceptic political parties. We have reason to believe that identity is more influential (a) for the general public than for cognitively sophisticated individuals or functional interest groups, (b) for populist tan parties than for radical left parties, and (c) when regional integration is political as well as economic." (p. 21) "Conflict over Europe is ideologically structured. Party government does not exist at the European level, but partisanship is influential in national responses to Europe and in European institutions. It is important to distinguish between rhetoric and reality when

	examining where national government's stand on Europe.” (p. 22) “We have argued that the European Union is part of a system of multi-level governance which is driven by identity politics as well as by functional and distributional pressures. Conceptions of the political community are logically prior to decisions about regime form.” (p. 23)
	Conway, M., Patel, K. (Eds.) (2010) Europeanization in the Twentieth Century **Historical Approaches** -europeanization: transnational entity (could be examined in historical and geographical terms) -the role of international organizations in defining Europe (governance, finance, economic production, norms ,ideas, institutions) -Europeanization in History: An Introduction -europeanization as 'growth' industry -since the early 1990s, Europeanization has been often associated with new forms of European governance and the adaptation of nation-state legal and administrative procedures to the pressures associated with EU membership -primarily the term used in law and political science

	-to what extent the history of Europe can be conceptualized in terms of processes of Europeanization (task for historians) -this volume is the first step towards the application of the idea of Europeanization to the history of the 20th-century Europe “Europeanization in the twentieth century is not a fact (and still less a cause), but rather a thesis which needs to be tested against the history of the century” (p. 2) “(...) it provides a means of linking together what are often tacitly regarded as the self-contained sub-periods of the twentieth century (inter-war, post-war, the 1960s, etc.) in order to investigate changes that took place over longer or less defined time periods” (p. 2) “Europeanization has the advantage of bringing together those working on different areas of history: Europeanization may indeed be inherently multi-disciplinary but it also emphatically crosses the boundaries between the fields of political, economic, social and cultural history, suggesting a more integrated approach to processes of historical change” (p. 2) <u>3 theses on Europeanization:</u> 1. Europeanization is not a uniform, unidirectional and teleological process. 2. Europeanization has no fixed geographical boundaries.

	3. Europeanization is not just about Europe.
	Olsen, J. P. (2010). Governing through Institutional Building: Institutional Theory and Recent European Experiments in Democratic Organization. Oxford: OUP.
	Alecu de Flers, N, Mülller, P. (2010). APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANIZATION TO THE STUDY OF **FOREIGN POLICY: DIMENSIONS AND MECHANISMS** -Europeanization concept used for the study of foreign policy -interplay between top-down and bottom-up dynamics between the EU and national levels (previously isolated phenomena) -Europeanization concept contributes to a better understanding of the complex nature of European foreign policy-making -the literature review of the literature on Europeanization in the foreign policy realm -central to top-down Europeanization is the 'goodness of fit' (not suitable for the study of foreign policy) “Europeanization is not a theory but rather a conceptual framework that draws on a range of theoretical and

	explanatory schemes, and Europeanization studies are often couched in both rationalist and constructivist perspectives (Featherstone 2003, p12)" (p. 5) -a growing consensus that the Europeanization of foreign policy is best understood as an interactive process of change linking the national and EU levels (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Major 2005; Wong 2006, 2007) -as Member States together initiate and shape the policies to which they later adapt, the two dimensions are linked in practice and Europeanization may also take place during, and even before, the process of sectoral integration on the EU level -table 1 !!! !Distinguishing between dimensions (uploading and downloading), outcomes (national projection and foreign policy adaptation) and especially mechanisms of Europeanization (socialization and learning), we have attempted to better capture the complex dynamics of the Europeanization of foreign policy, which differ in important ways from areas of hierarchical governance located in the EU's first pillar. Very importantly, Europeanization processes in the foreign policy area are more voluntary and less hierarchical in nature.! (p. 18) -the central added value of studying European foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization lies in the fact that Europeanization concepts shift the attention to the interactions between the national and EU level

	Whetten, L. L. (1970). Recent Changes in East European Approaches to European Security. The World Today, 26(7), 277–288. Post-war West-East efforts to create common European security. ((national - European security)) - summary of such proposals - history of diplomatic exchanges “A persisting handicap for the Pact members was their inability to agree on the purpose of a regional collective security arrangement. Was such a plan to increase East-West understanding, stimulate rapport and co-operation, facilitate closing the technological gap, sponsor political détente, consolidate the status quo, expand the appeal of neutrality, insure international recognition of vital interests, outline military disengagement, encourage NATO´s dissolution, curtail American leadership or disarm and incapacitate the Federal Republic? All of the above have been cited by various Pact members as a just cause for an international conference; together, however, they are self-defeating. Pursuing their varying national interests, the Easter regimes also have been unable to agree on appropriate tactics. Should a conference inaugurate or

	culminate security negotiations? Should the North Americans be included in the negotiations, and if so, when? What weight should be allotted to neutral opinion? Would a conference be desirable if West Germany afforded only de facto recognition of East Germany? If one pact will not be dismantled without concrete evidence that the other is doing likewise, what credence and verification procedures are compatible with security requirements? Are unilateral steps toward disengagement feasible or prudent? What institutional and legal structures should replace existing ones? Is the return to the Postdam Agreement and all its anachronisms, as some advocate, either feasible or desirable? What is the future of the small States in a Europeanized Europe? Will a Europeanized Europe inherently be more or less stable than the existing division with its established checks? If less, what improvisations are plausible before Europe is Europeanized, through either settlement or American lack of interest? From the Western viewpoint the inability of the East to establish a common position on such fundamental concepts and tactics has undermined the credibility of the East´s proposals, and this, in turn, has prompted additional modifications or has further postponed decisions.” (Whetten, 1970, pp. 286-287)

	Campion, E. J. (2014). The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries. The European Legacy, 19(1), 100–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2013.858867
> Increased European legislation	**Featherstone, K., Radaelli, C. M. (Eds.). (2003). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press**.
	The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration. (2000). Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472562142 -what have been the principal legal effects of European integration? • the effects of European integration on certain fields of national law, such as constitutional law, administrative law, labour law, or private law, and • the elaboration of European Union law so as to provide a new framework for or sometimes even replace national laws, • the more piecemeal development of specific legal strands of EU law which have become intertwined with national or international laws in practice, • the indirect and sometimes unintended consequences of European integration with regard to national, EU, or international law.

	-the Europeanisation of law has provoked a number of unintended or unforeseen consequences, such as new divergences among national legal systems, an incredibly complex EU legal system, a deep crisis of legitimacy and values, and the creation of contradictory norms and processes which tend to undercut Europeanisation itself (p. 4) -further reflection on the constitutional aspects of Europeanisation, that is, Europeanisation as a process of constitutionalisation, and notably on the basic values involved in Europeanisation and on the nature of the EU as a legal system and as polity (p. 9) -the Europeanisation of law stimulates certain types of economic relationships that tend to undercut the process of EU constitution-building (Francis Snyder´s chapter)
> Increased narratives about Europe	**Sassatelli, M. (2009). Becoming Europeans. Palgrave Macmillan UK.** https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230250437 -Europeanization: from integration to identity -unity in diversity -Europeanization, a term that strives to be more inclusive and less biased than European integration itself -the book concentrates on European institutions because it is about explicit institutional attempts at creating (or 'reawakening') a sense of European

	belonging or identity, as a prominent example of institutional identity building and forms of resistance to it in today's conditions -it considers wider cultural ideas of Europe -the book focuses on the academic and institutional debate on European cultural identity -European cultural space & identity; "European cultural identity: both collective and individual, as it contains the two dimensions in which the process of social construction of reality crystallizes: objectified shared (public and collective) understandings of what it means, in this case, to be European, and forms of individual self-understanding, developed through interiorization (and exteriorization) of those meanings and necessary to the latter's (re)production" (p. 5) "Europeanization exists, not because of any mysterious virtues – or of 'Europeanness' – but due to the material and cultural conditions from which it emerges, a process with shifting boundaries and contents, and with no mainstream agency able to totally create, substantiate and impose a monolithic narrative or practice" (p. 69)
	Olsen, J. P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5), 921–952. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00403

	-‘Europeanization’ is a fashionable but contested concept -whether and how the term can be useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity -an immediate challenge is to develop partial, middle-range theoretical approaches that emphasize domains of application or scope conditions, and that are empirically testable -5 possible uses of Europeanization 1) changes in external boundaries 2) developing institutions at the European level 3) central penetration of national system of overnance 4) exporting forms of political organization 5) a political unification project(pp. 523-524) -exploring the scope conditions of each model is a beginning. -understanding their interaction is the long-term and difficult challenge (p. 944)
	Miller, R., & Day, G. (Eds.). (2012). The Evolution of European Identities. Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137009272

	-the nations in Euroidentities included representatives of the original states of the European Union, both its centre (Germany) and its western (Northern Ireland and Wales) and southern (Italy) peripheries. The new Accession States of the European Union were represented by a large central state (Poland) and two smaller peripheral states (Estonia, denoting a relatively economically successful new member state, and Bulgaria, one less so) -eight distinct dimensions for the expression of European identity that will be discussed in turn further: -Multiple social identities and biographical identity -Transnational intimate relationships -Collective action -Cultural production and intercultural translation -Inclusion/Exclusion -Standardisation and regulation -Structural conditions and opportunity structures -The public sphere and state- regulated institutions (each one further explained pp. 10-19) Chapter 5 - Transnational Work in the Biographical Experiences of Traditional Professions and Corporate Executives: Analysis of Two Cases

	"Europeanisation understood in terms of a process through which a European mental space and European identifications (as defined in the project) may emerge" (p. 76)
	Sittermann. B. (2006). Europeanisation – **A Step Forward in Understanding Europe?** -Europeanisation: 1) historical Europe -export of European political institutions, political practise and way of life beyond European continent (mainly through colonisation) 2) cultural Europe -culture and identity: citizenship, standardization of cultural practices (watching the same movies or tv programmes), cross-border personal contacts, same shops all over the Europe etc. 3) political Europe -europeanisation as EU enlargement, europeanisation as the development of Polity and Policies at the European level, europeanisation as national adaptation due to EU influence -working definition of europeanisation: "Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of

	formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies." "The complexity of this issue is among things due to the multi-dimensional effects of Europeanisation: It does affect not just polity, policy and politics but as well levels ranging from individual actors, regime types in policy areas to the overall functioning of the political system (e.g. loss of sovereignty for the parliament of subnational levels). Despite the broad influence of Europeanisation it is obvious as well that national diversity will persist." (p.20)
> Dialogues among European citizens (EPS)	**Blockmans, S. & Russack, S. (2020). Deliberative Democracy in the EU Countering: Populism with Participation and Debate. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.** -Chapter 17 The European Citizens Initiative and its Reform -crisis of representative democracy has prompted several EU member states to introduce elements of direct democracy in order to increase citizens´ participation -European Citizens´Initiative (ECI) in 2012 -low legislative impact of the initiatives

	-new reform in 2020 -ECI the first instrument in EU law to enable citizens to proactively contribute to the Union's policy making process “The tool was intended to bridge the perceived distance between the EU institutions and citizens, and to reduce the infamous democratic deficit of the European Union (EU) by allowing citizens to submit legislative initiatives to the European Commission.” (p. 281) “The experience with the ECI and the comparison with the national level suggest that such tools can only ever be complementary. But if established, they should be taken seriously and properly integrated into the policymaking process instead of remaining a mere gesture.” (p. 293) -Chapter 20 How can technology facilitate citizen participation in the EU? -digital and e-democracy -technology can both facilitate and hinder civic engagement -the chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for European and national authorities
	Anderson, P. (2009). The New Old World. London: Verso.

	-The tension between the two planes ofEurope, national and supranational, creates a peculiar analytic dilemma for any attempt to reconstruct the recent history of the region -the EU is unquestionably a polity, with more or less uniform effects throughout its jurisdiction; yet in the life of the states that belong to it, politics-at an incomparably higher level of intensity-continues to be overwhelmingly internal -to hold both levels steady within a single focus is a task that has so far defied all comers -Europe, in that sense, seems an impossible object -past and present of the Union; first part history of the EU, second part of the book moves to the national level; third part looks at Cyprus (joined the EU in 2004) and at Turkey -historically important two changes of regimes: 1) neoliberalism (Reagan & Thatcher), 2) collapse of the Communist bloc “The European ideology that has grown up, around a changed reality, is another matter. The self-satisfaction of Europe's elites, and their publicists, has become such that the Union is now widely presented as a paragon for the rest of the world, even as it becomes steadily less capable of winning the confidence of its citizens, and more and more openly flouts the popular will.” (p. xv)

	--- “The density of pan-European exchanges across it is without precedent, and these exchanges along with innumerable others-conferences, workshops, colloquia, lectures in adjacent disciplines, from history and economics to law and sociology-have created what should comprise the bases of an intellectual community capable of lively debate across national borders. Yet in practice, there is still remarkably little of that. In part, this has to do with the characteristic traits of the academy, when scholarship turns inwards only to a profession rather than also outwards to a broader culture. In larger measure, however, it is a reflection of the lack of any animating political divisions in this-in principle-eminently political field, occupied chiefly by political scientists . To speak of a pensee unique would be unfair: it is more like a pensee ouate, which hangs like a pall over too much of it. The media offer little, if any, counterbalance, columns and editorials hewing in general to a Euro-conformism more pronounced than that of chairs or think-tanks.” (p. xvi) -one effect of such unanimism is to undermine the emergence of any real public sphere in Europe “(...) It might well be thought that the echo-chambers of today's Union are less genuinely European than much of the cultural life of the inter-war, or even pre-First World War period. There are not many equivalents today of the correspondence between Sorel and Croce, the collaboration between Larbaud and Joyce, the

	debate among Eliot, Curtius and Mannheim, the arguments of Ortega with Husserl; not to speak of the polemics within the Second and early Third Internationals. Intellectuals formed a much smaller,less institutionalized group in those days, with deeper roots in a common humanist culture. Democratization has dispersed this, while releasing a vastly larger number of talents into the arena" (p. xvii)
	Europeanising European Public Spheres (2020) "Within political science, Europeanisation is most frequently conceptualised as a top-down or horizontal process through which EU rules and procedures, but also norms, ideas and routines impact domestic institutions and policies. A second, very broad, field deals with Europeanisation from a different perspective, namely with the question of how the EU and European integration affect political culture, citizens' identities and political attitudes in terms of opposition and support. Here, recent debates focus on two related issues, namely growing contestation and politicisation of the EU. Both are intimately connected with the topic of the European public sphere, which, in turn, directly touches upon questions regarding the Europeanisation of mass media or parliamentary communication." (p. 7) "Transparency, openness and politicisation are also intimately related to the notion of the European public sphere as an arena for EU-wide public discourse" (p. 8) -most commentators agree that a unified and truly European public sphere would require a common

	language, a shared identity and, most importantly, a common infrastructure, i.e. European media - and that neither of these vital elements are seen as fully present or likely to fully develop in the EU within the near future. -as a result, the academic debate has turned to the notion of national, but Europeanised and connected, public spheres, and to national media and parliaments as two important arenas for public debate. --- <u>Defining Europeanisation (pp. 18-30)</u> An encompassing and widely cited definition, finally, that incorporates both perspectives was provided by Claudio Radaelli: 'Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.' Europeanisation in this sense can impact various different aspects of domestic adaptation, such as political institutions, policies, actor preferences, actions and strategies, but also norms, ideas, cultural traditions, everyday habits and identities. Europeanisation should not, however, be confused with either convergence or harmonisation. Convergence

	can be a consequence of European integration and Europeanisation processes. Similarly, harmonisationof, e.g., national policies is often seen as an important goal of European integration. Yet empirical research suggests that Europeanisation can lead to a 'differential' impact of European requirements on domestic policies: ‘Countries have responded to the pressures of Europeanization as they have to those of globalisation at different times to differing degrees with different results’. Importantly, the ways, ormechanisms, through which European integration and EU politics/policies impact the member states vary. Here, scholars distinguish between vertical and horizontal mechanisms. --- <u>European Public Sphere (pp. 37-38)</u> “As a result, the concept of a European public sphere defined as a single and unified public space spanning the whole of the EU was rejected in the academic literature rather early on as an unreachable ideal or utopia. Instead, and in part drawing on Habermas’s re-conceptualisation of the public sphere as constituted by different interconnected arenas of public communication, the focus turned to the concept of national, but connected and Europeanised, public spheres. ‘The public sphere extends from episodic café and street gatherings, via organised professional, cultural and artistic public spheres, to abstract public spheres, where listeners, readers and viewers are isolated and spread in time and space. There are strictly situated

	public spheres, where the participants meet face to face; there are written public spheres, and there are anonymous, faceless, public spheres made possible by the new electronic technologies.' Within the discussion on the European political public sphere, the empirical literature focuses mainly on three arenas, most importantly the media, but also on parliaments, and here national parliaments in particular, as well as political parties" --- -see also 3.5 Parliaments as Europeanised Public Spheres <u>Europeanisation of National Media (pp. 41-45)</u> 1) horizontal, 2) vertical "For most scholars, the national mass media are therefore the principal forums within which a Europeanised public sphere can materialise.172 For Schlesinger173, for example, this is based on three prerequisites, namely, first, the dissemination of a European news agenda that, second, becomes an integral part of citizens' daily or routine media consumption and thus, third, enables them to define their citizenship beyond the national level and in European terms. In addition, it has been argued that a Europeanisation of national public spheres also requires the inclusion of (European) non-national actors, and the discussion of EU topics through similar frames that enable transnational discussion. 174 Accordingly, we can distinguish between the

	Europeanisation of the media in a vertical and a horizontal sense” *-if focuses also on the coverage of COVID-19 (might be useful for WP2)*
	Risse-Kappen, T. (2010). A community of Europeans? Transnational identities and public spheres. Cornell University Press. -It’s no wonder that issues of European identity, community, and democracy have assumed center stage in EU politics. Policymakers, scholars, and ordinary citizens increasingly ask several basic questions: 1. What are the pre political conditions of a supranational polity? Can the EU rely on a sense of community among its peoples and a collective identity? How does European identity relate to communication across borders? And how can we explain the emergence as well as the limits of a European sense of community and of a European public sphere? 2. How do a European sense of community and a European public sphere affect European integration and political change? Do European identity and a transnational European public sphere facilitate or hinder effective policy making in the EU? Alternatively, can the EU work without a sense of community and without politicization? 3. What are the implications for the democratic legitimacy of the European project? How much

	collective identity and shared communicative space does the EU need as a multilevel governance system? And what are the conclusions for the EU's future of thirty-plus member states? Europe and the EU are integrated in people's sense of belonging. Empirical analyses document that more than 50 percent of European citizens hold such Europeanized national identities, if only as a secondary identity. Those who incorporate Europe into their sense of identity tend to support European integration much more than individuals who adhere to exclusively nationalist identities (Hooghe and Marks 2005). (p. 5) "Moreover, the Europeanization of collective identities varies widely across old and new EU member states, and the meanings attached to "Europe" are also diverse. In general, however, the Europeanization of identities is well advanced in continental Western and Southern Europe, while majorities in Scandinavia and—most important—Great Britain still hold exclusively nationalist identities. Interestingly enough, citizens of the new Central Eastern European member states are not that different from people in the older EU member states with regard to their identification levels." (p. 5) "(The book) challenges the notion that the EU lacks common communicative spaces because of the absence of a common language and European-wide media. Instead of looking for a European public sphere above and beyond national public spheres, we can

	observe the Europeanization of public spheres whenever European issues are debated as questions of common concern using similar frames of reference and whenever fellow Europeans participate regularly in these national debates. Such Europeanization of public spheres is still segmented and varies across member states. Once again, continental Western and Southern Europe seems to be integrating into a transnational public sphere, while we know too little about Central Eastern Europe to reach firm conclusions (see, however, Kutter 2009 on Poland). Once again, Great Britain remains the odd one out." (p. 5) --- -emergence of transnational European communities of communication through the interconnectedness of Europeanized public spheres -Europeanized identities and European public spheres are closely linked -the increasing politicization of European affairs contributes to the Europeanization of public spheres -<u>2 Europes</u> "Struggles over European identity involve at least two distinct substantive concepts of what "Europe" actually means. On the one hand, there is a modern EU Europe supported by the European elites (Fligstein 2008; Bruter 2005) and embracing modern, democratic, and humanistic values against a past of nationalism,

	militarism, or Communism. This modern and secular Europe resonates in the elite discourses of France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, but also to some extent in Poland, the Czech Republic, and other new member states. On the other hand, there is a Europe of white Christian peoples that sees itself as a distinct civilization (in the sense of Huntington 1996). This European identity construction is less open to strangers and entails boundaries against Islam as well as Asian or African "cultures." The extreme version of this antimodern and antisecular identity construction is nationalist, xenophobic, and racist. This "nationalist Europe" is increasingly politicized by Euro Skeptical populist parties particularly on the right who have taken up the European issue, while the European elites have tried to silence debates on what kind of Europe people want to see." (p. 6)
	Van Mol, C. (2018). Becoming Europeans: The relationship between student exchanges in higher education, European citizenship and a sense of European identity. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 31(4), 449–463. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2018.1495064 -findings suggest the impact of European exchange programmes on European citizenship and a sense of European identity is relatively limited -most recent version of the programme guide, for example, it is literally stated that transnational mobility of higher education students and staff should "raise participants" awareness and understanding of other cultures and countries, offering them the opportunity to

	build networks of international contacts, to actively participate in society and develop a sense of European citizenship and identity' (European Commission 2018, 30) -three main research questions: "First, how do exchange and non-Exchange students differ, on average, in the development of their identification with Europe, as a European citizen and as a European over the course of one year? Second, do non-exchange and exchange students who have similar identification scores at the pre-test, differ at the post-test? And third, which interaction patterns abroad are most influential in changing identification patterns among exchange students? By relying on a pretest – posttest nonequivalent groups design including higher education students from thirteen European countries (n = 400), the methodological approach adopted in this paper aims to overcome the limitations of repeated cross-sectional research (e.g. King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Van Mol 2013) or an exclusive focus on one national departure and/or receiving context (e.g. Llurda et al. 2016; Sigalas 2010; Stoeckel 2016; Wilson 2011), which mostly informed our current understanding of the relationship between student exchanges and the development of a sense of European identity (for an exception, see Mitchell 2015)." (p. 450) -theoretical background (p. 450-451) -the analysis clearly shows no relationship between participation in student exchanges and changes in

	identification with Europe, as a European and as a European citizen for our sample (p. 459) -in contrast to the studies of Mitchell (2015) and Stoeckel (2016), my analysis did also not confirm the idea that social interaction with international students would be most constitutive in changing existing identification patterns (p. 459) -for specific sample, no significant relationships could be detected between participation in intra-European student exchanges and the development of a sense of European identity and citizenship (p. 461)
	Walter, S. (2017). EU Citizens in the European Public Sphere: An Analysis of EU News in 27 EU Member States. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-14486-9 “The European democratic deficit mainly refers to a lack of input legitimacy (Schmidt 2006; Fisher 2004) and is based on the assumption that democratic legitimacy of the EU cannot be derived by its policy output alone. Therefore, making the EU institutions more representative and participatory is often seen as a solution to the European democratic deficit” (p. 20) -possibility that there is a communication deficit between citizens and governmental actors located at the bottom-up side of European political communication -one component of the political system that is not directly a part of the formal arrangement of the EU, but

	is nevertheless a requirement for democracy at the EU level, is the European public sphere -concept of public sphere originally developed in the context of the national state and is considered an essential element of democratic governance -public sphere can be defined as a communication system that mediates between the citizens at the micro-level and the governmental system at the macro-level “Since the European integration has led to a shift in governance from the national state to the EU level, a European public sphere is needed to ensure accountability and responsiveness and ultimately the legitimacy of EU governance (Koopmans 2007; Meyer 2005; Peters et al. 2005).” (p. 21) “As citizens hardly have any direct experience with EU governance, the mass media constitute a relevant mechanism through which EU citizens’ views can be communicated to the decision makers at the EU level. The visibility of political actors in the news coverage as such is seen as a precondition for the functioning of representative democracy at the national andEuropean levels (cf. de Vreese, 2003). The mediatherefore play an important role in political communication by operating as an intermediary between governments and citizens (Habermas 2006).”(p. 21) “This study argues that especially in the case of the EU, which a large number of people perceive as a distant and elitist institution (Follesdal and Hix 2006), the visibility of citizens in the news coverage can enhance

	communication between the institution and its constituents. From a participatory perspective, the visibility of EU citizens in the news coverage about the EU is important, because it makes citizens and their opinions visible to policy makers. Given the decline in support for the European integration (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Armingeon and Ceka 2013), it is important that politicians at the EU level take citizens' preferences into account when making decisions. The visibility of EU citizens in the news coverage can also function as a feedback mechanism for policies implemented at the EU level." (p. 21) -pp. 21-22 !!! -Europeanisation of the national public spheres (pp. 85-88) -previous studies mostly claim that the emergence of a European public sphere can more realistically be expected to result from a Europeanisation of national public spheres -in the broadest sense, Europeanisation refers to a process where debates in the national public spheres of the EU member states become more "European" by discussing EU affairs to a greater extent. Gerhards (1993b), who systematically introduced the distinction between a transnational European public sphere and the Europeanisation of national public spheres, defines the latter as discussions of EU governance in the national media

	-vertical and horizontal Europeanisation -when thinking about the role of the public sphere for facilitating accountability and responsiveness of governance, it is the vertical dimension of the European public sphere that is of importance for the legitimacy of EU governance. (p. 86) “This study proposes a minimal definition, in which the European public sphere is constituted by public discussions on EU governance in the national media. The thematic focus on governance has also been a defining criterion for the public sphere in the nation state context (cf. Habermas 1974). Hence, a European public sphere exists and can fulfil its mediating function for the EU’s political system and enhance democratic legitimacy at the EU level, if discussions on EU affairs take place in the national media of EU member states.” (p. 87)
	Pérez, F. S. (2013). Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits of the European Public Sphere. Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137305138 -focuses on mediation, and also on what is being mediated (p. 7) -”communications gap” -hypothesis: “(...) the way in which the EU has been built, the way in which the EU is governed and the sort of cultural

	community that EU citizens form are the three main factors (the first two structural or systemic, the third cultural) that explain why Europe lacks a European public sphere comparable to those of its constituent member states. The key to explaining the poor popular engagement with the EU is not to be found in the news media or with the journalists, but with the sort of political regime and cultural community that "Europe" is. The EU is not a state (though it has some traces of a regional state, as there are supranational institutions and EU law is binding to its member states) and Europe is not a nation (though it is a form of cultural community, in which European identity, as Eurobarometer figures have historically shown, is second or third in the scale of popular loyalties. The understanding that the EU is not a liberal-democratic state, but a sui generis polity, should be at the forefront of any examination of the European public sphere." (p. 7) <u>Chapter 1 The true deficits of the European Public Sphere: Domestication and Politicisation</u> "The two key issues where which I expect the European public sphere to be dysfunctional are a) its ability to enable domestication (the ability to facilitate an identification between representatives and represented) and b) its capacity to encourage politicisation (the capacity to visualise conflict between/among alternative/optional ways of governing a society). The term domestication draws heavily on Carl Schmitt's concept of democracy as identification between the government and the governed. The term

	politicisation is also very much a Schmittian expression, but I rely on one of his interpreters, Chantal Mouffe, to distinguish between antagonistic politicisation (between enemies, such as the USA and Iran) and agonistic politicisation (between rivals, such as theUK's Labour and Conservative parties). There is a tight relationship between the two concepts" (p. 12)
	Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (n.d.). The Making of a European Public Sphere. 357. -three theoretically possible forms of Europeanization of public communication and mobilization (Koopmans and Erbe 2004): 1. The first form is the emergence of a supranational European public sphere constituted by the interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around European themes, ideally accompanied by (and creating the basis for) the development of European-wide mass media. 2. The second is vertical Europeanization, which consists of communicative linkages between the national and the European level. There are two basic variants of this pattern: a bottom-up one, in which national actors address European actors, make claims on European issues, or both; and a top-down one, in which European actors intervene in national public debates in the name of European regulations and common interests. 3. The third is horizontal Europeanization, which consists of communicative linkages between different

	European countries. We may distinguish a weak and a strong variant. In the weak variant, the media in one country cover debates and contestation in another country, but there is no communicative link in the structure of claim making between actors in different countries. In the stronger variant, there is such a communicative link, and actors from one country explicitly address or refer to actors or policies in another European country. (p. 38) -p. 39 - the model -weak and strongest variant of each forms follows "We can speak of a Europeanized public sphere to the extent that a substantial – and, over time, increasing – part of public contestation goes beyond a particular national political space (the European public sphere's inner boundary), and does not bypass Europe by referring only to non-European supranational and transnational spaces (the outer boundary of the European public sphere). Coverage of other member states' internal and foreign affairs constitutes a borderline case and can only be interpreted as a form of Europeanization if such coverage is overrepresented (and over time increasingly so) compared to the coverage of the internal and foreign affairs of non-European countries." (p. 43)
	Cathleen Kantner (2016). War and Intervention in the Transnational Public Sphere: Problem-solving and European identity-formation. London: Routledge

	-”The results of this study provide a differentiated long-term picture of transnational public discourses on wars and humanitarian military interventions across Europe and the US.” (p. 3) -”This study provides surprising empirical evidence regarding the dynamics of transnational political communication on wars and humanitarian military interventions and the expression of European collective identities in this context.” (p. 5) European integration began with defence (p. 10) -(pp. 16-17) identity is presumed to be a functional precondition of democracy (European-identity formation) -(p. 17) This study argues that a ‘European identity’ is emerging as ordinary citizens across Europe already share important pragmatic and even ethical convictions with regard to European policies. -European defence identity -strong European identity is considered to be of crucial importance for the prospects of further political integration -(pp. 23-24) theoretical background for collective identity -(p. 33) If something is to be said about European identity in the qualitative sense, one has to evaluate how Europeans see themselves as Europeans

	-(pp. 34-35) transnational political communication -“the lack of a transnational European public sphere is at the root of the impossibility of democratising the EU. The development of a transnational European public sphere is a precondition for overcoming the often criticised 'democratic deficit'” (p. 35) (p. 37) - the development of a transnational (European) public sphere (!!!)
	Uricchio, W. (Ed.). (2009). We Europeans: Media, representations, identities. Intellect. -homogenization and diversity: media and cultural identities -exploring the relations between media and identity among the many shifting collectivities, both past and present, that constitute Europe -chapter Imaginary Americas in Europe´s Public Space -chapter Media and Cultural Diversity in Europe -public broadcasting system (the integrator of democracy) -in post-war years, it was broadcasting that became the central mechanism for constructing this collective life and culture of the nation (p. 109) -over the past twenty years:

	1) shift in media regulatory principles: from regulation in the national public interest to a new regulatory regime (deregulation); 2) proliferation of new, or alternative, distribution technologies, and particularly satellite television (transnational broadcasting systems to be developed and new transnational and global audio-visual markets to be formed) -"Contemporary developments in media industries and cultures are crucial for contemporary Europe. If public service broadcasting was central to the institution of national cultures and communities, we may argue that the new broadcasting culture must be central to the imagination of the new Europe that is coming into existence." (p. 110) -transnational Turkish media - a case of imagined community? -a call for a new political and cultural geography for media policy and regulation -there are important cultural issues concerning 'cultural rights' and multiculturalism -there are also very significant political questions to be raised concerning the public sphere and the future of public service philosophy -"But, if developments in transnational broadcasting are thus raising new issues about both media regulation and cultural policy, we may say that there is no constituency for discussing what the implications of this

	new development are. There are now possibilities for the institution of what could be an interestingly and productively new transnational European map." (p. 121) -chapter Meanings of Money: the Euro as a Sign of Value and of Cultural Identity
> Increased weight of European identity	Menédez, J. (2004). Which Citizenship? Whose Europe? — The Many Paradoxes of European Citizenship. (spec. issue of German Law Journal --- 'EU Citizenship: Twenty Years On')
	Brändlea, V. K, Galpin b, Ch., Trenz, H.-J. (2018) Marching for Europe? Enacting European citizenship as justice during Brexit. Citizenship Studies, vol. 22, no. 8, 810–828 https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1531825 -article examines pro-European mobilisation in the United Kingdom following the European Union (EU) referendum -develops a framework that combines Isin's 'acts of citizenship' with Nancy Fraser's three dimensions of justice – redistribution, recognition and representation – to examine the way in which Brexit has served as a mobilisation trigger for claims about European citizenship

	-Brexit as a process that makes people aware of the 'right to have rights' as EU citizens -interview with anti-Brexit protesters “Our findings demonstrate that many protesters experience Brexit as an injustice relating to redistribution, recognition and representation within the United Kingdom. Concerns about economic downturn and an erosion of the NHS, a misrecognition of their British identities away from tolerance and internationalism and ordinary-political misrepresentation in the form of distrust in the government and opposition parties, who are seen as ignoring the concerns of ‘the 48%’ or pandering to xenophobia, are visible.” (p. 824) -for these protesters the conception of justice as redistribution, recognition, and representations extends beyond the nation-state -the EU becomes a crucial political frame from which they might be excluded in the future, economically, culturally, politically (fears of lack of agency)
	Marfleet, P. (1999). Nationalism and internationalism in the new **Europe. International Socialism (84).** “As British prime minister Tony Blair explained to a European Union (EU) summit, 'This place Kosovo is right on the doorstep of Europe,' and Europeans were required to act in solidarity with their neighbours.1 For

	Blair, principles of 'European justice' and of 'civilised society' were to be defended against national antagonism and ethnic conflict." ---- "The EU is routinely presented by its supporters as an internationalist project. Its founding documents refer to 'ever closer union' between peoples of the region,3 and for decades it has been promoted as a means of overcoming national differences and state rivalries. The call to be a 'good European' therefore appeals to many on the left, who often identify the EU with modernisation, economic and social advance, and as a means of moving beyond the conflicts of the past.Social democratic and Communist parties, which havebeen strongly attached to national (often nationalist) agendas, have increasingly identified an internationalist dimension to the EU." --- "'Europeanism' is based upon the idea of 'Europeanity'--the notion that Europeans have a common heritage which sets them apart from 'others'. It is this which gives them rights in the EU--most importantly, the right of residence. For EU strategists, wider awareness of a shared European identity, and of the imagined benefits it brings, is seen as vital for successful political integration. They hope to increase popular identification with the EU and to induce consent to decisions taken through the bodies such as the European Parliament. But this notion rests upon the idea of fundamental differences between 'Europeans'

	and 'non-Europeans', and upon the proposition that the latter have no rights in the EU. It is on this basis that people who wish to enter EU state are excluded. Poor and vulnerable people, notably refugees, are depicted as opportunists seeking to exploit the benefits of life within the Union. At the same time, citizens of EU states are invited to identify 'internal enemies'--those depicted as out of place or even 'alien' within the New Europe. The effect is to heighten racism, weakening solidarities within the working class across the continent and between workers of Europe and others worldwide. The EU has nothing to do with internationalism, a tradition which has always been built from below, against all ideas of national and ethnic difference, and against top down 'transnationalism'." --- -critical about the European project "Forty years later the nation states of Western Europe declared a new project for peace and mutual understanding. This European community was another 'apparently utopian' but reactionary plan--a phoney internationalism which has used the rhetoric of unity in the interests of capital."
	Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2012). Constructions of European identity: Debates and discourses on Turkey and the EU. Palgrave Macmillan. -Europe as a Security Community -Europe as an Upholder of Democratic Values

	-Europe as a Political Project -Europe as a Cultural Space -“At the end of the 1990s, the French political scientist Dominique Moisi (1999) used the phrase ‘soul-searching’ to describe Europe’s quest for identity in an era of rapid change” -“The question of Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) provides an ideal case to assess the essence of this ‘soul-searching’ in the EU.” (p. 1) -“Amidst this strong emphasis on the criteria of being European with respect to Turkish membership, this book aims to take up the challenge of looking into the ways in which Europe is discursively constructed through current EU representations of Turkey” (p. 2) --- -Europe is taken as a contested notion, the meaning of which is not fixed -“post-structuralist perspective: identity as relational and discursively constructed within representations where its construction is dependent on the definition of the European Self with respect to various Others” (p. 2) -argument: -EU discourses on Turkey, through their representations of the country, give significant insights into the discursive construction of European identity

	"The discursive struggle to define Europe is a political act, which, by definition, entails the drawing of both spatial and temporal boundaries that can only be revealed through deconstructing the various meaning(s) given to Europe in order to make more transparent the attempts at the fixation of the concept under the rubric of the European Union." (p. 8)
	Keinz, A., & Lewicki, P. (2019). European Bodies. Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 28(1), 7–24. https://doi.org/10.3167/ajec.2019.280104 -europeanisation and colonisation -body, embodiment, and europeanisation -focus on processes of europeanisation and the work of colonial legacies and their impact on the production of the european body, a body that is always already racialised, classed and gendered. 'european body' can be observed in discourses and practices that constitute the normal/desired/legitimate body and concomitantly impacts notions about the civilised/cultured body, often linked to whiteness, secularism, legitimate class and gender performances -how does europeanisation generate (tacit) knowledge about the legitimate body? -what is a 'european body' then? Jean Comaroff (1993) has once shown that: 'nationality, culture and physical type are condensed into the language that [. . .] would mature into scientific racism' which 'imprinted the physical contours of stereotypic others on the

	European imagination – and, with them, a host of derogatory associations' (p. 309). -connected to refugee crisis and eu enlargement -both processes produced questions about the category of "europe" "(...) we turn the focus on different forms of Europeanisation and embodiment and suggest we explore the work of imperial legacies (Stoler 2013a) ethnographically in the production of the legitimate – precious and prosperous – european bodies (see also Hirschkind 2011; Stoler 2002). We ask in which ways these formations mutually embody the Other and the european self and how a body is constructed as specific type of body that is embedded in imaginations of 'the west' – of progress, freedom, and modernity – in representations, images, politics and everyday life" (p. 3) -(...)we follow recent studies on europeanisation that see it as a global, historical and entangled process of production of Europe -"we believe that this perspective helps to move anthropological research on europe and europeanisation beyond the reproduction of implicit eurocentrism. It instead turns the focus of anthropological research on europe away from doing research in europe and towards the production of europe and processes of europeanisation – ostensibly trivial cultural dynamics that activate postcolonial and imperial genealogies in embodiment, in the way bodies, as heterogeneous and unsecluded processes and

	products of global entanglements, are living-in-the-world and emerge in relations with their surroundings as well as in distant spaces away from europe" (p. 5) -an inquiry into discourses and materiality, practices as well as emotional, affective, and sensual/olfactory dimensions, stipulating new research perspectives on body, embodiment and europeanisation (p. 14)
	Checkel, J. T., & Katzenstein, P. J. (n.d.). (2009) European Identity. 281. -european identity as project -european identity as process -european identity in context -multidisciplinary perspective on the politics of European identity (anthropology, sociology, history) -"This approach allows us to capture the experiences of the winners and losers, optimists and pessimists, movers and stayers in a Europe where spatial and cultural borders are becoming ever more permeable. A full understanding of Europe's ambivalence, refracted through its multiple, nested identities, lies at the intersection of competing European political projects and social processes." (p. 2) -european identity theory (pp. 4-14) -europeanization (pp. 9-10)

	-“Europeanization, which in many senses provides the state of the art on how Europe might be reshaping deeply held senses of community – national, local, regional, and otherwise” (p. 9) -examination of the effects Europe has on the contemporary state - its policies, institutions, links to society, adn patterns of individual-collective identification -complex dynamic through which Europe and the nation-state interact (not to be stuck in binary distinctions - both EU and nation-state) -work on europeanisation generated new thoughts and empirical evidence on european identity -positive-sum nature (one can be French and at the same time European; European and national) -europeanisation (top-down focus on institutions), but: “With its strong institutional focus (Fligstein, Sandholtz, and Sweet 2001), Europeanization research misses the politics and conflict that often accompany transformational dynamics. In a recent conversation, a specialist on the Middle East decried the way in which Europeanists study identity. “For you folks, identity is something nice; it’s all about institutions, deliberation and elites. Where I study identity, people die for it!” Although it is true that European identity politics are today typically not a matter of life or death, they do incite strong political reactions. And as those living in London and Madrid have learned firsthand, such

	politics can easily become a matter of life and death even in contemporary Europe." (pp. 10-11)
	Paasi, A. (2001). Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies, 8(1), 7–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/096977640100800102 -During the 1990s competing images emerged of what constitutes European identity, who belongs to it, and what are its internal and external boundaries -This has forced reflection on the links between state territoriality, and territorialities occurring on and between other spatial scales -Europe is understood as an experience, a structural body and an institution -Growing flows of refugees and immigrants call into question the state-centred identities and narratives of nationally bounded cultures -cosmopolitan view > exclusive concept of place -Place as the spatiality of experience "The perpetual striving to redefine 'spatial categories' such as region, place and boundaries reflects a search for making sense of the rapid changes occurring in the

	dialectic between spatial structures, social relations and meanings" (p. 24) "the spatial identities of human beings are by necessity changing elements or 'hybrids'" (p. 25)
	Cantat, C. (2015) Narratives and counter-narratives of Europe. **Constructing and contesting Europeanity. Cahiers Mémoire et Politique, no. 3.** -the article examines the relation to Europe and to narratives of European belonging of migration solidarity movements in the European Union. -the narratives of European belonging (mainly pro-migrant solidarity and activism) « Europe » has never been as present in the media and in political discourse as it is today. -the 2009 Eurozone crisis has sparked heated debates between partisans and opponents of austerity and the recent « negotiations » opposing the Greek Syriza-led government to European leaders and institutions have made the headlines for months <u>-debates about Europe:</u> -austerity - Eurozone - financial crisis -migration

	-transnational movement of solidarity with migrants has been in formation in the EU over the last two decades -increasingly trans-European in shape, this movement is not however structured around shared narratives of alternative European futures or counter-discourses of Europe and European identity -for activists, the EU is too contradictory to be grasped -neoliberal Europe brought racialised patterns of marginalisation and exploitation -activists' accounts of the European Union pointed to a process of ideological disengagement from a project they felt shared little with the forms of internationalism or cosmopolitanism they defended -more than EU citizens, activists were connected to the idea of world citizen
> Increased European capitalism	**Žižek, S. & Horvat, S. (2013) What does Europe want – the Union and its Discontents. New York: Columbia University Press.** -This book is an attempt to rethink Europe's current deadlock and to prepare a terrain for future, meaningful political action for the roosters who will come. -Greece -Cyprus -Slovenia

	-Croatia etc. -both Horvat and Žižek are arguing for the strong European Left or left eurocentrism --- -the deconstruction of Greece as a Model for All of Europe: Is this the future that Europe deserves (Alexis Tsipras) -economic crisis 2008 - breaking point (collapse of Greece) -Greek economy entered a vicious cycle of uncontrolled depression -austerity; debt crisis spreading to other European countries -European pact of stability (central institutions of the EU are allowed to intervene in budgets and impose tough fiscal measures to reduce deficits) “If people use democracy as a defence against austerity, as happened recently in Italy, the result for democracy is even worse.” (p. XI) -the generalised European model was not created in order to save Greece, but to destroy it -Europe´s future: happy bankers, unhappy societies “These problems led to an historic conflict in Europe. A conflict that seemingly has geographical dimensions and designations: on the surface it seems to be divided

	into that of north-south, yet beneath the surface there is a class conflict that relates to two conflicting strategies for Europe. One strategy defends the complete domination of capital, unconditionally and without principles, and without any plan for secure social cohesion and welfare. The other strategy defends European democracy and social needs. The conflict has already begun." (p. XII) Horvat, S. "The pattern is always the same: according to the then Slovenian foreign minister, by joining the EU, Slovenia has come 'one step closer to the European centre, European trends, European life, European prosperity, European dynamics and the like'. On the other hand, all things that are 'back wards', 'bad' or 'out' stand for –you can guess – the Balkans. Or, as one journalist saidin the Spanish daily El País, 'By joining the EU, Slovenia escaped the Balkan curse.' But if we take a closer look, Europe is 'Balkanised' already, and, on theother hand, the Balkans is 'Europeanised' as well." (p. 30) Žižek, S. "Late in his life, Freud asked the famous question, 'Was will das Weib?' ('What does Woman want?'), admitting his perplexity when faced with the enigma of feminine sexuality. And a similar perplexity arises today, when post-communist countries are entering the European Union: which Europe will they be entering? For long years, I have been pleading for a renewed 'Leftist Eurocentrism'. To put it bluntly, do we want to live in a world in which the only choice is between the American

	civilisation and the emerging Chinese authoritarian - capitalist one? If the answer is no, then the only alternative is Europe. The Third World cannot generate a strong enough resistance to the ideology of the American Dream; in the present constellation, it is only Europe that can do it." (p. 40) "What we find reprehensible and dangerous in US politics and civilisation is thus a part of Europe itself, one of the possible outcomes of the European project. There is no place for self satisfied arrogance: the United States is a distorted mirror of Europe itself. Back in the 1930s, Max Horkheimer wrote that those who do not want to speak (critically) about liberalism should also keep silent about fascism. Mutatis mutandis, one should say to those who decry the new US imperialism: those who do not want to engage critically with Europe itself should also keep silent about the United States. This, then, is the only true question beneath the self-congratulatory celebrations that accompany the extension of the European Union: what Europe are we joining? And when confronted with this question, all of us, 'New' and 'Old' Europe, are in the same boat" (p. 43)
	Jacobsen, J. K. S. (2003). The Tourist Bubble and the Europeanisation of Holiday Travel. Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change, 1(1), 71–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14766820308668160

> Increased European civil society	**Salgado, R. S. (2014) Europeanizing Civil Society How the EU Shapes Civil Society Organizations. London: Palgrave** -a combination of institutional analysis with a micro-sociology of the European Union (EU) (a better understanding of the impact of Europe on state-society relationships) -europeanisation-absence of common definition (p. 14) -sociologically informed concept of Europeanization “Olsen (2002) has pointed out the many contrasting uses of this term. For example, it is used to describe changes in external territorial boundaries, the development of governance at the EU level, EU penetration in national and subnational systems of governance, the export of European forms of governance beyond the European territory and a political project aiming for a unified and politically strong Europe.” (p. 15) -some definitions include processes of constructionand the institutionalization of rules or the emergence ofnew modes of governance at the EU level -studies are defining Europeanization as "uploading" -Defining Europeanization exclusively as ‘downloading’ has the advantage of offering the most clear-cut approach to the term. This definition, in establishing a sharp separation between the process of European integration (uploading) and the process of

	Europeanization (downloading), preserves the analytical distinction between the dependent and the independent variables. (p. 15) -different conceptualization of Europeanization (p. 16) -Europeanization: an interactive process in which dependent and independent variables cannot be clearly disentangled “This definition has the advantage of giving a broader picture, increasing the number of cases to be researched and uncovering the interactive character of the Europeanization process (for example, feedback loops). The definitions that place the emphasis on this interactive character highlight the explanatory variables of the process of change: institutions, strategic interests and shared beliefs (EPPIE 2007). This move has also the advantage of bringing European studies closer to mainstream comparative research (Hassenteufel and Surel 2000). However, the formulation of a research design that can capture uploading and downloading dynamics simultaneously is much more challenging. The conception of Europeanization as interaction is better adapted to capture the sociological dimension and thus is more appropriate for the study of civilsociety organizations (CSOs)” (p. 16) -more detailed theoretization pp. 15-24
	Porta, D. & Caiani, M. (2009). Social Movements and Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -limited attention to soc movements in the EU

	-europeanization - multilevel governance -Europeanization from below -some insights from the research on Europeanization might help in understanding a growing relevance of the EU for social movements, which follows different and complex paths -research on multilevel governance as a complex field of interaction among different actors at different geographical levels -inspired by constructivist approaches in international relations, we shall refer to the role of ideas and images of Europe as structuring the conflicts on the EU, its politics and policies “Research on Europeanization has addressed, in fact, processes of resistance, transformation, andadaptation to European policies and norms in member states, shifting attention from the supranational level to multilevel governance. Linked to this is the notion that public policies are no longer the exclusive product of national institutions, but are instead part of a complex system where several norms and implementing agencies interact.” (p. 10) -”Europeanization involves a complex process of transcending internal boundaries, as well as constructing new boundaries against the outside” (p. 10) -”If Europeanization is seen as producing more layers of decision-making, social movements might be

	expected to adapt themselves to a multilevel governance that includes variable networks of both territorial and functional actors" (p. 13) -"triangulated sources and methods in an attempt to overcome their specific limits and exploit their strengths in reconstructing the complex picture of Europeanization from below, which we defined as Europeanization of and by civil society" (p. 25) -self-organised citizenry - including grass-roots social movement organizations, and more formalized non-governmental organizations -civil society constitutes what, in relation to European institutions, Young and Wallace (2000) call the civic interests- as opposed to the private or sectoral interests of economic groups-and includes groups active on environmental, gender or social rights (p. 26)
	Bellamy, R., Castiglione, D. & Shaw, J. (2006) Making European Citizens: Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context. London: Palgrave. <u>-Introduction: From National to Transnational Citizenship</u> -what citizenship means and what it entails in contemporary societies remain open questions, as does the nature of the relationship between the political community and its members. Nor can one treat the construction of citizenship as an entirely elite-driven, top-down process. Ours is a more problematic statement

	-the investigation of whether, and if so how, EU citizenship has been constructed as a formal status, a practice and a normative commitment -it invokes a certain methodological perspective: one that sees the construction of citizenship as a dynamic and contested process emanating as much from below as from above -volume address the degree to which European citizens are not only being 'made' and 'transformed' by European institutions and contemporary social and economic conditions but also (and more importantly) 'making' and 'transforming' both themselves and the European political space -PART III - Citizens´Mobilisation and Opportunities - Europeanisation of Civil Society -the Europeanisation of Eastern European interest representation "the Europeanisation of interest representation is here understood as the convergence of the accession countries' repertoires of interest intermediation with the EU-model" (p. 160)
	Soysal, Y. N. (2002). Locating Europe. European Societies, 4(3), 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461669022000013586 -emerging European public space and identity - as it is built and exercised in educational spheres

	-shared identity and culture -argument: the presumed inextricable link between such constructs as identities, cultures and political communities is neither tenable nor empirically suitable in the European case -European identity is a loose collection of civic ideals and principles, such as democracy, progress, equality and human rights -European identity will not replace the nation, the nation still strong notion -the emerging Europe is a space for participation -European public space is open to conflict but also creates its own conflicts --- “Europe requires Europeans. Otherwise, there is a legitimacy crisis of the very process of European integration and the European project, the argument goes. The problem of identity and legitimacy constantly surfaces in debates over Europe and European integration.” (p. 266) -Europe as a cultural collectivity -Europe as a category of subjectivity -Europe as institutional unity -Europeanization (the creation of Europe)

	“I will focus my discussion on two specific aspects of the Europeanization of identity (or the emergence of the category of European identity): its location and its content. By location I mean the public and social spaces within which Europeanization is ‘happening’. This raises methodological questions for studying Europeanization from an institutionalist perspective:rst, the actors and processes on which we focus our analytical gaze, and second, the level of analysis we choose. By content, on the other hand, I mean the discourses through which the claims to identity are advanced, and also the constitution of the emerging identities. A discussion on the content of European identity invites us to revisit the two major analytical concerns of the institutionalist theory: first, the issue of convergence and divergence; second, institutional conflict and change” (p. 269)

Becoming (better) European

> Increased weight of European identity	Menédez, J. (2004). Which Citizenship? Whose Europe? — The Many Paradoxes of European Citizenship. (spec. issue of German Law Journal --- 'EU Citizenship: Twenty Years On')

> Strengthening citizen participation (and CS)	**Ålander, M. & Ondarza, N. (2020) The European Citizens' Initiative and its reform: Truly unique or the same old story?. In Blockmans, S. & Russack, S. (ed), *Deliberative Democracy in the EU Countering: Populism with Participation and Debate.* London: Rowman & Littlefield International.** Chapter 17 The European Citizens Initiative and its Reform -crisis of representative democracy has prompted several EU member states to introduce elements of direct democracy in order to increase citizens´ participation -European Citizens´Initiative (ECI) in 2012 -low legislative impact of the initiatives -new reform in 2020

	-ECI the first instrument in EU law to enable citizens to proactively contribute to the Union's policy making process -The tool was intended to bridge the perceived distance between the EU institutions and citizens, and to reduce the infamous democratic deficit of the European Union (EU) by allowing citizens to submit legislative initiatives to the European Commission. (p. 281) -The experience with the ECI and the comparison with the national level suggest that such tools can only ever be complementary. But if established, they should be taken seriously and properly integrated into the policymaking process instead of remaining a mere gesture. (p. 293)
	Blockmans, S. (2020) Participatory fusion: How to galvanise representative democracy **with deliberative tools. In Blockmans, S. & Russack, S. (ed), *Deliberative Democracy in the EU Countering: Populism with Participation and Debate*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.** -most European citizens doubt that their children have better prospects than their parents; democracy under threat (China & Russia) -proposal how to strengthen representative democracy fit into coherent framework following the four cumulative criteria used by modern political theorists to

	assess the health of democracy: inclusion, choice, deliberation and impact -“Inclusion means that all adult citizens have an equal opportunity to participate. Choice means that the alternatives for public decision need to be significantly different and realistically available. Deliberation requires that people are encouraged and empowered to think critically about competing alternatives. Finally, impact means that people’s deliberative choices direct or constrain official decisions or policies.” (p. 358) “Our project concludes just as the Conference on the Future of Europe kicks off, with one of its stated aims to improve democratic processes. While the focus along the institutional strand of its work is expected to rest on the election of the EU’s leadership and transnational lists (after the difficult process that followed the 201 EP elections), the discussion should be extended to the whole spectrum of democratic legitimacy (Chapter 17). Indeed, the Conference presents an opportunity for the EU, and in particular the new Commissioner responsible for democracy and demography, to consider a more proactive strategy to develop new kinds of democratic representation, deliberation and accountability, and to encourage a more far-sighted vision of democracy.” (p. 379)
	Sebe, M., Mure, B. & Va, E. (2020) How can technology facilitate citizen participation in the EU? In Blockmans, S. & Russack, S. (ed), Delibe*rative Democracy in the EU Countering: Populism with*

	***Participation and Debate*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.** -digital and e-democracy -technology can both facilitate and hinder civic engagement -the chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for European and national authorities (pp. 341-343): -using digital tools to spread awareness about EU legislation and its impact on citizens -supporting citizen participation in the EU with the help of artificial intelligence -reducing disinformation in the EU by fostering critical thinking via media literacy
	Europeanisation from below: Still time for another Europe? Introduction to the special issue of the European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology. -on social movements' alternative visions and practices of 'another Europe' -as trust in the EU is falling, research on alternative visions of Europe 'from below' are more relevant

	-changes based on endogenous as well as exogenous processes -“Nowadays, progressive movements seem to combine all of them, but in different balances than in past movements, with a return to domestication, but also the emergence of forms of solidarisation, that could be considered an additional path to Europeanisation.” (p. 229) -Europeanisation - different paths: 1) domestication, 2) externalisation, 3) transnationalisation “Through a path of externalisation (Chabanet 2002), national movement actors targeted the EU in order to put pressure on their own governments. In these cases, actors who feel weak at home try to mobilise allies at the transnational level: protest addresses EU institutions, pushing them to intervene in domestic governments.” (p. 230) -Research on the ESF has also singled out a third path of Europeanisation of protest, through transnationalisation, as the creation of EU-wide social movement organisations putting forward claims directly in front of EU institutions -financial crisis 2008 another impulse for transnational path of Europeanisation
> Strengthening enlightenment values	**Hasan, R. (2021). Modern Europe and the Enlightenment. Eastbourne :Sussex Academic Press**

	-an interesting question is whether Enlightenment values and ethos have permeated the body fabric of former communist countries that have liberalised and democratised -(the book) It assesses the extent to which Enlightenment values influence the polity and society of the different parts of Europe delineated into Western Europe, former Eastern European communist countries who are members of the EU, and former Eastern European communist countries who are not members of the EU -core values: reason human rights religion and secularism freedom of thought and expression political and economic liberalism race women's rights workers´rights -decolonisation -eastern Europe contra EU

	-enlightenment values in the face of current development in central Europe (Hungary and Poland) and pandemics -enlightenment and climate change -the dangers of counter-Enlightenment values thinking -the science=the triumph of the Enlightenment -“What is, however, important to observe is that the tackling of the deadly virus has been firmly grounded in Enlightenment values with primacy accorded to hypothesis-building, evidence, reason, modelling of data – in sum, the rigorous and transparent application of the scientific method. Faced with such a global crisis, there was unanimity that science was the only and indispensable tool to grapple with the problem and urgently provide solutions.” (pp. 166-167) “At the heart of counter-Enlightenment thinking is hostility to or disregard for reason, objectivity, universality, rigorous evidence, and the supremacy of the scientific method in the discovery of robust theories and truths. Such thinking manifests itself primarily on the part of those with strong religious sentiments and beliefs but also, in regard to the coronavirus pandemic, by those drawn to wild conspiracy theories and others who for whatever reason minimised the impact of the virus.” (p. 170)

> Strengthening rules of law and human rights (and nature / non-human animal rights)	**Latour, B. (2018). Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime. Cambridge: Polity.** !!! pp. 94-103 !!! -Latour´s environmental politics manifesto results into the new vision of Europe (colonialism - globalization - humans w non-humans) -reevaluates history to come with the prospect for sustainable future -globalization-plus, globalization-minus -Europe as province (although it once has attempted to dominate the whole world; provincial experiment iswhat it means to inhabit an earth after modernization) -Europe´s second chance To land is necessarily to land someplace. What follows should be taken as an opening in a highly risky diplomatic negotiation with those with whom one wishes to cohabit. In my case, it is in Europe that I want to come down to earth. -Europe: changed its geopolitcs (two main events: brexit & Trump) “It is toward what I hesitate to call the European homeland that I should like to turn. Europe is alone, it is true, but only Europe can pick up the thread of its own history. Precisely because it went through August

	1914 and dragged the rest of the world along with it. Against globalization and against the return to national and ethnic borders. ... The European Union has managed, through an incredible amount of tinkering, to materialize in countless ways the superimposition and overlapping of the various national interests. It is by the intricacy of its regulations, which are attaining the complexity of an ecosystem, that it shows the way. Exactly the sort of experience that one needs to approach the ecological mutation that is straddling all borders." (p. 95) "Continental Europe is said to have committed the sin of ethnocentrism and to have claimed to dominate the world, and therefore it has to be "provincialized" to bring it down to size. But this provincialization is saving it today." (p. 96) "knows the fragility of its tenure in global space. No, it can no longer claim to dictate the world order, but it can offer an example of what it means to rediscover inhabitable ground." (p. 96) "If the first united Europe was created from below, on a base of coal, iron, and steel, the second will also come from below, from the humble matter of a somewhat durable soil. If the first united Europe was created to give a common home to millions of "displaced persons," as was said at the end of the last war, then the second will also be made by and for the displaced persons of today." (p. 97)

	Gray, E., & Statham, P. (2005). Becoming European? The Transformation of the British Pro-migrant NGO Sector in Response to Europeanization*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(4), 877–898. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00600.x
> Avoiding antagonistic nationalisms	**Meek, J. (2019). Dreams of Leaving and Remaining. London: Verso Books.** **-**a collection of essays previously published in London Review of Books -the polarisation of society by referendum “Puzzlingly, I’d found other, contradictory impulses triggered in me by things I had heard or read: impulses that suggested that, although I had voted to remain in the EU, and would do so again, I had my inner Leaver too. Impulses that, if spoken out loud, would sound like ‘How did it get to the point that untangling a set of bureaucratic agreements makes everyone so hostile and emotional? I’m not sure I want to stay in an organisation that makes such a big deal about us leaving it.’” (pp. 9-10) -inner leaver (Brexit) -psychic dislocation -Britain as a fortress against globalisation and immigration

	--- “One of the strangest of the Facebook ads funded by Brexiteers declared, ‘The EU blocks our ability to speak out and protect polar bears!’ The claim seemed to relate to an episode in 2013 when EU member governments were trying to come up with a common position on an international move to ban the world trade in polar bear skin, paws and teeth. Most EU countries, including Britain, were in favour of the ban. Denmark was against. In the end, the European Commission persuaded the EU states in favour of a ban to abstain, the proposal was defeated, and the trade in bear parts continued. Naturally the Brexiteers wanted to emphasise the wickedness of the EU by portraying the bloc as a bear-murdering police state, and assumed voters wouldn’t look too closely at the details. (...) Far from showing the EU as the Brexiteers like to portray it – as a monolithic bureaucracy ruthlessly crushing national nonconformity, paying no heed to cultural difference and local sovereignty – it reveals the EU as agonisingly cautious in its deliberations, clumsily trying to please everyone, aiming to do the right thing and, in the end, trying to protect the ancient traditions of the Inuit hunters against the big, politically correct, liberal-infested, tree–hugging nations of Europe.” (p. 17) EU=national vs supranational

	“The two idealistic strands are deeply contradictory. A belief in the imperative to conserve the traditional, authentic and distinctive in local cultures clashes with an equally fervent promotion of universal rights and freedoms. This is the liberal bourgeois dilemma.” (p. 18)
	Sasson, D (2021). A Morbid Symptoms. London: Verso Books. -history lesson initiated by the current crisis ofEuropean democracy and the rise of nationalism across European landscape -roots of political barbarism -Brexit & Trump -the optimism of the will (Gramsci) --- (pp. 191-192) “Both nations and nationalism are too strong to be ignored in the European project. Indeed, all the documents of the European Union, whenever they mention the need for more coherence and a common identity, are careful to mention the necessity of avoiding fragmentation, chaos, and conflict, and the desirability of achieving cohesion, solidarity, subsidiarity, and cooperation, and of respecting the existing national identities of the member states.

	--- I don't think a European identity can be taught. I don't think that one can make Europe a nation-state of nation-states – which is not to say that the slow and painful construction of the European Union, in spite of all the problems, the mistakes, the silly rules, the democratic deficit, and the low turnout at elections, is not a Good Thing. Besides, elements of a European identity have evolved in some countries, thanks to a common currency, the abolition of passport controls in the Schengen area, and the university exchange known as the Erasmus programme. What is certainly not taught, or not taught enough, is the history of other European countries. But let us not forget that most people's idea of history is not based purely on what they were taught at school. They learn their history partly from the distorted recollections and prejudices of parents and grandparents, partly from the inchoate references to the past they glean from broadcast news, newspapers, books (particularly novels), and, above all, from television and films." (p. 209) "The persistence of provincialism and low-level nationalism is only one of the reasons for the relative failure of the European project. Euroscepticism has increased remarkably in the last twenty years, as have Eurosceptic parties, even in Italy, a former euro-enthusiastic country, where Eurosceptic parties have grown enormously. In 2004, 50 percent of Europeans trusted the EU, but by 2016 the figure was down to 32 per cent (converging with the dismal percentage of

	those trusting their national governments, which hovers around 31–2 per cent mark).” (p. 47) “The celebration of a pre-communist past, however unsavoury, is an increasingly common feature of post-communist nationalism. In Warsaw an enormous statue was erected to Roman Dmowski, the so-called father of Polish nationalism and a notorious anti- Semite, while a plaque commemorating the birthplace of Rosa Luxemburg in Zamość was removed. As Brecht wrote in his ‘Epitaph for Luxemburg’ (1948): Here lies, buried Rosa Luxemburg A Jewess from Poland, Champion of German workers Killed on the orders of the German oppressors. Oppressed, Bury your discord.”
	Goodfellow, M. (2019). Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats. London: Verso Books. -UK and immigration -Eastern European immigrants as well

	-immigration and European citizenship -intws with migrants -hostile environment -"From anti-immigration politics come all kinds of policies: ones that ruin lives, leave people to drown at borders, treat them as subhuman or make their lives more difficult in a myriad of quiet and subtle ways. This book sets out to explain why this is not an inevitability; it will show how decades of restrictive policy and demonising rhetoric have created this system. And it will argue that it doesn't have to be this way." (p. 14) --- -"The name 'hostile environment' is surprisingly appropriate for the raft of policies it refers to. It stands out from the dreary, opaque names governments give to those they'd rather stay under the radar. (...) But when Theresa May unveiled her flagship immigration package as home secretary, she didn't even attempt to hide its cruelty. She flaunted it. The aim was to create a 'really hostile environment for illegal immigrants,' she boasted.1 The plan was to make their lives unbearable. And, so, the government began to create this hostile environment, stitching immigration checks into every element of people's lives. Through measures brought in by the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts, a whole host of professionals – from landlords and letting agents to doctors and nurses – were turned into border guards" (p. 14)

> Humane European Capitalism	**Klein, N. (2020). On Fire: The Burning Case for a Green New Deal. NY: Simon & Schuster.** -immigration-fortification -post-WW2 development and the death of nature -new green deal for Europe
	Aglietta, M. (2020) The Reform of Europe: A Political Guide to the Future. London: Verso Books. -what is Europe's role in the new age of globalization -written in 2014 -crisis of eurozone -euro - a unification through currency “Europe as such does not exist politically. The first reason, underscored throughout this book, is the incompleteness of the euro. Europe will only have political influence if the institutional developments discussed in Chapters 5–7 are implemented. A European constitutional order, legitimating political power at community level, is a precondition for articulating a European goal for the world. But that is not enough. This ambition must also be relevant, offering answers to the problems humanity will face in this century. As I have recalled, after the Second World War such an ambition existed. It was to establish peace and offer the world the most advanced model of

	social progress. In our era, as I tried to show in Chapters 8 and 9, inclusive, sustainable growth should be the goal." (p. 168) -Europe has abandoned the social market economy for market fundamentalis -international climate negotiations -in search of international monetary governance
	Moore, J. W. (2016) Anthropocene or Capitalocene?: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism. Oakland: PM Press. "Ongoing economic development and overproduction, the spread of industrial infrastructures, the contagion of industrial food production and consumption, and the dissemination of consumer material and ideational culture are proliferating "neo-Europes"12 everywhere (Manning 2005). The existential endpoint of this biological and cultural homogenization is captured by the Invisible Committee's description of the European landscape: We've heard enough about the "city" and the "country," and particularly about the supposed ancient opposition between the two. From up close, or from afar, what surrounds us looks nothing like that: it is one single urban cloth, without form or order, a bleak zone, endless and undefined, a global continuum of museum-like hypercenters and natural parks, of enormous suburban housing developments and massive agricultural projects, industrial zones and subdivisions,

	country inns and trendy bars: the metropolis All territory is subsumed by the metropolis. Everything occupies the same space, if not geographically then through the intermeshing of its networks. (The Invisible Committee 2009, 52)" --- -cheap nature -origins of ecological crisis (medieval Europe transformed Continental ecology, deforesting vast regions etc.) -fast growing urbanisation, European imperialism "For European modernity, nature is encaged in value, torn from its natural context and integrated into an economic circuit of value circulation. The complexity of nature is reduced to a simple, fetishized category: natural capital." (p. 149)
> Stimulating inclusions (avoiding Fortresse Europe) and (gender/ethnic) equality	Žižek, S. (2017). Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbours. London: Penguin Books. -Žižek is quoting Sloterdijk´s In the World of Interior of Capital: "What Sloterdijk correctly points out is that capitalist globalization stands not only for openness and conquest, but also for the idea of a self-enclosed globe separating its privileged Inside from its Outside. These two aspects of globalization are inseparable: capitalism's global reach is grounded in the way it

	introduces a radical class division across the entire globe, separating those protected by the sphere from those left vulnerable outside it. In this way, both the Paris terrorist attacks and the now constant flow of refugees into Europe are momentary reminders of the violent world outside our glasshouse: a world which, for us insiders, appears mostly on TV and in media reports about distant conflicts, not as part of our everyday reality. That's why it is our duty to become fully aware of the brutal violence that pervades the world outside our protected environment – violence that is not only religious, ethnic and political but also sexual. In her outstanding analysis of the trial of South African athlete Oscar Pistorius, Jacqueline Rose pointed out how Pistorius's killing of his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp has to be read against both the complex background of white men's fear of black violence and the terrible reality of widespread violence against women: 'Every four minutes in South Africa a woman or a girl – often a teenager, sometimes a child – is reported raped and every eight hours a woman is killed by her partner. The phenomenon has a name in South Africa: "intimate femicide", or, as the journalist and crime writer Margie Orford calls the repeated killing of women across the country, "serial femicide".' With regard to the refugees, our proper aim should be to try and reconstruct global society on such a basis that desperate refugees will no longer be forced to wander around. Utopian as it may appear, this large-scale solution is the only realist one, and the display of altruistic virtues ultimately prevents the carrying out of this aim. The more we treat refugees as objects of

	humanitarian help, and allow the situation which compelled them to leave their countries to prevail, the more they come to Europe, until tensions reach boiling point, not only in the refugees' countries of origin but here as well. So, confronted with this double blackmail, we are back at the great Leninist question: what is to be done?" --- "The refugee crisis offers Europe a unique chance to redefine itself, to mark its distinction from both poles that oppose it: Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism and the 'Asian values'-infused authoritarian capitalism. Those who bemoan the ongoing decline of the European Union seem to idealize its past – yet the 'democratic' EU, whose loss they now regret, never in fact existed. Recent EU policy is just a desperate attempt to make Europe fit for the new global capitalism. The usual Left-liberal critique of the EU – it's basically OK, just with something of a 'democratic deficit' – betrays the same naivety as the critics of ex-Communist countries who basically supported them while complaining about the lack of democracy. In both cases, however, these friendly critics failed to realize that the 'democratic deficit' was a necessary, inbuilt part of the structure." (p. 11) -emancipatory core of the idea of Europe --- "So, what if Europe should accept the paradox that its democratic openness is based on exclusion: there is

	‘no freedom for the enemies of freedom’, as Robespierre put it long ago? In principle, this is of course a reasonable proposition, but it is here that one has to be very specific. In a way, the Norwegian terrorist Breivik was right in his choice of target: he didn’t attack foreigners but those within his own community who were too tolerant towards the intruders. The problem is not foreigners, it is our own (European) identity. Although the ongoing crisis of the European Union appears as one of economy and finance, it is, fundamentally, an ideologico-political crisis. The failure of referendums on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 gave a clear signal that voters perceived the EU as a ‘technocratic’ economic union, one lacking any vision that could mobilize people: until the recent wide protest movements in Greece and Spain, the only ideology able to inspire action was the anti-immigrant defence of Europe (or the defence of UK borders, in the case of Britain).” (p. 33) -European homeland
	Dahl, H., Keränen, M., Kovalainen, A. (Eds.) (2011) Europeanization, Gender and Care: Global complexities. London: Palgrave. -care in Europe, care as a form of europeanization, europeanization of care -it considers care as a crucial part of European restructuring of care labour markets, the contents of care and the different forms of care that range from the EU legislation level to the diversities among the

	individual care workers' life situations and experiences of being cared for in present-day Europe -"The argument binding the articles of the book is that the renegotiations of relationships among the family, the market and the social welfare state take different forms and different shapes throughout Europe, thus requiring special attention to be given to care chains, forms of care and the embedded and embodied nature of care. Still, Europeanization is not a single, straightforward process of integration and unification of similarities, but is full of smaller processes that are closer to differentiation and even contradictory by nature. In addition, global trends have an effect at the European and the national levels: the interdependency of economic fluctuations and national possibilities to allocate budgets to care structures is clearly increasing with the current global economic uncertainty." (p. 2) "Whatever the nature of Europeanization processes, the Europeanization of the nation-state is not leading to any grander, single version of the nation-state. Europeanization can in fact be treated as a specific form of globalization (see, for example, Rumford 2003; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Sassen 2007), thus displaying and articulating the tendencies that can unify and can be common to nationstates, tendencies that may tear them apart, as well as other tendencies such as culturally and socially embedded ideas of citizenship, good care, the role of women in care

	processes and positions of families, markets and the state.” (pp. 2-3) --- “Care takes place in informal and formal settings where embedded institutional arrangements (such as national or supranational legislation, the welfare state or the labour market) enable or define the forms of care. Thinking about care in general terms involves seeing and taking responsibility for the needs of dependent people, such as children, and handicapped and elderly persons, that they cannot possibly meet themselves.” (p. 4) -care interpersonal, care is also socio-cultural, care carries also legal notions of how and in what ways care is permanently and institutionally arranged, supported, organized, discussed and handled in the nation-state context -aspect of dependency Europeanization of care -emerging, yet thin, European social citizenship “Europeanization can be identified as taking place at various levels. At one level the Council of Europeissues directives such as the formally binding piece of legislation on parental leave (1996), and it can also issue less binding targets such as those adopted for child care provision (2002). At another level the European Court of Justice gradually pushes welfare regulation on health issues forward, thus reducing the

	sovereignty of the member states and creating rights for European citizens on some forms of care (Martinsen 2009). Other understandings of Europeanization highlight the convergence toward a European social model on social expenditures (Greve 1996; Heichel et al. 2005). And yet at another level it seems impossible to neglect the spread of sociocultural ideas about good care around countries within Europe, which also contributes to the Europeanization of care" (pp. 6-7) "One of the consequences of Europeanization is that the models and the varied ways of organizing care in different parts of Europe need to be taken into consideration at the same time as the process of Europeanization modifies and changes the models themselves. Welfare state models therefore become descriptions of variation in the local contexts. At the same time Europeanization has to be described as a process that transforms and revises." (p. 8)
	Niemi-Kiesiläinen, J., Peroni, L., & Stoyanova, V. (Eds.). (2020). International law and violence against women: Europe and the Istanbul Convention. Routledge.
	Galpin, Ch. (). Contesting Brexit Masculinities: Pro-European Activists and Feminist EU Citizenship. Manuscript in preparation. -Although Brexit campaigns mobilised discourses of hegemonic masculinity that marginalise women,

	women seemed to be at the forefront of pro-EU campaigns post-referendum -to what extent pro-EU activists make claims to EU citizenship that contest masculinities of Brexit -citizenship as 'performed subject positions', intersecional feminist theory -masculinity became a site of EU citizenship contestations -interviews with grassroots pro-EU activists -rejecting British militaristic discourses of British identity by asserting multiple embodied identities, demanding rights relating to the intimate sphere, and participating in informal, local and non-hierarchical ways -European colonialism -during Brexit, the masculinity became a site of struggle at the European level; Brexit´s white masculinity constructed through ideas about European exceptionalism -embodied nature of the citizen through intersectionality “Race, gender and class – and national and European identities – are therefore not separate, pre-existing categories but instead ‘come into existence in and through relation to each other – if in contradictory and conflictual ways’ (McClintock, 1995, p. 5). These identities reflect intersecting structures of power inherent to citizenship; unpacking them can help to

	understand how citizenship ‘can be both domination and empowerment separately or simultaneously’ (Isin, 2009, p. 369).” (p. 8) -this article calls for an intersectional feminist theory of EU citizenship that conceptualises citizenship as subjectivity, deconstructs the public/private divide through sites and scales, and makes visible the "unnamed and unmarked" wwhitness in traditional mascuilne conceptions of EU citizenship (p. 23) -multiple and embodied nature of European identities

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